

2ND EDITION

Embedded Systems Architecture

Design and write software for embedded devices to
build safe and connected systems

DANIELE LACAMERA

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Daniele Lacamera



BIRMINGHAM—MUMBAI

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Preface

Embedded systems have become increasingly popular in the last two decades thanks to the technological progress made by microelectronics manufacturers and designers, which has aimed to increase computing power and decrease the size of the logic of microprocessors and peripherals.

Designing, implementing, and integrating the software components for these systems requires a direct approach to the hardware functionalities in most cases, where tasks are implemented in a single thread and there is no operating system to provide abstractions to access CPU features and external peripherals. For this reason, embedded development is considered a domain on its own in the universe of software development, in which the developer's approach and workflow need to be adapted accordingly.

This book briefly explains the hardware architecture of a typical embedded system, introduces the tools and methodologies needed to get started with the development of a target architecture, and then guides the readers through interaction with the system features and peripheral interaction. Some areas, such as energy efficiency and connectivity, are addressed in more detail to give a closer view of the techniques used to design low-power and connected systems. Later in the book, a more complex design, incorporating a (simplified) real-time operating system, is built from the bottom up, starting from the implementation of single system components. Finally, in this second edition, we have added a detailed analysis of the implementation of TrustZone-M, the TEE technology introduced by ARM as part of its latest family of embedded microcontrollers.

The discussion often focuses on specific security and safety mechanisms by suggesting specific technologies aimed at improving the robustness of the system against programming errors in the application code, or even malicious attempts to compromise its integrity.

Who this book is for

If you're a software developer or designer that wants to learn about embedded programming, this is the book for you. You'll also find this book useful if you're a less experienced or a beginner embedded programmer willing to expand your knowledge of embedded systems. More experienced embedded software engineers may find this book useful for refreshing their knowledge of the internals of device drivers, memory safety, secure data transfers, privilege separation, and secure execution domains.

What this book covers

Chapter 1, Embedded Systems – A Pragmatic Approach, is an introduction to microcontroller-based embedded systems. The scope of the book is identified, from a broader definition of “embedded systems” to the actual domain that will be analyzed – 32-bit microcontrollers with physical memory mapping.

Chapter 2, Work Environment and Workflow Optimization, outlines the tools used and the development workflow. This is an introduction to the toolchain, debuggers, and emulators that can be used to produce code in a binary format that can be uploaded and run on the target platform.

Chapter 3, Architectural Patterns, is all about the strategies and development methodologies for collaborative development and testing. This chapter proposes a description of the processes that are typically used while developing and testing software for embedded systems.

Chapter 4, The Boot-Up Procedure, analyzes the boot phase of an embedded system, boot stages, and bootloaders. It contains a detailed description of the bring-up code and the mechanisms used to separate the software into several boot stages.

Chapter 5, Memory Management, suggests some optimal strategies for memory management by pointing out common pitfalls and explaining how to avoid memory errors that can result in unpredictable or bad behavior in the application code.

Chapter 6, General-Purpose Peripherals, walks through accessing GPIO pins and other generic integrated peripherals. This is the first interaction of the target platform with the outside world, using electric signals to perform simple input/output operations.

Chapter 7, Local Bus Interfaces, guides you through the integration of serial bus controllers (UART, SPI, and I2C). A code-oriented, detailed analysis of the most common bus communication protocols is introduced by explaining the code required to interact with the transceivers commonly available in embedded systems.

Chapter 8, Power Management and Energy Saving, explores the techniques available to reduce power consumption in energy-efficient systems. Designing low-power and ultra-low-power embedded systems requires specific steps to be performed for reducing energy consumption while running the required tasks.

Chapter 9, Distributed Systems and IoT Architecture, introduces the available protocols and interfaces required to build distributed and connected systems. IoT systems need to communicate with remote endpoints using standard network protocols that are implemented using third-party libraries. Particular attention is dedicated to securing communication between endpoints using secure sockets.

Chapter 10, Parallel Tasks and Scheduling, explains the infrastructure of a multitasking operating system through the implementation of a real-time task scheduler. This chapter proposes three approaches for implementing operating systems for microcontrollers from scratch, using different schedulers (cooperative, pre-emptive, and safe).

Chapter 11, Trusted Execution Environment, describes the TEE mechanisms typically available on embedded systems and provides an example of running secure and non-secure domains using ARM TrustZone-M. On modern microcontrollers, TEE provides the opportunity to secure specific areas of memory or peripherals by limiting their access from the non-secure execution domain.

To get the most out of this book

It is expected that you are proficient in the C language and understand how computer systems work. A GNU or Linux development machine is required to apply the concepts explained. Going through the example code provided is sometimes necessary to fully understand the mechanisms implemented. You are encouraged to modify, improve, and reuse the examples provided, applying the suggested methodologies.

Software/hardware covered in the book	Operating system requirements
STM32F4DISCOVERY kit	
STM32L5 Nucleo-144 board	
GNU ARM Embedded Toolchain	Windows, macOS, or Linux
GNU Make	
OpenOCD	

Additional usage instructions for the requested tools are available in *Chapter 2, Work Environment and Workflow Optimization*.

If you are using the digital version of this book, we advise you to type the code yourself or access the code from the book's GitHub repository (a link is available in the next section). Doing so will help you avoid any potential errors related to the copying and pasting of code.

Download the example code files

You can download the example code files for this book from GitHub at <https://github.com/PacktPublishing/Embedded-Systems-Architecture-Second-Edition>. If there's an update to the code, it will be updated in the GitHub repository.

We also have other code bundles from our rich catalog of books and videos available at <https://github.com/PacktPublishing/>. Check them out!

Download the color images

We also provide a PDF file that has color images of the screenshots and diagrams used in this book. You can download it here: <https://packt.link/kVMr1>.

Conventions used

There are a number of text conventions used throughout this book.

Code in text: Indicates code words in text, database table names, folder names, filenames, file extensions, pathnames, dummy URLs, user input, and Twitter handles. Here is an example: “A single configuration file must be provided from the command-line invocation, with several platforms and development board configurations provided under the `/scripts` directory.”

A block of code is set as follows:

```
/* Jump to non secure app_entry */
asm volatile("mov r12, %0" ::"r"
    ((uint32_t)app_entry - 1));
asm volatile("blxns    r12" );
```

When we wish to draw your attention to a particular part of a code block, the relevant lines or items are set in bold:

```
Secure Area 1:
    SECWM1_PSTRT : 0x0   (0x80000000)
    SECWM1_PEND  : 0x39  (0x80390000)
```

Any command-line input or output is written as follows:

```
$ renode /opt/renode/scripts/single-node/stm32f4_discovery.resc
```

Commands for the debugger console are written as follows:

```
> add-symbol-file app.elf 0x1000
> bt full
```

Tips or important notes

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Part 1 – Introduction to Embedded Systems Development

This part gives a bird's eye view of embedded development, explaining how it differs from other technical fields that developers may be familiar with. The second chapter helps transform a developer's workstation into an actual hardware/software development lab and optimizes the steps needed to develop, test, debug, and deploy embedded software.

This part has the following chapters:

- *Chapter 1, Embedded Systems – A Pragmatic Approach*
- *Chapter 2, Work Environment and Workflow Optimization*

Embedded Systems – A Pragmatic Approach

Designing and writing software for embedded systems poses a different set of challenges than traditional high-level software development.

This chapter provides an overview of these challenges and introduces the basic components and the platform that will be used as a reference in this book.

In this chapter, we will discuss the following topics:

- Domain definition
- **General-purpose input/output (GPIO)**
- Interfaces and peripherals
- Connected systems
- Introduction to isolation mechanisms
- The reference platform

Domain definition

Embedded systems are computing devices that perform specific, dedicated tasks with no direct or continued user interaction. Due to the variety of markets and technologies, these objects have different shapes and sizes, but often, all have a small size and a limited amount of resources.

In this book, the concepts and the building blocks of embedded systems will be analyzed through the development of the software components that interact with their resources and peripherals. The first step is to define the scope for the validity of the techniques and the architectural patterns explained in this book, within the broader definition of embedded systems.

Embedded Linux systems

One part of the embedded market relies on devices with enough power and resources to run a variant of the GNU/Linux OS. These systems, often referred to as **embedded Linux**, are outside the scope of this book, as their development includes different strategies of design and integration of the components. A typical hardware platform that is capable of running a system based on the Linux kernel is equipped with a reasonably large amount of RAM, up to a few gigabytes, and sufficient storage space on board to store all the software components provided in the GNU/Linux distribution.

Additionally, for the Linux memory management to provide separate virtual address spaces to each process on the system, the hardware must be equipped with a **memory management unit (MMU)**, a hardware component that assists the OS in translating physical addresses into virtual addresses, and vice versa, at runtime.

This class of devices presents different characteristics that are often overkill for building tailored solutions, which can use a much simpler design and reduce the production costs of single units.

Hardware manufacturers and chip designers have researched new techniques to improve the performance of microcontroller-based systems. In the past few decades, they have introduced new generations of platforms that would cut hardware costs, firmware complexity, size, and power consumption to provide a set of features that are most interesting for the embedded market.

Due to their specifications, in some real-life scenarios, embedded systems must be able to execute a series of tasks within a short, measurable, and predictable amount of time. These kinds of systems are called **real-time systems** and differ from the approach of multi-task computing, which is used in desktops, servers, and mobile phones.

Real-time processing is a goal that is extremely hard, if not impossible, to reach on embedded Linux platforms. The Linux kernel is not designed for hard real-time processing, and even if patches are available to modify the kernel scheduler to help meet these requirements, the results are not comparable to bare-metal, constrained systems that are designed with this purpose in mind.

Some other application domains, such as battery-powered and energy-harvesting devices, can benefit from the low power consumption capabilities of smaller embedded devices and the energy efficiency of the wireless communication technologies often integrated into embedded connected devices. The higher amount of resources and the increased hardware complexity of Linux-based systems often do not scale down enough on energy levels or require effort to meet similar figures in power consumption.

The type of microcontroller-based systems that we will analyze in this book is 32-bit systems, which are capable of running software in a single-threaded, bare-metal application, as well as integrating minimalist real-time OSs, which are very popular in the industrial manufacturing of embedded systems, which we use daily to accomplish specific tasks. They are becoming more and more adopted to help define more generic, multiple-purpose development platforms.

Low-end 8-bit microcontrollers

In the past, **8-bit microcontrollers** dominated the embedded market. The simplicity of their design allows us to write small applications that can accomplish a set of predefined tasks but are too simple and usually equipped with too few resources to implement an embedded system, especially since 32-bit microcontrollers have evolved to cover all the use cases for these devices within the same range of price, size, and power consumption.

Nowadays, 8-bit microcontrollers are mostly relegated to the market of educational platform kits, aimed at introducing hobbyists and newcomers to the basics of software development on electronic devices. 8-bit platforms are not covered in this book because they lack the characteristics that allow advanced system programming, multithreading, and advanced features to be developed to build professional embedded systems.

In the context of this book, the term **embedded systems** is used to indicate a class of systems running on microcontroller-based hardware architecture, offering constrained resources but allowing real-time systems to be built through features provided by the hardware architecture to implement system programming.

Hardware architecture

The architecture of an embedded system is centered around its microcontroller, also sometimes referred to as the **microcontroller unit (MCU)**. This is typically a single integrated circuit containing the processor, RAM, flash memory, serial receivers and transmitters, and other core components. The market offers many different choices among architectures, vendors, price ranges, features, and integrated resources. These are typically designed to be inexpensive, low-resource, low-energy consuming, self-contained systems on a single integrated circuit, which is the reason why they are often referred to as **System-on-Chip (SoC)**.

Due to the variety of processors, memories, and interfaces that can be integrated, there is no actual reference architecture for microcontrollers. Nevertheless, some architectural elements are common across a wide range of models and brands, and even across different processor architectures.

Some microcontrollers are dedicated to specific applications and expose a particular set of interfaces to communicate to peripherals and the outside world. Others are focused on providing solutions with reduced hardware costs, or with very limited energy consumption.

Nevertheless, the following set of components is hardcoded into almost every microcontroller:

- **Microprocessor**
- **RAM**
- **Flash memory**
- **Serial transceivers**

Additionally, more and more devices are capable of accessing a network, to communicate with other devices and gateways. Some microcontrollers may provide either well-established standards, such as *Ethernet* or *Wi-Fi interfaces*, or specific protocols specifically designed to meet the constraints of embedded systems, such as sub-GHz radio interfaces or a **Controller Area Network (CAN)** bus, being partially or fully implemented within the IC.

All the components must share a bus line with the processor, which is responsible for coordinating the logic. The RAM, flash memory, and control registers of the transceivers are all mapped in the same physical address space:




Figure 1.1 – A simplified block diagram of the components inside a generic microcontroller

The addresses where **RAM** and **Flash Memory** are mapped depend on the specific model and are usually provided in the datasheet. A microcontroller can run code in its native machine language; that is, a sequence of instructions conveyed into a binary file that is specific to the architecture it is running on. By default, compilers provide a generic executable file as the output of the compilation and assembly operations, which needs to be converted into a format that can be executed by the target.

The **Processor** part is designed to execute the instructions that have been stored in its own specific binary format directly from RAM as well as from its internal flash memory. This is usually mapped starting from position zero in memory or another well-known address specified in the microcontroller manual. The CPU can fetch and execute code from RAM faster, but the final firmware is stored in the flash memory, which is usually bigger than the RAM on almost all microcontrollers and permits it to retain the data across power cycles and reboots.

Compiling a software operating environment for an embedded microcontroller and loading it onto the flash memory requires a host machine, which is a specific set of hardware and software tools. Some knowledge about the target device's characteristics is also needed to instruct the compiler to organize the symbols within the executable image. For many valid reasons, C is the most popular language in embedded software, although not the only available option. Higher-level languages, such as Rust and C++, can produce embedded code when combined with a specific embedded runtime, or even in some cases by entirely removing the runtime support from the language.

Note

This book will focus entirely on C code because it abstracts less than any other high-level language, thus making it easier to describe the behavior of the underlying hardware while looking at the code.

All modern embedded systems platforms also have at least one mechanism (such as **JTAG**) for debugging purposes and uploading the software to the flash. When the debugging interface is accessed from the host machine, a debugger can interact with the breakpoint unit in the processor, interrupting and resuming the execution, and can also read and write from any address in memory.

A significant part of embedded programming is communicating the peripherals while using the interfaces that the MCU exposes. Embedded software development requires basic knowledge of electronics, the ability to understand schematics and datasheets, and confidence with the measurement tools, such as logic analyzers or oscilloscopes.

Understanding the challenges

Approaching embedded development means keeping the focus on the specifications as well as the hardware restrictions at all times. Embedded software development is a constant challenge that requires focusing on the most efficient way to perform a set of specific tasks but keeping the limited resources available in strong consideration. There are several compromises to deal with, which are uncommon in other environments. Here are some examples:

- There might be not enough space in the flash to implement a new feature
- There might not be enough RAM to store complex structures or make copies of large data buffers
- The processor might be not fast enough to accomplish all the required calculations and data processing in due time
- Battery-powered and resource-harvesting devices might require lower energy consumption to meet lifetime expectations

Moreover, PC and mobile OSs make large use of the MMU, a component of the processor that allows runtime translations between physical and virtual addresses.

The MMU is a necessary abstraction to implement address space separation among the tasks, as well as between the tasks and the kernel itself. Embedded microcontrollers do not have an MMU, and usually lack the amount of non-volatile memory required to store kernels, applications, and libraries. For this reason, embedded systems are often running in a single task, with the main loop performing all the data processing and communication in a specific order. Some devices can run embedded OSs, which are far less complex than their PC counterparts.

Application developers often see the underlying system as a commodity, while embedded development often means that the entire system has to be implemented from scratch, from the boot procedure up to the application logic. In an embedded environment, the various software components are more closely related to each other because of the lack of more complex abstractions, such as memory separations between the processes and the OS kernel.

A developer approaching embedded systems for the first time might find testing and debugging on some of the systems a bit more intricate than just running the software and reading out the results. This becomes especially true in those systems that have been designed with little or no human interaction interfaces.

A successful approach requires a healthy workflow, which includes well-defined test cases, a list of key performance indicators coming from the analysis of the specifications to identify possibilities of trade-offs, several tools and procedures at hand to perform all the needed measurements, and a well-established and efficient prototyping phase.

In this context, security deserves some special consideration. As usual, when writing code at the system level, it is wise to keep in mind the system-wide consequences of possible faults. Most embedded application code runs with extended privileges on the hardware, and a single task misbehaving can affect the stability and integrity of the entire firmware. As we will see, some platforms offer specific memory protection mechanisms and built-in privilege separation, which are useful for building fail-safe systems, even in the absence of a full OS based on separating process address spaces.

Multithreading

One of the advantages of using microcontrollers designed to build embedded systems is the possibility to run logically separated tasks within separate execution units by time-sharing the resources.

The most popular type of design for embedded software is based on a single loop-based sequential execution model, where modules and components are connected to expose callback interfaces. However, modern microcontrollers offer features and core logic characteristics that can be used by system developers to build a multitasking environment to run logically separated applications.

These features are particularly handy in the approach to more complex real-time systems, and they help us understand the possibilities of the implementation of safety models based on process isolation and memory segmentation.

RAM

“640 KB of memory ought to be enough for everyone”

– Bill Gates (founder and former director of Microsoft)

This famous statement has been cited many times in the past three decades to underline the progress in technology and the outstanding achievements of the PC industry. While it may sound like a joke for many software engineers out there, it is still in these figures that embedded programming has to be thought about, more than 30 years after MS-DOS was initially released.

Although most embedded systems are capable of breaking that limit today, especially due to the availability of external DRAM interfaces, the simplest devices that can be programmed in C may have as little as 4 KB of RAM available to implement the entire system logic. This has to be taken into account when designing an embedded system, by estimating the amount of memory potentially needed for all the operations that the system has to perform, and the buffers that may be used at any time to communicate with peripherals and nearby devices.

The memory model at the system level is simpler than that of PCs and mobile devices. Memory access is typically done at the physical level, so all the pointers in your code are telling you the physical location of the data they are pointing to. In modern computers, the OS is responsible for translating physical addresses into a virtual representation of the running tasks.

The advantage of the physical-only memory access on those systems that do not have an MMU is the reduced complexity of having to deal with address translations while coding and debugging. On the other hand, some of the features that are implemented by any modern OS, such as process swapping and dynamically resizing address spaces through memory relocation, become cumbersome and sometimes impossible.

Handling memory is particularly important in embedded systems. Programmers who are used to writing application code expect a certain level of protection to be provided by the underlying OS. A virtual address space does not allow memory areas to overlap, and the OS can easily detect unauthorized memory accesses and segmentation violations, so it promptly terminates the process and avoids having the whole system compromised.

On embedded systems, especially when writing bare-metal code, the boundaries of each address pool must be checked manually. Accidentally modifying a few bits in the wrong memory, or even accessing a different area of memory, may result in a fatal, irrevocable error. The entire system may hang, or, in the worst case, become unpredictable. A safe approach is required when handling memory in embedded systems, in particular when dealing with life-critical devices. Identifying memory errors too late in the development process is complex and often requires more resources than forcing yourself to write safe code and protecting the system from a programmer's mistakes.

Proper memory-handling techniques will be explained in *Chapter 5, Memory Management*.

Flash memory

In a server or a personal computer, the executable applications and libraries reside in storage devices. At the beginning of the execution, they are accessed, transformed, possibly uncompressed, and stored in RAM before the execution starts.

The firmware of an embedded device is, in general, one single binary file containing all the software components, which can be transferred to the internal flash memory of the MCU. Since the flash memory is directly mapped to a fixed address in the memory space, the processor is capable of sequentially fetching and executing single instructions from it with no intermediate steps. This mechanism is called **execute in place (XIP)**.

All non-modifiable sections on the firmware do not need to be loaded in memory and are accessible through direct addressing in the memory space. This includes not only the executable instructions but also all the variables that are marked as constant by the compiler. On the other hand, supporting XIP requires a few extra steps when preparing the firmware image to be stored in flash, and the linker needs to be instructed about the different memory-mapped areas on the target.

The internal flash memory that is mapped in the address space of the microcontroller is not accessible for writing. Altering the content of the internal flash can be done only by using block-based access, due to the hardware characteristics of flash memory devices. Before changing the value of a single byte in flash memory, the whole block containing it must be erased and rewritten. The mechanism offered by most manufacturers to access block-based flash memory for writing is known as **In-Application**

Programming (IAP). Some filesystem implementations take care of abstracting write operations on a block-based flash device, by creating a temporary copy of the block where the write operation is performed.

While selecting the components for a microcontroller-based solution, it is vital to match the size of the flash memory to the space required by the firmware. The flash is often one of the most expensive components in the MCU, so for deployment on a large scale, choosing an MCU with a smaller flash could be more cost-effective. Developing software with code size in mind is not very usual nowadays within other domains, but it may be required when trying to fit multiple features in such little storage. Finally, compiler optimizations may exist on specific architectures to reduce code size when building the firmware and linking its components.

Additional non-volatile memories that reside outside of the MCU silicon can typically be accessed using specific interfaces, such as the **Serial Peripheral Interface**. External flash memories use different technologies than internal flash, which is designed to be fast and execute code in place. While being generally more dense and less expensive, external flash memories do not allow direct memory mapping in the physical address space, which makes them unsuitable for storing firmware images. This is because it would be impossible to execute the code fetching the instructions sequentially unless a mechanism is used to load the executable symbols in RAM – read access on these kinds of devices is performed one block at a time. On the other hand, write access may be faster compared to IAP, making these kinds of non-volatile memory devices ideal for storing data that is retrieved at runtime in some designs.

General-purpose input/output (GPIO)

The most basic functionality that can be achieved with any microcontroller is the possibility to control signals on specific pins of the integrated circuit. The microcontroller can turn a digital output on or off, which corresponds to a reference voltage to be applied to the pin when the value assigned to it is 1, and zero volts when the value is 0. In the same way, a pin can be used to detect a 1 or a 0 when the pin is configured as input. The software will read the digital value “1” when the voltage applied to it is higher than a certain threshold.

ADC and DAC

Some chips have onboard ADC controllers, which are capable of sensing the voltage that is applied to the pin and sampling it. This is often used to acquire measurements from input peripherals providing a variable voltage as output. The embedded software will be able to read the voltage, with an accuracy that depends on the predefined range.

A DAC controller is the inverse of an ADC controller, transforming a value on a microcontroller register into the corresponding voltage.

Timers and PWM

Microcontrollers may offer diverse ways to measure time. Often, there is at least one interface based on a countdown timer that can trigger an interrupt and automatically reset upon expiry.

GPIO pins configured as output can be programmed to output a square wave with a preconfigured frequency and duty cycle. This is called **pulse-wave modulation (PWM)** and has several uses, from controlling output peripherals to dimming an LED or even playing an audible sound through a speaker.

More details about GPIO, interrupt timers, and watchdogs will be explored in *Chapter 6, General-Purpose Peripherals*.

Interfaces and peripherals

To communicate with peripherals and other microcontrollers, several *de facto* standards are well established in the embedded world. Some of the external pins of the microcontroller can be programmed to carry out communication with external peripherals using specific protocols. A few of the common interfaces available on most architectures are as follows:

- Asynchronous UART-based serial communication
- **Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI)** bus
- **Inter-integrated circuit (I²C)** bus
- **Universal Serial Bus (USB)**

Let's review each in detail.

Asynchronous UART-based serial communication

Asynchronous communication is provided by the **Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter (UART)**. These kinds of interfaces, commonly known as **serial ports**, are called asynchronous because they do not need to share a clock signal to synchronize the sender and the receiver, but rather work on predefined clock rates that can be aligned while the communication is ongoing. Microcontrollers may contain multiple UARTs that can be attached to a specific set of pins upon request. Asynchronous communication is provided by UART as a full-duplex channel, through two independent wires, connecting the RX pin of each endpoint to the TX pin on the opposite side.

To understand each other, the systems at the two endpoints must set up the UART using the same parameters. This includes the framing of the bytes on the wire and the frame rate. All of these parameters have to be known in advance by both endpoints to correctly establish a communication channel. Despite being simpler than the other types of serial communication, UART-based serial communication is still widely used in electronic devices, particularly as an interface for modems and GPS receivers. Furthermore, using TTL-to-USB serial converters, it is easy to connect a UART to a console on the host machine, which is often handy for providing log messages.

SPI

A different approach to classic UART—based communication is **SPI**. Introduced in the late 1980s, this technology aimed to replace asynchronous serial communication toward peripherals by introducing several improvements:

- Serial clock line to synchronize the endpoints
- Master-slave protocol
- One-to-many communication over the same three-wire bus

The master device, usually the microcontroller, shares the bus with one or more slaves. To trigger the communication, a separate **slave select (SS)** signal is used to address each slave connected to the bus. The bus uses two independent signals for data transfer, one per direction, and a shared clock line that synchronizes the two ends of the communication. Due to the clock line being generated by the master, the data transfer is more reliable, making it possible to achieve higher bitrates than ordinary UART. One of the keys to the continued success of SPI over multiple generations of microcontrollers is the low complexity required for the design of slaves, which can be as simple as a single shift register. SPI is commonly used in sensor devices, LCDs, flash memory controllers, and network interfaces.

I²C

I²C is slightly more complex, and that is because it is designed with a different purpose in mind: *interconnecting multiple microcontrollers*, as well as multiple slave devices, on the same two-wire bus. The two signals are **serial clock (SCL)** and **serial data (SDA)**. Unlike SPI or UART, the bus is half-duplex, as the two directions of the flow share the same signal. Thanks to a 7-bit slave-addressing mechanism incorporated in the protocol, it does not require additional signals dedicated to selecting the slaves. Multiple masters are allowed on the same line, given that all the masters in the system follow the arbitration logic in the case of bus contention.

USB

The USB protocol, originally designed to replace UART and include many protocols in the same hardware connector, is very popular in personal computers, portable devices, and a huge number of peripherals.

This protocol works in host-device mode, with one side of communication, the device, exposing services that can be used by the controller, on the host side. USB transceivers present in many microcontrollers can work in both modes. By implementing the upper layer of the USB standards, different types of devices can be emulated by the microcontroller, such as serial ports, storage devices, and point-to-point Ethernet interfaces, creating microcontroller-based USB devices that can be connected to a host system.

If the transceiver supports host mode, the embedded system can act as a USB host, and devices can be connected to it. In this case, the system should implement device drivers and applications to access the functionality provided by the device.

When both modes are implemented on the same USB controller, the transceiver works in **on-the-go (OTG)** mode, and selecting and configuring the desired mode can be done at runtime.

A more extended introduction to some of the most common protocols used for communicating with peripherals and neighboring systems will be provided in *Chapter 7, Local Bus Interfaces*.

Connected systems

An increasing number of embedded devices designed for different markets are now capable of network communication with their peers in the surrounding area or with gateways routing their traffic to a broader network or the internet. The term **Internet of Things (IoT)** has been used to describe the networks where those embedded devices can communicate using internet protocols.

This means that IoT devices can be addressed within the network in the same way as more complex systems, such as PCs or mobile devices, and most importantly, they use the transport layer protocols typical of internet communications to exchange data. TCP/IP is a suite of protocols standardized by the IETF, and it is the fabric of the infrastructure for the internet and other self-contained, local area networks.

The **Internet Protocol (IP)** provides network connectivity, but on the condition that the underlying link provides packet-based communication and mechanisms to control and regulate access to the physical media. Fortunately, many network interfaces meet these requirements. Alternative protocol families, which are not compatible with TCP/IP, are still in use in several distributed embedded systems, but a clear advantage of using the TCP/IP standard on the target is that, in the case of communication with non-embedded systems, there is no need for a translation mechanism to route the frames outside the scope of the LAN.

Besides the types of links that are widely used in non-embedded systems, such as Ethernet or wireless LAN, embedded systems can benefit from a wide choice of technologies that are specifically designed for the requirements introduced by IoT. New standards have been researched and put into effect to provide efficient communication for constrained devices, defining communication models to cope with specific resource usage limits and energy efficiency requirements.

Recently, new link technologies have been developed in the direction of lower bitrates and power consumption for wide-area network communication. These protocols are designed to provide narrow-band, long-range communication. The frame is too small to fit IP packets, so these technologies are mostly employed to transmit small payloads, such as periodic sensor data, or device configuration parameters if a bidirectional channel is available, and they require some form of gateway to translate the communication so that it can travel across the internet.

The interaction with the cloud services, however, requires, in most cases, connecting all the nodes in the network, and implementing the same technologies used by the servers and the IT infrastructure directly in the host. Enabling TCP/IP communication on an embedded device is not always straightforward. Even though there are several open source implementations available, system TCP/IP code is complex, big in size, and often has memory requirements that may be difficult to meet.

The same observation applies to the **Secure Socket Layer (SSL)/Transport Layer Security (TLS)** library, which adds confidentiality and authentication between the two communication endpoints. Choosing the right microcontroller for the task is, again, crucial, and if the system has to be connected to the internet and support secure socket communication, then the flash and RAM requirements have to be updated in the design phase to ensure integration with third-party libraries.

Challenges of distributed systems

Designing distributed embedded systems, especially those that are based on wireless link technologies, adds a set of interesting challenges.

Some of these challenges are related to the following aspects:

- Selecting the correct technologies and protocols
- Limitations on bitrate, packet size, and media access
- Availability of the nodes
- Single points of failure in the topology
- Configuring the routes
- Authenticating the hosts involved
- The confidentiality of the communication over the media
- The impact of buffering on network speed, latency, and RAM usage
- The complexity of implementing the protocol stacks

Chapter 9, Distributed Systems and IoT Architecture, analyzes some of the link-layer technologies implemented in embedded systems to provide remote communication, where TCP/IP communication is integrated into the design of distributed systems that are integrated with IoT services.

Introduction to isolation mechanisms

Some newer microcontrollers include support for isolation between trusted and non-trusted software running onboard. This mechanism is based on a CPU extension, available only on some specific architectures, which usually relies on a sort of physical separation inside the CPU itself between the two modes of execution. All the code running from a non-trusted zone in the system will have a

restricted view of the RAM, devices, and peripherals, which must be dynamically configured by the trusted counterpart in advance.

Software running from the trusted area can also provide features that are not directly accessible from the non-trusted world, through special function calls that cross the secure/non-secure boundary.

Chapter 11, Trusted Execution Environment, explores the technology behind **Trust Execution Environments (TEEs)**, as well as the software components involved in real embedded systems to provide a safe environment to run non-trusted modules and components.

The reference platform

The preferred design strategy for embedded CPU cores is **reduced instruction set computer (RISC)**. Among all the RISC CPU architectures, several reference designs are used as guidelines by silicon manufacturers to produce the core logic to integrate into the microcontroller. Each reference design differs from the others in several characteristics of the CPU implementation. Each reference design includes one or more families of microprocessors integrated into embedded systems, which share the following characteristics:

- Word size used for registers and addresses (8-bit, 16-bit, 32-bit, or 64-bit)
- Instruction set
- Register configurations
- Endianness
- Extended CPU features (interrupt controller, FPU, MMU)
- Caching strategies
- Pipeline design

Choosing a reference platform for your embedded system depends on your project needs. Smaller, less feature-rich processors are generally more suited to low energy consumption, have a smaller MCU packaging, and are less expensive. Higher-end systems, on the other hand, come with a bigger set of resources and some of them have dedicated hardware to cope with challenging calculations (such as a floating-point unit, or an **Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)** hardware module to offload symmetric encryption operations). 8-bit and 16-bit core designs are slowly giving way to 32-bit architectures, but some successful designs remain relatively popular in some niche markets and among hobbyists.

ARM reference design

ARM is the most ubiquitous reference design supplier in the embedded market, with more than 10 billion ARM-based microcontrollers produced for embedded applications. One of the most interesting core designs in the embedded industry is the ARM Cortex-M family, which includes a range of models scaling from cost-effective and energy-efficient, to high-performance cores specifically designed for

multimedia microcontrollers. Despite ranging among three different instruction sets (ARMv6, ARMv7, and ARMv8), all Cortex-M CPUs share the same programming interface, which improves portability across microcontrollers in the same families.

Most of the examples in this book will be based on this family of CPUs. Though most of the concepts expressed will apply to other core designs as well, picking a reference platform now opens the door to a more complete analysis of the interactions with the underlying hardware. In particular, some of the examples in this book use specific assembly instructions from the ARMv7 instruction set, which is implemented in some Cortex-M CPU cores.

The Cortex-M microprocessor

The main characteristic of the 32-bit cores in the Cortex-M family are as follows:

- 16 generic-purpose CPU registers
- Thumb 16-bit only instructions for code density optimizations
- A built-in **Nested Vector Interrupt Controller (NVIC)** with 8 to 16 priority levels
- ARMv6-M (M0, M0+), ARMv7-M (M3, M4, M7), or ARMv8-M (M23, M33) architecture
- Optional 8-region **memory protection unit (MPU)**
- Optional TEE isolation mechanism (ARM TrustZone-M)

The total memory address space is 4 GB. The beginning of the internal RAM is typically mapped at the fixed address of `0x20000000`. The mapping of the internal flash, as well as the other peripherals, depends on the silicon manufacturer. However, the highest 512 MB (`0xE0000000` to `0xFFFFFFFF`) addresses are reserved for the **System Control Block (SCB)**, which groups together several configuration parameters and diagnostics that can be accessed by the software at any time to directly interact with the core.

Synchronous communication with peripherals and other hardware components can be triggered through interrupt lines. The processor can receive and recognize several different digital input signals and react to them promptly, interrupting the execution of the software and temporarily jumping to a specific location in the memory. Cortex-M supports up to 240 interrupt lines on the high-end cores of the family.

The interrupt vector, located at the beginning of the software image in flash, contains the addresses of the interrupt routines that will automatically execute on specific events. Thanks to the NVIC, interrupt lines can be assigned priorities so that when a higher-priority interrupt occurs while the routine for a lower interrupt is executed, the current interrupt routine is temporarily suspended to allow the higher-priority interrupt line to be serviced. This ensures minimal interrupt latency for these signal lines, which are somewhat critical for the system to execute as fast as possible.

At any time, the software on the target can run in two privilege modes: unprivileged or privileged. The CPU has built-in support for privilege separation between system and application software, even providing two different registers for the two separate stack pointers. In *Chapter 10, Parallel Tasks and Scheduling*, we will examine how to properly implement privilege separation, as well as how to enforce memory separation when running untrusted code on the target, in more detail. This is, for example, used to hide secrets such as private keys from direct access from the non-secure world. In *Chapter 11, Trusted Execution Environment*, we will learn how to properly implement privilege separation, as well as how to enforce memory separation within an OS when running application code on the target with a different level of trust.

A Cortex-M core is present in many microcontrollers, from different silicon vendors. Software tools are similar for all the platforms, but each MCU has a different configuration to take into account. Convergence libraries are available to hide manufacturer-specific details and improve portability across different models and brands. Manufacturers provide reference kits and all the documentation required to get started, which are intended to be used for evaluation during the design phase, and may also be useful for developing prototypes at a later stage. Some of these evaluation boards are equipped with sensors, multimedia electronics, or other peripherals that extend the functionality of the microcontroller. Some even include preconfigured, third-party “middleware” libraries such as TCP/IP communication stacks, TLS and cryptography libraries, simple filesystems and other accessory components, and modules that can be quickly and easily added to a software project.

Summary

When approaching embedded software requirements, before anything else, you must have a good understanding of the hardware platform and its components. By describing the architecture of modern microcontrollers, this chapter pointed out some of the peculiarities of embedded devices and how developers should efficiently rethink their approach to meeting requirements and solving problems, while at the same time taking into account the features and the limits of the target platform.

In the next chapter, we will analyze the tools and procedures typically used in embedded development, including command-line toolchains and **integrated development environments (IDEs)**. We will understand how to organize the workflow and how to effectively prevent, locate, and fix bugs.

2

Work Environment and Workflow Optimization

The first step toward a successful software project is choosing the right tools. Embedded development requires a set of hardware and software instruments that make the developer's life easier and may significantly improve productivity and cut down the total development time. This chapter provides a description of these tools and gives advice on how to use them to improve the workflow.

The first section gives us an overview of the workflow in native C programming, and gradually reveals the changes necessary to translate the model to an embedded development environment. The **GCC toolchain**, a set of development tools to build the embedded application, is introduced through the analysis of its components.

Finally, in the last two sections, strategies of interaction with the target are proposed, to provide mechanisms for the debugging and validation of the embedded software running on the platform.

The topics covered in this chapter are the following:

- Workflow overview
- Text editors versus integrated environments
- The GCC toolchain
- Interaction with the target
- Validation

By the end of this chapter, you will have learned how to create an optimized workflow by following a few basic rules, keeping the focus on test preparation, and a smart approach to debugging.

Workflow overview

Writing software in C, as well as in every other compiled language, requires the code to be transformed into an executable format for a specific target to run it. C is portable across different architectures and execution environments. Programmers rely on a set of tools to compile, link, execute, and debug software to a specific target.

Building the firmware image of an embedded system relies on a similar set of tools, which can produce firmware images for specific targets, called a **toolchain**. This section gives an overview of the common sets of tools required to write software in C and produce programs that are directly executable on the machine that compiled them. The workflow must then be extended and adapted to integrate the toolchain components and produce executable code for the target platform.

The C compiler

The **C compiler** is a tool responsible for translating source code into machine code, which can be interpreted by a specific CPU. Each compiler can produce machine code for one environment only, as it translates the functions into machine-specific instructions, and it is configured to use the address model and the register layout of one specific architecture. The native compiler included in most GNU/Linux distributions is the **GNU Compiler Collection**, commonly known as **GCC**. The GCC is a free software compiler system distributed under the GNU general public license since 1987, and since then, it has been successfully used to build UNIX-like systems. The GCC included in the system can compile C code into applications and libraries capable of running on the same architecture as that of the machine running the compiler.

The GCC compiler takes source code files as input, with the `.c` extension, and produces object files, with `.o` extensions, containing the functions and the initial values of the variables, translated from the input source code into machine instructions. The compiler can be configured to perform additional optimization steps at the end of the compilation that are specific to the target platform and insert debug data to facilitate debugging at a later stage.

A minimalist command line used to compile a source file into an object using the host compiler only requires the `-c` option, instructing the GCC program to compile the sources into an object of the same name:

```
$ gcc -c hello.c
```

This statement will try to compile the C source contained in the `hello.c` file and transform it into machine-specific code that is stored in the newly created `hello.o` file.

Compiling code for a specific target platform requires a set of tools designed for that purpose. Architecture-specific compilers exist, which provide compilers creating machine instructions for a specific target, different from the building machine. The process of generating code for a different target is called **cross compilation**. The **cross compiler** runs on a development machine, the host, to produce machine-specific code that can execute on the target.

In the next section, a GCC-based toolchain is introduced as the tool to create the firmware for an embedded target. The syntax and the characteristics of the GCC compiler are described there.

The first step for building a program made of separate modules is to compile all the sources into object files so that the components needed by the system are grouped and organized together in the final step, consisting of linking together all the required symbols and arranging the memory areas to prepare the final executable, which is done by another dedicated component in the toolchain.

Linker

The **linker** is the tool that composes executable programs and resolves the dependencies among object files provided as input.

The default executable format that is produced by the linker is the **Executable and Linkable Format (ELF)**. The ELF is the default standard format for programs, objects, shared libraries, and even GDB core dumps on many Unix and Unix-like systems. The format has been designed to store programs on disks and other media supports, so the host operating system can execute it by loading the instructions in RAM and allocating the space for the program data.

Executable files are divided into sections, which can be mapped to specific areas in memory needed by the program to execute. The ELF file starts with a header containing the pointer to the various sections within the file itself, which contains the program's code and data.

The linker maps the content of the areas describing an executable program into sections conventionally starting with a `.` (dot). The minimum set of sections required to run the executable consists of the following:

- `.text`: Contains the code of the program, accessed in read-only mode. It contains the executable instructions of the program. The functions compiled into object files are arranged by the linker in this section, and the program always executes instructions within this memory area.
- `.rodata`: Contains the value of constants that cannot be altered at runtime. It is used by the compiler as the default section to store constants because it is not allowed to modify the stored values at runtime.
- `.data`: Contains the values of all the initialized variables of the program that are accessible in the read/write mode at runtime. It is the section that contains all the variables (static or global) that have been initialized in the code. Before executing, this area is generally remapped to a writable location in RAM, and the content of the ELF is automatically copied during the initialization of the program, at runtime, before executing the main function.

- `.bss`: This is a section reserved for uninitialized data, accessible in the read/write mode at runtime. It derives its name from an ancient assembly instruction of old microcode written for the IBM 704 in the 1950s. It was originally an acronym for **Block Started by Symbol (BSS)**, used to reserve a fixed amount of uninitialized memory. In the ELF context, it contains all the uninitialized global and static symbols, which must be accessible in the read-write mode at runtime. Because there is no value assigned, the ELF file only describes the section in the header but does not provide any content for it. The initialization code should ensure that all the variables in this section are set to *zero* before the execution of the `main()` function.

When building native software on the host machine, much of the complexity of the linking step is hidden, but the linker is configured by default to arrange the compiled symbols into specific sections, which can be later used by the operating system to assign the corresponding segments in the process virtual address space when executing the program. It is possible to create a working executable for the host machine by simply invoking `gcc`, this time without the `-c` option, providing the list of the object files that must be linked together to produce the ELF file. The `-o` option is used to specify the output filename, which otherwise would default to `a.out`:

```
$ gcc -o helloworld hello.o world.o
```

This command will try to build the `helloworld` file, which is an ELF executable for the host system, using the symbols previously compiled into the two objects.

In an embedded system things change a bit, as booting a bare-metal application implies that the sections must be mapped to physical areas in memory at linking time. To instruct the linker to associate the sections to well-known physical addresses, a custom linker script file must be provided, describing the memory layout of the executable bare-metal application, and providing additional custom sections that may be required by the target system.

A more detailed explanation of the linking step is provided later, in the *Linking the executable* section.

Make: a build automation tool

Several open source tools are available to automate a build process, and a few of them are widely used in different development environments. **Make** is the standard UNIX tool to automate the steps required to create the required binary images from the sources, check the dependencies for each component, and execute the steps in the right order. Make is a standard **POSIX tool**, and it is part of many UNIX-like systems. In a GNU/Linux distribution, it is implemented as a standalone tool, which is part of the GNU project. From this point on, the GNU Make implementation is simply referred to as Make.

Make is designed to execute the default build by simply invoking the `make` command with no arguments from the command line, provided that a **makefile** is present in the working directory. A makefile is a special instruction file, containing rules and recipes to build all the files needed until the expected output files are generated. Open source alternatives offering similar solutions for build automation exist, such as CMake and SCons, but all the examples in this book are built using Make because it provides a simple and essential enough environment to control the build system, and it is the one standardized by **POSIX**.

Some integrated development environments use built-in mechanisms to coordinate the building steps or generate makefiles before invoking Make automatically when the user requests to build the output files. However, editing makefiles manually gives complete control over the intermediate steps to generate the final images, where the user can customize the recipes and rules used to generate the desired output files.

There is no specific version that needs to be installed to cross compile code for the Cortex-M target, but some extra parameters, such as the location of the toolchain binaries, or the specific flags needed by the compiler, need to be taken care of when writing targets and directives within the makefile.

One of the advantages of using a build process is that targets may have implicit dependencies from other intermediate components that are automatically resolved at compile time. If all the dependencies are correctly configured, a makefile ensures that the intermediate steps are executed only when needed, reducing the compile time of the whole project when only a few sources are altered or when single object files have been deleted.

Makefiles have a specific syntax to describe rules. Each rule begins with the target files expected as the output of the rule, a colon, and the list of prerequisites, which are the files necessary to execute the rule. A set of recipe items follow, each one describing the actions that Make will execute to create the desired target:

```
target: [prerequisites]
    recipe
    recipe
    ...
```

By default, Make will execute the first rule encountered while parsing the file if no rule name is specified from the command line. If any of the prerequisites are not available, Make automatically looks for a rule in the same makefile that can create the required file recursively until the chain of requirements is satisfied.

Makefiles can assign a custom string of text to internal variables while executing. Variable names can be assigned using the `=` operator and referred to by prefixing them with `$`. For example, the following assignment is used to put the name of two object files into the `OBJS` variable:

```
OBJS = hello.o world.o
```


A few important variables that are assigned automatically within the rules are the following:

Variable	Meaning
\$ (@)	Name of the target for the currently executing rule
\$ (^)	List of all the prerequisites for this rule, without duplicates
\$ (+)	List of all the prerequisites for this rule, with duplicates, if any
\$ (<)	The first element in the prerequisites list

Table 2.1 – Some automatic variables that can be used in makefile recipes

These variables are handy to use within the recipe action lines. For example, the recipe to generate a `helloworld` ELF file from the two object files can be written as follows:

```
helloworld: $(OBJS)
    gcc -o $(@) $(^)
```

Some of the rules are implicitly defined by Make. For example, the rule to create the `hello.o` and `world.o` files from their respective source files can be omitted, as Make expects to be able to obtain each one of these object files in the most obvious way, which is by compiling the corresponding C source files with the same name if present. This means that this minimalist makefile is already able to compile the two objects from the sources and link them together using the default set of options for the host system.

The linking recipe can also be implicit if the executable has the same name as one of its prerequisite objects minus its `.o` extension. If the final ELF file is called `hello`, our makefile could simply become the following one-liner:

```
hello: world.o
```

This would automatically resolve the `hello.o` and `world.o` dependencies, and then link them together using an implicit linker recipe similar to the one we used in the explicit target.

Implicit rules use predefined variables, which are assigned automatically before the rules are executed, but can be modified within the makefile. For example, it is possible to change the default compiler by altering the `CC` variable. Here is a short list of the most important variables that may be used to alter implicit rules and recipes:

Variable	Meaning	Default value
CC	Compiler program	cc
LD	Linker program	ld
CFLAGS	Flags are passed to the compiler when compiling sources	<empty>
LDFLAGS	Flags passed to the compiler in the linking step	<empty>

Table 2.2 – Implicit, predefined variables that specify the default toolchain and flags

When linking a bare-metal application for embedded platforms, the makefile must be modified accordingly, and as shown later in this chapter, several flags are required to properly cross compile the sources and instruct the linker to use the desired memory layout to organize the memory sections. Moreover, additional steps are generally needed to manipulate the ELF file and translate it to a format that can be transferred to the target system. However, the syntax of the makefile is the same, and the simple rules shown here are not too different from those used to build the example. The default variables still need to be adjusted to modify the default behavior if implicit rules are used.

When all the dependencies are correctly configured in the makefile, Make ensures that the rules are only executed when the target is older than its dependencies, thus reducing the compile time of the whole project when only a few sources are altered or when single object files have been deleted.

Make is a very powerful tool, and its range of possibilities goes far beyond the few features used to generate the examples in this book. Mastering the automation process of builds may lead to optimized build processes. The syntax of makefiles includes useful features, such as conditionals, which can be used to produce different results by invoking a makefile using different targets or environment variables. For a better understanding of the capabilities of Make, please refer to the GNU Make manual available at <https://www.gnu.org/software/make/manual>.

Debugger

In the host environment, debugging an application that runs on top of the operating system is done by running a debugger tool, which can attach to an existing process or spawn a new one given an executable ELF file and its command-line arguments. The default debugging option provided by the GCC suite is called **GDB**, an acronym for the **GNU Debugger**. While GDB is a command-line tool, several frontends have been developed to provide better visualization of the state of the execution, and some integrated development environments provide built-in frontends for interacting with the debugger while tracing the single lines being executed.

Once again, the situation is slightly changed when the software to debug is running on a remote platform. A version of GDB, distributed with the toolchain and specific to the target platform, can be run on the development machine to connect to a remote debug session. A debug session on a remote target requires an intermediate tool that is configured to translate GDB commands into actual actions on the core CPU and the related hardware infrastructure to establish communication with the core.

Some embedded platforms provide hardware breakpoints, which are used to trigger system exceptions every time the selected instructions are executed.

Later in this chapter, we will see how a remote GDB session can be established with the target in order to interrupt its execution at the current point, proceed to step through the code, place breakpoints and watchpoints, and inspect and modify the values in memory.

A handful of GDB commands are introduced, giving a quick reference to some of the functionalities provided by the GDB command-line interface, which can be effectively used to debug embedded applications.

The debugger gives the best possible understanding of what the software is doing at runtime and facilitates the hunt for programming errors while directly looking at the effects of the execution on memory and CPU registers.

Embedded workflow

If compared to other domains, the embedded development life cycle includes some additional steps. The code must be cross compiled, the image manipulated then uploaded to a target, tests must be run, and possibly hardware tools are involved in the measurement and verification phases. The life cycle of native application software, when using compiled languages, looks like this diagram:




Figure 2.1 – A typical life cycle of application development

When writing software within the same architecture, tests and debugging can be performed right after compiling, and it is often easier to detect issues. This results in a shorter time for the typical loop. Moreover, if the application crashes because of a bug, the underlying operating system can produce a core dump, which can be analyzed using the debugger at a later time by restoring the content of the virtual memory and the context of the CPU registers right at the moment when the bug shows up.

On the other hand, intercepting fatal errors on an embedded target might be slightly more challenging because of the potential side effect of memory and register corruption in the absence of virtual addresses and memory segmentation provided by the operating systems in other contexts. Even if some targets can intercept abnormal situations by triggering diagnostic interrupts, such as the hard fault handler in Cortex-M, restoring the original context that generated the error is often impossible.

Furthermore, every time new software is generated, there are a few time-consuming steps to perform, such as the translation of the image to a specific format, and uploading the image to the target itself, which may take anywhere from a few seconds up to a minute, depending on the size of the image and the speed of the interface used to communicate with the target:




Figure 2.2 – The embedded development life cycle, including additional steps required by the environment

In some of the phases of the development, when multiple consecutive iterations may be required to finalize a feature implementation or detect a defect, the timing between compiling and testing the software has an impact on the efficiency of the whole life cycle. Specific tasks implemented in the software, which involve communication through serial or network interfaces, can only be verified with signal analysis or by observing the effect on the peripheral or the remote system involved. Analyzing the electrical effects on the embedded system requires some hardware setup and instrument configuration, which add more time to the equation.

Finally, developing a distributed embedded system composed of several devices running different software images may result in repeating the preceding iterations for each of these devices. Whenever possible, these steps should be eliminated by using the same image and different set configuration parameters on each device and by implementing parallel firmware upgrade mechanisms. Protocols such as JTAG support uploading the software image to multiple targets sharing the same bus, significantly cutting down the time required for the firmware upgrades, especially in those distributed systems with a larger number of devices involved.

No matter how complex the project is expected to be, it is, in general, worth spending as much time as needed to optimize the life cycle of the software development at the beginning in order to increase efficiency later on. No developer likes to switch the focus away from the actual coding steps for too long, and it might be frustrating to work in a suboptimal environment where stepping through the process requires too much time or human interaction.

An embedded project can be started from scratch using a text editor or by creating a new project in an integrated development environment.

Text editors versus integrated environments

While mostly a matter of developer preferences, the debate is still open in the embedded community between those who use a standalone text editor and those who prefer to have all the components of the toolchain integrated into one GUI.

Modern IDEs incorporate tools for the following tasks:

- Managing the components of the project
- Quickly accessing all the files for editing as well as extensions to upload the software on the board
- Starting a debugging session with a single click

Microcontroller manufacturers often distribute their development kits along with IDEs that make it easy to access advanced features that are specific to the microcontroller, thanks to preconfigured setups and wizards facilitating the creation of new projects. Most IDEs include widgets to automatically generate the setup code for pin multiplexing for specific microcontrollers, starting from a graphical interface. Some of them even offer simulators and tools to predict runtime resource usage, such as dynamic memory and power consumption.

The majority of these tools are based on some customization of Eclipse, a popular open source desktop IDE, originally designed as a tool for Java software development, then later on very successful in many other fields thanks to the possibilities to extend and customize its interface.

There are downsides to the IDE approach too. IDEs, in general, do not embed the actual toolchain in the code. Rather, they provide a frontend interface to interact with a compiler, linker, debugger, and other tools. To do so, they have to store all the flags, configuration options, the paths of included files, and compile-time-defined symbols in a machine-readable configuration file. Some users find those options difficult to access by navigating through the multiple menus of the GUI. Other key components of the project, such as the linker script, may also be well hidden under the hood, in some cases even automatically generated by the IDE and difficult to read. For most IDE users, however, these downsides are compensated by the perks of developing with an integrated environment.

There is one last caveat that has to be considered, though. The project will sooner or later be built and tested automatically, as previously analyzed in the *Make: a build automation tool* section. Robots are, in general, terrible users of IDEs, while they can build and run any test, even interacting with real targets, using a command-line interface. A development team using an IDE for embedded development should always consider providing an option to build and test any software through a command-line alternate strategy.

While some complexity of the toolchain can be abstracted with a GUI, it is useful to understand the functions of the set of applications under the hood. The remaining sections of this chapter explore the GCC toolchain, the most popular cross-architecture set of compilers for many 32-bit microcontrollers.

The GCC toolchain

While in the case of the IDE, its complexity is abstracted through the user interface, a toolchain is a set of standalone software applications, each one serving a specific purpose.

GCC is one of the reference toolchains to build embedded systems due to its modular structure allowing backends for multiple architectures. Thanks to its open source model, and the flexibility in building tailored toolchains from it, GCC-based toolchains are among the most popular development tools in embedded systems.

Building software using a command-line-based toolchain has several advantages, including the possibility of automating the intermediate steps that would build all the modules up from the source code into the final image. This is particularly useful when it is required to program multiple devices in a row or to automate builds on a continuous integration server.

ARM distributes the GNU Arm Embedded Toolchain for all the most popular development hosts. Toolchains are prefixed with a triplet describing the target. In the case of the GNU Arm Embedded Toolchain, the prefix is `arm-none-eabi`, indicating that the cross compiler backend is configured to produce objects for ARM, with no specific support for an operating system API, and with the embedded ABI.

The cross compiler

The cross compiler distributed with a toolchain is a variant of GCC, with the backend configured to build object files that contain machine code for a specific architecture. The output of the compilation is one set of object files containing symbols that can only be interpreted by the specific target. `arm-none-eabi-gcc`, the GCC variant provided by ARM to build software for microcontrollers, can compile C code into machine instructions and CPU optimizations for several different targets. Each architecture needs its own specific toolchain that will produce target-specific executables.

The GCC backend for the ARM architecture supports several machine-specific options to select the correct instruction set for the CPU and the machine-specific optimization parameters.

The following table lists some of the ARM-specific machine options available on the GCC backend as `-m` flags:

Option	Description
<code>-marm</code> <code>-mthumb</code>	Selects the ARM or Thumb instruction set
<code>-march=name</code>	Selects the architecture ISA within the family (for example, <code>armv7</code>)
<code>-mtune=name</code>	Selects the CPU name for which GCC is optimized (for example, <code>cortex-m3</code>)
<code>-mcpu=name</code>	Selects the CPU name for optimizations and architecture (can be used instead of <code>-march</code> and <code>-mtune</code>)

Table 2.3 – Architecture-specific compiler options for GCC ARM

To compile code that is compatible with a generic ARM Cortex M4, the `-mthumb` and `-mcpu=cortex-m4` options must be specified every time the compiler is invoked:

```
$ arm-none-eabi-gcc -c test.c -mthumb -mcpu=cortex-m4
```

The `test.o` file that is the result of this compile step is very different from the one that can be compiled, from the same source, using the `gcc` host. The difference can be better appreciated if, instead of the two object files, the intermediate assembly code is compared. The compiler is, in fact, capable of creating intermediate assembly code files instead of compiled and assembled objects when it is invoked with the `-S` option.

In a similar way to the host GCC compiler, there are different levels of possible optimization available to activate. In some cases, it makes sense to activate the size optimization to generate smaller object files. It is preferable, though, that the non-optimized image can fit the flash during the development to facilitate the debugging procedures, as optimized code flow is more difficult to follow when the compiler may change the order of the execution of the code and hide away the content of some variables. The optimization parameter can be provided at the command line to select the desired optimization level:

Option	Effect
<code>-O0</code>	Do not optimize—turn off optimizations
<code>-O1</code>	Optimize for performance
<code>-O2</code>	Optimize even more
<code>-O3</code>	The maximum level of performance optimization
<code>-Os</code>	Optimize for size

Table 2.4 – GCC levels of optimization

Another generic GCC command-line option that is often used while debugging and prototyping is the `-g` flag, which instructs the compiler to keep the debugging-related data in the final object in order to facilitate access to functions' and variables' readable handles while running within the debugger.

To inform the compiler that we are running a bare-metal application, the `-ffreestanding` command-line option is used. In GCC jargon, a freestanding environment is defined by the possible lack of a standard library in the linking step, and most importantly, this option alerts the compiler that it should not expect to use the main function as the entry point of the program or provide any preamble code before the beginning of the execution. This option is required when compiling code for the embedded platforms, as it enables the boot mechanism described in *Chapter 4, The Boot-Up Procedure*.

The GCC program supports many more command-line options than those quickly introduced here. For a more complete overview of the functionalities offered, please refer to the GNU GCC manual, available at <https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/>.

To integrate the cross compiling toolchain in the automated build using Make, a few changes are required in the makefile.

Assuming that the toolchain is correctly installed on the development host and reachable in its executing path, it is sufficient to change the default compiler command using the CC Make variable in the makefile:

```
CC=arm-none-eabi-gcc
```

The custom command-line options required to run the compile options may be exported through the CFLAGS variable:

```
CFLAGS=-mthumb -mcpu=cortex-m4 -ffreestanding
```

Using default makefile variables, such as CC and CFLAGS, enables implicit makefile rules, building object files from C sources with the same name, and a custom compiler configuration.

Compiling the compiler

Binary distributions of the GCC toolchain are available to download for several specific targets and host machines. To compile the code for the ARM Cortex-M microprocessors, the `arm-none-eabi` toolchain is made available for most GNU/Linux distributions. However, in some cases, it might be handy to build the toolchain entirely from the sources. This might be, for example, when the compiler for a certain target does not exist yet or is not shipped in binary format for our favorite development environment. This process is also useful to better understand the various components that are required to build the tools.

Crosstool-NG is an open source project that consists of a set of scripts aimed at automating the process of creating a toolchain. The tool retrieves the selected version of every component, then creates an archive of the toolchain that can be redistributed in binary form. This is normally not necessary,

while sometimes useful when it is necessary to modify the sources for a specific component, such as, for example, the C libraries that are finally integrated into the toolchain. It is easy to create a new configuration in crosstool-NG, thanks to its configurator, based on the Linux `menuconfig` kernel. After installing crosstool-NG, the configurator can be invoked by using the following:

```
$ ct-ng menuconfig
```

Once the configuration has been created, the build process can be started. Since the operation requires retrieving all the components, patching them, and building the toolchain, it may take several minutes, depending on the speed of the host machine and the internet connection, to retrieve all the components. The build process can be started by issuing the following:

```
$ ct-ng build
```

Predefined configurations are available for compiling commonly used toolchains, mostly for targets running Linux. When compiling a toolchain for a Linux target, there are a few C libraries to choose from. In our case, since we want a bare-metal toolchain, `newlib` is the default choice. Several other libraries provide an implementation of a subset of the C standard library, such as `uClibc` and `musl`. The `newlib` library is a small cross-platform C library mostly designed for embedded systems with no operating system on board, and it is provided as the default in many GCC distributions, including the `arm-none-eabi` cross compiler distributed by ARM.

Linking the executable

Linking is the last step in the creation of the ELF file. The cross compiling GCC groups all the object files together and resolves the dependencies among symbols. By passing the `-T filename` option at the command line, the linker is asked to replace the default memory layout for the program with a custom script, contained in the filename.

The **linker script** is a file containing the description of the memory sections in the target, which need to be known in advance in order for the linker to place the symbols in the correct sections in flash, and instruct the software components about special locations in the memory mapping area that can be referenced in the code. The file is recognizable by its `.ld` extension, and it is written in a specific language. As a rule of thumb, all the symbols from every single compiled object are grouped in the sections of the final executable image.

The script can interact with the C code, exporting symbols defined within the script and following indications provided in the code using GCC-specific attributes associated with symbols. The `__attribute__` keyword is provided by GCC to be put in front of the symbol definition to activate GCC-specific, non-standard attributes for each symbol.

Some GCC attributes can be used to communicate to the linker about the following:

- Weak symbols, which can be overridden by symbols with the same name
- Symbols to be stored in a specific section in the ELF file, defined in the linker script
- Implicitly used symbols, which prevent the linker from discarding the symbol because it is referred to nowhere in the code

The `weak` attribute is used to define weak symbols, which can be overridden anywhere else in the code by another definition with the same name. Consider, for example, the following definition:

```
void __attribute__((weak)) my_procedure(int x) { /* do nothing */ }
```

In this case, the procedure is defined to do nothing, but it is possible to override it anywhere else in the code base by defining it again, using the same name, but this time without the `weak` attribute:

```
void my_procedure(int x) { y = x; }
```

The linker step ensures that the final executable contains exactly one copy of each defined symbol, which is the one without the attribute, if available. This mechanism introduces the possibility of having several different implementations of the same functionality within the code, which can be altered by including different object files in the linking phase. This is particularly useful when writing code that is portable to different targets while still maintaining the same abstractions.

Besides the default sections required in the ELF description, custom sections may be added to store specific symbols, such as functions and variables, at fixed memory addresses. This is useful when storing data at the beginning of a flash page, which might be uploaded to flash at a different time than the software itself. This is the case for target-specific settings in some cases.

Using the custom GCC `section` attribute when defining a symbol ensures that the symbol ends up at the desired position in the final image. Sections may have custom names as long as an entry exists in the linker to locate them. The `section` attribute can be added to a symbol definition as follows:

```
const uint8_t  
__attribute__((section(".keys")))  
private_key[KEY_SIZE] = {0};
```

In this example, the array is placed in the `.keys` section, which requires its own entry in the linker script as well.

It is considered good practice to have the linker discard the unused symbols in the final image, especially when using third-party libraries that are not completely utilized by the embedded application. This can be done in GCC using the linker garbage collector, activated via the `-gc-sections` command-line option. If this flag is provided, the sections that are unused in the code are automatically discarded, and the unused symbols will be kept out of the final image.

To prevent the linker from discarding symbols associated with a particular section, the `used` attribute marks the symbol as implicitly used by the program. Multiple attributes can be listed in the same declaration, separated by commas, as follows:

```
const uint8_t    __attribute__((used, section(".keys")))
    private_key[KEY_SIZE] = {0};
```

In this example, the attributes indicate both that the `private_key` array belongs to the `.keys` section and that it must not be discarded by the linker garbage collector because it is marked as `used`.

A simple linker script for an embedded target defines at least the two sections relative to RAM and FLASH mapping and exports some predefined symbols to instruct the assembler of the toolchain about the memory areas. A bare-metal system based on the GNU toolchain usually starts with a `MEMORY` section, describing the mapping of the two different areas in the system, such as the following:

```
MEMORY {
    FLASH(rx) : ORIGIN = 0x00000000, LENGTH=256k
    RAM(rwx)  : ORIGIN = 0x20000000, LENGTH=64k
}
```

The preceding code snippet describes two memory areas used in the system. The first block is 256k mapped to FLASH, with the *r* and *x* flags indicating that the area is accessible for *read* and *execute* operations. This enforces the read-only attribute of the whole area and ensures that no variant sections are placed there. RAM, on the other hand, can be accessed in write mode directly, which means that variables are going to be placed in a section within that area. In this specific example, the target maps the FLASH mapping at the beginning of the address space, while the RAM is mapped starting at 512 MB. Each target has its address space mapping and flash/RAM size, which makes the linker script target-specific.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the `.text` and `.rodata` ELF sections can only be accessed for reading, so they can safely be stored in the FLASH area since they will not be modified while the target is running. On the other hand, both `.data` and `.bss` must be mapped in RAM to ensure that they are modifiable.

Additional custom sections can be added to the script where it is necessary to store additional sections at a specific location in memory. The linker script can also export symbols related to a specific position in memory or to the length of dynamically sized sections in memory, which can be referred to as external symbols and accessed in the C source code.

The second block of statements in the linker script is called `SECTIONS` and contains the allocation of the sections in specific positions of the defined memory areas. The `.` symbol, when associated with a variable in the script, represents the current position in the area, which is filled progressively from the lower addresses available.

Each section must specify the area where it has to be mapped. The following example, though still incomplete to run the binary executable, shows how the different sections can be deployed using the linker script. The `.text` and `.rodata` sections are mapped in the flash memory:

```
SECTIONS
{
    /* Text section (code and read-only data) */
    .text :
    {
        . = ALIGN(4);
        _start_text = .;
        *(.text*) /* code */
        . = ALIGN(4);
        _end_text = .;
        *(.rodata*) /* read only data */
        . = ALIGN(4);
        _end_rodata = .;
    } > FLASH
```

The modifiable sections are mapped in RAM, with two special cases to notice here.

The `AT` keyword is used to indicate the load address to the linker, which is the area where the original values of the variables in `.data` are stored, while the actual addresses used in the execution are in a different memory region. More details about the load address and the virtual address for the `.data` section are explained in *Chapter 4, The Boot-Up Procedure*.

The `NOLOAD` attribute used for the `.bss` section ensures that no predefined values are stored in the ELF file for this section. Uninitialized global and static variables are mapped by the linker in the RAM area, which is allocated by the linker:

```
_stored_data = .;
.data: AT(__stored_data)
{
    . = ALIGN(4);
    _start_data = .;
    *(.data*)
```

```

    . = ALIGN(4);
    _start_data = .;
} > RAM

.bss (NOLOAD):
{
    . = ALIGN(4);
    _start_bss = .;
    *(.bss*)
    . = ALIGN(4);
    _end_bss = .;
} > RAM

```

The alternative way to force the linker to keep sections in the final executable, avoiding their removal due to the linker garbage collector, is the use of the `KEEP` instruction to mark sections. Please note that this is an alternative to the `__attribute__((used))` mechanism explained earlier:

```

.keys :
{
    . = ALIGN(4);
    *(.keys*) = .;
    KEEP(*(.keys*));
} > FLASH

```

It is useful, and advisable in general, to have the linker create a `.map` file alongside the resultant binary. This is done by appending the `-Map=filename` option to the link step, such as in the following:

```

$ arm-none-eabi-ld -o image.elf object1.o object2.o
-T linker_script.ld -Map=map_file.map

```

The map file contains the location and the description of all the symbols, grouped by sections. This is useful for looking for the specific location of symbols in the image, as well as for verifying that useful symbols are not accidentally discarded due to a misconfiguration.

Cross compiling toolchains provide standard C libraries for generic functionalities, such as string manipulation or standard type declarations. These are substantially a subset of the library calls available in the application space of an operating system, including standard input/output functions. The backend implementation of these functions is often left to the applications, so calling a function

from the library that requires interaction with the hardware, such as `printf`, implies that a write function is implemented outside of the library, providing the final transfer to a device or peripheral.

The implementation of the backend write function determines which channel would act as the standard output for the embedded application. The linker is capable of resolving the dependencies towards standard library calls automatically, using the built-in `newlib` implementation. To exclude the standard C library symbols from the linking process, the `-nostdlib` option can be added to the options passed to GCC during the linking step.

Binary format conversion

Despite containing all the compiled symbols in binary format, an ELF file is prefixed with a header that contains a description of the content and pointers to the positions where the sections start within the file. All this extra information is not needed to run on an embedded target, so the ELF file produced by the linker has to be transformed into a plain binary file. A tool in the toolchain, called `objcopy`, converts images from one standard format to others, and what is generally done is a conversion of the ELF into a raw binary image without altering the symbols. To transform the image from ELF to binary format, invoke the following:

```
$ arm-none-eabi-objcopy -I elf -O binary image.elf image.bin
```

This creates a new file, called `image.bin`, from the symbols contained in the original ELF executable, which can be uploaded to the target.

Even if not suitable in general for direct upload on the target with third-party tools, it is possible to load the symbols through the debugger and upload them to the flash address. The original ELF file is also useful as the target of other diagnostic tools in the GNU toolchain, such as `nm` and `readelf`, which display the symbols in each module, with their type and relative address within the binary image. Furthermore, by using the `objdump` tool on the final image, or even on single object files, several details about the image can be retrieved, including the visualization of the entire assembly code, using the `-d` disassemble option:

```
arm-none-eabi-objdump -d image.elf
```

At this point, the toolchain has provided us with all the artifacts needed to run, debug, and analyze the compiled software on a target microcontroller. In order to transfer the image or start a debugging session, we need additional specific tools, described in the next section.

Interacting with the target

For development purposes, embedded platforms are usually accessed through a JTAG or an SWD interface. Through these communication channels, it is possible to upload the software onto the flash of the target and access the on-chip debug functionality. Several self-contained JTAG/SWD adapters

on the market can be controlled through a USB from the host, while some development boards are equipped with an extra chip controlling the JTAG channel that connects to the host through a USB.

A powerful generic open source tool to access JTAG/SWD functionalities on the target is the **Open On-Chip Debugger (OpenOCD)**. Once properly configured, it creates local sockets that can be used as a command console and for interaction with the debugger frontend. Some development boards are distributed with additional interfaces to communicate with the core CPU. For example, STMicroelectronics prototyping boards for **Cortex-M** are rarely shipped without a chip technology called ST-Link, which allows direct access to debug and flash manipulation functionalities. Thanks to its flexible backend, OpenOCD can communicate with these devices using different transport types and physical interfaces, including ST-Link and other protocols. Several different boards are supported and the configuration files can be found by OpenOCD.

When started, OpenOCD opens two local TCP server sockets on preconfigured ports, providing communication services with the target platform. One socket provides an interactive command console that can be accessed through Telnet, while the other is a GDB server used for remote debugging, as described in the next section.

OpenOCD is distributed along with two sets of configuration files that describe the target microcontroller and peripherals (in the `target/` directory), and the debugging interface used to communicate to it via JTAG or SWD (in the `interface/` directory). A third set of configuration files (in the `board/` directory) contain configuration files for well-known systems, such as development boards equipped with an interface chip, which combines both interfaces and target settings by including the correct files.

In order to configure OpenOCD for the **STM32F746-Discovery target**, we can use the following `openocd.cfg` configuration file:

```
telnet_port 4444
gdb_port 3333
source [find board/stm32f7discovery.cfg]
```

The board-specific configuration file, which was imported from `openocd.cfg`, through the `source` directive, instructs OpenOCD to use the ST-Link interface to communicate with the target and sets all the CPU-specific options for the STM32F7 family of microcontrollers.

The two ports specified in the main configuration file, using the `telnet_port` and `gdb_port` directives, instruct OpenOCD to open two listening TCP sockets.

The first socket, often referred to as the monitor console, can be accessed by connecting to the local **4444 TCP port**, using a Telnet client from the command line:

```
$ telnet localhost 4444
Open On-Chip Debugger
>
```

The sequence of OpenOCD directives to initialize, erase the flash, and transfer the image starts with the following:

```
> init
> halt
> flash probe 0
```

The execution is stopped at the beginning of the software image. After the probe command, the flash is initialized, and OpenOCD will print out some information, including the address mapped to write on the flash. The following information shows up with the STM32F746:

```
device id = 0x10016449
flash size = 1024kbytes
flash "stm32f2x" found at 0x08000000
```

The geometry of the flash can be retrieved using this command:

```
> flash info 0
```

Which, on STM32F746 shows as the following:

```
#0 : stm32f2x at 0x08000000, size 0x00100000, buswidth 0,
chipwidth 0
# 0: 0x00000000 (0x8000 32kB) not protected
# 1: 0x00008000 (0x8000 32kB) not protected
# 2: 0x00010000 (0x8000 32kB) not protected
# 3: 0x00018000 (0x8000 32kB) not protected
# 4: 0x00020000 (0x20000 128kB) not protected
# 5: 0x00040000 (0x40000 256kB) not protected
# 6: 0x00080000 (0x40000 256kB) not protected
# 7: 0x000c0000 (0x40000 256kB) not protected
STM32F7 [4|5]x - Rev: Z
```

This flash contains eight sectors. If the OpenOCD target supports it, the flash can be completely erased by issuing the following command from the console:

```
> flash erase_sector 0 0 7
```


Once the flash memory is erased, we can upload a software image to it, linked and converted to raw binary format using the `flash write_image` directive. As the raw binary format does not contain any information about its destination address in the mapped area, the starting address in the flash must be provided as the last argument, as follows:

```
> flash write_image /path/to/image.bin 0x08000000
```

These directives can be appended to the `openocd.cfg` file, or to different configuration files, in order to automate all the steps needed for a specific action, such as erasing the flash and uploading an updated image.

Some hardware manufacturers offer their own set of tools to interact with the devices. STMicroelectronics devices can be programmed using the ST-Link utilities, an open source project that includes a flash tool (`st-flash`), and a GDB server counterpart (`st-util`). Some platforms have built-in bootloaders that accept alternative formats or binary transfer procedures. A common example is **Device Firmware Upgrade (DFU)**, which is a mechanism to deploy firmware on targets through a USB. The reference implementation on the host side is `dfu-util`, which is a free software tool.

Each tool, either generic or specific, tends to meet the same goal of communicating with the device and providing an interface for debugging the code, although often exposing a different interface toward the development tools.

Most IDEs provided by manufacturers to work with a specific family of microcontrollers incorporate in the IDE their own tools or third-party applications to access flash mapping and control the execution on the target. While, on one hand, they promise to hide the unnecessary complexity of the operation and provide firmware upload in one click, on the other, they generally do not provide a convenient interface for programming multiple targets at the same time, or at least efficiently, when it comes to production in large batches requiring to upload of the initial factory firmware.

Knowing the mechanisms and procedures from a command-line interface allows for understanding what is happening behind the scenes every time a new firmware is uploaded to the target, and anticipating the issues that would impact the life cycle during this phase.

The GDB session

Regardless of the programmer's accuracy or the complexity of the project we are working on, most of the development time will be spent trying to understand what our software does, or most likely, what has gone wrong and why the software is not behaving as we would expect when the code was written for the first time. The debugger is the most powerful tool in our toolchain, allowing us to communicate directly with the CPU, place breakpoints, control the execution flow instruction by instruction, and check the values of CPU registers, local variables, and memory areas. Good knowledge of the debugger means less time spent trying to figure out what is going on, and a more effective hunt for bugs and defects.

The `arm-none-eabi` toolchain includes a GDB capable of interpreting the memory and the register layout of the remote target and can be accessed with the same interfaces as the host GDB, provided that its backend can communicate with the embedded platform, using OpenOCD or a similar host tool providing communication with the target through the GDB server protocol. As previously described, OpenOCD can be configured to provide a GDB server interface, which in the proposed configuration is on port 3333.

After starting `arm-none-eabi-gdb`, we may connect to the running tool using the GDB `target` command. Connecting to the GDB server while OpenOCD is running can be done using the `target` command:

```
> target remote localhost:3333
```

All GDB commands can be abbreviated, so the command often becomes the following:

```
> tar rem :3333
```

Once connected, the target would typically stop the execution, allowing GDB to retrieve the information about the instruction that is currently being executed, the stack trace, and the values of the CPU registers.

From this moment on, the debugger interface can be used normally to step through the code, place breakpoints and watchpoints, and inspect and alter CPU registers and writable memory areas at runtime.

GDB can be used entirely from its command-line interface, using shortcuts and commands to start and stop the execution, and access memory and registers.

The following reference table enumerates a few of the GDB commands available in a debug session and provides a quick explanation of their usage:

Command	Description
<code>file name</code>	Load all the symbols from the ELF file on the host filesystem. If the ELF file has been compiled with the <code>GCC -g</code> option, it will contain all the data to facilitate debugging.
<code>load</code>	Upload the currently loaded symbols to the target. Used to flash new versions of the software during a debug session.
<code>mon</code>	Access monitor commands, platform-specific. The OpenOCD monitor interfaces provide commands, such as <code>mon reset</code> and <code>mon init</code> , to power cycle the core and initialize the execution.
<code>break (b)</code> <code>b function_name</code> <code>b line_number</code> <code>b file.c:line_num</code> <code>b *address</code>	Place a breakpoint in the code at the specified location. The location can be specified in different ways. When the execution hits the instruction with the breakpoint, the CPU is temporarily stopped, and the control returns to the debugger for inspection.

Command	Description
<code>watch (w) address</code>	Like <code>break</code> , but instead of placing a breakpoint on a specific location in the code, observe a variable in memory at the given address and interrupt the execution whenever the value changes. Useful to trace the point in the code where a specific value in the memory is altered.
<code>info b</code>	Provide information about the breakpoints and watchpoints currently set in this debugging session.
<code>delete (d) n</code>	Remove breakpoint <code>n</code> .
<code>print (p) ...</code>	Inspect the value of a variable or a C expression that can be evaluated using variables and memory addresses.
<code>display ...</code>	Like <code>print</code> , but refreshes the value of the expression every time that the control returns to the debugger. Useful to track the changes while stepping through the code.
<code>next (n)</code>	Execute the next instruction. If the next instruction is a function call, place an automatic breakpoint on the function return, and return the control to the debugger only when the called function has returned.
<code>step (s)</code>	Execute the next instruction. If the next instruction is a function call, place an automatic breakpoint on the function return, and return the control to the debugger only when the called function has returned.
<code>stepi (si)</code>	Like <code>step</code> , but only execute the next machine instruction instead of the whole C line that generated it. Useful to step through single machine instructions.
<code>continue (c)</code>	Resume the execution on the target from the current position. The control is returned to the debugger if a breakpoint is hit or if <code>Ctrl + C</code> is pressed from the GDB console.
<code>set var=...</code> <code>set \$cpu_reg=...</code>	Assign the desired value (or the result of an expression) to a variable or a CPU register, referenced using the <code>\$</code> symbol.
<code>backtrace (bt)</code>	Inspect the contents of the stack in reverse order, including the call trace to the current location.
<code>up</code> <code>down</code>	Move the stack pointer through the current call trace. To switch to the context of the caller toward outer functions, use <code>up</code> ; to switch back to inner functions, use <code>down</code> .

Table 2.5 – A few commonly used GDB commands

GDB is a very powerful and complete debugger, and the commands that have been shown in this section are a small portion of its actual potential. We advise you to discover the other features offered by GDB by going through its manual in order to find the set of commands that best fit your needs.

IDEs often offer a separate graphic mode to deal with debugging sessions, which is integrated with the editor and allows you to set breakpoints, watch variables, and explore the content of memory areas while the system is running in *debug mode*.

Validation

Debugging alone, or even simple output analysis is often not enough when verifying system behavior and identifying issues and unwanted effects in the code. Different approaches may be taken to validate the implementation of single components, as well as the behavior of the entire system under different conditions. While, in some cases, the results can be directly measurable from the host machine, in more specific contexts, it is often difficult to reproduce the exact scenario or to acquire the necessary information from the system output.

External tools may come in handy, especially in the analysis of communication interfaces and network devices in a more complex, distributed system. In other cases, single modules can be tested off-target using simulated or emulated environments to run smaller portions of the code base.

Different tests, validation strategies, and tools are considered in this section to provide solutions for any scenario.

Functional tests

Writing test cases before writing the code is generally considered an optimal practice in modern programming. Writing tests first not only speeds up the development phases but also improves the structure of the workflow. By setting clear and measurable goals from the beginning, it is harder to introduce conceptual defects in the design of the single components, and it also forces a clearer separation among the modules. More specifically, an embedded developer has less possibility to verify the correct behavior of the system through direct interaction; thus **test-driven development (TDD)** is the preferred approach for the verification of single components as well as the functional behavior of the entire system, as long as the expected results can be directly measurable from the host system.

However, it must be considered that testing often introduces dependencies on specific hardware, and sometimes the output of an embedded system can only be validated through specific hardware tools or in a very unique and peculiar usage scenario. In all these cases, the usual TDD paradigm is less applicable, and the project can instead benefit from a modular design to give the possibility to test as many components as possible in a synthetic environment, such as emulators or unit test platforms.

Writing tests often involves programming the host so that it can retrieve information about the running target while the embedded software is executing or alongside an ongoing debugging session while the target executes in between breakpoints. The target can be configured to provide immediate output

through a communication interface, such as a UART-based serial port, which can, in turn, be parsed by the host. It is usually more convenient to write test tools on the host using a higher-level interpreted programming language to better organize the test cases and easily integrate the parsing of test results using regular expressions. Python, Perl, Ruby, and other languages with similar characteristics, are often a good fit for this purpose, also thanks to the availability of libraries and components designed for collecting and analyzing test results and interacting with continuous integration engines. A good organization of the test and verification infrastructure contributes more than everything else to the stability of the project because regressions can be detected at the right time only if all the existing tests are repeated at every modification. Constantly running all the test cases while the development is ongoing not only improves the efficiency of detecting undesired effects as early as possible but helps keep the development goals visible at all times by directly measuring the number of failures and makes the refactoring of components more affordable at any stage in the project lifetime.

Efficiency is the key because embedded programming is an iterative process with several steps being repeated over and over, and the approach required from the developers is much more predictive than reactive.

Hardware tools

If there is a tool that is absolutely indispensable in assisting embedded software developers, it is the logic analyzer. By scoping the input and output signals involving the microcontroller, it is possible to detect the electrical behavior of the signals, their timing, and even the digital encoding of the single bits in the interface protocols. Most logic analyzers can identify and decode sequences of symbols by sensing the voltage of the wires, which is often the most effective way to verify that protocols are correctly implemented and compliant with the contracts to communicate with peripherals and network endpoints. While historically available only as standalone dedicated computers, a logic analyzer is often available in other forms, such as electronic instruments that can be connected to the host machine using USB or Ethernet interfaces, and use PC-based software to capture and decode the signals. The result of this process is a complete discrete analysis of the signals involved, which are sampled at a constant rate and then visualized on a screen.

While a similar task can be performed by oscilloscopes, they are often more complex to configure than logic analyzers when dealing with discrete signals. Nevertheless, an oscilloscope is the best tool for the analysis of analog signals, such as analog audio and communication among radio transceivers. Depending on the task, it might be better to use one or the other, but in general, the biggest advantage of a logic analyzer is that it provides better insight into discrete signals. Mixed-signal logic analyzers are often a good compromise between the flexibility of an oscilloscope, with the simplicity and insights of discrete signal-logic analysis.

Oscilloscopes and logic analyzers are often used to capture the activity of signals in a specific time window, which might be challenging to synchronize with the running software. Instead of capturing those signals continuously, the beginning of the capture can be synchronized with a physical event, such as a digital signal changing its value for the first time or an analog signal crossing a predefined threshold. This is done by configuring the instrument to initiate the capture using a trigger, which guarantees that the information captured only contains a time slice that is interesting for the ongoing diagnostic.

Testing off-target

Another efficient way to speed up the development is by limiting the interaction, as much as possible, with the actual target. This is, of course, not always possible, especially when developing device drivers that need to be tested on actual hardware, but tools and methodologies to partially test the software directly on the development machine exist.

Portions of code that are not CPU-specific can be compiled for the host machine architecture and run directly, as long as their surroundings are properly abstracted to simulate the real environment. The software to test can be as small as a single function, and in this case, a unit test can be written specifically for the development architecture.

Unit tests are, in general, small applications that verify the behavior of a single component by feeding them with well-known input and verifying its output. Several tools are available on a Linux system to assist in writing unit tests. The check library provides an interface for defining unit tests by writing a few preprocessor macros. The result is small self-contained applications that can be run every time the code is changed, directly on the host machine. Those components of the system that the function under test depends on are abstracted using mocks. For example, the following code detects and discards a specific escape sequence, *Esc* + *C*, from the input from a serial line interface, reading from the serial line until the `\0` character is returned:

```
int serial_parser(char *buffer, uint32_t max_len)
{
    int pos = 0;
    while (pos < max_len) {
        buffer[pos] = read_from_serial();
        if (buffer[pos] == (char)0)
            break;
        if (buffer[pos] == ESC) {
            buffer[++pos] = read_from_serial();
            if (buffer[pos] == 'c')
                pos = pos - 1;
            continue;
        }
    }
}
```

```
    }  
    pos++;  
}  
return pos;  
}
```

A set of unit tests to verify this function using a check test suite may look like the following:

```
START_TEST(test_plain) {  
    const char test0[] = "hello world!";  
    char buffer[40];  
    set_mock_buffer(test0);  
    fail_if(serial_parser(buffer, 40) != strlen(test0));  
    fail_if(strcmp(test0,buffer) != 0);  
}  
END_TEST
```

Each test case can be contained in its `START_TEST()` / `END_TEST` block and provide a different initial configuration:

```
START_TEST(test_escape) {  
    const char test0[] = "hello world!";  
    const char test1[] = "hello \033cworld!";  
    char buffer[40];  
    set_mock_buffer(test1);  
    fail_if(serial_parser(buffer, 40) != strlen(test0));  
    fail_if(strcmp(test0,buffer) != 0);  
}  
END_TEST  
  
START_TEST(test_other) {  
    const char test2[] = "hello \033dworld!";  
    char buffer[40];  
    set_mock_buffer(test2);  
    fail_if(serial_parser(buffer, 40) != strlen(test2));  
    fail_if(strcmp(test2,buffer) != 0);  
}  
END_TEST
```

This first `test_plain` test ensures that a string with no escape characters is parsed correctly. The second test ensures that the escape sequence is skipped, and the third one verifies that a similar escape string is left untouched by the output buffer.

Serial communication is simulated using a mock function that replaces the original `serial_read` functionality provided by the driver when running the code on the target. This is a simple mock that feeds the parser with a constant buffer that can be reinitialized using the `set_serial_buffer` helper function. The mock code looks like this:

```
static int serial_pos = 0;
static char serial_buffer[40];

char read_from_serial(void) {
    return serial_buffer[serial_pos++];
}

void set_mock_buffer(const char *buf)
{
    serial_pos = 0;
    strncpy(serial_buffer, buf, 20);
}
```

Unit tests are very useful to improve the quality of the code, but of course, achieving high code coverage consumes a large amount of time and resources in the economy of the project. Functional tests can also be run directly in the development environment by grouping functions into self-contained modules and implementing simulators that are slightly more complex than mocks for specific test cases. In the example of the serial parser, it would be possible to test the entire application logic on top of a different serial driver on the host machine, which is also able to simulate an entire conversation over the serial line, and interact with other components in the system, such as virtual terminals and other applications generating input sequences.

While covering a larger portion of the code within a single test case, the complexity of the simulated environment increases, and so does the amount of work required to reproduce the surroundings of the embedded system on the host machine. Nevertheless, it is good practice, especially when they could be used as verification tools throughout the whole development cycle and even integrated into the automated test process.

Sometimes, implementing a simulator allows for a much more complete set of tests, or it might be the only viable option. Think, for example, about those embedded systems using a GPS receiver for positioning: testing the application logic with negative latitude values would be impossible while

sitting in the northern hemisphere, so writing a simulator that imitates the data coming from such a receiver is the quickest way to verify that our final device will not stop working across the equator.

Emulators

Another valid approach to running the code on the development machine, which is much less invasive for our code base and loosens the specific portability requirements, is emulating the whole platform on the host PC. An emulator is a computer program that can replicate the functionality of an entire system, including its core CPU, memory, and a set of peripherals. Some of the modern virtualization hypervisors for PCs are derived from **QEMU**, a free software emulator capable of virtualizing entire systems, even with a different architecture from those of the machine where it runs. Since it contains the full implementation of the instruction set of many different targets, QEMU can run the firmware image, which had been compiled for our target, in a process on top of the development machine's operating system. One of the supported targets that can run ARM Cortex-M3 microcode is `lm3s6965evb`, an old Cortex-M-based microcontroller, no longer recommended for new designs by the manufacturer, that is fully supported by QEMU.

Once a binary image has been created using `lm3s6965evb` as a target, and properly converted to raw binary format using `objcopy`, a fully emulated system can be run by invoking QEMU as follows:

```
$ qemu-system-arm -M lm3s6965evb --kernel image.bin
```

The `--kernel` option instructs the emulator to run the image at startup, and while it might sound misnamed, it is called `kernel` because QEMU is widely used to emulate headless Linux systems on other synthetic targets. Similarly, a convenient debugging session can be started by using QEMU's built-in GDB server through the `-gdb` option, which can also halt the system until our GDB client is connected to it:

```
$ qemu-system-arm -M lm3s6965evb --kernel image.bin -nographic  
-S -gdb tcp::3333
```

In the same way, as with the real target, we can connect `arm-none-eabi-gdb` to TCP port 3333 on `localhost` and start debugging the software image exactly as it was running on the actual platform.

The limit of the emulation approach is that QEMU can only be used to debug generic features that do not involve interaction with actual modern hardware. Nevertheless, running QEMU with a Cortex-M3 target can be a quick way to learn about generic Cortex-M features, such as memory management, system interrupt handling, and processor modes, because many features of the Cortex-M CPU are accurately emulated.

More accurate emulation of microcontroller systems can be achieved using **Renode** (<https://renode.io>). Renode is an open source, configurable emulator for many different microcontrollers and CPU-based embedded systems. The emulation includes peripherals, sensors, LEDs, and even wireless and wired interfaces to interconnect multiple emulated systems and the host network.

Renode is a desktop application with a command-line console. A single configuration file must be provided from the command-line invocation, with several platforms and development board configurations provided under the `/scripts` directory. This means that once installed, the emulator for the *STM32F4 discovery board* can be started by invoking the following command:

```
$ renode /opt/renode/scripts/single-node/stm32f4_discovery.resc
```

This command will load the demo firmware on an emulated STM32F4 target flash memory and redirect the I/O of one of the emulated UART serial ports to a console in a new window. To start the demo, type `start` in the Renode console.

The example script comes with a demo firmware image running *Contiki OS*. The firmware image is loaded by the script via the Renode command:

```
sysbus LoadELF $bin
```

Where `$bin` is a variable pointing to the path (or the URL) of the firmware ELF file to load on the emulated flash memory. This option, as well as the UART analyzer port and other specific commands to execute when the emulator is started, can be easily changed by customizing the script file.

Renode integrates a GDB server that can be spawned from the Renode console or the startup script before starting the emulation, for example, using the following:

```
machine StartGdbServer 3333
```

In this case, `3333` is the TCP port the GDB server will be listening to, as in the other cases with QEMU and a debugger on the physical target.

Unlike QEMU, which is a very generic emulator, Renode is a project created with the purpose of assisting embedded developers throughout the entire life cycle. The possibility to emulate different complete platforms, creating mocks for sensors on several architectures, including RISC-V, makes it a unique tool to automate testing on multiple targets quickly or test on systems even when the actual hardware is not available.

Last but not least, thanks to its own scripting language, Renode is perfectly integrated with test automation systems, where the execution of the emulated target can be started, stopped, and resumed, and the configuration of all devices and peripherals altered while the test is running.

The approaches proposed for the definition of test strategies take into account different scenarios. The idea has been to introduce a range of possible solutions for software validation, from lab equipment to tests off-target in simulated and emulated environments, for the developer to choose from in a specific scenario.

Summary

This chapter introduced the tools for working on the development of embedded systems. A hands-on approach has been proposed to get you up and running with the toolchain and the utilities required to communicate with the hardware platform. Using appropriate tools can make embedded development easier and shorten workflow iterations.

In the next chapter, we provide indications for workflow organization when working with larger teams. Based on real-life experiences, we propose solutions for splitting and organizing tasks, executing tests, iterating throughout the phases of design, and the definition and implementation of an embedded project.

Part 2 – Core System Architecture

This part goes a little deeper into the rabbit hole, by introducing you to pragmatic software design at first and then guiding you step by step through the code needed for proper boot-up mechanisms and memory management, with a strong focus on a memory-safe approach.

This part has the following chapters:

- *Chapter 3, Architectural Patterns*
- *Chapter 4, The Boot-Up Procedure*
- *Chapter 5, Memory Management*

Architectural Patterns

Starting an embedded project from scratch means progressively stepping towards the final solution by going through all the research and development phases and considering the synergy among all the parts involved.

Software development needs to evolve accordingly throughout these phases. In order to get the best results without excessive overhead, there are a few best practices to follow and tools to discover.

This chapter describes a possible approach toward configuration-management tools and design patterns, based on real-life experiences. Describing this approach may help you to understand the dynamics of working in a team focused on producing an embedded device or solution.

We will discuss the following topics in this chapter:

- Configuration management
- Source code organization
- The life cycle of an embedded project
- Security considerations

By the end of the chapter, you will gain an overview of the architectural patterns useful for designing the system based on the specifications and the platform limits.

Configuration management

When working as a team, coordination and synchronization can be optimized to improve efficiency. Tracking and controlling the development life cycle smoothes the development flow, cutting downtime and costs.

The most important tools known to help manage the software life cycle are the following:

- Revision control
- Issue tracking
- Code reviews
- Continuous integration

Different options exist for the four categories. The source code is synchronized among developers through a revision control system. **Issue tracking systems (ITSs)** usually consist of web platforms that keep track of the activities and known bugs of the system. Code reviews can be encouraged with specific web-based tools and enforced through rules on the revision control systems.

Continuous integration tools ensure that build and test execution tasks are scheduled to automatically execute, periodically or upon changes in the code, collecting test results and notifying the developers about regressions.

Revision control

No matter whether you are working alone or in a large development team, properly keeping track of the development progress is extremely important. **Revision control** tools allow developers to roll back failed experiments at any time with the press of a button, and visiting its history gives a clear view of how the project is evolving at any time.

A **revision control system**, also known as a **version control system**, or **VCS**, encourages cooperation by making merge operations easier. The most updated official version is referred to as a **trunk**, **master**, or **main** branch, depending on the VCS in use. VCSs offer, among other things, fine-grained access control and authorship attribution down to a single commit.

One of the most modern and widely used open source VCSs is Git. Originally created as the VCS for the Linux kernel, Git offers a range of features but, most importantly, provides a flexible mechanism to allow switching among different versions and feature branches quickly and reliably and facilitates the integration of conflicting modifications in the code.

Note

Git terminology is used in this book when describing specific activities related to the VCS.

A **commit** is a VCS action that results in a new version of the repository. The repository keeps track of the sequence of commits and the changes introduced in each version in a hierarchical structure:

- **Branch:** A linear sequence of commits is a branch.
- **HEAD:** The latest version in a branch is called HEAD.

- **master:** Git refers to the main development branch as a master. The master branch is the main focus of the development. Bug fixes and minor changes may be committed directly to the master.
- **Feature branches:** These are created for self-contained tasks in progressing and ongoing experiments, which will eventually be merged into the master. When not abused, feature branches are a perfect fit when working in a smaller sub-team on a task and can simplify the code review process, allowing developers to work simultaneously on separate branches, and concentrate the validation of completed tasks as single **merge** requests.

A **merge operation** consists of joining together two versions from two different branches that may have diverged and present conflict in the code throughout the development. Some merges are trivial and are automatically resolved by the VCS, while others may require manual fixing.

Using meaningful and verbose commit messages improves the readability of the history of the repository and can help to track regressions later on. **Tags** can be used to track intermediate versions that are released and distributed.

Tracking activities

Keeping track of activities and tasks can be simplified by using ITS. Some tools can be directly linked to the revision control system so that tasks can be linked to specific commits in the repository and vice versa. This is, in general, a good idea, as it is possible to have a good overview of what has been changed to accomplish a specific task.

At first, tasking out the specifications into short activities facilitates the approach to development. Ideally, tasks are as small as possible and may be grouped by category. Later on, priorities can be set based on intermediate goals and taking into account the availability of the final hardware. Tasks created should be grouped into intermediate milestones, which some tools refer to as blueprints, so that the overall progress towards an intermediate deliverable can be measured based on the progress made on single tasks.

ITS can be used to track actual issues in the project. A **bug report** should be extensive enough for other developers to understand the symptoms and reproduce the behavior that proves that there is a defect in the code. Ideally, final users and early adopters should be able to add new issues to the tracking system, so the tracking system can be used to track all communication with the development team. Community-based open source projects should provide a publicly accessible ITS interface to users.

Bug-fixing activities generally get a higher priority than development tasks, except in a few cases, for instance, when the bug is the effect of a temporary approximation done by an intermediate prototype, which is expected to be fixed in the next iteration. When a bug affects the behavior of the system, which was proven to work beforehand, it must be marked as a regression. This is important because regressions can usually be handled differently than normal bugs, as it is possible to track them down to a single commit using revision control tools.

Repository control platforms provide several tools, including source code history browsing and the issue-tracking features described earlier. GitLab is a free and open source implementation of such repository control platforms, which can be installed to run as a self-hosted solution. Community projects are often hosted on social coding platforms, such as GitHub, which aim to facilitate contributions to open source and free software projects.

Code reviews

Often integrated into ITS tools, **code reviews** facilitate team cooperation by encouraging the critical analysis of the changes proposed to the code base, which can be useful to detect potential issues before the proposed changes make it to the master branch. Depending on the project requirements, code reviews may be recommended, or even enforced by the team, to increase the quality of the code and early detection of defects by human inspection.

When properly integrated with the VCS, it is possible to set a threshold of mandatory positive reviews from other members of the team before the commit is considered for merging. It is possible to mandate the review of every single commit in the master branch, using tools such as **Gerrit**, integrated with the VCS. Depending on the size of the contribution, this mechanism can introduce some unnecessary overhead, so, in most cases, it may be more appropriate to group the changes introduced by a branch altogether to facilitate the review when the branch is proposed for merging into the master. Mechanisms based on merge requests give the reviewers an overview of the changes introduced during the entire development of the modification proposed. In the case of open source projects that accept external contributions, code reviews are a necessary step to validate the changes coming from less trusted contributors, or in general, from outside the team of maintainers. Code reviews are the most powerful tool to prevent malicious code that may be disguised and could not be detected by automatic test and code analysis utilities.

Continuous integration

As previously mentioned, the test-driven approach is crucial in an embedded environment. Automating tests is the best way to promptly detect regressions, and defects in general, while the development is ongoing. Using an automation server, such as **Jenkins**, it is possible to plan several actions, or *jobs*, to run responsively (such as at every commit), periodically (such as every Tuesday at 1 a.m.), or manually, upon user requests. Here are a few examples of jobs that can be automated to improve the efficiency of an embedded project:

- Unit tests on the development machine
- System validation tests
- Functional tests on a simulated environment
- Functional tests on a physical target platform

- Stability tests
- Static code analysis
- Generating documentation
- Tagging, versioning, and packaging

The desired level of quality must be decided during design, and test cases must be coded accordingly. Unit test code coverage can be measured using `gcov` upon each test execution. Some projects intended for life-critical applications may require a very high percentage of coverage for unit tests, but writing a complete set of tests for a complex system has a great impact on the total programming effort and may increase the cost of the development significantly, so researching the right balance between efficiency and quality is advisable in most cases.

A different approach has to be taken with functional tests. All the functionalities implemented on the target should be tested, and tests prepared in advance should be used to define performance indicators and acceptance thresholds. Functional tests should be run in an environment that is as close as possible to the real use case scenario in all those cases where it is impossible to recreate the full use case on the target system and its surroundings.

Source code organization

The code base should contain all the source code, third-party libraries, data, scripts, and automation needed to build the final image. It is a good idea to keep self-contained libraries in separate directories so that they can be easily updated to newer versions by replacing the subdirectory. Makefiles and other scripts can be placed in the project's root directory.

Application code should be short and synthetic and access the modules abstracting the macro functionalities. Functional modules should describe a process while hiding the details of the underlying implementation, such as reading data from a sensor after it has been properly sampled and processed. Aiming for small, self-contained, and adequately abstracted modules also makes the components of the architecture easier to test. Keeping the majority of the logic for the application components separated from their hardware-specific implementation improves portability across different platforms and allows us to change the peripherals and the interfaces used on the target even during the development phase. Abstracting too much, though, impacts costs, in terms of development effort and resources needed, so the right balance should be researched.

Hardware abstraction

General-purpose prototyping platforms are built and distributed by silicon manufacturers to evaluate microcontrollers and peripherals, so part of the software development may often be performed on these devices even before the design of the final product begins.

The software that can be run on the evaluation board is usually distributed as a reference implementation, in the form of source code or proprietary precompiled libraries. These libraries can be configured and adapted for the final target, to be used as reference hardware abstraction from the beginning, and their settings updated to match changes in the hardware configuration.

On our reference target, support for the hardware components of a generic Cortex-M microcontroller is provided in the form of a library called **Cortex Microcontroller Software Interface Standard (CMSIS)**, distributed by ARM as a reference implementation. Silicon manufacturers derive their specific hardware abstractions by extending CMSIS. An application linked to a target-specific hardware abstraction can access peripherals through its specific API calls and core MCU functionalities through CMSIS.

For code to be portable across different MCUs in the same family, drivers may require an additional level of abstraction on top of the vendor-specific API calls. If the HAL implements multiple targets, it can provide the same API to access generic features across multiple platforms, hiding the hardware-specific implementation under the hood.

The goal of CMSIS and other free software alternatives, such as **libopencm3** and **unicore-mx**, is to group all the generic Cortex-M abstractions and the vendor-specific code for the most common Cortex-M silicon manufacturers while masking the difference among platform-specific calls when controlling the system and the peripherals.

Regardless of the hardware abstraction, some of the code required at the earliest stage of the boot is very specific to each target the software is intended to run on. Each platform has its own specific address space segmentation, interrupt vector, and configuration register displacement. This means that while working on code that is supposed to be portable among different platforms, makefiles and scripts automating the build must be configurable to link using the correct startup code and linker configurations.

The examples contained in this book do not depend on any specific hardware abstraction, as they aim to introduce the control of the system components by directly interacting with the system registers and implementing platform-specific device drivers while focusing on the interaction with the hardware component.

Middleware

Some of the features may already have a well-known solution that has been previously implemented by a single developer, a community, or an enterprise. Solutions may be generic, perhaps designed for a different platform, or even come from outside the embedded world.

In any case, it is always worth looking for libraries for any data transformation, protocol implementation, or subsystem model that might already have been coded and is waiting to be integrated into our project.

Several open source libraries and software components are ready to be included in embedded projects, allowing us to implement a broader set of functionalities. Integrating components from open source projects is particularly useful for delivering standard functionalities. There is a vast choice of well-

established open source implementations designed for embedded devices that can be easily integrated into embedded projects, including the following examples:

- Real-time operating systems
- Cryptography libraries
- TCP/IP, 6LoWPAN, and other network protocols
- **Transport Layer Security (TLS)** libraries
- Filesystems
- IoT message queue protocols
- Parsers

Some components from these categories are described in more detail later in this book.

Basing the software upon an operating system allows us to manage memory areas and thread execution. In this case, threads execute independently from each other, and it is even possible to implement memory separation among threads and between running threads and the kernel. This approach is advisable when the complexity of the design increases or when there are well-known blocking points in the modules that cannot be redesigned. Other libraries usually require multithreading support if an operating system is used, which can be enabled at compile time.

The decision of integrating third-party libraries must be evaluated by measuring the resources needed, in terms of code size and memory used, to perform specific tasks on the target platform. As the whole firmware is distributed as a single executable file, all the licenses of the components must be compatible, and the integration must not violate the license terms of any of its single components.

Application code

The role of the application code is to coordinate, from the highest layer in the project design, all the modules involved, and orchestrate the heuristics of the system. A clean main module that is well-designed allows us to keep a clear view of all the macroscopic blocks of the system, how they are related to each other, and the execution timing of the various components.

Bare-metal applications are built around a main endless loop function, which is in charge of distributing the CPU time among the entry points of the underlying libraries and drivers. The execution happens sequentially, so the code cannot be suspended except by interrupt handlers. For this reason, all the functions and library calls invoked from the main loop are supposed to return as fast as possible because stall points hidden inside other modules may compromise the system's reactivity, or even block them forever, with the risk of never returning to the main loop. Ideally, in a bare-metal system, every component is designed to interact with the main loop using the event-driven paradigm, with the main loop constantly waiting for events and mechanisms to register callbacks to wake up the application on specific events.

The advantage of the bare-metal, single-thread approach is that synchronization among threads is not needed, all the memory is accessible by any function in the code, and it is not necessary to implement complex mechanisms, such as context and execution model switches. Some basic synchronization mechanisms, however, could still be required when interrupts are on and the flow of execution can be interrupted by external events at any point to execute a specific handler.

If multiple tasks are meant to run on top of an operating system, each task should be confined as much as possible within its own module and explicitly export its start function and public variables as global symbols. In this case, tasks can sleep and call blocking functions, which should implement the OS-specific blocking mechanisms.

Thanks to the flexibility of the Cortex-M CPU, there are different degrees of threads and process separation that can be activated on the system.

The CPU offers multiple tools to facilitate the development of multithreading systems with separation among tasks, multiple execution modes, kernel-specific registers, privilege separation, and memory-segmentation techniques. These options allow architects to define complex systems, more oriented to general-purpose applications, which offer privilege separation and memory segmentation among processes, but also smaller, simpler, more straightforward systems, which do not need these as they are generally designed for a single purpose.

Selecting an executing model that is based on non-privileged threads results in a much more complex implementation of the context changes in the system, and may impact the latency of the real-time operations, which is why bare-metal, single-threaded solutions are still preferred for most real-time applications.

Security considerations

One of the most important aspects to consider when designing a new system is security. Depending on the characteristics of the system, the requirements, and the evaluation of the risks, different countermeasures may be appropriate. Security-enhancing features are often a mix of hardware and software efforts to provide specific protections against known attacks.

Vulnerability management

Software components keep evolving as new features are introduced, and defects are fixed along the way. Some of the defects that are discovered and fixed in a later version may impact the security of the system running outdated software if proper action is not taken promptly. Once vulnerabilities in third-party components are fully disclosed to the public, it is no longer a good choice to keep running outdated code.

Older versions with known defects running on public networks have an increased possibility of becoming the attack surface for attempts to damage the system, take control of the software execution, or steal important data. The best response is prepared very early during the design of the system and consists

of planning remote updates using procedures that fit the specific use case, security requirements, and safety levels.

When using third-party libraries, it is appropriate to follow the development of their latest versions and fully understand the impact of the defects that are fixed, especially when those are marked as security issues.

Software cryptography

Cryptography algorithms should be used when appropriate, for example, to encrypt data stored locally or in transit between two systems, authenticate a remote actor on the network, or verify that data has not been altered and comes from a trusted source.

Good cryptography is always based on open, transparent standards so that the security of the system depends solely on the security of the keys, according to the Kerckhoff principle formulated by the Dutch cryptographer Auguste Kerckhoff in the 19th century, rather than on secret mechanisms, with the (false) hope that its implementation will never be disclosed or reverse engineered. Although this last statement should be obvious to whoever has some confidence with the concept of information security, in the past many embedded systems have adopted *security by obscurity*, as a bad practice of taking shortcuts in the attempt to circumvent the restrictions posed by the lack of appropriate resources to run well-established cryptography primitives on older hardware architectures.

Nowadays, embedded cryptography libraries exist, capable of running the same latest standard algorithms used in PCs and servers in microcontroller-based systems, which meanwhile are becoming more powerful and fit for running the (often CPU-hungry) cryptography math primitives. A complete cryptography library offers a ready-to-use implementation of, typically, three families of algorithms:

- **Asymmetric cryptography** (RSA, ECC) is based on a pair of keys, private and public, associated with each other. Besides one-way encryption, these algorithms provide other mechanisms, such as authenticating a signature and deriving secondary keys starting from two key pairs, for example, to use as a shared secret by both endpoints communicating over an untrusted medium.
- **Symmetric cryptography** (AES, ChaCha20) is mostly adopted for bidirectional encryption using the same pre-shared secret key in both directions.
- **Hash algorithms** (SHA) provide an injective digest calculation and are often used to verify that data has not been altered.

A complete set of algorithms, optimized for embedded systems, is provided by wolfCrypt, the cryptography engine distributed as part of wolfSSL, a professionally maintained open source library that also includes transport layer security protocols, which will be further explained in *Chapter 9, Distributed Systems and IoT Architecture*.

Hardware cryptography

Taking security aspects under consideration from the very beginning of the design process is important to prematurely identify software and hardware components needed to implement the correct mechanisms. Simply adding a cryptography library does not guarantee an increased level of security in the system unless all the requirements are fulfilled, which often implies some participation from specific hardware components.

Some algorithms require random values with high entropy, which is often hard to obtain on microcontrollers without the help of specific hardware, such as **True Random Number Generators (TRNGs)**.

Other public-key-based cryptography requires trust anchor storage, which means a memory location that cannot be modified at runtime by an attacker, and usually relies on some non-volatile memory features that may be present on the flash memory controller. Finally, to store secret keys, hardware assistance can be needed to provide a secure vault that can only be accessed by privileged code or, in some cases, is never accessible from software and is only allowed to be used in combination with hardware cryptography engines that are coupled with secure storage.

Running untrusted code

As embedded systems become more complex and the code memory increases, it is not unusual to see software components from multiple sources integrated into a single firmware image. Some systems may even provide a software development kit that runs custom code provided by the user.

Others may have an interface that allows you to execute code from a remote location. In all these cases, it would be appropriate to consider separation mechanisms to prevent accidental (or intentional) access to memory areas or peripherals that should not be reachable by actors with lower capabilities.

Most microcontrollers provide two levels of execution privileges, and on some platforms, it is possible to divide the addressable memory space according to those privileges through context switching in the OS. Newer generations of microcontrollers provide TEEs to strictly enforce memory boundaries based on the execution level of the current stage.

The life cycle of an embedded project

Modern development frameworks suggest splitting the work into smaller action points and marking milestones through the project development while producing intermediate working deliverables. Each deliverable focuses on giving a prototype of the entire system, with the missing features temporarily replaced using dummy code.

These recommendations seem particularly effective for embedded projects. In an environment where every error could be fatal to the entire system, working on small action points, one at a time, is an efficient way to promptly identify defects and regressions while working on the code base, provided that a **Continuous Integration (CI)** mechanism is in place from the early stages of the development.

Intermediate milestones should be as frequent as possible, and for this reason, it is advisable to create a prototype of the final system as soon as possible in the development phase. This has to be taken into account when actions are identified, prioritized, and distributed to the team.

Once the steps to reach the goal are defined, we need to find the optimal sequence to produce working prototypes for the intermediate milestones. The dependencies among the development actions are taken into account to sort the priorities for the assignments of the work.

A progressive understanding of the system behavior and hardware constraints may change the view on the system's architecture while it is under development, as unexpected issues are faced. Changing specifications as a reaction to measurements and evaluations performed on the intermediate prototype may require a major code rework. Throwing away consistent parts of the project to replace them with a new, improved design is often beneficial for the quality of the project and may result in improved productivity in the later stages. This process, known as **refactoring**, must not be seen as a development overhead whenever it is aimed at improving the design and behavior of the system.

Finally, the process of creating system software includes defining a clear API for the applications to interact with the system in the desired way. Embedded systems provide specific APIs to access system resources most of the time; however, some operating systems and libraries may provide POSIX-like interfaces to access functionalities. In any case, the API is the entry point for the system interfaces and must be designed for usability and well documented.

Defining project steps

When analyzing specifications, defining the required steps, and assigning priorities, several factors may have to be taken into account. Consider designing an air quality monitor device with a PM10 air quality serial sensor, which collects the hourly measurements into the internal flash, then transmits all the statistics daily to a gateway using a wireless transceiver. The target system is a custom board based on Cortex-M MCU, which is adequately sized to run the final software. The final hardware design will not be available until some real-life measurements are done on the transceiver transmitting data to the gateway.

The list of steps to be performed to reach the final goal resulting from these specifications may look as follows:

1. Boot a minimal system on the target (empty main loop).
2. Set up serial port 0 for logging.
3. Set up serial port 1 for the communication to the sensor.
4. Set up a timer.
5. Write the PM10 sensor driver.
6. Create an application that wakes up every hour and reads from the sensor.
7. Write a flash submodule to store/restore measurements.

8. Set up an SPI port to communicate to the radio chip.
9. Write the radio driver.
10. Implement a protocol to communicate with the gateway.
11. Every 24 measurements, the application sends daily measurements to the gateway.

Note

Some of the steps may depend on others, so there are constraints on the order of execution. Some of these dependencies can be removed by using simulators or emulators.

For example, we might want to implement the communication protocol without having a working radio only if there is a way to test the protocol against the agent running on the gateway by using a simulated radio channel on the gateway itself. Keeping the modules self-contained and with a minimal set of API calls exposed to the outside makes it easier to detach the single modules to run and test them on different architectures, and under a controlled environment, before integrating them into the target system.

Prototyping

As it is part of the specifications, we know that we should prioritize the activities related to the radio communication to allow the hardware team to progress on the design, so in this case, the first prototype must do the following:

1. Boot a minimal system on the target (empty main loop).
2. Set up serial port 0 for logging.
3. Set up an SPI port to communicate to the radio chip.
4. Write the radio driver.
5. Set up the timer.
6. Write the main application to test the radio channel (sending raw packets at regular intervals).

This first prototype will already start to look like the final device, even if it does not yet know how to communicate with the sensor. Some test cases can already be implemented to run on a mock gateway, checking that messages are received and valid.

Moving ahead to the next prototype definition, we can start to add a few additional features. Real sensor readings are not necessary to progress on the protocol with the gateway, as it is possible to use made-up, *synthetic* test values that reproduce a specific behavior instead. This allows us to progress on other tasks when the real hardware is not available.

Whether the development team is adopting pure agile software development or is working with a different methodology, fast prototyping in an embedded development environment allows responding faster to the uncertainties on the path, which often depend on the behavior of the hardware and the actions that need to be taken in the software.

Providing workable intermediate deliverables is a common practice in embedded development teams, which directly derives from agile methodologies. Agile software development foresees the delivery of working software regularly and within short intervals of time. Like in the preceding example, an intermediate prototype does not have to implement all the logic of the final software image but instead must be used to prove concepts, make measurements, or provide examples on top of a reduced part of the system.

Refactoring

Too often considered a drastic remedy for a failure, refactoring is actually a healthy practice that improves the software while the system takes its final shape, and the support for software components and peripherals evolves over time.

Refactoring works better if all the tests are up and running on the old code. Unit tests should be adapted to the new function signatures while redesigning the module internals. On the other hand, existing functional tests for the module being refactored should not change if the API of the module stays unchanged and will provide continuous feedback about the status and the accuracy of the process as long as the interface toward other modules remains the same.

Smaller portions of the code base are exponentially easier to refactor than larger ones, which gives us yet another reason to keep each module small and dedicated to a specific function on the system. Progressing through intermediate deliverable prototypes implies constant alterations in the application code, which should require less effort when the subsystems are designed to be independent of each other and from the application code itself.

API and documentation

We all know that a book should not be judged by its cover. However, a system can often be judged by its API, which may reveal many aspects of the internal implementation and the design choices of the system architects. A clear, readable, and easy-to-understand API is one of the most important features of an embedded system. Application developers expect to understand how to access functionalities quickly and to use the system in the most efficient way possible. The API represents the *contract* between the system and the applications, and for this reason, it must be designed beforehand and modified as little as possible, if at all, while the development moves towards the final delivery.

Some interfaces in the API may describe complex subsystems and abstract more elaborate characteristics, so it is always a good idea to provide adequate documentation to help application developers move around and exploit all the system capabilities. There are different ways to provide documentation along with the code, either distributing user manuals in the repository as separate files or including the explanation of the different interfaces directly in the code.

The amount of comments in the code is not an indicator of quality. Comments tend to *age* whenever the code they refer to gets modified because of the possibility that the developer forgets to update the comment to match the new behavior in the code. Moreover, not all code needs to be commented; good habits, such as keeping functions short and low in complexity or using expressive symbol names, would make code comments redundant in most cases, as the code can explain itself.

There are exceptions for lines of code that contain complex calculations, bit shifting, elaborate conditions, or side effects that are not easy to spot when reading the code for the first time. Some portions of code may also require a description at the beginning, for example, those functions with multiple return values and specific error handling. Switch/case statements not containing the break instruction between two cases must always have a comment to indicate that the fall-through is intended and not a mistake.

They should also possibly explain why some actions are grouped between two or more cases. Adding superfluous comments that do not provide any valuable explanation of the code only contributes to making the code harder to read.

On the other hand, describing the behavior of a module with a separate editor and tools requires dedication, as all the documentation must be updated every time there are significant changes in the code, and the developers are asked to switch the focus away from the actual code.

Usually, the important part to document is the description of the contract mentioned previously, enumerating and explaining the functions and the variables that the applications and the other components involved can access at runtime. Since these declarations can be grouped within header files, it is possible to describe the entire contract by adding extended comments on top of the declaration of each exported symbol.

Software tools exist that convert these comments into formatted documentation. A popular example is **Doxxygen**, a free and open source document-generation tool that parses comments matching a specific syntax in the whole code base to produce hypertexts, structured PDF manuals, and many other formats. If the documentation is in the code base, updating and keeping track of its results is easier and less invasive for the developers' workflow. Integrating the generation of the documentation on the automation server can provide a freshly generated copy of the manuals for all the APIs at every commit on the master branch.

Summary

The methodologies that have been proposed are meant as an example of reference patterns used to design and manage the development of embedded projects. While it is possible that some of the patterns described may not apply to all projects, the goal of this chapter is to encourage embedded architects to look for improvements in the process that may result in a more efficient and less expensive software life cycle. Finally, we analyzed the possibility of increasing security by adding appropriate processes and components when required by the use case.

In the next chapter, we shall analyze what happens at boot time inside the embedded system, and how to prepare a bootable application using a simple, bare-metal, main-loop approach.

4

The Boot-Up Procedure

Now that the mechanisms, tools, and methodologies are in place, it is finally time to start looking at the procedures required to run the software on the target. Booting up an embedded system is a process that often requires knowledge of the specific system and the mechanisms in play. Depending on the target, there are a few indications we need to look for in the manual to find out what the system expects from the developer to successfully boot executables from the flash memory. This chapter will focus on the description of the boot process, with emphasis on the case of the Cortex-M microcontroller, which we decided to use as a reference platform. In particular, we will cover the following topics:

- The interrupt vector table
- Memory layout
- Building and running the boot code
- Multiple boot stages

By the end of this chapter, you will have an overview of main-loop embedded development.

Technical requirements

You can find the code files for this chapter on GitHub at <https://github.com/PacktPublishing/Embedded-Systems-Architecture-Second-Edition/tree/main/Chapter4>.

The interrupt vector table

The **interrupt vector table**, often abbreviated to **IVT** or simply **IV**, is an array of pointers to functions associated by the CPU to handle specific *exceptions*, such as faults, system service requests from the application, and interrupt requests from peripherals. The IVT is usually located at the beginning of the binary image and thus is stored starting from the lowest address in the flash memory.

An interrupt request from a hardware component or peripheral will force the CPU to abruptly suspend the execution and execute the function at the associated position in the vector. For this reason, these functions are called **interrupt service routines** (or simply **ISRs**). Runtime exceptions and faults can be handled in the same way as hardware interrupts, so special service routines are associated with internal CPU triggers through the same table.

The order of the ISRs enumerated in the vector, and their exact positions depend on the CPU architecture, the microcontroller model, and the peripherals supported. Each interrupt line corresponds to a predefined interrupt number and, depending on the microcontroller features, may be assigned a priority.

In a Cortex-M microcontroller, the first 16 positions in memory are reserved for storing the pointers to system handlers, which are architecture-dependent, and associated to different types of CPU runtime exceptions. The lowest address is used to store the initial value of the stack pointer, and the next 15 positions are reserved for system services and fault handlers. However, some of these positions are reserved and not connected to any event. The system exceptions that can be handled using separate service routines in a Cortex-M CPU are as follows:

- Reset
- **Non-Maskable Interrupt (NMI)**
- Hard fault
- Memory exception
- Bus fault
- Usage fault
- Supervisor call
- Debug monitor event
- PendSV call
- System tick

The order of the hardware interrupts, starting from position 16, depends on the microcontroller configuration and, thus, on the specific silicon model, as the interrupt configuration refers to specific components, interfaces, and external peripheral activities.

A fully populated vector of external interrupt handlers for STM32F407 and LM3S targets can be found in this book's code repository.

Startup code

In order to boot a workable system, we need to define the interrupt vector and associate pointers with defined functions. A typical startup code file for our reference platform places the interrupt vector in a dedicated section using the GCC `section` attribute. As the section will be put at the beginning of the image, we must define our interrupt vector starting with the reserved space for the initial stack pointer, followed by the system exception handlers.

The zeros correspond to the positions of the reserved/unused slots:

```
__attribute__((section(".isr_vector")))
void (* const IV[])(void) =
{
    (void (*)(void))(END_STACK),
    isr_reset,
    isr_nmi,
    isr_hard_fault,
    isr_mem_fault,
    isr_bus_fault,
    isr_usage_fault,
    0, 0, 0, 0,
    isr_svc,
    isr_dbgmon,
    0,
    isr_pendsv,
    isr_systick,

```

From this position on, we define the interrupt lines for the external peripherals as follows:

```
    isr_uart0,
    isr_ethernet,
    /* ... many more external interrupts follow */
};
```

The startup code must also include the implementation of every symbol referenced in the array. The handler can be defined as void procedures with no arguments, in the same format as the signature of the IV:

```
void isr_bus_fault(void) {
    /* Bus error. Panic! */
}
```



```
while(1);  
}
```

The interrupt handler in this example never returns, as a result of an unrecoverable bus error, and hangs the system forever. Empty interrupt handlers can be associated to both system and external interrupts using weak symbols that can be overridden in the device driver modules by simply defining them again in the relevant code section.

Reset handler

When the microcontroller is powered on, it starts the execution from the `reset` handler. This is a special ISR that does not return but rather performs initialization of the `.data` and `.bss` sections, and then calls the entry point of the application. The initialization of the `.data` and `.bss` sections consists of copying the initial value of the variables in the `.data` section in flash onto the actual section in RAM where variables are accessed at runtime and filling the `.bss` section in RAM with zeros so that the initial value of static symbols is guaranteed to be zero as per C convention.

The source and destination addresses of the `.data` and `.bss` sections in RAM are computed by the linker when generating the binary image and exported as pointers using the linker script. The implementation of `isr_reset` may look similar to the following:

```
void isr_reset(void)  
{  
    unsigned int *src, *dst;  
    src = (unsigned int *) &_amp;stored_data;  
    dst = (unsigned int *) &_amp;start_data;  
    while (dst != (unsigned int *)&end_data) {  
        *dst = *src;  
        dst++;  
        src++;  
    }  
    dst = &_amp;start_bss;  
    while (dst != (unsigned int *)&end_bss) {  
        *dst = 0;  
        dst++;  
    }  
    main();  
}
```

Once the variables in the `.bss` and `.data` sections have been initialized, it is finally possible to call the `main` function, which is the entry point of the application. The application code ensures that `main` never returns by implementing an infinite loop.

Allocating the stack

In order to comply with the **application binary interface (ABI)** of the CPU, it is required to assign space in memory for the execution stack. This can be done in different ways, but usually, it is preferable to mark the end of the stack space in the linker script and associate the stack space to a specific area in RAM, not in use by any section.

The address obtained through the `END_STACK` symbol, exported by the linker script, points to the end of an unused area in RAM. As mentioned earlier, its value must be stored at the beginning of the vector table, at address 0 in our case, just before the IV. The address of the end of the stack has to be constant and cannot be calculated at runtime because the IV content is stored in the flash memory and thus cannot be modified later on.

Properly sizing the execution stack in memory is a delicate task that includes the assessment of the whole code base, keeping in mind stack usage from local variables and the depth of the call trace at any time during the execution. The analysis of all the factors related to stack usage and troubleshooting will be part of a wider topic that is covered in the next chapter. Our simple startup code provided here has a stack size that is big enough to contain the local variables and the function call stack, as it is mapped by the linker script as far as possible from the `.bss` and `.data` sections. Further aspects of the placement of the stack are considered in *Chapter 5, Memory Management*.

Fault handlers

Fault-related events are triggered by the CPU in the case of execution errors or policy violations. The CPU is able to detect a number of runtime errors, such as the following:

- Attempting to execute code outside the memory areas marked as executable
- Fetching data or the next instruction to execute from an invalid location
- Illegal loading or storing using an unaligned address
- Division by zero
- Trying to access unavailable coprocessor functionalities
- Attempting to read/write/execute outside the memory areas allowed for the current running mode

Some core microcontrollers support different types of exceptions depending on the type of error. The Cortex-M3/M4 can distinguish between bus errors, usage faults, memory access violations, and generic faults, triggering the related exception. In other, smaller systems, fewer details are available on the type of runtime error.

Very often, a fault will make the system unusable or unable to continue the execution due to the CPU register values or the stack being corrupted. In some cases, even placing a breakpoint inside the exception handler is not sufficient to detect the cause of the problem, making debugging harder. Some CPUs support extended information on the cause of the fault, which is available through memory-mapped registers after the exception occurs. In the case of the Cortex-M3/M4, this information is available through the **Configurable Fault Status Register (CFSR)**, which is mapped at address 0xE000ED28 on all Cortex-M3/M4 CPUs.

Memory violations may be non-fatal if the corresponding exception handler implements some kind of recovery strategy and can be useful to detect and react to the fault at runtime, which is especially useful in multithreaded environments, as we will see in more detail in *Chapter 9, Distributed Systems and IoT Architecture*.

Memory layout

The linker script, as we already know, contains the instructions for the linker on how to assemble the components of an embedded system. More specifically, it describes the sections mapped in memory and how they are deployed into the flash and the RAM of the target, as in the example provided in *Chapter 2, Work Environment and Workflow Optimization*.

In most embedded devices, and in particular our reference platform, the `.text` output section in the linker script, which contains all the executable code, should also include the special input section dedicated to storing the IV at the very beginning of the executable image.

We integrate the linker script by adding the `.isr_vector` section at the beginning of the `.text` output section before the rest of the code:

```
.text :
{
    *(.isr_vector)
    *(.text*)
    *(.rodata*)
} > FLASH
```

Defining a read-only area in flash, which is dedicated to the vector table, is the only strict requirement for our system to boot up properly, as the address of the `isr_reset` function is retrieved by the CPU at boot time from the 0x04 address in memory.

Right after the definition for the text and read-only areas in flash, the linker script should export the value of the current address, which is the beginning of the `.data` output section stored in flash. This section contains the initial value of all the global and static variables that have been initialized in the code. In the example linker script, the beginning of the `.data` section is marked by the `_stored_data` linker script variable, as follows:

```
_stored_data = .;
```

The data section will eventually be mapped in RAM, but its initialization is done manually in the `isr_reset` function by copying the content from flash to the actual region designated to the `.data` section in RAM. The linker script provides a mechanism to separate the **Virtual Memory Address (VMA)** and the **Load Memory Address (LMA)** for a section, using the `AT` keyword in the definition of the section. If no `AT` keyword is specified, the LMA is, by default, set to the same address as the VMA. In our case, the VMA of the `.data` input section is in RAM and exported using the `_start_data` pointer, which will be used by `isr_vector` as the destination address when copying the values of the symbols stored from flash. The LMA of `.data`, though, is located in the flash memory, so we set the LMA address to the `_stored_data` pointer in flash, while defining the `.data` output section:

```
.data : AT (_stored_data)
{
    _start_data = .;
    *(.data*)
    . = ALIGN(4);
    _end_data = .;
} > RAM
```

For `.bss`, there is no LMA, as no data is stored in the image for this section. When including the `.bss` output section, its VMA will automatically be set to the end of the `.data` output section:

```
.bss :
{
    _start_bss = .;
    *(.bss*)
    . = ALIGN(4);
    _end_bss = .;
    _end = .;
} > RAM
```

Finally, in this design, the linker is expected to provide the initial value for the execution stack. Using the highest address in memory is a common choice for a single-threaded application, even though, as discussed in the next chapter, this may cause problems in the case of stack overflow. For this example, however, this is an acceptable solution, and we define the `END_STACK` symbol by adding the following line to the linker script:

```
END_STACK = ORIGIN(RAM) + LENGTH(RAM);
```

To better understand where each symbol will be placed in memory, variable definitions can be added to the startup file in different places within the code. This way, we can check the locations where the variables are stored in memory when running the executable in the debugger for the first time.

Supposing that we have variables stored in both the `.data` and `.bss` output sections, the memory layout for the example startup code may look like the following:




Figure 4.1 – Memory layout in the example startup code

When the executable is linked, the symbols are automatically set at compile time to indicate the beginning and the end of each section in memory. In our case, variables indicating the beginning and the end of each section are automatically assigned to the right value, depending on the size of the sections that the linker will include when creating the executable. Since the size of each section is known at compile time, the linker is able to identify those situations where the `.text` and `.data` sections do not fit into the flash, and a linker error is generated at the end of the build. Creating a map file is useful for checking the size and the location of each symbol. In our boot-up example code, here is how the `.text` section appears within the map file:

```
.text 0x0000000000000000 0x168
0x0000000000000000 _start_text = .
*(.isr_vector)
.isr_vector 0x0000000000000000 0xf0 startup.o
0x0000000000000000 IV
```

```
*(.text*)
.text 0x00000000000000f0 0x78 startup.o
0x00000000000000f0 isr_reset
0x0000000000000134 isr_fault
0x000000000000013a isr_empty
0x0000000000000146 main
```

Similarly, we can find the boundaries of each section, exported by the linker script at compile time:

```
0x0000000000000000 _start_text = .
0x0000000000000168 _end_text = .
0x0000000020000000 _start_data = .
0x0000000020000004 _end_data = .
0x0000000020000004 _start_bss = .
0x0000000020000328 _end_bss = .
0x0000000020000328 _end = .
```

The `.rodata` input section, which is empty in this minimalist example, is mapped in the flash memory area, in between `.text` and the data LMA. This is reserved for constant symbols because constants do not have to be mapped in RAM. It is advisable to enforce the `const C` modifier when defining constant symbols because RAM is often our most precious resource, and in some cases, even sparing a few bytes of writable memory by moving constant symbols to the flash can make a difference in the project development, as flash memory is usually much bigger, and its usage can be easily determined at linking time.

Building and running the boot code

The example provided here is one of the simplest executable images that can be run on the target. To assemble, compile, and link everything together, we can use a simple makefile that automates all the steps and allows us to focus on our software life cycle.

When the image is ready, we can transfer it to the real target or alternatively, run it using an emulator.

The makefile

A very basic makefile to build our startup application describes the final target (`image.bin`) and the intermediate steps required to build it. Makefile syntax is, in general, very vast, and covering all the functions provided by **Make** is outside the scope of this book. However, the few concepts explained here should be sufficient to get up and running on automating the build process.

Defining the targets for our makefile, in this case, is quite simple. The `startup.c` source file, containing the IV, some exception handlers, and the main and the global variables we used in the

example, can be compiled and assembled into a `startup.o` object file. The linker uses the indications provided in the `target.ld` linker script to deploy the symbols in the correct sections, producing the `.elf` executable image.

Finally, `objcopy` is used to transform the `.elf` executable into a binary image, which can be transferred to the target or run using QEMU:




Figure 4.2 – Build steps and dependencies

The makefile should contain a few configuration variables to describe the toolchain. The `=` assignment operator allows you to set values for the variables when invoking the `make` command. Some of these variables are implicitly used as default during compilation and linking. It is common practice to define the toolchain prefix using the `CROSS_COMPILE` variable and use that as a prefix for the tools involved in the build process:

```

CROSS_COMPILE=arm-none-eabi-
CC=$(CROSS_COMPILE)gcc
LD=$(CROSS_COMPILE)ld
OBJCOPY=$(CROSS_COMPILE)objcopy

```

Changing the default cross compiler for this project can be done by running `make` and assigning a different value to the `CROSS_COMPILE` environment variable. All the names of the tools are prefixed by the `CROSS_COMPILE` variable expansion so that the build steps will use the components from the given toolchain. In the same way, we can define our default flags for the compiler and the linker:

```

CFLAGS=-mcpu=cortex-m3 -mthumb -g -ggdb -Wall -Wno-main
LDFLAGS=-T target.ld -gc-sections -nostdlib -Map=image.map

```

When invoked with no arguments, Make builds the first target defined in the `image.bin` makefile. A new target for `image.bin` can be defined as follows:

```
image.bin: image.elf
$(OBJCOPY) -O binary $^ $@
```

The `$@` and `$^` variables will be replaced in the recipe with the target and the list of dependencies, respectively. This means that, in the example, the makefile will process the recipe as follows:

```
arm-none-eabi-objcopy -O binary image.elf image.bin
```

This is the command we need to produce a raw binary image from the `.elf` executable.

Similarly, we can define the recipe for `image.elf`, which is the linking step, depending on the `startup.o` compiled object file, and the linker script:

```
image.elf: startup.o target.ld
$(LD) $(LDFLAGS) startup.o -o $@
```

In this case, we are not going to use the `$^` variable for the list of dependencies, as the recipe includes the linker script in the linker command line using `LDFLAGS`. The recipe for the linking step will be expanded by `main` as follows:

```
arm-none-eabi-ld -T target.ld -gc-sections -nostdlib  
-Map=image.map startup.o -o image.elf
```

Using `-nostdlib` ensures that no default C libraries are linked automatically to the project, among those available in the toolchain, that would, by default, be linked in to produce the executables. This ensures that no symbols are automatically pulled.

The last step for resolving dependencies is compiling the source code into the object file. This is done in a makefile implicit recipe that eventually gets translated to the following when using the project default values:

```
arm-none-eabi-gcc -c -o startup.o startup.c -mcpu=cortex-m3  
-mthumb -g -ggdb -Wall -Wno-main
```

Using the `-mcpu=cortex-m3` flag ensures that the code produced is compatible with Cortex-M targets from Cortex-M3 onward. The same binary can, in fact, eventually be run on any Cortex-M3, M4, or M7 target, and it is generic until we do not decide to use any CPU-specific feature, or define hardware interrupt handlers, as the order of those depends on the specific microcontroller.

By defining a `clean` target, at any point in time, it is possible to start over from a clean slate, by removing the intermediate targets and the final image and running `make` again. The `clean` target is also often included in the same makefile. In our example, it looks as follows:

```
clean:
    rm -f image.bin image.elf *.o image.map
```

The `clean` target usually has no dependencies. Running `make clean` removes all the intermediate and final targets as instructed in the recipe, leaving the sources and the linker script untouched.

Running the application

Once the image is built, we can run it on a real target or using `qemu-system-arm`, as explained in *Chapter 2, Work Environment and Workflow Optimization*. Since the application will produce no output while running on the emulator, to investigate more about the actual behavior of the software, we need to attach a debugger to it. When running the emulator, `qemu-system-arm` must be invoked with the `-S` option, meaning stop, so that it will not start the execution until the debugger is connected. Since the `CFLAGS` variable in the previous step contains the `-g` option, all the symbol names will be kept in the `.elf` executable so that the debugger can follow the execution through the code line by line, placing breakpoints and checking the values for the variables.

Following the procedures step by step and comparing addresses and values with those in the `.map` files can be helpful in understanding what is happening and how the context changes through the entire boot sequence.

Multiple boot stages

Booting a target through a bootloader is useful in several cases. In a real-life scenario, being able to update the running software on devices in a remote location means that developers are able to fix bugs and introduce new features after the first version of the embedded system has been deployed.

This represents a huge advantage for maintenance when a bug is discovered in the field, or when the software has to be re-engineered to adapt to changes in requirements. Bootloaders may implement automatic remote upgrades and other useful features, such as the following:

- Loading of the application image from an external storage
- Verification of the integrity of the application image before boot
- Failover mechanisms in case of a corrupted application

Multiple bootloaders can be chained to perform a multiple-stage boot sequence. This allows you to have separate software images for the multiple boot stages, which can be uploaded to the flash independently. A first-stage boot, when present, is usually very simple and used to simply select the entry point for the next stage. However, in some cases, early stages benefit from slightly more complex

designs to implement software upgrade mechanisms or other features. The example proposed here shows the separation between two boot stages, achieved using the functionalities available in many Cortex-M processors. The only purpose of this simple bootloader is to initialize the system for booting the application in the next stage.

Bootloader

The first-stage bootloader starts up as a normal standalone application. Its IV must be located at the beginning of the flash, and the `reset` handler initializes the associated `.data` and `.bss` memory sections, like in a normal single-stage boot. A partition at the beginning of the flash should be reserved for the `.text` and `.data` bootloader sections. To do so, the linker script for the bootloader will only include the beginning of the flash memory, and that of the application will have an offset of the same size.

The bootloader and the application will, in fact, be built into two separate binaries. This way, the two linker scripts can have the same name for sections, and differ only by the description of the FLASH partition in the linker memory. Nevertheless, the method suggested next is only one of the possible configurations: a more complex setup may benefit from exporting the full geometry using the start addresses and sizes of all the partitions.

If we want to reserve 4 KB for the bootloader partition, we can hardcode the FLASH area in the bootloader linker script as follows:

```
FLASH (rx) : ORIGIN = 0x00000000, LENGTH = 0x00001000
```

Similarly, the linker script of the application has an offset in the origin, hardcoded to the size of the bootloader, so that the `.text` output section of the application always starts at the `0x1000` address. From the application point of view, the whole FLASH area starts from the `0x00001000` address:

```
FLASH (rx) : ORIGIN = 0x00001000, LENGTH = 0x0003F000
```

The geometry of the flash, in this case, would be the following:




Figure 4.3 – Layout of the flash content, showing the sections of both the bootloader and the application

Bootloader and **Application** run separate code and can define their own IV based on the handler that will be used in the respective stage. The simplest example of a working bootloader can be realized by hardcoding the address of the application and jumping to the entry point, being the `reset` handler in the IV of the application stored with offset 4 inside the vector table.

The application may enforce its own memory layout. At startup, it will be able to initialize the new `.data` and `.bss` sections according to the new geometry and even define a new initial stack pointer and IV. The bootloader can obtain these two pointers by reading the first two words of the IV stored at address `0x1000`:

```
uint32_t app_end_stack = (*(uint32_t *) (APP_OFFSET));  
void (* app_entry) (void);  
app_entry = (void *) (*(uint32_t *) (APP_OFFSET + 4));
```

Before jumping to the entry point of the application, we want to reset the main execution stack pointer to the end address of the stack. Since `MSP` is a special-purpose CPU register in the ARMv7-M architecture, it can only be written using the assembly instruction **move special from register** (`msr`). The following code is inlined in the bootloader to set the correct application stack pointer to the value stored in flash at the beginning of the application image:

```
asm volatile("msr msp, %0" :: "r" (app_end_stack));
```

In Cortex-M3 and other, more powerful, 32-bit Cortex-M CPUs, a control register is present within the system control block area, which can be used to specify an offset for the vector table at runtime. This is the **Vector Table Offset Register (VTOR)**, which is located at address `0xE000ED08`. Writing the application offset to this register means that, from that moment, the new IV is in place, and the interrupt handlers defined in the application will be executed upon exceptions:

```
uint32_t * VTOR = (uint32_t *) 0xE000ED08;  
*VTOR = (uint32_t *) (APP_OFFSET);
```

When this mechanism is not available, like in Cortex-M0 microcontrollers, which do not have a VTOR, the application will still share the interrupt vector with the bootloader after it is started. To provide a different set of interrupt handlers, the relevant function pointers can be stored in a different area of the flash, and the bootloader can check whether the application had been started or not at every interrupt, and in case it was, call the respective handler from the table in the application space.

When handling pointers to interrupt handlers and other exception routines, it is important to consider that an exception can occur at any time while running the code, especially if the bootloader has enabled peripherals or activated timers in the CPU. To prevent unpredictable jumps to interrupt routine, it is advisable to disable all the interrupts while the pointers are being updated.

The instruction set provides mechanisms to temporarily mask all the interrupts. While running with the interrupt globally disabled, the execution cannot be interrupted by any exception, excluding NMI. In Cortex-M, interrupts can be temporarily disabled by using the `cpsid i` assembly statement:

```
asm volatile ("cpsid i");
```

To enable the interrupt again, the `cpsie i` instruction is used:

```
asm volatile ("cpsie i");
```

Running code with interrupts disabled should be done as much as strictly necessary, and not done only in special cases where other solutions are not available because it impacts the latency of the entire system. In this special case, it is used to ensure that no service routines are invoked while the IV is being relocated.

The last action performed by the bootloader in its short life is a direct jump to the `reset` handler in the application IV. Since the function will never return, and a brand-new stack space has been just allocated, we force an unconditional jump by setting the value CPU program counter register to start executing from the address of `app_entry`, which is pointed to by `isr_reset`:

```
asm volatile("mov pc, %0" :: "r"(app_entry));
```

In our example, this function will never return, since we replaced the execution stack pointer value. This is compatible with the behavior foreseen by the `reset` handler, which will, in turn, jump to the main function in the application.

Building the image

Since the two executables will be built in separate `.elf` files, there are mechanisms to join the content of the two partitions together into a single image, to upload to the target, or to use in the emulator. The bootloader partition can be filled with zeros up to its size by using the `--pad-to` option of `objcopy` when converting the `.elf` executable into the binary image. Wearing the flash can be reduced by using the `0xFF` value to fill the padding area, which can be obtained by passing the `--gap-fill=0xFF`. The resultant image `bootloader.bin` will be exactly 4096 bytes so that the application image can be concatenated at the end of it. The steps to compose an image containing the two partitions are the following:

```
$ arm-none-eabi-objcopy -O binary --pad-to=4096 --gap-fill=0xFF  
bootloader.elf bootloader.bin  
$ arm-none-eabi-objcopy -O binary app.elf app.bin  
$ cat bootloader.bin app.bin > image.bin
```

Looking at the resultant `image.bin` file with a hexadecimal editor, it should be possible to identify the end of the bootloader within the first partition by recognizing the zero pattern that is used by `objdump` as padding, and the application code starting at address `0x1000`.

By aligning the application offset to the start of a physical page in flash instead, it is even possible to upload the two images in separate steps, allowing you, for instance, to upgrade the application code, leaving the bootloader partition untouched.

Debugging a multi-stage system

The separation between two or more stages implies that the symbols of the two executables are linked into different `.elf` files. Debugging using both sets of symbols is still possible, but the symbols from both `.elf` files must be loaded in the debugger in two steps. When the debugger is executed using the symbols from the bootloader, by adding the `bootloader.elf` file as an argument, or using the `file` command from the GDB command line, the symbols of the bootloader are loaded in the symbol table for the debugging session. To add the symbols from the application `.elf` file, we can add the corresponding `.elf` at a later stage using `add-symbol-file`.

The `add-symbol-file` directive, unlike `file`, ensures that the symbols of a second executable are loaded without overwriting the ones previously loaded and allows you to specify the address where the `.text` section starts. In the system composed in this example, there is no clash between the two sets of symbols, as the two partitions do not share any area on the flash. The debugger can continue the execution normally and still have all the symbols available after the bootloader jumps to the application entry point:

```
> add-symbol-file app.elf
add symbol table from file "app.elf"(y or n) y
Reading symbols from app.elf...done.
```

Sharing the same names for sections and symbols between the two executables is legal, as the two executables are self-contained and not linked together. The debugger is aware of duplicate names when we refer to a symbol by its name during debugging. For example, if we place a breakpoint on `main` and we have correctly loaded the symbols from both executables, the breakpoint will be set on both locations:

```
> b main
Breakpoint 1 at 0x14e: main. (2 locations)
> info b
Num Type Disp Enb Address What
1 breakpoint keep y <MULTIPLE>
1.1 y 0x0000014e in main at startup_bl.c:53
```

```
1.2 y 0x00001158 in main at startup.c:53
```

Separate boot stages are completely isolated from each other and do not share any executable code. For this reason, software distributed with different licenses, even if not compatible with each other, can run in separate boot stages. As seen in the example, the two software images can use the same symbol names without creating conflicts, as they would have been running on two separate systems.

In some cases, however, multiple boot stages may have functionalities in common that can be implemented using the same library. Unfortunately, there is no simple way to access the symbols of the library from separate software images. The mechanism described in the next example provides access to shared libraries between the two stages by storing the symbols needed only once in the flash.

Shared libraries

Suppose that there is a small library providing general-purpose utilities or device drivers, which is in use by both the bootloader and the application. Even when the footprint is small, it is preferable not to have duplicate definitions of the same functions in the flash memory. The library can instead be linked in a dedicated section of the bootloader and referred to in a later stage. In our preceding two-stage example, we can safely place the API function pointers in an array starting at address 0x400, which is past the end of the interrupt vector we are currently using. In a real project, the offset must be high enough to be after the actual vector table in memory. The `.utils` input section is placed in the linker script in between the vector table and the start of `.text` in the bootloader:

```
.text :
{
    _start_text = .;
    KEEP(*(.isr_vector))
    . = 0x400;
    KEEP(*(.utils))
    *(.text*)
    *(.rodata*)
    . = ALIGN(4);
    _end_text = .;
} > FLASH
```

The actual function definitions can be placed in a different source file and linked in the bootloader. What is actually in the `.utils` section is a table containing the pointers to the actual address of the functions inside the `.text` bootloader output section:

```
__attribute__((section(".utils"),used))
static void *utils_interface[4] = {
```

```

(void *) (utils_open),
(void *) (utils_write),
(void *) (utils_read),
(void *) (utils_close)
};

```

The layout of the bootloader now has this extra `.utils` section, aligned at address `0x400`, containing a table with the pointers to the library functions that are meant to be exported for use from other stages:




Figure 4.4 – Bootloader partition with the `.utils` section

The application expects to find the function table at the given address:

```
static void **utils_interface = (void**) (0x00000400);
```

The address of the single functions that have been stored in the bootloader is now available, but there is no information about the signature of these functions. For this reason, the application can only access the API properly if the pointers are converted to match the expected function signature. An inline wrapper can then be provided so that the application code can access the function directly:

```

static inline int utils_read(void *buf, int size) {
    int (*do_read)(void*, int) = (int (*)(void*,int))
        (utils_interface[2]);
    return do_read(buf, size);
}

```

In this case, the contract is implicitly shared between the two modules, and the correspondence between the function signatures is not checked at compile time, nor is the validity of the function pointer stored in flash. On the other hand, it is a valid approach to avoid binary code duplication and might be an effective way to reduce flash usage by sharing symbols across separate contexts.

Remote firmware updates

One of the reasons to include a bootloader in an embedded system design is often to provide a mechanism to update the running application from a remote location. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a reliable update mechanism is often a critical requirement for vulnerability management. On rich embedded systems running Linux, bootloaders are often equipped with their own TCP/IP stacks, network device drivers, and protocol-specific implementations to transfer kernel and filesystem updates autonomously. On smaller embedded systems, it is often convenient to assign this task to the application, which is in most cases already using similar communication channels for other functional purposes. Once the new firmware has been downloaded and stored in any non-volatile memory support (for example, in a partition at the end of the flash memory), a bootloader could implement a mechanism to install the received update by overwriting the previous firmware in the **Application** partition.

Secure boot

Many projects require a mechanism to prevent the execution of unauthorized or altered firmware that could have been compromised intentionally by an attacker in an attempt to take control of the system. This is a task for secure bootloaders, which use cryptography to verify the authenticity of a signature calculated on the content of the firmware image on board. Secure bootloaders implementing such mechanisms rely on a trust anchor to store a public key and require the use of a manifest that must be attached to the firmware image file. The manifest contains the signature that has been created by the owner of the private key associated with the public key stored in the device. Cryptographic signature verification is a very effective method to prevent unauthorized firmware updates, both from remote locations and from physical attacks.

Implementing a secure bootloader from scratch is a considerable amount of work. A few open source projects provide a mechanism to sign and verify images using cryptography algorithms. **wolfBoot** is a secure bootloader providing integrity and authenticity checks of the current firmware and the candidates for update installations. It provides a fail-safe mechanism to swap the two firmware partitions' content during the update installation, to provide a backup in case of failed execution of the newly updated image. The bootloader comes with tools to generate the signature and attach the manifest to the file to be transferred to the device, and a wide range of configurable options, ciphers, and features.

Summary

Understanding the boot procedure is a key step toward the development of an embedded system. We have seen how to boot straight into the bare-metal application, and we have examined the structures involved in a multi-stage system boot, such as separate linker scripts with different entry points, the relocation of IVs via CPU registers, and shared code sections across stages.

In the next chapter, we will explore mechanisms and approaches for memory management that represent the most important factor to take into account while developing safe and reliable embedded systems.

5

Memory Management

Handling memory is one of the most important tasks for an embedded system programmer, and surely the most important to take into account in every phase of the development of a system. This chapter is about the models commonly used to manage memory in an embedded system, the geometry and the mapping of the memory, and how to prevent issues that could compromise the stability and safety of the software running on the target.

This chapter is divided into four parts:

- Memory mapping
- The execution stack
- Heap management
- The memory protection unit

By the end of this chapter, you will have an in-depth knowledge of how to manage the memory in an embedded system.

Technical requirements

You can find the code files for this chapter on GitHub at <https://github.com/PacktPublishing/Embedded-Systems-Architecture-Second-Edition/tree/main/Chapter5/memory>.

Memory mapping

Application software usually benefits from a number of abstractions available in the environment for the handling of memory. In modern operating systems on personal computers, each process can access its own memory space, which can also be relocated by remapping memory blocks to virtual memory addresses. Moreover, dynamic memory allocations are possible through virtual memory pools provided by the kernel. Embedded devices do not rely on these mechanisms, as there is no way to assign virtual addresses to physical memory locations. In all contexts and running modes, all the symbols can be accessed only by pointing at physical addresses.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, booting a bare-metal embedded application requires defining the sections at compile time within the assigned regions in the available address space, using the linker script. In order to properly configure the memory sections in our embedded software, it is important to analyze the properties of the various regions and the techniques that we can use to organize and manage the memory areas.

Memory model and address space

The total amount of available addresses depends on the size of memory pointers. 32-bit machines can reference a contiguous memory space of 4 GB, which is segmented to host all the memory-mapped devices in a system. This may include the following:

- Internal RAM
- Flash memory
- System control registers
- Components internal to the microcontroller
- An external peripheral bus
- Additional external RAM

Every region has a fixed physical address that may depend on the characteristics of the platform. All the locations are hardcoded, and some of them are platform-specific.

In the ARM Cortex-M, the total addressable space is divided into six macro-regions. Depending on their purpose, the regions have different permissions so that there are areas of memory that can only be accessible for read operations at runtime, or that are not allowed to execute in place. These constraints are implemented in hardware but might be configurable at runtime on microcontrollers that include an MPU:




Figure 5.1 – The ARM Cortex-M address space

In general, only small sections (that are the same size as physical components) are mapped within these regions. Trying to access memory that is not mapped to any hardware triggers an exception in the CPU. When approaching a target platform, it is important to know the locations and the sizes of the memory sections corresponding to the hardware on board, in order to properly describe the geometry of the available address space in the linker script and in the source code.

The code region

The lowest 512 MB of the addressing space in a Cortex-M microcontroller is reserved for executable code. Targets that support XIP always map the flash memory within this area, and the memory is generally not writable at runtime. In our previous examples, the `.text` and `.rodata` sections are mapped within this region, as they remain constant during the execution of the software. Additionally, the initial values of all non-zero defined symbols are placed in this area and need to be explicitly copied and re-mapped to a writable segment in order to modify their value at runtime. As we already know, the **interrupt vector table (IVT)** is usually located at the beginning of the mapped section. Multiple flash memory banks may be mapped into the code region. The regions associated

with physical devices must be known in advance and are dependent on the hardware design. Many microcontrollers map the code region at address 0x00000000, while others choose a different starting address (for example, 0x10000000 or 0x08000000). STM32F4 FLASH memory is mapped at 0x08000000 and provides an alias so that the same memory can be accessed at runtime, starting at address 0x00000000 as well.

Note

When the flash memory address starts at address 0, NULL pointers can be de-referenced and will point to the beginning of the code region, which is normally accessible for reading. While this technically violates the C standard, it is a common practice within embedded C code to read from address 0x00000000 in these cases – for example, to read the initial stack pointer in the IVT on the ARM.

The RAM regions

Internal RAM banks are mapped to addresses in the second 512 MB block, starting at address 0x20000000. External memory banks may be mapped anywhere in the 1 GB region, starting at address 0x60000000. Depending on the geometry of the internal SRAM inside the Cortex-M microcontroller, or the displacement of external memory banks, actually accessible memory areas can be mapped in non-contiguous, different parts of the memory within the allowed range. Memory management must take into account discontinuity in the physical mapping and refer to each section separately. The STM32F407 MPU, for example, has two non-contiguously mapped blocks of internal SRAM:

- 128 KB of SRAM at address 0x20000000 (in two contiguous blocks of 112 KB and 16 KB)
- A separate bank of 64 KB **Core-Coupled Memory (CCM)**, mapped at address 0x10000000

This second memory is tightly coupled to the CPU and optimized for time-critical operations, which allows for zero wait state access from the CPU itself.

In this case, we may reference the two blocks as two separate areas in the linker script:

```
flash (rx) : ORIGIN = 0x08000000, LENGTH = 256K
SRAM (rwx) : ORIGIN = 0x20000000, LENGTH = 128K
CCMSRAM(rwx) : ORIGIN = 0x10000000, LENGTH = 64K
```

While the RAM region is designed for data, it generally keeps execution permissions, so sections of code can be loaded into RAM and executed at runtime. Executing code in RAM expands the flexibility of the system, allowing us to process code sections before loading them to memory. Binaries that are not meant to be executed in place can be stored on any device in other formats too, even using compression or encryption algorithms. While sometimes handy, the possibility of using sections in RAM to store executable code takes away precious runtime memory from a system. The benefits must be carefully taken into account beforehand when designing the system, especially from the point of view of actual runtime memory demands coming from the application.

Peripheral-access regions

The 512 MB area following the internal RAM region, starting at address 0x40000000, is reserved for peripherals that are normally built into a microcontroller. The 1 GB area starting at address 0xA0000000 is instead used to map external memory chips and other devices that can be memory-mapped in the MCU addressing space but are not part of the original chip package. In order to correctly access the peripherals, the configuration of the internal components within the MCU packaging and the addresses of the memory-mapped devices must be known in advance. Code execution is never allowed in these regions.

The system region

The highest 512 MB of the Cortex-M memory mapping is reserved for accessing system configuration and private control blocks. This region contains the system control registers, which are the registers used to program the processor, and the peripheral control registers, used to configure devices and peripherals. Code execution is not allowed, and the region is uniquely accessible when the processor is running at *privileged level*, as explained in more detail in *Chapter 10, Parallel Tasks and Scheduling*.

Accessing hardware registers by de-referencing their well-known addresses is useful to set and get their values at runtime. However, there is no way for the compiler to tell the difference between an assignment of a variable mapped in RAM and a configuration register in the system control block. For this reason, the compiler often thinks that it is a good idea to optimize code by altering the order of the memory transactions, which might in fact result in unpredictable effects when the next operation depends on the correct conclusion of all the memory transfer from the previous ones. For this reason, extra care is needed when accessing configuration registers to ensure that the memory transfer operation is concluded before the next one is executed.

Order of memory transactions

On ARM CPUs, the memory system does not guarantee that the memory transactions are executed in the same order as the instructions that generate them. The order of memory transactions can be altered to adjust to the characteristics of the hardware, such as the wait states required to access underlying physical memory, or by the speculative branch prediction mechanisms implemented at the microcode level. While Cortex-M microcontrollers guarantee a strict ordering of the transactions involving the peripherals and the system regions, in all other cases code must be instrumented accordingly, by placing adequate memory barriers to ensure that the previous memory transactions have been executed before executing the next instruction. The Cortex-M instruction set includes three kinds of barriers:

- The **data memory barrier (DMB)**
- The **data synchronization barrier (DSB)**
- The **instruction synchronization barrier (ISB)**

The DSB is a *soft* barrier, invoked to ensure that all the pending transactions are executed before the next memory transaction occurs. The DSB is used to actually suspend the execution until all the pending transactions have been executed. The ISB, in addition, also flushes the CPU pipeline and ensures that all the new instructions are fetched again after the memory transactions, thus preventing any side effects caused by the outdated memory content. There are a number of cases where using a barrier is required:

- After updating the VTOR to change the address of the IV
- After updating the memory mapping
- During the execution of code that modifies itself

The execution stack

As seen in the previous chapter, a bare-metal application starts executing with an empty stack area. The execution stack grows backward, from the high address provided at boot to lower addresses every time a new item is stored. The stack keeps track of the chain of function calls at all times by storing the branching point at each function call, but it also serves as temporary storage during function executions. Variables within the local scope of each function are stored inside the stack while the function is executing. For this reason, keeping stack usage under control is one of the most critical tasks while developing an embedded system.

Embedded programming requires us to be aware at all times of stack usage while coding. Placing big objects in the stack, such as communication buffers or long strings, is in general not a good idea, considering that the space for the stack is always very limited. The compiler can be instructed to produce a warning every time the stack space required by a single function exceeds a certain threshold, as, for example, in this code:

```
void function(void)
{
    char buffer[200];
    read_serial_buffer(buffer);
}
```

If compiled with the GCC option, `-Wstack-usage=100`, it will produce the following warning:

```
main.c: In function 'function':
main.c:15:6: warning: stack usage is 208 bytes [-Wstack-usage=]
```

This can be intercepted at compile time.

While this mechanism is useful to identify local stack overuses, it is not effective to identify all the potential stack overflows in the code, as the function calls may be nested and their stack usage added

up. Our function uses 208 bytes of the stack whenever it is invoked, 200 to host the `buffer` local variable in the stack, and 8 additional bytes to store two pointers: the origin of the call in the code section, which is stored as a return point, and the frame pointer, which contains the old location of the stack pointer before the call.

By design, the stack grows every time a function is called and shrinks again when functions return. In a given case, it is particularly difficult to make estimations about the runtime stack usage, which is the purpose of recursive functions. For this reason, the use of recursion in the code should be avoided whenever possible, or reduced to the minimum and kept under strict control otherwise, knowing that the memory area reserved for the stack in the target is small:




Figure 5.2 – The stack pointer moves down when a function is called to store frame pointers and local variables

Stack placement

The initial pointer to the stack area can be selected at boot by setting the desired memory address in the first word of the IV table, which corresponds to the beginning of the binary image loaded in flash.

This pointer may be set at compile time, in different ways. The simple example from *Chapter 4, The Boot-Up Procedure*, shows how it is possible to assign a specific area for the stack or use symbols exported from the linker script.

Using the linker script as a central point to describe memory regions and segments makes the code more portable across similar platforms.

Since our STM32F407 provides an additional, tightly coupled 64-KB memory bank at address `0x10000000`, we may want to reserve its lower 16 KB for the execution stack and keep the rest in a separate section for later use. The linker script must define the region on top, in the `MEMORY` block:

```
MEMORY
{
    FLASH (rx) : ORIGIN = 0x00000000, LENGTH = 1M
```



```

SRAM (rwx) : ORIGIN = 0x20000000, LENGTH = 128K
CCRAM(rwx) : ORIGIN = 0x10000000, LENGTH = 64K
}

```

Two symbols may now be exported at the end of the file, by assigning constant, pre-defined values:

```

_stack_size = 16 * 1024;
_stack_end = ORIGIN(CCRAM) + _stack_size;

```

The values of `_stack_size` and `_stack_end` can be accessed by the application as ordinary C symbols. `_stack_end` is placed at address 0 when the vector table is initialized to indicate the highest stack address:

```

__attribute__ ((section(".isr_vector")))
void (* const IV[])(void) =
{
    (void (*)(void))(&_end_stack),
    isr_reset, // Reset
    isr_fault, // NMI
    isr_fault, // HardFault
    /* more interrupt routines follow */
}

```

Whenever possible, it is a good idea to delegate a separate memory region to the stack area, as in this case. Unfortunately, this is not possible on all platforms.

Most embedded devices with physical memory mapping offer a single continuous mapping region for the entire RAM. A common strategy used to organize the memory in these cases is to place the initial stack pointer at the highest available address at the end of the mappable memory. This way, the stack is free to grow from the top of the memory down, while the application can still use the memory to allocate dynamic objects from the lowest address that is not used by any other section. While this mechanism is considered the most efficient, giving the illusion that it is possible to use up every last byte of RAM available, it is dangerous because the two areas growing in opposite directions may collide, leading to unpredictable results.

Stack overflows

The main problem with stack sizing and placement is that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to recover from a situation of stack overflow in a single-thread, bare-metal application. When the stack is self-contained in its own physical region, such as a separate memory bank, if its lower bound is a region not mapped to any device, a stack overflow will cause a hard fault exception, which can be trapped to halt the target.

In other cases, such as when adjacent memory is used for other purposes, the stack pointer might overflow into other segments, with a concrete risk of corrupting other memory areas, with catastrophic consequences including even opening the door to malicious code injections and arbitrary code execution attacks on the target. The best strategy usually consists of assigning adequate stack space at boot, isolating the stack as much as possible from the other memory sections, and checking the stack usage at runtime. Configuring the stack to use the lowest available addresses in RAM ensures that a stack overflow will result in a hard fault, rather than accessing valid pointers in adjacent areas in memory. The most classic approach for a bare-metal system with a single contiguous region of memory-mapped RAM is putting the initial stack pointer at the highest address available and having it grow backward toward lower addresses. The linker script exports the highest address mapped as the initial stack pointer:

```
_end_stack = ORIGIN(RAM) + LENGTH(RAM) ;
```

The available memory between the end of the `.bss` section and the lowest address in the stack may be used for dynamic allocations by the application, and at the same time, the stack is allowed to grow in the opposite direction. This is an efficient way to utilize all the available memory because the stack does not require a lower boundary, but it is safe only as long as the total amount of memory used from both sides fits inside the designated areas. If the sections are allowed to dynamically grow toward higher addresses, there is always a possibility of collisions if there is overlap from both sides:




Figure 5.3 – Heap allocations and the execution stack growing in opposite directions

Collisions between two contiguous memory areas are very common and dangerous events in embedded systems with one single continuous region of memory. A solution proposed later in this chapter, in the *Memory protection unit* section, can be used to separate memory into two logical blocks by inserting a third inaccessible block in the middle and to help identify and intercept these cases.

Stack painting

An effective way to measure the amount of stack space needed at runtime consists of filling the estimated stack space with a well-known pattern. This mechanism, informally referred to as stack painting, reveals the maximum expansion of the execution stack at any time. By running the software with a painted stack, it is in fact possible to measure the amount of stack used by looking for the last recognizable pattern, and assuming that the stack pointer has moved during the execution, but never crossing that point.

We can perform stack painting manually in the reset handler, during memory initialization. To do so, we need to assign an area to paint. In this case, it would be the last 8 KB of memory up until `_end_stack`. Once again, while manipulating the stack in the `reset_handler` function, local variables should not be used. The `reset_handler` function will store the value of the current stack pointer in the `sp` global variable:

```
static unsigned int sp;
```

Within the handler, the following section can be added before invoking `main()`:

```
asm volatile("mrs %0, msp" : "=r"(sp));
dst = ((unsigned int *)(&_end_stack)) - (8192 / sizeof(unsigned
int)); ;
while (dst < sp) {
    *dst = 0xDEADC0DE;
    dst++;
}
```

The first assembly instruction is used to store the current value of the stack pointer to the `sp` variable, ensuring that the painting stops after the area is painted but only up until the last unused address in the stack:




Figure 5.4 – Painting the stack area with a recognizable pattern helps to estimate the stack memory used in the prototype

The current stack usage can be checked periodically at runtime – for instance, in the `main` loop – to detect the area painted with the recognizable pattern. The areas that are still painted have never been used by the execution stack so far and indicate the amount of stack still available.

This mechanism may be used to verify the amount of stack space required by the application to run comfortably. According to the design, this information can be used later on to set a safe lower limit on the segment that can be used for the stack. Stack painting, however, is not always effective, as it gives a measurement of the stack used during the execution, but it might overlook corner cases where the stack usage may be bigger. Increasing test coverage while keeping an eye on the stack painting at the end of each test may help to allocate the appropriate amount of stack space during the development phase.

Heap management

Safety-critical embedded systems are often designed not to implement any dynamic memory allocation. While this may sound extreme, it minimizes the impact of the most common programming mistakes in the application code, which might lead to catastrophic consequences for the running system.

On the other hand, dynamic allocation is a powerful tool because it gives complete control over the lifetime and the size of the memory blocks. Many third-party libraries designed for embedded devices expect an existing implementation of dynamic memory allocation. Dynamic memory is managed through a heap structure in memory, by keeping track of the status and the size for each allocation, incrementing the pointer to the next area of free memory, and reusing blocks that have been freed if new allocation requests are processed.

A standard programming interface for heap allocation consists of two basic functions:

```
void *malloc(size_t size);  
void free(void *ptr);
```

These function signatures are defined by the ANSI-C standard and are commonly found in operating systems. They allow us to request a new memory area of a given size and free up the previously allocated area referred to by the specified pointer respectively. More complete heap management has support for an additional call, `realloc`, that allows us to resize a memory area previously allocated, either in place or by relocating it to a new segment that is large enough to contain an object of the given size:

```
void *realloc(void *ptr, size_t size);
```

While `realloc` is generally left out from most of the embedded system implementations, it may be useful in some cases to resize objects in memory.

Depending on the implementation, memory management could be more or less efficient in joining together contiguous blocks that had been freed, in order to create larger available segments without having to allocate new space. Real-time operating systems usually offer allocators with different heap management. To mention one, FreeRTOS provides five different portable heap managers to choose from.

If we opt for a solution that allows for dynamic allocations, it is important to design it while taking into account a few important factors:

- The geometry of the regions where the heap is placed
- The higher boundary of the section dedicated to the heap, if it is shared with the stack, to prevent heap-stack collisions
- The policy to adopt if there is not enough memory to satisfy requests for new allocations
- How to deal with memory fragmentation and keep the overhead of unused blocks as small as possible
- Using separate pools to separate the memory used by specific objects and modules
- Spreading a single pool of memory across non-contiguous regions

When no allocator is available on the target – for example, if we are developing a bare-metal application from scratch – we might be required to implement an allocator that responds to the characteristics of the design. This can be done either from scratch by providing a custom implementation of the `malloc/free` functions or using implementations provided by the C library in use. The first approach gives complete control over the fragmentation, memory areas, and pools to be used to implement the heap, while the latter hides most of the handling while still allowing customization of the (contiguous) memory area and boundaries. In the next two sections, we will explore the two possible strategies in more detail.

Custom implementation

Unlike servers and personal computers, where memory allocations are handled using pages of a specific size, in bare-metal embedded systems, the heap is usually one or more contiguous areas of physical memory that can be divided internally using any alignment. Building heap-based memory allocation based on the `malloc/free` interface consists of keeping track of the requested allocations in memory. This is usually done by attaching a small header in front of each allocation to track the state and the size of the allocated section, which can be used in the `free` function to validate the allocated block and make it available for the next allocation. A basic implementation, providing dynamic memory starting from the first available address after the end of the `.bss` section, might represent each block in memory using a preamble, such as the following:

```
struct malloc_block {
    unsigned int signature;
    unsigned int size;
};
```

Two different signatures can be assigned to identify valid blocks and differentiate blocks still in use versus blocks that have already been freed:

```
#define SIGNATURE_IN_USE (0xAAC0FFEE)
#define SIGNATURE_FREED (0xFEEDFACE)
#define NULL (((void *)0))
```

The malloc function should keep track of the highest address in the heap. In this example, a static variable is used to mark the current end of the heap. This is set to the start address at the beginning and will grow every time a new block is allocated:

```
void *malloc(unsigned int size)
{
    static unsigned int *end_heap = 0;
    struct malloc_block *blk;
    char *ret = NULL;
    if (!end_heap) {
        end_heap = &_amp;start_heap;
    }
```

The next two lines ensure that the block requested is 32-bit-aligned to optimize the access to malloc_block:

```
if (((size >>2) << 2) != size)
    size = ((size >> 2) + 1) << 2;
```

The malloc function then first looks in the heap for a memory section that has been previously freed:

```
blk = (struct malloc_block *)&_start_heap;
while (blk < end_heap) {
    if ((blk->signature == SIGNATURE_FREED) &&
        (blk->size >= size)) {
        blk->signature = SIGNATURE_IN_USE;
        ret = ((char *)blk) + sizeof(struct malloc_block);
        return ret;
    }
    blk = ((char *)blk) + sizeof(struct malloc_block) +
        blk->size;
}
```

If no available slot is found, or if none of them is large enough to satisfy the size required for the allocation, the memory is allocated at the end of the stack and the pointer is updated accordingly:

```
blk = (struct malloc_block *)end_heap;
blk->signature = SIGNATURE_IN_USE;
blk->size = size;
ret = ((char *)end_heap) + sizeof(struct malloc_block);
end_heap = ret + size;
return ret;
}
```

In both cases, the address returned hides the `malloc_block` control structure that precedes it. The `end_heap` variable always points to the end of the last block allocated in the heap, but it is not an indication of the memory used, as intermediate blocks may have been freed in the meanwhile. This example `free` function, demonstrating a very simple case, is only performing basic checks on the block that needs to be freed and setting the signature to indicate that the block is no longer being used:

```
void free(void *ptr)
{
    struct malloc_block *blk = (struct malloc_block *)
        (((char *)ptr) - sizeof(struct malloc_block));
    if (!ptr)
        return;
    if (blk->signature != SIGNATURE_IN_USE)
        return;
    blk->signature = SIGNATURE_FREED;
}
```

Although this example is very simplistic, it aims at explaining the basic functionality of heap allocation without taking into account all real-life constraints and limitations. In fact, allocating and freeing objects of different sizes may cause fragmentation. To minimize the impact of this phenomenon in terms of memory usage and wasted space between active allocations, the `free` function should at least implement some kind of mechanism to join together adjacent areas that are no longer in play. Furthermore, the preceding example, `malloc`, assumes that the heap section does not have an upper boundary, does not perform any check on the new location of the `end_heap` pointer, and does not define a strategy when there is no memory available to allocate.

Although toolchains and libraries often provide a default implementation of `malloc` and `free`, implementing custom heap-based allocation mechanisms still makes sense in cases where the implementations available do not meet the requirements – for example, if we want to manage separate memory pools or merge separate physical memory sections to use them in the same pool.

Fragmentation issues cannot be completely resolved on systems with physical memory mapping because it is impossible to move around previously allocated blocks to optimize the space available. The issue can, however, be mitigated by keeping the number of allocations under control, reusing allocated blocks as much as possible, and avoiding frequent calls to `malloc/free`, especially to request blocks with different sizes.

The use of dynamic memory, regardless of the implementation, introduces a number of safety concerns and should be avoided in all life-critical systems, and in general wherever it is not required. Simpler, single-purpose embedded systems can be designed to avoid the use of dynamic memory allocations altogether. In these cases, a simple `malloc` interface can be provided to allow permanent allocations during startup.

Using newlib

Toolchains may provide a set of utilities, which often include dynamic memory allocation mechanisms. GCC-based toolchains for microcontrollers include a reduced set of standard C calls, usually in the built-in standard C library. A popular choice, often included in the ARM-GCC embedded toolchain, is `newlib`. While providing the implementation of many standard calls, `newlib` remains as flexible as possible by allowing customization of the operations involving the hardware. The `newlib` library can be integrated into both single-thread, bare-metal applications and in a real-time operating system, provided that the required system calls are implemented.

In the case of `malloc`, `newlib` requires an existing implementation of the `sbrk` function. This function is expected to move the heap pointer forward every time a new allocation requires an extension of the heap space and return the old value of the heap to `malloc`, in order to complete allocations every time an existing, previously freed, and reusable block is not found in the pool:




Figure 5.5 – newlib implements malloc and free and relies on an existing implementation of `_sbrk`

A possible implementation of the `_sbrk` function may be the following:

```
void * _sbrk(unsigned int incr)
{
    static unsigned char *heap = NULL;
    void *old_heap = heap;
    if (((incr & 0x03) != incr)
        incr = ((incr >> 2) + 1) << 2;
    if (old_heap == NULL)
        old_heap = heap = (unsigned char *)&_start_heap;
    heap += incr;
    return old_heap;
}
```

If the code is linked without the `-nostdlib` flag, the `malloc` and `free` functions, if invoked anywhere in the code, will be automatically found within the `newlib` library built in the toolchain and included in the final binary. Failing to define an `_sbrk` symbol, in this case, will result in a linking error.

Limiting the heap

In all the allocation functions seen so far, there is no limit imposed by the software on the amount of memory reserved for the heap. While overflowing the stack is often hard to prevent, and extremely difficult to recover from, running out of available heap memory can more often be gracefully handled by the application – for example, by canceling or postponing the operation that required the allocation. In more complex multithreaded systems, an operating system could actively react to the memory shortage by terminating non-vital processes to free up memory for new allocations. Some advanced systems using page-swapping mechanisms, such as Linux, may implement overcommit on the available memory. This mechanism guarantees that memory allocations never fail, and `malloc` will never return `NULL` to indicate a failure.

Memory-consuming processes in a system may be instead terminated at any time by a kernel thread, the out-of-memory killer, to make space for new allocations from other less resource-consuming processes. On an embedded system, especially if there is no multithreading, the best choice is to have the allocator return `NULL` when there is no physical space left on the heap so that the system can keep running and the application can possibly recover by recognizing the out-of-memory episode. The section in memory dedicated to the heap can be limited by exporting the address for its upper boundary in the linker script, as shown here:

```
_heap_end = ORIGIN(RAM) + LENGTH(RAM);
```

The backend for the newlib library `malloc` implementation can account for the newly introduced upper bound in the `_sbrk()` function:

```
void * _sbrk(unsigned int incr) {
    static unsigned char *heap = NULL;
    void *old_heap = heap;
    if (((incr & 0x03) != incr)
        incr = ((incr >> 2) + 1) << 2;
    if (old_heap == NULL)
        old_heap = heap = (unsigned char *)&_start_heap;
    if ((heap + incr) >= &_end_heap)
        return (void *)(-1);
    else
        heap += incr;
    return old_heap;
}
```

The special `(void *)(-1)` value that is returned by `sbrk` in case of memory shortage for heap allocation indicates to the calling `malloc` that there is not enough space to perform the requested allocation. `malloc` will then return `NULL` to the caller.

It is very important in this case that the caller always checks the return value at each invocation of `malloc()` and that the application logic is able to correctly detect that the system is out of memory, and react in an attempt to recover from it.

Multiple memory pools

In some systems, it is useful to keep separate sections as dynamic memory heaps, each dedicated to a specific function in the system. Heap allocation mechanisms using separate pools may be implemented for different reasons, such as ensuring that specific modules or subsystems do not use more memory than the amount that is assigned to them at compile time, or ensuring that allocations with the same size can reuse the same physical space in memory, reducing the impact of fragmentation, or even assigning a pre-defined, fixed area in memory for DMA operations with peripherals or network devices. It is possible to delimit the sections for the different pools by, as usual, exporting symbols in the linker script. The following example pre-allocates the space in memory for two pools, of 8 KB and 4 KB respectively, located at the end of the `.bss` section in RAM:

```
PROVIDE(_start_pool0 = _end_bss);
PROVIDE(_end_pool0 = _start_pool0 + 8KB);
PROVIDE(_start_pool1 = _end_pool0);
PROVIDE(_end_pool1 = _start_pool1 + 4KB);
```

A custom allocation function must be defined, since the `malloc` interface does not support the selector of the pool, but the functions can be made generic for both pools. A global structure can be populated with the values exported by the linker:

```
struct memory_pool {
    void *start;
    void *end;
    void *cur;
};
static struct memory_pool mem_pool[2] = {
    {
        .start = &_amp_start_pool0;
        .end = &_amp_end_pool0;
    },
    {
        .start = &_amp_start_pool1;
        .end = &_amp_end_pool1;
    },
};
```

The function must take an extra argument to specify the pool. Then, the allocation is performed with the same algorithm, only changing the current pointer and the boundaries of the selected pool. In this version, the out-of-memory errors are detected before moving the current heap value forward, returning `NULL` to notify the caller:

```
void *mempool_alloc(int pool, unsigned int size)
{
    struct malloc_block *blk;
    struct memory_pool *mp;
    char *ret = NULL;
    if (pool != 0 && pool != 1)
        return NULL;
    mp = mem_pool[pool];
    if (!mp->cur)
        mp->cur = mp->start;
    if (((size >> 2) << 2) != size)
        size = ((size >> 2) + 1) << 2;
    blk = (struct malloc_block *)mp->start;
    while (blk < mp->cur) {
```

```
if ((blk->signature == SIGNATURE_FREED) &&
    (blk->size >= size)) {
    blk->signature = SIGNATURE_IN_USE;
    ret = ((char *)blk) + sizeof(struct malloc_block);
    return ret;
}
blk = ((char *)blk) + sizeof(struct malloc_block) +
        blk->size;
}
blk = (struct malloc_block *)mp->cur;
if (mp->cur + size >= mp->end)
    return NULL;
blk->signature = SIGNATURE_IN_USE;
blk->size = size;
ret = ((char *)mp->cur) + sizeof(struct malloc_block);
mp->cur = ret + size;
return ret;
}
```

Once again, this mechanism does not account for memory fragmentation, so the `mempool_free` function can have the same implementation as `free` for the simplified `malloc`, as the only necessary thing to do is to mark the blocks being freed as unused.

In more complete cases, where `free` or a separate garbage collector routine takes care of merging contiguous freed blocks, it might be required to keep track of the freed blocks in each pool, in a list, or in another data structure that can be visited to check whether merging is possible.

Common heap usage errors

The use of dynamic memory allocation is considered unsafe in some environments, as it is widely known to be the source of nasty bugs, which are in general both critical and very hard to identify and fix. Dynamic allocations may be difficult to track, especially when code grows in size and complexity and there are many dynamically allocated data structures. This is already very serious in multithreaded environments, where it is still possible to implement fallback mechanisms, such as terminating a misbehaving application, but it becomes critical on single-threaded embedded systems, where these kinds of errors are often fatal for the system. The most common types of errors when programming with heap allocations are as follows:

- NULL pointer de-reference
- Double free

- Use after `free`
- Failure to call `free`, resulting in memory leaks

Some of these can be avoided by following a few simple rules. `malloc` returns the value that should always be checked before using the pointer. This is particularly important in environments where resources are limited, and the allocator can return `NULL` pointers to indicate that there is no memory available for the allocation. The preferred approach is ensuring that there is a defined strategy to follow when the required memory is not available. In any case, all dynamic pointers must be checked to ensure that they do not point to a `NULL` value before attempting to de-reference.

Freeing `NULL` pointers is a legal operation that must be identified when `free` is called. By including a check at the beginning of the function, if the pointer is `NULL`, no action is performed and the call is ignored.

Immediately after, we can also check that the memory has not been freed before. In our `free` function, we implement a simple check against the signature of the `malloc_block` structure in memory. It would be possible to add a log message, or even a breakpoint, to debug the origin of the second `free` function:

```
if (blk->signature != SIGNATURE_IN_USE) {  
    /* Double free detected! */  
    asm("BKPT #0") ;  
    return;  
}
```

Unfortunately, this mechanism may only work in some cases. In fact, if the block that was previously freed is assigned again by the allocator, it would be impossible to detect further uses of its original reference, and a second `free` would cause the second reference to be lost as well. For the same reason, use-after-free errors are hard to diagnose, as there is no way to tell that a freed memory block has been accessed again. It is possible to paint freed blocks with a recognizable pattern so that if the content of the block is altered after `free` has been called, the next invocation of `malloc` on that block can detect the alteration. However, this again does not guarantee detection of all the cases and only works for write accesses to a freed pointer; additionally, this would not be able to identify all the cases where freed memory is accessed for reading.

Memory leaks are easy to diagnose but sometimes difficult to locate. With limited resources, it is often the case that forgetting to free allocated memory uses up all the available heap very quickly. While there are techniques used to track down allocations, it is often sufficient to break into the software with the debugger and look for repeated allocations of the same size to track down the buggy caller.

In conclusion, due to their catastrophic and hideous nature, dynamic memory bugs may be one of the biggest challenges on embedded systems. Therefore, writing safer application code is often less expensive in terms of resources than hunting for memory bugs at the system level – for example, instrumenting the allocator. Analyzing the lifetime of each allocated object thoroughly, and making the logic as clear and readable as possible, can prevent most of the problems related to pointer handling and save a lot of time that would otherwise be spent debugging.

The memory protection unit

In a system without virtual address mapping, it is harder to create a separation between sections that can be accessed by the software at runtime. The memory protection unit, often referred to as the MPU, is an optional component present in many ARM-based microcontrollers. The MPU is used to separate sections in memory by setting local permissions and attributes. This mechanism has several uses in real-life scenarios, such as preventing access to memory when the CPU is running in user mode, or preventing fetching code from being executed from writable locations in RAM. When the MPU is enabled, it enforces the rules by triggering a memory exception interrupt when those rules are violated.

While commonly used by operating systems to create process stack separation and enforce privileged access to system memory, the MPU can be useful in a number of other cases, including bare-metal applications.

MPU configuration registers

In the Cortex-M, the control block region related to MPU configuration is located in the system control block, starting at address 0xE000ED90. Five registers are used to access the MPU:

- The **MPU Type Register** (offset 0x00) contains information about the availability of the MPU system and the number of regions supported. This register is also available on systems without an MPU to indicate that the functionality is not supported.
- The **MPU Control Register** (offset 0x04) is used to activate the MPU system and enable the default background mapping for all the regions that are not explicitly mapped in the MPU. If background mapping is not enabled, accessing non-mapped regions is not allowed.
- The **MPU Region Number Register** (RNR offset 0x08) is used to select the region to configure.
- The **MPU Region Base Address Register** (RBAR offset 0x0C) can be accessed to change the base address of the selected region.
- The **MPU Region Attribute and Size Register** (RASR offset 0x10) defines the permissions, attributes, and size of the selected region.

Programming the MPU

The MPU of Cortex-M microcontrollers supports up to eight different programmable regions. A function that enables the MPU and sets up all the regions can be implemented and invoked at the beginning of program. The MPU registers are mapped in HAL libraries, but in this case, we are going to define our own version and access them directly:

```
#define MPU_BASE 0xE000ED90
#define MPU_TYPE (*(volatile uint32_t *) (MPU_BASE + 0x00))
#define MPU_CTRL (*(volatile uint32_t *) (MPU_BASE + 0x04))
#define MPU_RNR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (MPU_BASE + 0x08))
#define MPU_RBAR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (MPU_BASE + 0x0c))
#define MPU_RASR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (MPU_BASE + 0x10))
```

In our example, we used the following defined bit-field value definitions to set the right attributes in RASR:

```
#define RASR_ENABLED (1)
#define RASR_RW (1 << 24)
#define RASR_RDONLY (5 << 24)
#define RASR_NOACCESS (0 << 24)
#define RASR_SCB (7 << 16)
#define RASR_SB (5 << 16)
#define RASR_NOEXEC (1 << 28)
```

The possible sizes, which should end up in the size field of RASR in bits 1:5, are coded as follows:

```
#define MPUSIZE_1K (0x09 << 1)
#define MPUSIZE_2K (0x0a << 1)
#define MPUSIZE_4K (0x0b << 1)
#define MPUSIZE_8K (0x0c << 1)
#define MPUSIZE_16K (0x0d << 1)
#define MPUSIZE_32K (0x0e << 1)
#define MPUSIZE_64K (0x0f << 1)
#define MPUSIZE_128K (0x10 << 1)
#define MPUSIZE_256K (0x11 << 1)
#define MPUSIZE_512K (0x12 << 1)
#define MPUSIZE_1M (0x13 << 1)
#define MPUSIZE_2M (0x14 << 1)
```

```
#define MPUSIZE_4M (0x15 << 1)
#define MPUSIZE_8M (0x16 << 1)
#define MPUSIZE_16M (0x17 << 1)
#define MPUSIZE_32M (0x18 << 1)
#define MPUSIZE_64M (0x19 << 1)
#define MPUSIZE_128M (0x1a << 1)
#define MPUSIZE_256M (0x1b << 1)
#define MPUSIZE_512M (0x1c << 1)
#define MPUSIZE_1G (0x1d << 1)
#define MPUSIZE_2G (0x1e << 1)
#define MPUSIZE_4G (0x1f << 1)
```

The first thing to do when we enter the `mpu_enable` function is to ensure that the feature is available on our target, by checking the `MPU_TYPE` register:

```
int mpu_enable(void)
{
    volatile uint32_t type;
    volatile uint32_t start;
    volatile uint32_t attr;
    type = MPU_TYPE;
    if (type == 0) {
        /* MPU not present! */
        return -1;
    }
}
```

In order to configure the MPU, we must ensure that it is disabled while we change the base addresses and the attributes of each region:

```
MPU_CTRL = 0;
```

The flash region that contains the executable code can be marked as read-only region 0. The values for the RASR attributes are as follows:

```
start = 0;
attr = RASR_ENABLED | MPUSIZE_256K | RASR_SCB |
      RASR_RDONLY;
mpu_set_region(0, start, attr);
```


The whole RAM region can be mapped as read-write. If we do not need to execute code from RAM, we can set the **execute-never (XN)** bit in the region attributes. RAM is mapped as region 1 in this case:

```
start = 0x20000000;  
attr = RASR_ENABLED | MPU_SIZE_64K | RASR_SCB | RASR_RW  
      | RASR_NOEXEC;  
mpu_set_region(1, start, attr);
```

Since memory mapping is processed in the same order as memory region numbers, we can use region 2 to create an exception within region 1. Regions with higher numbers have priority over regions with lower numbers, so exceptions can be created within an existing mapping with a lower number.

Region 2 is used to define a guard region as a lower boundary for the stack growing backward, the purpose of which is to intercept stack overflows. In fact, if at any moment the program tries to access the guard region, it triggers an exception and the operation fails. In this case, the guard region occupies 1 KB at the bottom of the stack. It has no access permissions configured in its attributes. The MPU ensures that the region is not accessible at runtime:

```
start = (uint32_t)(&_end_stack) - (STACK_SIZE + 1024);  
attr = RASR_ENABLED | MPU_SIZE_1K | RASR_SCB |  
      RASR_NOACCESS | RASR_NOEXEC;  
mpu_set_region(2, start, attr);
```

Finally, we describe the system area as a read-write, non-executable, and non-cacheable area so that the program will still be able to access the system registers after the MPU has been activated again. We use region 3 for this:

```
start = 0xE0000000;  
attr = RASR_ENABLED | MPU_SIZE_256M | RASR_SB  
      RASR_RW | RASR_NOEXEC;  
mpu_set_region(3, start, attr);
```

As a final step, we enable the MPU again. The MPU will allow us to define a *background region*, setting the default permissions for those areas that are not covered in the active region configurations. In this case, the absence of a definition for a background policy results in prohibited access to all the areas that are not explicitly mapped:

```
MPU_CTRL = 1;  
return 0;  
}
```

The helping function that sets the starting address and the attributes for the memory regions looks like the following:

```
static void mpu_set_region(int region, uint32_t start, uint32_t
attr)
{
    MPU_RNR = region;
    MPU_RBAR = start;
    MPU_RNR = region;
    MPU_RASR = attr;
}
```

The value used to set attributes and sizes in MPU_RASR in this example is defined according to the structure of the register itself. MPU_RASR is a bit-field register, containing the following fields:

- **Bit 0:** The enable/disable region.
- **Bits 1:5:** The size of the partition (see the special values to assign to this field).
- **Bits 16:18:** Indicate whether the memory is bufferable, cacheable, and shared, respectively. Devices and system registers should be marked as non-cacheable at all times to guarantee the strict order of the transaction, as explained at the beginning of this chapter.
- **Bits 24:26:** Access permissions (read/write), separated for user and supervisor mode.
- **Bit 28:** Disable execution (the XN flag).

It is now possible to write a program that overflows the stack and see the difference in the debugger when the `mpu_enable` function is called and when it is not. If the MPU is available on the target, it is now able to intercept stack overflows, triggering an exception in the CPU:




Figure 5.6 – The guard region is marked as inaccessible in the MPU to prevent stack overflows

The configuration we used in this case for the MPU is very strict, not allowing access to any memory, except for the regions mapping flash and RAM. The extra 1-KB guard region ensures that we can detect stack overflows at runtime. This configuration in fact introduces an artificial separation between the two regions allocated for heap and stack areas, in a physically continuous space, by introducing a block that replicates inaccessible blocks in between. Although allocations in the heap exceeding the heap limit will not directly trigger an overflow, any memory access in the guard region will cause a memory fault.

In real applications, the MPU configuration may be more complex and even change its values at runtime. In *Chapter 10, Parallel Tasks and Scheduling*, for example, we will explain how the MPU can be used to isolate thread address spaces in a real-time operating system.

Summary

Memory management in an embedded system is the source of the most critical bugs, and for this reason, particular attention must be dedicated to designing and implementing the correct solutions for the platform in use and application purposes. The execution stack should be carefully placed, sized, and delimited when possible.

Systems not providing dynamic allocations are safer, but embedded systems with higher complexity benefit from dynamic allocation techniques. Programmers must be aware that errors in memory handling can be critical for a system and very difficult to spot, so extra care is required when code handles dynamically allocated pointers.

The MPU can be a vital tool to enforce access permissions and attributes on memory regions, and it can be used for several purposes. In the example shown, we implemented an MPU-based mechanism to enforce a physical boundary for the stack pointer.

In the next chapter, we will examine other common components included in modern microcontrollers. We will learn how to handle clock settings, interrupt priorities, general-purpose I/O communication, and other optional features.

Part 3 – Device Drivers and Communication Interfaces

This part explains how to program interface and device drivers typical of an embedded system. All the system communication from and to the outside world, up to distributed systems communicating via TCP/IP, will be covered in this part, with particular attention paid to increasing the security of IoT solutions.

This part has the following chapters:

- *Chapter 6, General-Purpose Peripherals*
- *Chapter 7, Local Bus Interfaces*
- *Chapter 8, Power Management and Energy Saving*
- *Chapter 9, Distributed Systems and IoT Architecture*

6

General-Purpose Peripherals

Modern microcontrollers integrate several features that help in building stable and reliable embedded systems. Once the system is up and running, memory and peripherals can be accessed, and basic functionalities are in place. Only then can all the components of the system be initialized by activating the associated peripherals through the system registers, setting the correct frequencies for the clock lines, and configuring and activating interrupts. In this chapter, we will describe the interface exposed by the microcontroller to access built-in peripherals and some basic system functionalities. We will focus on the following topics:

- The interrupt controller
- System time
- Generic timers
- **General-purpose input/output (GPIO)**
- The watchdog

While these peripherals are often accessible through the hardware-support libraries implemented and distributed by chip manufacturers, our approach here involves fully understanding the hardware components and the meaning of all the registers involved. This will be achieved by configuring and using the functionalities in the microcontroller straight through the interface exported by the hardware logic.

When designing drivers for a specific platform, it is necessary to study the interface provided by the microcontroller to access peripherals and CPU features. In the examples provided, the STM32F4 microcontroller is used as a reference target for implementing platform-specific features. Nevertheless, inspecting a possible implementation on our reference platform allows us to get better insight into how to interact with generic targets exposing similar functionalities using the documentation provided by the silicon manufacturer.

Technical requirements

You can find the code files for this chapter on GitHub at <https://github.com/PacktPublishing/Embedded-Systems-Architecture-Second-Edition/tree/main/Chapter6>.

Bitwise operations

The examples associated with this chapter make extensive use of bitwise operations for checking, setting, and clearing single bits within larger registers (in most cases, 32-bit long). You should already be familiar with bitwise logic operations in C.

The operations commonly used in the examples are the following:

- **Setting the Nth bit in the register R via the assignment** $R \mid= (1 \ll N)$: The new value of the register R will contain the result of the bitwise OR operation between its original value and a bitmask containing all zeros, except the bit corresponding to the value we want to set, which is set to the value one
- **Clearing (resetting) the Nth bit in the register R via the assignment** $R \&= \sim(1 \ll N)$: The new value of the register is the result of a bitwise AND operation between its original value and a bitmask containing all ones, except the bit in the position we want to clear, which is set to the value zero
- **Checking whether the Nth bit of the register R is set or cleared, via the condition** $(R \& (1 \ll N)) == (1 \ll N)$: Returns `true` only if the Nth bit of the register is set

Let us quickly jump into the first topic.

The interrupt controller

Real-time systems have improved their accuracy thanks to the rapid evolution of modern embedded systems, in particular from the research on interrupt controllers. Assigning different priorities to interrupt lines guarantees a lower interrupt latency for higher-priority interrupt sources and makes the system react faster to prioritized events. Interrupts may, however, occur at any time while the system is running, including during the execution of another interrupt service routine. In this case, the interrupt controller provides a way to chain the interrupt handlers, and the order of execution depends on the priority levels assigned to the interrupt source.

One of the reasons for the popularity of the Cortex-M family of microprocessors among real-time and low-power embedded applications is perhaps the design of its programmable real-time controller—namely, the **Nested Vector Interrupt Controller**, or **NVIC** for short. The NVIC supports up to 240 interrupt sources, which can be grouped into up to 256 priority levels, depending on the bits reserved to store the priority in the microprocessor logic. These characteristics make it very flexible, as the priorities can also be changed while the system is running, maximizing the freedom of choice for the

programmer. As we already know, the NVIC is connected to the vector table located at the beginning of the code region. Whenever an interrupt occurs, the current state of the executing application is pushed into the stack automatically by the processor, and the service routine associated with the interrupt line is executed.

Systems that do not have an interrupt-priority mechanism implement back-to-back interrupt handling. In these cases, chaining interrupts implies that the context is restored at the end of the execution of the first service routine in line, and then saved again while entering the following one. The NVIC implements a tail-chaining mechanism to execute nested interrupts. If one or more interrupts occur while another service routine is executing, the pull operation normally occurring at the end of the interrupt to restore the context from the stack will be canceled, and the controller will instead fetch the location of the second handler in the interrupt vector and ensure it is executed immediately after the first. Because of the increased pace of the stack save and restore operations being implemented in hardware, the interrupt latency is significantly reduced in all those cases where interrupts are chained. Thanks to its implementation, NVIC allows us to change parameters while the system is running, and is able to reshuffle the order of execution of the interrupt service routines associated with the pending signals, according to the priority levels. Moreover, the same interrupt is not allowed to run twice in the same chain of handlers, which may be caused by altering the priorities in the other handlers. This is intrinsically enforced by the NVIC logic, which ensures that no loops are possible in the chain.

Peripherals' interrupt configuration

Each interrupt line can be enabled and disabled through the NVIC Interrupt Set/Clear Enable registers, `NVIC_ISER` and `NVIC_ICER`, located at addresses `0xE000E100` and `0xE000E180`, respectively. If the target supports more than 32 external interrupts, arrays of 32-bit registers are mapped at the same locations. Each bit in the registers is used to activate a predefined interrupt line, associated with the bit position in that specific register. For example, on an STM32F4 microcontroller, in order to activate the interrupt line for the **Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI)** controller SPI1, which is associated with the number 35, the fourth bit should be set on the second register in the `NVIC_ISER` area.

The generic NVIC function, to enable the interrupt, activates the flag corresponding to the NVIC interrupt number for the source, in the associate `NVIC_ISER` register:

```
#define NVIC_ISER_BASE (0xE000E100)

static inline void nvic_irq_enable(uint8_t n)
{
    int i = n / 32;
    volatile uint32_t *nvic_iser =
        ((volatile uint32_t *) (NVIC_ISER_BASE + 4 * i));
    *nvic_iser |= (1 << (n % 32));
}
```


Similarly, to disable the interrupt, the `nvic_irq_disable` function activates the corresponding bit in the interrupt clear register:

```
#define NVIC_ICER_BASE (0xE000E180)
static inline void nvic_irq_disable(uint8_t n)
{
    int i = n / 32;
    volatile uint32_t *nvic_icer =
        ((volatile uint32_t *) (NVIC_ICER_BASE + 4 * i));
    *nvic_icer |= (1 << (n % 32));
}
```

The interrupt priorities are mapped in an array of 8-bit registers, each containing the priority value for the corresponding interrupt line, starting at address `0xE000E400` so that they can be accessed independently to change the priority at runtime:

```
#define NVIC_IPRI_BASE (0xE000E400)
static inline void nvic_irq_setprio(uint8_t n,
    uint8_t prio)
{
    volatile uint8_t *nvic_ipri = ((volatile uint8_t *)
        (NVIC_IPRI_BASE + n));
    *nvic_ipri = prio;
}
```

These functions will come in handy to route and prioritize interrupt lines whenever an interrupt is enabled for a peripheral.

System time

Timekeeping is a basic requirement for almost any embedded system. A microcontroller can be programmed to trigger an interrupt at regular intervals, which is commonly used to increment the monotonic system clock. To do so, a few configuration steps must be performed at startup in order to have a stable tick interrupt. Many processors can run at custom frequencies while using the same oscillator as the source. The input frequency of the oscillator, which can be internal or external to the CPU, is used to derive the processor's main clock. The configurable logic integrated into the CPU is implemented by a **phase-locked loop (PLL)** that multiplies the input clock from an external stable source and produces the desired frequencies used by the CPU and integrated peripherals.

Adjusting the flash wait states

If the initialization code is running from flash, it might be necessary to set the wait state for the flash memory before altering the system clocks. If the microprocessor runs at high frequencies, it might require a few wait states in between two consecutive access operations to persistent memory with **execute-in-place (XIP)** capabilities. Failing to set the correct wait states to match the ratio between the CPU speed and the access time of the flash would most likely result in a hard fault. The configuration registers for the flash memory are located in a platform-specific location within the internal peripheral's region. On STM32F407, the flash configuration registers are mapped starting at address 0x40023800. The **Access Control Register (ACR)**, which is the one we need to access to set the wait states, is located at the beginning of the area:

```
#define FLASH_BASE (0x40023C00)
#define FLASH_ACR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (FLASH_BASE +
    0x00))
```

The lowest three bits in the FLASH_ACR register are used to set the number of wait states. According to the STM32F407 datasheet, the ideal number of wait states to access the flash while the system is running at 168 MHz is 5. At the same time, we can enable the data and instruction cache by activating bits 10 and 9, respectively:

```
void flash_set_waitstates(void) {
    FLASH_ACR = 5 | (1 << 10) | (1 << 9);
}
```

After the wait states are set, it is safe to run the code from the flash after setting the CPU frequency at a higher speed, so we can proceed with the actual clock configuration and distribution to the peripherals.

Clock configuration

The configuration of the clocks in Cortex-M microcontrollers happens through the **Reset and Clock Control (RCC)** registers, located at a specific address within the internal peripheral region. The RCC configuration is vendor-specific, as it depends on the logic of the PLL implemented in the microcontroller. The registers are described in the documentation of the microcontroller, and often, example source code is provided by the chip manufacturer demonstrating how to properly configure the clocks on the microcontroller. On our reference target, STM32F407, assuming that an external 8 MHz oscillator is used as a source, the following procedure configures a 168 MHz system clock and ensures that the clock is also distributed to each peripheral bus. The following code ensures that the PLL is initialized with the required value and that the CPU clock is ticking at the desired frequency. This procedure is common among many STM Cortex-M microcontrollers, and the values for the PLL configurations can be obtained from the chip documentation, or calculated using software tools provided by ST.

The software examples provided after this point will make use of a system-specific module, exporting the functions needed to configure the clock and set the flash memory latency. We now analyze two possible implementations for the PLL configuration, on two different Cortex-M microcontrollers.

To access the configuration of the PLL in the STM32F407-Discovery, first, we define some shortcut macros to the addresses of the registers provided by the RCC:

```
#define RCC_BASE (0x40023800)
#define RCC_CR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (RCC_BASE + 0x00))
#define RCC_PLLCFGR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (RCC_BASE +
    0x04))
#define RCC_CFGR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (RCC_BASE + 0x08))
#define RCC_CR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (RCC_BASE + 0x00))
```

For the sake of readability, and to ensure that the code is maintainable in the future, we also define the mnemonics associated with the single-bit values in the corresponding registers:

```
#define RCC_CR_PLLRDY (1 << 25)
#define RCC_CR_PLLON (1 << 24)
#define RCC_CR_HSERDY (1 << 17)
#define RCC_CR_HSEON (1 << 16)
#define RCC_CR_HSIRDY (1 << 1)
#define RCC_CR_HSION (1 << 0)

#define RCC_CFGR_SW_HSI 0x0
#define RCC_CFGR_SW_HSE 0x1
#define RCC_CFGR_SW_PLL 0x2
#define RCC_PLLCFGR_PLLSRC (1 << 22)

#define RCC_PRESCALER_DIV_NONE 0
#define RCC_PRESCALER_DIV_2 8
#define RCC_PRESCALER_DIV_4 9
```

Finally, we define the platform-specific constant values used to configure the PLL:

```
#define CPU_FREQ (168000000)
#define PLL_FULL_MASK (0x7F037FFF)
#define PLLM 8
#define PLLN 336
#define PLLP 2
```

```
#define PLLQ 7
#define PLLR 0
```

One additional macro invoking the DMB assembly instruction is defined, for brevity, as it will be used in the code to ensure that any pending memory transfer toward the configuration registers is completed before the execution of the next statement:

```
#define DMB() asm volatile ("dmb");
```

The next function will then ensure that the PLL initialization sequence is performed, in order to set the correct CPU frequency. First, it will enable the internal high-speed oscillator, and will wait until it is ready by polling the CR:

```
void rcc_config(void)
{
    uint32_t reg32;
    RCC_CR |= RCC_CR_HSION;
    DMB();
    while ((RCC_CR & RCC_CR_HSIRDY) == 0)
        ;
}
```

The internal oscillator is then selected as a temporary clock source:

```
reg32 = RCC_CFGR;
reg32 &= ~(1 << 1) | (1 << 0);
RCC_CFGR = (reg32 | RCC_CFGR_SW_HSI);
DMB();
```

The external oscillator is then activated in the same way:

```
RCC_CR |= RCC_CR_HSEON;
DMB();
while ((RCC_CR & RCC_CR_HSERDY) == 0)
    ;
```

On this device, the clock can be distributed to all the peripherals through three system buses. Using prescalers, the frequency of each bus can be scaled by a factor of two or four. In this case, we set the clock speed for HPRE, PPRE1, and PPRE2 to be 168, 84, and 46 MHz respectively on this target:

```
reg32 = RCC_CFGR;
reg32 &= ~0xF0;
```

```

RCC_CFGR = (reg32 | (RCC_PRESCALER_DIV_NONE << 4));
DMB();
reg32 = RCC_CFGR;
reg32 &= ~0x1C00;
RCC_CFGR = (reg32 | (RCC_PRESCALER_DIV_2 << 10));
DMB();
reg32 = RCC_CFGR;
reg32 &= ~0x07 << 13;
RCC_CFGR = (reg32 | (RCC_PRESCALER_DIV_4 << 13));
DMB();

```

The PLL configuration register is set to contain the parameters to correctly scale the external oscillator frequency to the desired value:

```

reg32 = RCC_PLLCFGR;
reg32 &= ~PLL_FULL_MASK;
RCC_PLLCFGR = reg32 | RCC_PLLCFGR_PLLSRC | PLLM |
    (PLLN << 6) | (((PLLP >> 1) - 1) << 16) |
    (PLLQ << 24);
DMB();

```

The PLL is then activated, and the execution is suspended until the output is stable:

```

RCC_CR |= RCC_CR_PLLON;
DMB();
while ((RCC_CR & RCC_CR_PLLRDY) == 0);

```

The PLL is selected as the final source for the system clock:

```

reg32 = RCC_CFGR;
reg32 &= ~(1 << 1 | 1 << 0);
RCC_CFGR = (reg32 | RCC_CFGR_SW_PLL);
DMB();
while ((RCC_CFGR & (1 << 1 | 1 << 0)) !=
    RCC_CFGR_SW_PLL);

```

The internal oscillator is no longer in use and can be disabled. The control returns to the caller, and all the clocks are successfully set.

As mentioned earlier, the procedure for clock initialization is strictly dependent on the PLL configuration in the microcontroller. To properly initialize the system clocks required for the CPU and the peripherals to operate at the desired frequencies, it is always advised to refer to the datasheet of the microcontroller provided by the silicon manufacturer. As a second example, we can verify how **Quick EMUlator (QEMU)** is capable of emulating the behavior of the LM3S6965 microcontroller. The emulator provides a virtual clock, which is configurable using the same initialization procedure as described on the manufacturer datasheet. On this platform, two registers are used for clock configuration, referred to as **RCC** and **RCC2**:

```
#define RCC (*(volatile uint32_t*)) (0x400FE060)
#define RCC2 (*(volatile uint32_t*)) (0x400FE070)
```

To reset the **RCC** registers to a known state, the reset value must be written to these registers at boot:

```
#define RCC_RESET (0x078E3AD1)
#define RCC2_RESET (0x07802810)
```

This microcontroller uses a raw interrupt to notify that the PLL is locked to the requested frequency. The interrupt status can be checked by reading bit 6 in the **Raw Interrupt Status (RIS)** register:

```
#define RIS (*(volatile uint32_t*)) (0x400FE050)
#define PLL_LRIS (1 << 6)
```

The clock configuration routine in this case starts by resetting the **RCC** registers and setting the appropriate values to configure the PLL. The PLL is configured to generate a 400 MHz clock from an 8 MHz oscillator source:

```
void rcc_config(void)
{
    RCC = RCC_RESET;
    RCC2 = RCC2_RESET;
    DMB();
    RCC = RCC_SYSDIV_50MHZ | RCC_PWMDIV_64 |
        RCC_XTAL_8MHZ_400MHZ | RCC_USEPWMDIV;
```

The resultant 50 MHz CPU frequency is derived from this master 400 MHz clock using the system divider. The clock is pre-divided by two, and then a factor of 4 is applied:

```
RCC2 = RCC2_SYSDIV2_4;
DMB();
```

The external oscillators are powered on:

```
RCC  &= ~RCC_OFF;
RCC2 &= ~RCC2_OFF;
```

And the system clock divider is powered on as well. At the same time, setting the bypass bit ensures that the oscillator is used as a source for the system clock, and the PLL is bypassed:

```
RCC |= RCC_BYPASS | RCC_USESYSDIV;
DMB();
```

The execution is held until the PLL is stable and has locked on the desired frequency:

```
while ((RIS & PLL_LRIS) == 0)    ;
```

Disabling the bypass bits in the RCC registers at this point is sufficient to connect the PLL output to the system clock:

```
RCC &= ~RCC_BYPASS;
RCC2 &= ~RCC2_BYPASS;
}
```

Clock distribution

Once the bus clocks are available, the RCC logic can be programmed to distribute the clock to single peripherals. To do so, the RCC exposes bit-mapped peripheral clock source registers. Setting the corresponding bit in one of the registers enables the clock for each mapped peripheral in the microcontroller. Each register can control clock gating for 32 peripherals.

The order of the peripherals, and consequently the corresponding register and bit, is strictly dependent on the specific microcontrollers. The STM32F4 has three registers dedicated to this purpose. For example, to enable the clock source for the internal watchdog, it is sufficient to set the bit number 9 in the clock enable register at address 0x40021001c:

```
#define APB1_CLOCK_ER (*(uint32_t *) (0x4002001c))
#define WDG_APB1_CLOCK_ER_VAL (1 << 9)

APB1_CLOCK_ER |= WDG_APB1_CLOCK_ER_VAL;
```

Keeping the clock source off for a peripheral that is not in use saves power; thus, if the target supports clock gating, it can implement optimization and fine-tuning of power consumption by disabling the single peripherals at runtime through their clock gates.

Enabling the SysTick

Once a stable CPU frequency has been set up, we can configure the main timer on the system—the SysTick. Since the implementation of a specific system timer is not mandatory on all Cortex-M, sometimes it is necessary to use an ordinary auxiliary timer to keep track of the system time. In most cases, though, the SysTick interrupt can be enabled by accessing its configuration, which is located in the system control block within the system configuration region. In all Cortex-M microcontrollers that include a system tick, the configuration can be found starting at address 0xE000E010, and exposes four registers:

- The control/status register (SYSTICK_CSR) at offset 0
- The reload value register (SYSTICK_RVR) at offset 4
- The current value register (SYSTICK_CVR) at offset 8
- The calibration register (SYSTICK_CALIB) at offset 12

The SysTick works as a countdown timer. It holds a 24-bit value, which is decreased at every CPU clock tick. The timer reloads the same value every time it reaches 0 and triggers the SysTick interrupt if it is configured to do so.

As a shortcut to access the SysTick registers, we define their locations:

```
#define SYSTICK_BASE (0xE000E010)
#define SYSTICK_CSR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (SYSTICK_BASE +
    0x00))
#define SYSTICK_RVR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (SYSTICK_BASE +
    0x04))
#define SYSTICK_CVR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (SYSTICK_BASE +
    0x08))
#define SYSTICK_CALIB (*(volatile uint32_t *) (SYSTICK_BASE
    + 0x0C))
```

Since we know the frequency of the CPU in Hz, we can define the system tick interval by setting the value in the **Reload Value Register (RVR)**. For a 1 ms interval in between two consecutive ticks, we simply divide the frequency by 1,000, and we subtract 1 to account for the zero-based timer value, ensuring that the next interrupt will take place after the counter has been decreased exactly N times, which corresponds to counting down from N-1 to zero. We can also set the initial value for the timer to 0 so that the first interrupt is immediately triggered after we enable the countdown. The SysTick

can finally be enabled by configuring the control/status register. The meaning of the least significant three bits of the CSR is as follows:

- **Bit 0:** Enables countdown. After this bit is set, the counter in the SysTick timer is automatically decreased at every CPU clock interval.
- **Bit 1:** Enables interrupt. If this bit is set when the counter reaches 0, a SysTick interrupt will be generated.
- **Bit 2:** Source clock selection. If this bit is reset, an external reference clock is used as the source. The CPU clock is used as the source when this bit is set.

We are going to define a custom SysTick interrupt handler, so we want to set bit 1 as well. Because we configured the CPU clock correctly, and we are scaling the system tick interval reload value on that, we also want bit 2 to be set. The last line of our `systick_enable` routine will enable the three bits together in the CSR:

```
void systick_enable(void) {  
    SYSTICK_RVR = ((CPU_FREQ / 1000) - 1);  
    SYSTICK_CVR = 0;  
    SYSTICK_CSR = (1 << 0) | (1 << 1) | (1 << 2);  
}
```

The system timer that we have configured is the same as that used by **real-time operating systems (RTOSs)** to initiate process switches. In our case, it might be helpful to keep a monotonic system wall clock, measuring the time elapsed since the clock configuration. A minimalist implementation of the interrupt service routine for the system timer could be as follows:

```
volatile unsigned int jiffies = 0;  
void isr_systick(void)  
{  
    ++jiffies;  
}
```

This simple function, and the associated global `volatile` variable associated, are sufficient to keep track of the time transparently while the application is running. In fact, the system tick interrupt happens independently, at regular intervals, when the `jiffies` variable is incremented in the interrupt handler, without altering the flow of the main application. What actually happens is that every time the system tick counter reaches 0, the execution is suspended, and the interrupt routine quickly executes. When `isr_systick` returns, the flow of the main application is resumed by restoring exactly the same context of execution stored in memory a moment before the interrupt occurred.

The reason why the system timer variable must be defined and declared everywhere as `volatile` is that its value is supposed to change while executing the application in a way that is independent of

the behavior possibly predicted by the compiler for the local context of execution. The `volatile` keyword in this case ensures that the compiler is forced to produce code that checks the value of the variable every time it is instantiated, by disallowing the use of optimizations based on the false assumption that the variable is not being modified by the local code.

Here is an example main program that uses the previous functions to boot the system, configure the master clock, and enable the SysTick:

```
void main(void) {
    flash_set_waitstates();
    clock_config();
    systick_enable();
    while(1) {
        WFI();
    }
}
```

The shortcut for the **WFI** assembly instruction (short for **wait for interrupt**) is defined. It is used in the main application to keep the CPU inactive until the next interrupt occurs:

```
#define WFI() asm volatile ("wfi")
```

To verify that the SysTick is actually running, the program can be executed with the debugger attached and stopped after a while. If the system tick has been configured correctly, the `jiffies` variable should always be displaying the time in milliseconds elapsed since boot.

Generic timers

Providing a SysTick timer is not mandatory for low-end microcontrollers. Some targets may not have a system timer, but all of them expose some kind of interface to program several general-purpose timers for the program to be able to implement time-driven operations. Timers in general are very flexible and easy to configure and are generally capable of triggering interrupts at regular intervals. The STM32F4 provides up to 17 timers, each with different characteristics. Timers are in general independent from each other, as each of them has its own interrupt line and a separate peripheral clock gate. On the STM32F4, for example, these are the steps needed to enable the clock source and the interrupt line for timer 2. The timer interface is based on a counter that is incremented or decremented at every tick. The interface exposed on this platform is very flexible and supports several features, including the selection of a different clock source for input, the possibility to concatenate timers, and even the internals of the timer implementation that can be programmed. It is possible to configure the timer to count up or down, and trigger interrupt events on different values of the internal counter. Timers can be one-shot or continuous.

An abstraction of the `timer` interface can usually be found in support libraries provided by the silicon vendor, or in other open source libraries. However, in order to understand the interface exposed by the microcontroller, the example provided here is once again directly communicating with the peripherals using the configuration registers.

This example mostly uses the default settings for a general-purpose timer on the STM32F407. By default, the counter is increased at every tick, up to its automatic reload value, and continuously generates interrupt events on overflow. A prescaler value can be set to divide the clock source to increase the range of possible intervals. To generate interrupts spread at a constant given interval, only a few registers need to be accessed:

- The **control registers 1 and 2** (CR1 and CR2)
- The **direct memory access (DMA)/Interrupt enable register** (DIER)
- The **status register** (SR)
- The **prescaler counter** (PSC)
- The **auto-reload register** (ARR)

In general, the offsets for these registers are the same for all the timers so that, given the base address, they can be calculated using a macro. In this case, only the register for the timer in use is defined:

```
#define TIM2_BASE (0x40000000)
#define TIM2_CR1 (*(volatile uint32_t *) (TIM2_BASE + 0x00))
#define TIM2_DIER (*(volatile uint32_t *) (TIM2_BASE +
    0x0c))
#define TIM2_SR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (TIM2_BASE + 0x10))
#define TIM2_PSC (*(volatile uint32_t *) (TIM2_BASE + 0x28))
#define TIM2_ARR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (TIM2_BASE + 0x2c))
```

Also, for readability, we define some relevant bit positions in the registers that we are going to configure:

```
#define TIM_DIER_UIE (1 << 0)
#define TIM_SR_UIF (1 << 0)
#define TIM_CR1_CLOCK_ENABLE (1 << 0)
#define TIM_CR1_UPD_RS (1 << 2)
```

First of all, we are going to define a service routine. The `timer` interface requires us to clear one flag in the status register, to acknowledge the interrupt. In this simple case, all we do is increment a local variable so that we can verify that the timer is being executed by inspecting it in the debugger. We mark the `timer2_ticks` variable as `volatile` so that it does not get optimized out by the compiler, since it is never used in the code:

```
void isr_tim2(void)
{
    static volatile uint32_t timer2_ticks = 0;
    TIM2_SR &= ~TIM_SR_UIF;
    timer2_ticks++;
}
```

The service routine must be associated, by including a pointer to the function in the right position within the interrupt vector defined in `startup.c`:

```
isr_tim2 , // TIM2_IRQ 28
```

If the timer is connected to a different branch in the clock tree, as in this case, we need to account for the additional scaling factor between the clock bus that feeds the timer and the actual CPU clock frequency, while calculating the values for the prescaler and the reload threshold. Timer 2 on STM32F407 is connected to the **Advanced Peripheral Bus (APB)** bus, which runs at half of the CPU frequency.

This initialization is an example of a function that automatically calculates `TIM2_PSC` and `TIM2_ARR` values and initializes a timer based on the given interval, expressed in milliseconds. The clock variable must be set to the frequency of the clock source for the timer, which may differ from the CPU frequency.

The following definitions are specific to our platform, mapping the address for the clock gating configuration and the interrupt number of the device we want to use:

```
#define APB1_CLOCK_ER (*(volatile uint32_t *) (0x40023840))
#define APB1_CLOCK_RST (*(volatile uint32_t *)
    (0x40023820))
#define TIM2_APB1_CLOCK_ER_VAL (1 << 0)
#define NVIC_TIM2_IRQN (28)
```

And here is the function to invoke from main to enable a continuous timer interrupt at the desired interval:

```
int timer_init(uint32_t clock, uint32_t interval_ms)
{
    uint32_t val = 0;
    uint32_t psc = 1;
    uint32_t err = 0;
    clock = (clock / 1000) * interval_ms;
    while (psc < 65535) {
        val = clock / psc;
        err = clock % psc;
        if ((val < 65535) && (err == 0)) {
            val--;
            break;
        }
        val = 0;
        psc++;
    }
    if (val == 0)
        return -1;
    nvic_irq_enable(NVIC_TIM2_IRQN);
    nvic_irq_setprio(NVIC_TIM2_IRQN, 0);
    APB1_CLOCK_RST |= TIM2_APB1_CLOCK_ER_VAL;
    DMB();
    TIM2_PSC = psc;
    TIM2_ARR = val;
    TIM2_CR1 |= TIM_CR1_CLOCK_ENABLE;
    TIM2_DIER |= TIM_DIER_UIE;
    DMB();
    return 0;
}
```

The example presented here is only one of the possible applications of system timers. On the reference platform, timers can be used for different purposes, such as measuring intervals between pulses, synchronizing with each other, or activating signals periodically, given a chosen frequency and duty cycle. This last usage will be explained in the *PWM* subsection later in this chapter. For all other uses of generic timers on the target, please refer to the reference manual of the microcontroller in use. Now that our system is configured and ready to run, and we have learned how to manage time and generate synchronous events, it is finally time to introduce our first peripherals to start communicating with the outside world. In the next section, we will introduce GPIO lines in their multiple configurations, which allow driving or sensing a voltage on single microcontroller pins.

GPIO

The majority of the pins of a microcontroller chip represent configurable I/O lines. Each pin can be configured to represent a logic level by driving the voltage of the pin as a digital output or to sense the logic state by comparing the voltage as a digital input. Some of the generic pins, though, can be associated with alternate functions, such as analog input, a serial interface, or the output pulse from a timer. Pins may have several possible configurations, but only one is activated at a time. The GPIO controller exposes the configuration of all the pins and manages the association of the pins with the subsystems when alternate functions are in use.

Pin configuration

Depending on the logic of the GPIO controller, the pins can be activated all together, separately, or in groups. In order to implement a driver to set up the pins and use them as needed, it is possible to refer to the datasheet of the microcontroller or any example implementation provided by the silicon vendor.

In the case of the STM32F4, GPIO pins are divided into groups. Each group is connected to a separate clock gate, so, to use the pins associated with a group, the clock gate must be enabled. The following code will distribute the clock source to the GPIO controller for the group D:

```
#define AHB1_CLOCK_ER (*(volatile uint32_t *) (0x40023840))
#define GPIOD_AHB1_CLOCK_ER (1 << 3)
AHB1_CLOCK_ER |= GPIOD_AHB1_CLOCK_ER;
```

The configuration registers associated with the GPIO controllers are mapped to a specific area in the peripherals region as well. In the case of the GPIOD controller, the base address is at 0x40020C00. On the STM32F4 microcontrollers, there are 10 different registers for configuring and using each digital I/O group. As groups are composed of at most 16 pins, some registers may use a representation of 2 bits per pin:

- Mode register (offset 0 in the address space) selects the mode (among digital input, digital output, alternate function, or analog input), using 2 bits per pin

- Output type register (offset 4) selects the output signal driving logic (push-pull or open-drain)
- Output speed register (offset 8) selects output drive speed
- Pull-up register (offset 12) enables or disables the internal pull-up or pull-down resistor
- Port input data (offset 16) is used to read the state of a digital input pin
- Port output data (offset 20) containing the current value of the digital output
- Port bit set/reset (offset 24) used to drive a digital output signal high or low
- Port configuration lock (offset 28)
- Alternate function low bit register (offset 32), 4 bits per pin, pins 0-7
- Alternate function high bit register (offset 36), 4 bits per pin, pins 8-15

The pin must be configured before use, and the clock gating configured to route the source clock to the controller for the group. The configurations available on this GPIO controller can be better explained by looking at specific examples.

Digital output

Enabling a digital output is possible by setting the mode to output in the mode register bits corresponding to the given pin. To be able to control the level of pin D13, which is also connected to an LED on our reference platform, we need to access the following registers:

```
#define GPIOD_BASE 0x40020c00
#define GPIOD_MODE (*(volatile uint32_t *) (GPIOD_BASE +
    0x00))
#define GPIOD_OTYPE (*(volatile uint32_t *) (GPIOD_BASE +
    0x04))
#define GPIOD_PUPD (*(volatile uint32_t *) (GPIOD_BASE +
    0x0c))
#define GPIOD_ODR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (GPIOD_BASE +
    0x14))
#define GPIOD_BSRR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (GPIOD_BASE +
    0x18))
```

In later examples, alternate functions are used to change the pin assignment. The two registers containing the alternate function settings are shown here:

```
#define GPIOD_AFL (*(volatile uint32_t *) (GPIOD_BASE +
    0x20))
```

```
#define GPIOD_AFH (*(volatile uint32_t *) (GPIOD_BASE +
0x24))
```

The following simple functions are meant to control the output of pin D15 connected to the blue LED on the STM32F4. The main program must call `led_setup` before any other function call, in order to configure the pin as output and activate the pull-up/pull-down internal resistor:

```
#define LED_PIN (15)
void led_setup(void)
{
    uint32_t mode_reg;
```

First, the clock gating is configured to enable the clock source for the GPIOD controller:

```
AHB1_CLOCK_ER |= GPIOD_AHB1_CLOCK_ER;
```

The mode register is altered to set the mode for GPIO D15 to digital output. The operation is done in two steps. Any previous value set in the 2 bits corresponding to the position of the pin mode within the register is erased:

```
GPIOD_MODE &= ~(0x03 << (LED_PIN * 2));
```

In the same position, the value 1 is set, meaning that the pin is now configured as digital output:

```
GPIOD_MODE |= 1 << (LED_PIN * 2);
```

To enable the pull-up and pull-down internal resistors, we do the same. The value to set in this case is 2, corresponding to the following:

```
GPIOD_PUPD &= ~(0x03 << (LED_PIN * 2));
GPIOD_PUPD |= 0x02 << (LED_PIN * 2);
}
```

After the `setup` function is invoked, the application and the interrupt handlers can call the functions exported, to set the value of the pin high or low, by acting on the bit set/reset register:

```
void led_on(void)
{
    GPIOD_BSRR |= 1 << LED_PIN;
}
```


The highest half of the BSRR is used to reset the pins. Writing 1 in the reset register bit drives the pin logic level to low:

```
void led_off(void)
{
    GPIOD_BSRR |= 1 << (LED_PIN + 16);
}
```

A convenience function is defined, to toggle the LED value from on to off and vice versa:

```
void led_toggle(void)
{
    if ((GPIOD_ODR & (1 << LED_PIN)) == (1 << LED_PIN))
        led_off();
    else
        led_on();
}
```

Using the timer configured in the previous section, it is possible to run a small program that blinks the blue LED on the STM32F407-Discovery. The `led_toggle` function can be called from inside the service routine of the timer implemented in the previous section:

```
void isr_tim2(void)
{
    TIM2_SR &= ~TIM_SR_UIF;
    led_toggle();
}
```

In the main program, the LED driver must be initialized before starting the timer:

```
void main(void) {
    flash_set_waitstates();
    clock_config();
    led_setup();
    timer_init(CPU_FREQ, 1, 1000);
    while(1)
        WFI();
}
```

The main loop of the program is empty. The `led_toggle` action is invoked every second to blink the LED.

PWM

Pulse Width Modulation, or **PWM** for brevity, is a commonly used technique to control different types of actuators, encode messages into signals with different pulse duration, and, in general, generate pulses with fixed frequency and variable duty cycles on digital output lines for different purposes.

The `timer` interface may allow associating pins to output a PWM signal. On our reference microcontroller, four output compare channels can be associated with general-purpose timers, and the pins connected to the OC channels may be configured to output the encoded output automatically. On the STM32F407-Discovery board, the blue LED pin PD15, used in the previous example to demonstrate digital output functionality, is associated with the OC4 that can be driven by timer 4. According to the chip documentation, selecting the alternate function 2 for the pin directly connects the output pin to OC4.

The following diagram shows the pin configuration to use alternate function 2 to connect it to the output of the timer:




Figure 6.1 – Configuring pin D15 to use alternate function 2 connects it to the output of the timer

The pin is initialized, and set to use the alternate configuration instead of the plain digital output, by clearing the MODE register bits and setting the value to 2:

```
GPIOD_MODE &= ~ (0x03 << (LED_PIN * 2));
GPIOD_MODE |= (2 << (LED_PIN * 2));
```

Pins from 0 to 7 in this GPIO group use 4 bits each in the AFL register of the GPIOD controller. Higher pins, in the range 8-15, use 4 bits each in the AFH register. Once the alternate mode is selected, the right alternate function number is programmed into the 4 bits associated with pin 15, so we are using the AFH register in this case:

```
uint32_t value;
if (LED_PIN < 8) {
    value = GPIOD_AFL & (~ (0xf << (LED_PIN * 4)));
    GPIOD_AFL = value | (0x2 << (LED_PIN * 4));
} else {
    value = GPIOD_AFH & (~ (0xf << ((LED_PIN - 8) * 4)));
    GPIOD_AFH = value | (0x2 << ((LED_PIN - 8) * 4));
}
```

The `pwm_led_init()` function, which we can call from the main program to configure the LED pin PD15, will look like this:

```
void led_pwm_setup(void)
{
    AHB1_CLOCK_ER |= GPIOD_AHB1_CLOCK_ER;
    GPIOD_MODE &= ~ (0x03 << (LED_PIN * 2));
    GPIOD_MODE |= (2 << (LED_PIN * 2));
    GPIOD_OSPD &= ~ (0x03 << (LED_PIN * 2));
    GPIOD_OSPD |= (0x03 << (LED_PIN * 2));
    GPIOD_PUPD &= ~ (0x03 << (LED_PIN * 2));
    GPIOD_PUPD |= (0x02 << (LED_PIN * 2));
    GPIOD_AFH &= ~ (0xf << ((LED_PIN - 8) * 4));
    GPIOD_AFH |= (0x2 << ((LED_PIN - 8) * 4));
}
```

The function that sets up the timer for PWM generation is similar to the one used in the simple interrupt-generating timer in the digital output example, except that configuring the timer to output a PWM involves modifying the value of four additional registers:

- The **capture/compare enable register (CCER)**
- The **capture/compare mode registers 1 and 2 (CCMR1 and CCMR2)**
- The **capture channel 4 (CC4)** configuration

The signature of the function we will use in the example to configure a PWM with the given duty cycle has the following signature:

```
int pwm_init(uint32_t clock, uint32_t dutycycle)
{
```

Enabling the clock gate to turn on timer 4 is still required:

```
APB1_CLOCK_RST &= ~TIM4_APB1_CLOCK_ER_VAL;
APB1_CLOCK_ER |= TIM4_APB1_CLOCK_ER_VAL;
```

Both the timer and its output compare channels are temporarily disabled to start the configuration from a clean slate:

```
TIM4_CCER &= ~TIM_CCER_CC4_ENABLE;
TIM4_CR1 = 0;
TIM4_PSC = 0;
```

For this example, we can use a fixed PWM frequency of 100 kHz, by setting the automatic reload value to 1/100000 of the input clock, and enforcing no use of the prescaler:

```
uint32_t val = clock / 100000;
```

The duty cycle is calculated according to the value that is passed as a second parameter to `pwm_init()`, expressed as a percentage. To calculate the corresponding threshold level, this simple formula is used so that, for example, a value of 80 means that the PWM will be active for 4/5 of the time. The resultant value is decremented by one, only if not zero to avoid underflow:

```
lvl = (val * threshold) / 100;
if (lvl != 0)
    lvl--;
```

Comparator value register CCR4, and auto-reload value register ARR, are set accordingly. Also, in this case, the value of ARR is decreased by 1, to account for the zero-based counter:

```
TIM4_ARR = val - 1;
TIM4_CCR4 = 171;
```

In order to correctly set up a PWM signal on this platform, we first ensure that the portions of the CCMR1 register we are going to configure are correctly cleared. This includes the capture selection and the mode configuration:

```
TIM4_CCMR1 &= ~(0x03 << 0);
TIM4_CCMR1 &= ~(0x07 << 4);
```

The PWM1 mode selected is just one of the possible alternate configurations that are based on the capture/compare timer. To enable the mode, we set the PWM1 value in CCMR2, after clearing the relevant bits of the registers:

```
TIM4_CCMR1 &= ~(0x03 << 0);
TIM4_CCMR1 &= ~(0x07 << 4);
TIM4_CCMR1 |= TIM_CCMR1_OC1M_PWM1;
TIM4_CCMR2 &= ~(0x03 << 8);
TIM4_CCMR2 &= ~(0x07 << 12);
TIM4_CCMR2 |= TIM_CCMR2_OC4M_PWM1;
```

Finally, we enable the output comparator OC4. The timer is then set up to automatically reload its stored value every time the counter overflows:

```
TIM4_CCMR2 |= TIM_CCMR2_OC4M_PWM1;
TIM4_CCER |= TIM_CCER_CC4_ENABLE;
TIM4_CR1 |= TIM_CR1_CLOCK_ENABLE | TIM_CR1_ARPE;
}
```

Using a PWM to drive the voltage applied on the LED modifies its brightness, according to the configured duty cycle. An example program such as the following reduces the brightness of the LED to 50% if compared to that of an LED powered by a constant voltage output, such as the one in the digital output example:

```
void main(void) {
    flash_set_waitstates();
    clock_config();
    led_pwm_setup();
}
```

```

pwm_init(CPU_FREQ, 50);
while(1)
    WFI();
}

```

The effect of the PWM on the LED brightness can be better visualized by dynamically altering the duty cycle. It is possible, for example, to set up a second timer to generate an interrupt every 50 ms. In the interrupt handler, the duty cycle factor is cycling in the range 0-80% and back, using 16 steps. In the first 8 steps, the duty cycle is increased by 10% at every interrupt, from 0 to 80%, and in the last 8 steps, it is reduced at the same rate, bringing the duty cycle back to 0:

```

void isr_tim2(void) {
    static uint32_t tim2_ticks = 0;
    TIM2_SR &= ~TIM_SR_UIF;
    if (tim2_ticks > 16)
        tim2_ticks = 0;
    if (tim2_ticks > 8)
        pwm_init(master_clock, 10 * (16 - tim2_ticks));
    else
        pwm_init(master_clock, 10 * tim2_ticks);
    tim2_ticks++;
}

```

If we initialize timer 2 in the main program to trigger interrupts spread over constant intervals, as in the previous examples, we can see the LED pulsating, rhythmically fading in and out.

In this case, timer 2 is initialized by the main program, and its associated interrupt handler updates the settings for timer 4, 20 times per second:

```

void main(void) {
    flash_set_waitstates();
    clock_config();
    led_pwm_setup();
    pwm_init(CPU_FREQ, 0);
    timer_init(CPU_FREQ, 1, 50);
    while(1)
        WFI();
}

```

Digital input

A GPIO pin configured in input mode detects the logic level of the voltage applied to it. The logic value of all the input pins on a GPIO controller can be read from the **input data register (IDR)**. On the reference board, pin A0 is connected to the user button, so the status of the button can be read at any time while the application is running.

The GPIOA controller can be turned on by clock gating:

```
#define AHB1_CLOCK_ER (*(volatile uint32_t *) (0x40023830))
#define GPIOA_AHB1_CLOCK_ER (1 << 0)
```

The controller itself is mapped at address 0x40020000:

```
#define GPIOA_BASE 0x40020000
#define GPIOA_MODE (*(volatile uint32_t *) (GPIOA_BASE +
    0x00))
#define GPIOA_IDR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (GPIOA_BASE +
    0x10))
```

To set up the pin for input, we only ensure that the mode is set to 0, by clearing the two mode bits relative to pin 0:

```
#define BUTTON_PIN (0)
void button_setup(void)
{
    AHB1_CLOCK_ER |= GPIOA_AHB1_CLOCK_ER;
    GPIOA_MODE &= ~ (0x03 << (BUTTON_PIN * 2));
}
```

The application can now check the status of the button at any time by reading the lowest bit of the IDR. When the button is pressed, the reference voltage is connected to the pin, and the value of the bit corresponding to the pin changes from 0 to 1:

```
int button_is_pressed(void)
{
    return (GPIOA_IDR & (1 << BUTTON_PIN)) >> BUTTON_PIN;
}
```

Interrupt-based input

Having to proactively read the value of a pin by constantly polling the IDR is not convenient in many cases, where the application is supposed to react to state changes. Microcontrollers usually provide mechanisms to connect digital input pins to interrupt lines so that the application can react in real time to events related to the input because the execution is interrupted to execute the associated service routine.

On the reference **microcontroller unit (MCU)**, pin A0 can be connected to the external interrupt and event controller, also known as **EXTI**. EXTI offers edge-detection triggers that can be attached to interrupt lines. The number of the pin within the GPIO group determines the number of the EXTI interrupt that is associated with it so that the EXTI 0 interrupt routine may be connected to pin 0 of any GPIO group if needed:




Figure 6.2 – EXTI0 controller associating edge detection triggers to the user button connected to PA0

To associate **PA0** to **EXTI 0**, the **EXTI configuration** register must be modified to set the number of the GPIO group in the bits associated with **EXTI 0**. In the STM32F4, the **EXTI configuration** registers (**EXTI_CR**) are located at address 0x40013808. Each register is used to set the interrupt controller associated with an EXTI line. The lowest four bits of the first register are relative to EXTI line 0. The number for the GPIO group A is 0, so we need to ensure that the corresponding bits are cleared in the first **EXTI_CR** register. The goal of the next example is to demonstrate how to enable the **EXTI 0** interrupt and associate it to pin A0, so the following definitions are provided to access the first **EXTI_CR** register to set the GPIO group A:

```
#define EXTI_CR_BASE (0x40013808)
#define EXTI_CR0 (*(volatile uint32_t *) (EXTI_CR_BASE +
```



```
0x00) )
#define EXTI_CR_EXTIO_MASK (0x0F)
```

The EXTI0 interrupt is connected to NVIC line number 6, so we add this definition to configure the NVIC:

```
#define NVIC_EXTIO_IRQN (6)
```

The EXTI controller in STM32F4 microcontrollers is located at address 0x40013C00, and provides the following registers:

- **Interrupt mask register (IMR)** at offset 0. Sets/clears the corresponding bit to enable/disable the interrupt for each of the EXTI lines.
- **Event mask register (EMR)** at offset 4. Sets/clears the corresponding bit to enable/disable the event trigger for the corresponding EXTI line.
- **Rising trigger select register (RTSR)** at offset 8. Sets the corresponding bit to generate events and interrupts when the associated digital input level switches from 0 to 1.
- **Falling trigger select register (FTSR)** at offset 12. Sets the corresponding bit to generate events and interrupts when the associated signal falls from a logic value of 1 back to 0.
- **Software interrupt enable register (SWIER)** at offset 16. If a bit is set in this register, the associated interrupt event will be immediately generated, and the service routine executed. This mechanism can be used to implement custom software interrupts.
- **Pending interrupt register (PR)** at offset 20. To clear a pending interrupt, the service routine should set the bit corresponding to the EXTI line, or the interrupt will remain pending. A new service routine will be spawned until the PR bit for the EXTI line is cleared.

For convenience, we may define the registers as follows:

```
#define EXTI_BASE (0x40013C00)
#define EXTI_IMR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (EXTI_BASE + 0x00))
#define EXTI_EMR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (EXTI_BASE + 0x04))
#define EXTI_RTSR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (EXTI_BASE +
    0x08))
#define EXTI_FTSR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (EXTI_BASE +
    0x0c))
#define EXTI_SWIER (*(volatile uint32_t *) (EXTI_BASE +
    0x10))
#define EXTI_PR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (EXTI_BASE + 0x14))
```

The procedure to enable the interrupt on the rising edge of PA0, associated with the button press, is the following:

```
void button_setup(void)
{
    AHB1_CLOCK_ER |= GPIOA_AHB1_CLOCK_ER;
    GPIOA_MODE &= ~ (0x03 << (BUTTON_PIN * 2));
    EXTI_CR0 &= ~EXTI_CR_EXTI0_MASK;
    nvic_irq_enable(NVIC_EXTI0_IRQN);
    EXTI_IMR |= 1 << BUTTON_PIN;
    EXTI_EMR |= 1 << BUTTON_PIN;
    EXTI_RTSR |= 1 << BUTTON_PIN;
}
```

The ISR, IMR, and RTSR corresponding bits have been set, and the interrupt has been enabled in the NVIC. Instead of polling for the value of the digital input to change, we can now define a service routine that will be invoked every time the button is pressed:

```
volatile uint32_t button_presses = 0;
void isr_exti0(void)
{
    EXTI_PR |= 1 << BUTTON_PIN;
    button_presses++;
}
```

In this simple example, the `button_presses` counter is expected to increase by one at every button press event. In a real-life scenario, buttons based on mechanical contact (such as the one on the STM32F407-Discovery) are tricky to control using this mechanism. A single physical button press may in fact trigger the rising front interrupt multiple times during the transitory phase. This phenomenon, known as a button bouncing effect, can be mitigated using specific *debounce* techniques, which are not discussed here.

Analog input

Some pins have the possibility to measure the applied voltage dynamically and assign a discrete number to the measured value, using an **analog-to-digital signal converter**, or **ADC**. This is very useful to acquire data from a wide range of sensors, capable of conveying the information as output voltage or simply using a variable resistor.

The configuration of the ADC subsystem may vary significantly across different platforms. ADCs on modern microcontrollers offer a wide range of configuration options. The reference microcontroller equips 3 separate ADC controllers, sharing 16 input channels, each one with a resolution of 12 bits. Multiple features are available, such as DMA transfer of the acquired data, and monitoring the signals in between two watchdog thresholds.

ADC controllers are generally designed to automatically sample input values multiple times per second and provide stable results that are immediately available. The case we analyze here is simpler and consists of a one-shot read operation for a single conversion.

Associating a specific pin to a controller is possible by checking how channels are mapped on the controllers if the pin supports it and it is connected through a channel to one of the configured as analog input and reading out the value, which results from the conversion of the analog signal. In this example, pin B1 is used as analog input and can be connected to the ADB1 controller through channel 9. The following constants and registers are defined for the configuration of the ADB1 controller:

```
#define APB2_CLOCK_ER (*(volatile uint32_t *) (0x40023844))
#define ADC1_APB2_CLOCK_ER_VAL (1 << 8)
#define ADC1_BASE (0x40012000)
#define ADC1_SR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (ADC1_BASE + 0x00))
#define ADC1_CR1 (*(volatile uint32_t *) (ADC1_BASE +
    0x04))
#define ADC1_CR2 (*(volatile uint32_t *) (ADC1_BASE +
    0x08))
#define ADC1_SMPR1 (*(volatile uint32_t *) (ADC1_BASE +
    0x0c))
#define ADC1_SMPR2 (*(volatile uint32_t *) (ADC1_BASE +
    0x10))
#define ADC1_SQR3 (*(volatile uint32_t *) (ADC1_BASE +
    0x34))
#define ADC1_DR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (ADC1_BASE + 0x4c))
#define ADC_CR1_SCAN (1 << 8)
#define ADC_CR2_EN (1 << 0)
#define ADC_CR2_CONT (1 << 1)
#define ADC_CR2_SWSTART (1 << 30)
#define ADC_SR_EOC (1 << 1)
#define ADC_SMPR_SMP_480CYC (0x7)
```

These are the definitions to configure GPIO as usual, this time mapped for GPIOB:

```
#define AHB1_CLOCK_ER (*(volatile uint32_t *) (0x40023830))
#define GPIOB_AHB1_CLOCK_ER (1 << 1)
#define GPIOB_BASE (0x40020400)
#define GPIOB_MODE (*(volatile uint32_t *) (GPIOB_BASE +
    0x00))
#define ADC_PIN (1)
#define ADC_PIN_CHANNEL (9)
```

The three ADCs share a few registers for common settings, such as the clock prescale factor, so they will all operate at the same frequency. The prescale factor for the ADC must be set within the working range of the converter recommended by the datasheet—in the target platform, halving the frequency of the APB2 clock through the common prescaler. The common ADC configuration registers start at port 0x40012300:

```
#define ADC_COM_BASE (0x40012300)
#define ADC_COM_CCR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (ADC_COM_BASE +
    0x04))
```

Based on these definitions, the initialization function can be written as follows. First, we enable the clock gating for both the ADC controller and the GPIO group:

```
int adc_init(void)
{
    APB2_CLOCK_ER |= ADC1_APB2_CLOCK_ER_VAL;
    AHB1_CLOCK_ER |= GPIOB_AHB1_CLOCK_ER;
```

PB1 is set to analog input mode, corresponding to the value 3 in the mode register:

```
GPIOB_MODE |= 0x03 << (ADC_PIN * 2);
```

ADC1 is temporarily switched off to set the desired configuration. The common clock prescaler is set to 0, meaning a divisor of 2 from the input clock. This ensures that the frequency fed to the ADC controller is within its operational range. Scan mode is disabled, and so is continuous mode, as we are not using these features in this example:

```
ADC1_CR2 &= ~(ADC_CR2_EN);
ADC_COM_CCR &= ~(0x03 << 16);
ADC1_CR1 &= ~(ADC_CR1_SCAN);
ADC1_CR2 &= ~(ADC_CR2_CONT);
```

The sampling frequency can be set using the two registers `SMPR1` and `SMPR2`, depending on the channel in use. Each register represents one channel sample rate using 3 bits per register, so the channels 0 to 9 are configurable using `SMPR1`, and all the others through `SMPR2`. The channel for PB1 is set to 9, so in this case, the `SMPR1` register is used, but to remind about this, the generic mechanism to set the sample rate on any channel is provided:

```
if (ADC_PIN_CHANNEL > 9) {
    uint32_t val = ADC1_SMPR2;
    val = ADC_SMPR_SMP_480CYC << ((ADC_PIN_CHANNEL - 10) *
    3);
    ADC1_SMPR2 = val;
} else {
    uint32_t val = ADC1_SMPR1;
    val = ADC_SMPR_SMP_480CYC << (ADC_PIN_CHANNEL * 3);
    ADC1_SMPR1 = val;
}
```

Finally, the channel is enabled in the conversion sequence of the ADC controller using the **sequence registers (SQRs)**. The mechanisms foresee that multiple channels can be added to the same sequence on the controller, by populating the registers in inverse order, from `SQR3` to `SQR1`. Each source channel is represented in five bits, so each register contains up to six sources, except `SQR1`, which stores five, and reserves the higher bits to indicate the length of the stack stored in the registers, minus one. In our case, there is no need to set the length-minus-one field, as it would be zero for a single source in `SQR1`:

```
ADC1_SQR3 |= (ADC_PIN_CHANNEL);
```

Finally, the ADC1 analog converter is enabled again by setting the enable bit in the `CR2` control register and the initialization function successfully returns:

```
ADC1_CR2 |= ADC_CR2_EN;
return 0;
}
```

After the ADC has been initialized and configured to convert the analog signal on PB1, the A/D conversion can be started at any time. A simple blocking read function would initiate the conversion, wait for the conversion to be successfully started, then wait until the conversion is completed by looking at the **end of conversion (EOC)** bit in the status register:

```
int adc_read(void)
{
    ADC1_CR2 |= ADC_CR2_SWSTART;
```

```
while (ADC1_CR2 & ADC_CR2_SWSTART)
;
while ((ADC1_SR & ADC_SR_EOC) == 0)
;
```

When the conversion is completed, the corresponding discrete value is available on the lowest 12 bits of the data register, and can be returned to the caller:

```
return (int) (ADC1_DR);
}
```

We have learned how to communicate with the outside world using GPIOs. The same GPIO setup and management interface will be useful again in the next chapter to configure more complex, local bus interfaces, using the alternate functions for the associated GPIO lines.

The upcoming section introduces the watchdog, the last of the generic system features analyzed in this chapter. Commonly present in several microcontrollers, it provides a handy emergency recovery procedure whenever, for any reason, the system is frozen and will not resume its normal execution.

The watchdog

A common feature in many microcontrollers is the presence of a watchdog timer. A watchdog ensures that the system is not stuck within an endless loop or any other blocking situation within the code. This is particularly useful in bare-metal applications that rely on an event-driven loop, where calls are required not to block, and to return to the main event loop within the allowed amount of time.

The watchdog must be seen as the very last resort to recover an unresponsive system, by triggering a forced reboot regardless of the current state of execution in the CPU.

The reference platform provides one independent watchdog timer, with a counter similar to those of the generic timers, with a 12-bit granularity and a prescaler factor. The prescaler of the watchdog, however, is expressed in multiples of 2 and has a range between 4 (represented by the value 0) and 256 (value 6).

The clock source is connected to a lower-speed oscillator, through an independent branch of the clock distribution. For this reason, clock gating is not involved in the activation of this peripheral.

The watchdog configuration area is mapped within the peripherals address region, and consists of four registers:

- The key register (offset 0), used to trigger the three unlock, start, and reset operations by writing predefined values in the lowest 16 bits

- The prescale register (offset 4), to set the prescale factor of the counter
- The reload register (offset 8), containing the reload value for the counter
- The status register (offset 12), providing the status flags to synchronize the setup operations

The registers can be referenced using shortcut macros:

```
#define IWDG_BASE (0x40003000)
#define IWDG_KR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (IWDG_BASE + 0x00))
#define IWDG_PR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (IWDG_BASE + 0x04))
#define IWDG_RLR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (IWDG_BASE + 0x08))
#define IWDG_SR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (IWDG_BASE + 0x0c))
```

The three possible operations that can be triggered via the key register are as follows:

```
#define IWDG_KR_RESET 0x0000AAAA
#define IWDG_KR_UNLOCK 0x00005555
#define IWDG_KR_START 0x0000CCCC
```

Two meaningful status bits are provided in the status, and they must be checked to ensure that the watchdog is not busy before unlocking and setting the value for prescale and reload:

```
#define IWDG_SR_RVU (1 << 1)
#define IWDG_SR_PVU (1 << 0)
```

The initialization function to configure and start the watchdog may look like the following:

```
int iwdt_init(uint32_t interval_ms)
{
    uint32_t pre = 0;
    uint32_t counter;
```

In the next line, the input value in milliseconds is scaled to the frequency of the watchdog clock, which is 32 kHz:

```
    counter = interval_ms << 5;
```

The minimum prescaler factor is 4, however, so the value should be divided again. We then look for the minimum prescaler value that results in a counter that fits the 12 bits available, by halving the counter value and increasing the prescaler factor until the counter is appropriately scaled:

```
    counter >>= 2;
    while (counter > 0xFFF) {
```

```
    pre++;  
    counter >>= 1;  
}
```

The following checks ensure that the interval provided does not result in a zero counter or a value that is too large for the available scaling factor:

```
if (counter == 0)  
    counter = 1;  
if (pre > 6)  
    return -1;
```

The actual initialization of the registers is done, but the device requires us to initiate the write with an unlock operation, and only after checking that the registers are available for writing:

```
while(IWDG_SR & IWDG_SR_PR_BUSY);  
IWDG_KR = IWDG_KR_UNLOCK;  
IWDG_PR = pre;  
while (IWDG_SR & IWDG_SR_RLR_BUSY);  
IWDG_KR = IWDG_KR_UNLOCK;  
IWDG_RLR = counter;
```

Starting the watchdog simply consists of setting the START command in the key register to initiate the start operation:

```
    IWDG_KR = IWDG_KR_START;  
    return 0;  
}
```

Once started, the watchdog cannot be stopped and will run forever, decreasing the counter until it reaches zero, and rebooting the system.

The only way to prevent the system from being rebooted is resetting the timer manually, an operation often referred to as *kicking the watchdog*. A watchdog driver should export a function that allows the application to reset the counter—for example, at the end of each iteration in the main loop. Here is ours:

```
void iwdt_reset(void)  
{  
    IWDG_KR = IWDG_KR_RESET;  
}
```


As a simple test for the watchdog driver, a watchdog counter of 2 seconds can be initialized in `main()`:

```
void main(void) {
    flash_set_waitstates();
    clock_config();
    button_setup();
    iwdt_init(2000);
    while(1)
        WFI();
}
```

The watchdog is reset upon button press, in the interrupt service routine of the GPIO button:

```
void isr_exti0(void)
{
    EXTI_PR |= (1 << BUTTON_PIN);
    iwdt_reset();
}
```

In this test, the system will reboot if the user button is not pressed for 2 seconds in a row, so the only way to keep the system running is by repeatedly pressing the button.

Summary

The clock configuration, timers, and I/O lines are the general-purpose peripherals shown in this chapter, commonly supported by a wide range of microcontrollers. Although implementation details such as register names and placement may differ on other targets, the proposed approach is valid on most embedded platforms, and the general-purpose peripherals are the bricks for building the most basic system functionalities as well as providing a means of interaction with sensors and actuators.

In the next chapter, we will focus on serial communication channels provided by most microprocessors as communication interfaces toward other devices, and peripherals in the proximity of the target system.

Local Bus Interfaces

The communication between an embedded system and other systems in its vicinity is enabled by a few protocols. Most microcontrollers designed for embedded systems support the most common interfaces that control and discipline the access to serial lines. Some of these protocols are so popular that they have become the standard for wired inter-chip communication among microcontrollers, and for controlling electronic devices, such as sensors, actuators, displays, wireless transceivers, and many other peripherals. This chapter describes how these protocols work, specifically focusing on the implementation of the system software, through examples running on the reference platform. In particular, we will cover the following topics in this chapter:

- Introducing serial communication
- A UART-based asynchronous serial bus
- An SPI bus
- An I²C bus

By the end of this chapter, you will learn how to integrate the common serial communication protocols.

Technical requirements

You can find the code files for this chapter on GitHub at <https://github.com/PacktPublishing/Embedded-Systems-Architecture-Second-Edition/tree/main/Chapter7>.

Introducing serial communication

All the protocols that we will analyze in this chapter manage the access to a serial bus, which may consist of one or more wires, transporting the information in the form of electrical signals corresponding to logic levels zeros and ones, when associated with specific time intervals. The protocols are different in the way they transmit and receive information on the data bus lines. To transmit a byte, the transceiver encodes it as a bit sequence, which is synchronized with a clock. The logic values of the bit are interpreted by the receiver reading its value on a specific front of the clock, depending on the clock's polarity.

Each protocol specifies the polarity of the clock and the bit order required to transmit the data, which can start with either the most significant or the least significant bit. For example, a system transmitting the ASCII character *D* over a serial line regulated by raising clock fronts, with the most significant bit first, would produce a signal such as the following:




Figure 7.1 – The logic levels of the bus on clock raise fronts are interpreted MSB-first into the byte value of 0x44

We will now define the characteristics of serial communication interfaces following different standards. In particular, we will indicate the options available for clock synchronization between two endpoints exchanging data; the wiring of the signals to be used, which are specified by each protocol to access the physical media; and finally, the implementation details to program the access to the peripheral, which may differ across different platforms.

Clock and symbol synchronization

In order for the receiving side to understand the message, the clock must be synchronized between the parts. The clock synchronization may be implicit, as in, setting the same data rate to read and write on the bus, or achieved by sharing the clock line from one side using an additional line to explicitly synchronize the transmit data rate. Serial protocols that do not foresee shared clock lines are called asynchronous.

Symbol synchronization should be explicit instead. As we expect to send and receive information in the form of bytes, the beginning of each 8-bit sequence should be marked either using special preamble sequences on the data line or by turning the clock on and off at the right time. The symbol synchronization strategy is defined differently by each protocol.

Bus wiring

The number of lines needed to establish bidirectional communication depends on the specific protocol too. Since one wire can only transport 1 bit of information in one direction at a time, to achieve full-duplex communication, a transceiver should connect to two different wires for transmitting and receiving data. If the protocol supports half-duplex communication, it should provide a reliable mechanism to regulate media access instead and switch between receiving and transmitting data on the same wire.

Important note

The two endpoints must share a common reference ground voltage, which means that it might be required to add one extra wire to connect the ground lines if the devices do not already share a common ground.

Depending on the protocol, devices accessing the bus may either share a similar implementation and act as peers or have different roles assigned when participating in the communication – for example, if a master device is in charge of synchronizing the clock or regulating access to the media.

A serial protocol may foresee communication among more than two devices on the same bus. This may be achieved by using extra slave selection wires, one per slave device sharing the same bus, or by assigning logical addresses to each endpoint, and including the destination address for the communication in the preamble of each transmission. Based on these classifications, an overview of the approach taken by the most popular serial protocols implemented in embedded targets is given in the following table:

Protocol	Number of wires	Clock	Symbol synchronization strategy	Bit order	Communication mode
UART-based	Two (data RX/TX)	Asynchronous	Configurable start and stop bits and a parity bit	LSB-first	One-to-one or one-to-many, with single point-to-point communication
Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI)	Three (master-to-slave data, slave-to-master data, and clock)	Shared through CLK	Clock activation	MSB-first or LSB-first	One-to-many single master and multiple slaves, using additional slave-selection lines
I ² C	Two (serial data and serial clock)	Shared through SCL	Clock activation, with support for clock stretching	MSB-first	One-to-many, master or slave with logic addresses, and dynamic multi-master selection
USB	Two (D+/D-half-duplex differential signal)	Synchronized with a synchronization pattern at the beginning of data transfer	CRC/end of packet	LSB-first	One host and/or multiple devices with device enumeration
CAN bus	Two (CAN-Hi and CAN-Low), differential and half-duplex	Asynchronous	Start bit, CRC, and end sequence	MSB-first	One-to-many, multi-master with address-based master arbitration
Dallas 1-Wire	One data wire	Synchronized with the front of the signal	Slave selection before each byte CRC	LSB-first	Master-to-slave with a fixed master and slave discovery with 64-bit addresses

The protocols that are detailed in this chapter are only the first three, as they are the most widely used in communicating with embedded peripherals.

Programming the peripherals

Multiple peripherals implementing the protocols described so far are usually integrated into microcontrollers, which means that the associated serial bus can be directly connected to specific pins of the microcontrollers. The peripherals can be enabled through clock gating and controlled by accessing configuration registries mapped in the peripheral region in the memory space. The pins connected to serial buses must also be configured to implement the corresponding alternate function, and the interrupt lines involved should be configured to be handled in the vector table.

Some microcontrollers, including our reference platform, support **Direct Memory Access (DMA)** to speed up memory operations between the peripheral and the physical RAM. In many cases, this feature is useful to help process the communication data in a shorter time frame and to improve the responsiveness of the system. The DMA controller can be programmed to initiate a transfer operation and trigger an interrupt when it completes.

The interface to control the features relative to each protocol is specific to the functionalities exposed by the peripheral. In the next sections, the interfaces exposed by UART, SPI, and I²C peripherals are

analyzed, and code samples tailored to the reference platform are provided as examples of one of the possible implementations for similar device drivers.

UART-based asynchronous serial bus

Historically used for many different purposes, thanks to the simplicity of its asynchronous nature, UART dates back to the origins of computing, and it is still a very popular circuit used in many contexts. Personal computers up to the early 2000s included at least one RS-232 serial port, realized with a UART controller and the transceivers allowing to operate at higher voltages. Nowadays, the USB has replaced serial communication on personal computers, but host computers can still access TTL serial buses using USB-UART peripherals. Microcontrollers have one or more pairs of pins that can be associated with an internal UART controller and connected to a serial bus to configure a bidirectional, asynchronous, full-duplex communication channel toward a device connected to the same bus.

Protocol description

As previously mentioned, asynchronous serial communications rely on implicit synchronization of the bit rate between the transmitter and the receiver in order to guarantee that the data is correctly processed on the receiving end of the communication. If the peripheral clock is fast enough to keep the device running at a high frequency, asynchronous serial communication may be pushed up to several megabits per second.

The symbol synchronization strategy is based on the identification of the beginning of the transmission of every single byte on the wire. When no device is transmitting, the bus is in an idle state.

To initiate the transmission, the transceiver pulls the TX line down to the low logic level, for a period of time that is at least half of the bit sampling period depending on the bit rate. The bits composing the byte being transferred are then translated into logical 0 or 1 values, which are held on the TX line for the time corresponding to each bit, according to the bit rate. After this start condition is easily recognized by the receiver, the bits composing the symbol follow in a specific order, from the least significant bit up to the most significant one.

The number of data bits composing the symbol is also configurable. The default data length of 8 bits allows each symbol to be converted into a byte. At the end of the data, an optional parity bit can be configured to count the number of active bits, as a very simplistic form of a redundant check. The parity bit, if present, can be configured to indicate whether the number of 1 values in the symbol is odd or even. While returning to the idle state, 1 or 2 stop bits must be used to indicate the end of the symbol.

A stop bit is transmitted by pulling the signal high for the entire duration of a bit transmission, marking the end of the current symbol, and forcing the receiver to initiate receiving the next one. A 1-stop bit is the most used default; the 1.5- and 2-stop bit settings provide a longer inter-symbol idling interval, which was useful in the past to communicate with slower, less responsive hardware but is rarely used today.

The two endpoints must be aware of these settings before initiating the communication. Serial controllers do not normally support the dynamic detection of the symbol rate or of any of the settings from the device connected to the other end, and, for this reason, the only way to successfully attempt any serial communication is to program both devices on the bus using the same well-known settings. As a recap, these settings are as follows:

- The bit rate, expressed in bits per second
- The number of data bits in each symbol (typically 8)
- The meaning of parity bit, if present (O is odd, E is even, and N is not present)
- The number of stop bits

Additionally, the sender must be configured to send 1, 1.5, or 2 stop bits at the end of each transmission. 1.5 and 2 stop bits were more widely used in the past to synchronize communication with ancient electromechanical devices. Nowadays, parity checks and stop bits greater than 1 are not needed for communications using modern transceivers and are rarely used.

This group of settings is often abbreviated into something such as 115200-8-N-1 or 38400-8-O-2 to indicate, respectively, a 115.2 Kbps serial line with 8 data bits per symbol, no parity and 1 stop bit, and a 38400 line with the same data bits, odd parity, and 2 stop bits.

Programming the controller

Development boards usually provide multiple UARTs, and our reference, the STM32F407, is not an exception. According to the manual, UART3 can be associated with the PD8 (TX) and PD9 (RX) pins, which we will use in this example. The code needed to turn on the clock for the D GPIO group and set the 8 and 9 pins in alternate mode, with an alternate function of 7, is as follows:

```
#define AHB1_CLOCK_ER (*(volatile uint32_t *) (0x40023830))
#define GPIOD_AHB1_CLOCK_ER (1 << 3)
#define GPIOD_BASE 0x40020c00
#define GPIOD_MODE (*(volatile uint32_t *) (GPIOD_BASE + 0x00))
#define GPIOD_AFL (*(volatile uint32_t *) (GPIOD_BASE + 0x20))
#define GPIOD_AFH (*(volatile uint32_t *) (GPIOD_BASE + 0x24))
#define GPIO_MODE_AF (2)
#define UART3_PIN_AF (7)
#define UART3_RX_PIN (9)
#define UART3_TX_PIN (8)
static void uart3_pins_setup(void)
{
    uint32_t reg;
```

```

AHB1_CLOCK_ER |= GPIOD_AHB1_CLOCK_ER;

reg = GPIOD_MODE & ~ (0x03 << (UART3_RX_PIN * 2));
GPIOD_MODE = reg | (2 << (UART3_RX_PIN * 2));
reg = GPIOD_MODE & ~ (0x03 << (UART3_TX_PIN * 2));
GPIOD_MODE = reg | (2 << (UART3_TX_PIN * 2));

reg = GPIOD_AFH & ~(0xf << ((UART3_TX_PIN - 8) * 4));
GPIOD_AFH = reg | (UART3_PIN_AF << ((UART3_TX_PIN - 8) *
    4));
reg = GPIOD_AFH & ~(0xf << ((UART3_RX_PIN - 8) * 4));
GPIOD_AFH = reg | (UART3_PIN_AF << ((UART3_RX_PIN - 8) *
    4));
}

```

The device has its own clock-gating configuration bit in the APB1_CLOCK_ER register, at position 18:

```

#define APB1_CLOCK_ER (*(volatile uint32_t *) (0x40023840))
#define UART3_APB1_CLOCK_ER_VAL (1 << 18)

```

Each UART controller can be accessed using registers mapped in the peripheral region, with fixed offsets from the UART controller base address:

- **UART Status Register (SR):** A read-only register containing status flags, with an offset equal to 0
- **UART_Data Register (DR):** A read/write data register, with an offset equal to 4
- **UART Bit Rate Register (BRR):** This sets the clock divisor to obtain the desired bit rate, offset equal to 8
- **UART Configuration Registers (CRxs):** One or more UART_CRx registers at offset 12, to set the serial port parameters, enable interrupts and DMA, and enable and disable the transceiver

In this example, we define shortcut macros to access the following registers for UART3:

```

#define UART3 (0x40004800)
#define UART3_SR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (UART3))
#define UART3_DR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (UART3 + 0x04))
#define UART3_BRR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (UART3 + 0x08))
#define UART3_CR1 (*(volatile uint32_t *) (UART3 + 0x0c))
#define UART3_CR2 (*(volatile uint32_t *) (UART3 + 0x10))

```


We define the positions in the corresponding bit fields:

```
#define UART_CR1_UART_ENABLE (1 << 13)
#define UART_CR1_SYMBOL_LEN (1 << 12)
#define UART_CR1_PARITY_ENABLED (1 << 10)
#define UART_CR1_PARITY_ODD (1 << 9)
#define UART_CR1_TX_ENABLE (1 << 3)
#define UART_CR1_RX_ENABLE (1 << 2)
#define UART_CR2_STOPBITS (3 << 12)
#define UART_SR_TX_EMPTY (1 << 7)
```

The `uart3_pins_setup` helper function can be called at the beginning of the initialization function to set up the pin. The function accepts arguments to set the bit rate, parity bit, and stop bits on the UART3 port:

```
int uart3_setup(uint32_t bitrate, uint8_t data,
char parity, uint8_t stop)
{
    uart3_pins_setup();
```

The device is turned on:

```
APB1_CLOCK_ER |= UART3_APB1_CLOCK_ER_VAL;
```

In the CR1 configuration register, the bit to enable the transmitter is set:

```
UART3_CR1 |= UART_CR1_TX_ENABLE;
```

UART_BRR is set to contain the divisor between the clock speed and the desired bit rate:

```
UART3_BRR = CLOCK_SPEED / bitrate;
```

Our function also accepts a character to indicate the desired parity. The options are O or E for odd or even. Any other character will keep the parity disabled:

```
/* Default: No parity */
UART3_CR1 &= ~(UART_CR1_PARITY_ENABLED |
    UART_CR1_PARITY_ODD);
switch (parity) {
    case 'O':
        UART3_CR1 |= UART_CR1_PARITY_ODD;
        /* fall through to enable parity */
```

```
case 'E':  
    UART3_CR1 |= UART_CR1_PARITY_ENABLED;  
    break;  
}
```

The number of stop bits is set according to the parameter. The configuration is stored using 2 bits of the register, with a value of 0 meaning 1 stop bit, and a value of 2 meaning 2:

```
reg = UART3_CR2 & ~UART_CR2_STOPBITS;  
if (stop > 1)  
    UART3_CR2 = reg | (2 << 12);
```

The configuration is now complete. The UART can be turned on to initiate transmissions:

```
UART3_CR1 |= UART_CR1_UART_ENABLE;  
return 0;  
}
```

Serial data can now be transmitted on PD8 simply by copying one byte at a time on the UART_DR register.

Hello world!

One of the most useful functions when developing an embedded system is to convert one of the available UARTs into a logging port, where debug messages and other information produced during the execution can be read on the host computer using a serial-to-USB converter:




Figure 7.2 – The host is connected to the serial port of the target platform using a converter

The UART logic includes FIFO buffers in both directions. The transmit FIFO is fed by writing on the UART_DR register. To actually output data on the UART TX line in polling mode, we choose to check that the FIFO is empty before writing each character, to ensure that no more than one character is put in the FIFO at a time. When the FIFO is empty, the bit associated with the TX_FIFO_EMPTY flag in UART3_SR is set to 1 by the device. The following function shows how to transmit an entire string of characters passed as an argument, waiting for the FIFO to empty after every byte:

```
void uart3_write(const char *text)
{
    const char *p = text;
    int i;
    volatile uint32_t reg;
    while(*p) {
        do {
            reg = UART3_SR;
        } while ((reg & UART_SR_TX_EMPTY) == 0);
        UART3_DR = *p;
        p++;
    }
}
```

In the main program, it is possible to call this function with a pre-formatted, NULL-terminated string:

```
#include "system.h"
#include "uart.h"
void main(void) {
    flash_set_waitstates();
    clock_config();
    uart3_setup(115200, 8, 'N', 1);
    uart3_write("Hello World!\r\n");
    while(1)
        WFI();
}
```

If the host is connected to the other endpoint of the serial bus, as a result, we can visualize the Hello World! message using a serial terminal program, such as minicom, on the host.

By capturing the output of the PD8 pin, used as UART_TX on the target, and setting the right option for the serial decoding, we have a better idea of how the serial flow is parsed on the receiving side. The logic analyzer can show how the data bits are sampled after every start condition, and reveal the ASCII

character associated with the byte on the wire. Logic analyzer tools are usually capable of decoding the bits captured on the wire, and showing each byte transmitted back into its ASCII format. This feature offers a quick and accurate way to verify that our serial communication is compliant, the time in between the consecutive bits respects the selected baud rate, and the content on the wire matches the data sent to the UART transceiver, as in the following figure, which shows our embedded target sending “Hello” from the string and passing it to the `uart3_write` function.



Figure 7.3 – Screenshot of the logic analyzer tool showing the first 5 bytes sent by the example to the host using UART3

newlib printf

Writing pre-formatted strings is not the most ideal API for accessing a serial port to provide debugging messages. Application developers would most certainly prefer if the system exposed a standard C `printf` function. When the toolchain includes an implementation of a standard C library, it usually gives you the possibility to connect the standard output of the main program to a serial interface. Luckily enough, the toolchain in use for the reference platform allows us to link to `newlib` functions. Similar to what we did in *Chapter 5, Memory Management*, using the `malloc` and `free` functions from `newlib`, we provide a backend function called `_write()`, which gets the output redirected from the string formatted by all the calls to `printf()`. The `_write` function implemented here will receive all the strings pre-formatted by `printf()`:

```
int _write(void *r, uint8_t *text, int len)
{
    char *p = (char *)text;
    int i;
    volatile uint32_t reg;
    text[len - 1] = 0;
    while(*p) {
        do {
            reg = UART3_SR;
        } while ((reg & UART_SR_TX_EMPTY) == 0);
        UART3_DR = *p;
        p++;
    }
}
```

```
    }  
    return len;  
}
```

So, in this case, linking with `newlib` allows us to use `printf` to produce messages, including its variance-argument parsing, as in this example `main()` function:

```
#include <stdio.h>  
#include "system.h"  
#include "uart.h"  
  
void main(void) {  
    char name[] = "World";  
    flash_set_waitstates();  
    clock_config();  
    uart3_setup(115200, 8, 'N', 1);  
  
    printf("Hello %s!\r\n", name);  
    while(1)  
        WFI();  
}
```

This second example will produce the same output as the first one, but this time, using the `printf` function from `newlib`.

Receiving data

To enable the receiver on the same UART, the initialization function should also turn on the receiver using the corresponding switch in the `UART_CR1` register:

```
UART3_CR1 |= UART_CR1_TX_ENABLE | UART_CR1_RX_ENABLE;
```

This ensures that the receiving side of the transceiver is enabled too. To read data in polling mode, blocking until a character is received, we can use the following function, which will return the value of the byte read:

```
char uart3_read(void)  
{  
    char c;  
    volatile uint32_t reg;  
    do {  
        reg = UART3_SR;
```

```
    } while ((reg & UART_SR_RX_NOTEMPTY) == 0);  
    c = (char)(UART3_DR & 0xff);  
    return c;  
}
```

This way, we can, for example, echo back to the console each character received from the host:

```
void main(void) {  
    char c[2];  
    flash_set_waitstates();  
    clock_config();  
    uart3_setup(115200, 8, 'N', 1);  
    uart3_write("Hello World!\r\n");  
    while(1) {  
        c[0] = uart3_read();  
        c[1] = 0;  
        uart3_write(c);  
        uart3_write("\r\n");  
    }  
}
```

Interrupt-based input/output

The examples in this section are based on polling the status of the UART by continuously checking the flags of UART_SR. The write operation contains a busy loop that can spin for several milliseconds, depending on the length of the string. Even worse, the read function presented earlier spins within a busy loop until there is data to read from the peripheral, which means that the whole system is hanging until new data is received. In a single-thread embedded system, returning to the main loop with the shortest latency possible is important to keep the system responsive.

The correct way to perform UART communication without blocking is by using the interrupt line associated with the UART to trigger actions based on the event received. UART can be configured to raise the interrupt signal upon multiple types of events. As we have seen in the previous examples, to regulate input and output operations, we are interested in particular in two specific events:

- A TX FIFO empty event, allowing more data to be transmitted
- A RX FIFO not-empty event, signaling the presence of newly received data

The interrupt for these two events can be enabled by setting the corresponding bits in `UART_CR1`. We define two helper functions with the purpose of turning interrupts on and off, independently:

```
#define UART_CR1_TXEIE (1 << 7)
#define UART_CR1_RXNEIE (1 << 5)

static void uart3_tx_interrupt_onoff(int enable)
{
    if (enable)
        UART3_CR1 |= UART_CR1_TXEIE;
    else
        UART3_CR1 &= ~UART_CR1_TXEIE;
}

static void uart3_rx_interrupt_onoff(int enable)
{
    if (enable)
        UART3_CR1 |= UART_CR1_RXNEIE;
    else
        UART3_CR1 &= ~UART_CR1_RXNEIE;
}
```

A service routine can be associated with the interrupt events, and then check the flags in `UART_SR` to identify the cause of the interrupt:

```
void isr_uart3(void)
{
    volatile uint32_t reg;
    reg = UART3_SR;
    if (reg & UART_SR_RX_NOTEMPTY) {
        /* Receive a new byte */
    }

    if ((reg & UART_SR_TX_EMPTY)
    {
        /* resume pending transmission */
    }
}
```

The implementation of the interrupt routine depends on the specific system design. An RTOS may decide to multiplex access to the serial port to multiple threads and wake up threads waiting to access the resource. In a single-thread application, it is possible to add intermediate system buffers to provide non-blocking calls, which return immediately after copying the data from the receiving buffer, or to the transmitting one. The interrupt service routine fills the receiving buffer with new data from the bus and transmits the data from the pending buffer. Using appropriate structures, such as circular buffers to implement system input and output queues, ensures that the use of the memory assigned is optimized.

SPI bus

The SPI bus provides a different approach, based on master-slave communication. As the name suggests, the interface was initially designed to control peripherals. This is reflected in the design, as all the communication is always initiated by the master on the bus. Thanks to the full-duplex pin configuration and the synchronized clock, it may be much faster than asynchronous communication, due to the better robustness to clock skews between the systems sharing the bus. An SPI is widely used as a communication protocol for several different devices, due to its simple logic and the flexibility given by the fact that the slave does not have to be preconfigured to communicate at a predefined speed that matches the one on the master. Multiple peripherals can share the same bus, as long as media access strategies are defined. A common way for a master to control one peripheral at a time is by using separate GPIO lines to control the slave selection, although this does require an additional wire for each slave.

Protocol description

The configuration of the SPI transceiver is very flexible. Usually, a transceiver on a microcontroller is able to act as a master as well as a slave. A few predefined settings must be known in advance and shared between the master and all the slaves on the same bus:

- The clock polarity, indicating whether the clock tick corresponds to a raising or a falling edge of the clock
- The clock phase, indicating whether the clock idle position is high or low
- The length of the data packet, any value between 4 and 16 bits
- The bit order, indicating whether the data is transmitted starting from the most significant bit or the least significant bit

Since the clock is synchronous and imposed by the master at all times, the SPI does not have a predefined frequency of operation, although using too high a speed might not work with all peripherals and microcontrollers.

SPI communication toward a slave is disabled until the master initiates a transaction. At the beginning of each transaction, the master selects the slave by activating its slave-select line:




Figure 7.4 – An additional signal may be used to select a specific slave on the bus

To initiate the communication, the master must activate the clock, and may send a command sequence to the slave on the MOSI line. When the clock is detected, the slave can immediately start transferring bytes in the opposite direction using the MISO line.

Even if the master has finished transmitting, it must comply with the protocol implemented by the slave and permit it to reply by keeping the clock alive for the duration of the transaction. The slave is given a predefined number of byte slots to communicate with the master.

In order to keep the clock alive even when there is no data to transfer to the slave, the master can keep sending *dummy* bytes through the MOSI line, which are ignored by the slave. In the meantime, the slave is allowed to send data through the MISO line, as long as the master ensures that the clock keeps running. Unlike UART, in the master-slave communication model implemented in the SPI, the slaves can never spontaneously initiate SPI communication, as the master is the only device on the bus allowed to transmit a clock. Each SPI transaction is self-contained, and at the end, the slave is deselected by turning off the corresponding slave-select signal.

Programming the transceiver

On the reference board, an accelerometer is connected as a slave to the SPI1 bus, so we can examine how to implement the master side of the communication on the microcontroller by configuring the transceiver and executing a bidirectional transaction toward the peripheral.

The SPI1 bus has its configuration registers mapped in the peripherals region:

```
#define SPI1 (0x40013000)

#define SPI1_CR1 (*(volatile uint32_t *) (SPI1))
```

```
#define SPI1_CR2 (*(volatile uint32_t *) (SPI1 + 0x04))
#define SPI1_SR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (SPI1 + 0x08))
#define SPI1_DR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (SPI1 + 0x0c))
```

The peripheral exposes a total of four registers:

- Two bit-field configuration registers
- One status register
- One bidirectional data register

It is clear that the interface is similar to that of the UART transceiver, as the configuration of the communication parameters goes through the `SPI_CRx` registers, the status of the FIFO can be monitored by looking at `SPI_SR`, and `SPI_DR` can be used to read and write data to the serial bus.

The value for the configuration register `CR1` contains the following:

- The clock phase, 0 or 1, in bit 0
- The clock polarity in bit 1
- The SPI master mode flag in bit 2
- The bit rate scaling factor in bits 3-5
- The SPI enable flag in bit 6
- Other configuration parameters, such as the word length, LSB-first, and other flags, which will not be used in this example, as the default will be kept for these parameters

The `CR2` configuration register contains the flags to enable the interrupt events and the DMA transfers, as well as the **Slave Select Output Enable (SSOE)** flag, which is relevant in this example.

The `SPI1_SR` status register is similar to the UART status register in the previous section, as it contains flags to determine whether the transmit FIFO is empty, and when the FIFO on the receiving side is not empty, to regulate the phases of the transfer.

The bits corresponding to the flags that are used in this example are defined as follows:

```
#define SPI_CR1_MASTER (1 << 2)
#define SPI_CR1_SPI_EN (1 << 6)
#define SPI_CR2_SSOE (1 << 2)
#define SPI_SR_RX_NOTEMPTY (1 << 0)
#define SPI_SR_TX_EMPTY (1 << 1)
```

The RCC controls the clock and the reset lines toward the SPI1 transceiver connected to the APB2 bus:

```
#define APB2_CLOCK_ER (*(volatile uint32_t *) (0x40023844))
#define APB2_CLOCK_RST (*(volatile uint32_t
                        *) (0x40023824))
#define SPI1_APB2_CLOCK_ER_VAL (1 << 12)
```

The transceiver can be reset by sending a reset pulse from the RCC:

```
static void spi1_reset(void)
{
    APB2_CLOCK_RST |= SPI1_APB2_CLOCK_ER_VAL;
    APB2_CLOCK_RST &= ~SPI1_APB2_CLOCK_ER_VAL;
}
```

The PA5, PA6, and PA7 pins can be associated with the SPI1 transceiver by setting the appropriate alternate function:

```
#define SPI1_PIN_AF 5
#define SPI1_CLOCK_PIN 5
#define SPI1_MOSI_PIN 6
#define SPI1_MISO_PIN 7

static void spi1_pins_setup(void)
{
    uint32_t reg;
    AHB1_CLOCK_ER |= GPIOA_AHB1_CLOCK_ER;
    reg = GPIOA_MODE & ~(0x03 << (SPI1_CLOCK_PIN * 2));
    reg &= ~(0x03 << (SPI1_MOSI_PIN));
    reg &= ~(0x03 << (SPI1_MISO_PIN));
    reg |= (2 << (SPI1_CLOCK_PIN * 2));
    reg |= (2 << (SPI1_MOSI_PIN * 2)) | (2 << (SPI1_MISO_PIN
        * 2));
    GPIOA_MODE = reg;
    reg = GPIOA_AFL & ~(0xf << ((SPI1_CLOCK_PIN) * 4));
    reg &= ~(0xf << ((SPI1_MOSI_PIN) * 4));
    reg &= ~(0xf << ((SPI1_MISO_PIN) * 4));
    reg |= SPI1_PIN_AF << ((SPI1_CLOCK_PIN) * 4);
```

```

    reg |= SPI1_PIN_AF << ((SPI1_MOSI_PIN) * 4);
    reg |= SPI1_PIN_AF << ((SPI1_MISO_PIN) * 4);
    GPIOA_AFL = reg;
}

```

The additional pin connected to the “chip select” line of the accelerometer is PE3, which is configured as output, with a pull-up internal resistor. The logic of this pin is active low so that a logical zero will turn the chip on:

```

#define SLAVE_PIN 3
static void slave_pin_setup(void)
{
    uint32_t reg;
    AHB1_CLOCK_ER |= GPIOE_AHB1_CLOCK_ER;
    reg = GPIOE_MODE & ~(0x03 << (SLAVE_PIN * 2));
    GPIOE_MODE = reg | (1 << (SLAVE_PIN * 2));
    reg = GPIOE_PUPD & ~(0x03 << (SLAVE_PIN * 2));
    GPIOE_PUPD = reg | (0x01 << (SLAVE_PIN * 2));
    reg = GPIOE_OSPD & ~(0x03 << (SLAVE_PIN * 2));
    GPIOE_OSPD = reg | (0x03 << (SLAVE_PIN * 2));
}

```

The initialization of the transceiver begins with the configuration of the four pins involved. The clock gate is then activated, and the transceiver receives a reset via a pulse through the RCC:

```

void spi1_setup(int polarity, int phase)
{
    spi1_pins_setup();
    slave_pin_setup();
    APB2_CLOCK_ER |= SPI1_APB2_CLOCK_ER_VAL;
    spi1_reset();
}

```

The default parameters (MSB-first, 8-bit word length) are left untouched. The bit rate scaling factor of this controller is expressed in powers of 2, starting with 2 corresponding to a bit field value of 0, and doubling at each increment. A generic driver should calculate the correct scaling factor, according to the desired clock rate and the peripheral clock frequency. In this simple case, we enforce a hardcoded scaling factor of 64, corresponding to the value 5.

SPI1_CR1 is then set as follows:

```
SPI1_CR1 = SPI_CR1_MASTER | (5 << 3) | (polarity << 1) |  
          (phase << 0);
```

Finally, we set the bit corresponding to the SSOE flag in SPI1_CR2, and the transceiver is enabled:

```
SPI1_CR2 |= SPI_CR2_SSOE;  
SPI1_CR1 |= SPI_CR1_SPI_EN;  
}
```

Read and write operations can now begin, as both the master and slave SPI controllers are ready to perform the transactions.

SPI transactions

The read and write functions represent the two different phases of the SPI transaction. Most SPI slave devices are capable of communicating using a full-duplex mechanism so that bytes are exchanged in both directions while the clock is active. During each interval, a byte is transmitted in both directions, using the MISO and MOSI lines independently.

A common strategy, implemented by many slaves, consists of accessing registers for read and write operations in the slave devices, by using well-known command handles that are documented in the device's datasheet.

The STM32F407DISCOVERY board has an accelerometer connected to the SPI1 bus, which responds to predefined commands accessing specific registers in the device memory for reading or writing. In these cases, the read and write operations are performed sequentially: during the first interval, the master transmits the command handle, while the device has nothing to transmit, then the actual bytes are transmitted in either direction at subsequent intervals.

The example operation described here consists of reading the WHOAMI register in the accelerometer, using the 0x8F command handle. The peripheral should respond with 1 byte containing the 0x3B value, which correctly identifies the device and proves that the SPI communication is working correctly. However, during the transmission of the command byte, the device has nothing to transmit yet, so the result of the first read operation can be discarded. Similarly, after sending the command, the master has nothing else to communicate to the slave, so it outputs a 0xFF value on the MOSI line while reading the byte transmitted by the slave through the MISO line at the same time.

The steps to perform to successfully perform a 1-byte read on this specific device are as follows:

1. Turn on the slave by pulling down the slave-select signal.
2. Send a byte containing the code for the 1-byte read operation.
3. Send 1 dummy byte while the slave transfers the reply using the clock.

4. Read back the value transferred from the slave during the second interval.
5. Turn off the slave by pulling the slave-select signal back up.

To do so, we define blocking read and write functions as follows:

```
uint8_t spi1_read(void)
{
    volatile uint32_t reg;
    do {
        reg = SPI1_SR;
    } while ((reg & SPI_SR_RX_NOTEMPTY) == 0);
    return (uint8_t)SPI1_DR;
}

void spi1_write(const char byte)
{
    int i;
    volatile uint32_t reg;
    SPI1_DR = byte;
    do {
        reg = SPI1_SR;
    } while ((reg & SPI_SR_TX_EMPTY) == 0);
}
```

The read operation waits until the `RX_NOTEMPTY` flag is enabled on `SPI1_SR` before transferring the contents of the data register. The transmit function instead transfers the value of the byte to transmit onto the data register, and then polls for the end of the operation by waiting for the `TX_EMPTY` flag.

The two operations can now be concatenated. The master has to explicitly send 2 data bytes in total, so our main application can query the accelerometer identification register by doing the following:

```
slave_on();
spi1_write(0x8F);
b = spi1_read();
spi1_write(0xFF);
b = spi1_read();
slave_off();
```

This is what happens on the bus:

- During the first write, the command `0x8F` is sent to MOSI.
- The value read using the first `spi1_read` function is the dummy bit that the slave has put into MISO while listening for the incoming command. The value obtained has no meaning in this particular case – therefore, it is discarded.
- The second write puts the dummy bit on the MOSI line, as the master does not have anything else to transmit. This forces the clock generation for the second byte, which is needed by the slave to reply to the command.
- The second read processes the reply transferred using the MISO line during the write of the dummy byte from the master. The value obtained in this second transaction is a valid reply from the slave, according to the description of the command in the documentation.

Looking at the serial transaction with the logic analyzer, we can clearly distinguish the two phases, and the alternate relevant content – first, on MOSI to transmit the command, and then on MISO to receive the reply:




Figure 7.5 – A bidirectional SPI transaction, containing a request from the master and a reply from the slave (from top to bottom: SPI1_MISO, SPI1_MOSI, SLAVE_SELECT, and SPI1_CLOCK)

Once again, using blocking operations with a busy loop is a very bad practice. The reason why it is shown here is to explain the primitive operations needed to successfully complete bidirectional SPI transactions. In a real embedded system, it is always recommended to use interrupt-based transfers to ensure that the CPU is not busy looping while waiting for the transfer to complete. SPI controllers provide interrupt signals to indicate the state of the FIFO buffers of the controller, in order to synchronize the SPI transaction with the actions required upon data transfers in either direction.

Interrupt-based SPI transfers

The interface to enable the interrupt for the SPI transceiver is in fact very similar to that of UART as seen in the previous section. In order for non-blocking transactions to be correctly implemented, they have to be split between their read and write phases to allow events to trigger the associated actions.

Setting these two bits in the SPI1_CR2 register will enable the interrupt trigger upon an empty transmit FIFO and a non-empty receive FIFO, respectively:

```
#define SPI_CR2_TXEIE (1 << 7)
#define SPI_CR2_RXNEIE (1 << 6)
```

The associated service routine, included in the interrupt vector, can still peek at the values in SPI1_SR to advance the transaction to the next phase:

```
void isr_spi1(void)
{
    volatile uint32_t reg;
    reg = SPI1_SR;
    if (reg & SPI_SR_RX_NOTEMPTY) {
        /* End of transmission: new data available on MISO*/
    }
    if ((reg & SPI_SR_TX_EMPTY)
    {
        /* End of transmission: the TX FIFO is empty*/
    }
}
```

Once again, the implementation of the top half of the interrupt is left to the reader, as it depends on the API that the system is required to implement, the nature of the transactions, and their impact on the responsiveness of the system. Short, high-speed SPI transactions, however, may be short and scattered in time so that even implementing blocking operations has a smaller influence on the system latency.

I²C bus

The third serial communication protocol analyzed in this chapter is I²C. From the communication strategy point of view, this protocol shares some similarities with SPI. However, the default bit rate for I²C communication is much lower, as the protocol privileges lower-power consumption over throughput.

The same two-wire bus can accommodate multiple participants, both masters and slaves, and there is no need for extra signals to physically select the slave of the transaction, as slaves have fixed logic addresses assigned:




Figure 7.6 – I²C bus with three slaves and external pull-up resistors

One wire transports the clock generated by the master, and the other is used as a bidirectional synchronous data path. This is possible thanks to the unique mechanism of arbitration of the channel, which relies on the electronic design of the transceivers and may deal with the presence of multiple masters on the same bus in a very clean way.

The two signals must be connected to the high-level voltage of the bus (typically 3.3 V) using pull-up resistors. The controllers never drive the signal high and instead, they let it float to its default value imposed by the pull-ups while transmitting ones. As a consequence, logic level zero is always dominant; if any of the devices connected to the bus enforce a zero by pulling the line down, all the devices will read the line as low, no matter how many other senders are keeping the logic level 1 on the bus. This allows the bus to be controlled by multiple transceivers at the same time, and transmit operations can be coordinated by initiating new transactions only when the bus becomes available. In this section, we will see an introduction to the protocol, in order to introduce the software tools used to manage the I²C controller peripherals. More information on the I²C bus communication and the related documentation can be found at <https://www.i2c-bus.org/>.

Protocol description

The synchronization between the master and slave is achieved by a recognizable **START condition** and a **STOP condition**, which determine the beginning and the end of a transaction, respectively. The bus is initially idle, with both signals at the high logic state when all the participants are idling.

The START condition is the only case when **SDA** is pulled low before **SCL** by the master. The special condition communicates to slaves and other masters on the bus that a transaction is initiated. A STOP condition can be identified by the SDA transaction from a low to a high level, while the SCL remains high. After a STOP condition, the bus is idle again, and initiating communication is only possible if a new START condition is transmitted.

A master sends a START condition by pulling SDA and SCL low in this order. A frame is composed of nine clock periods. After the edge of each clock pulse is raised, the level of SDA does not change until the clock is low again. This allows us to transmit 1 frame of 8 bytes in the first 8 clock raise fronts. During the last clock pulse, the master does not drive the SDA line, which is then held high by the pull-up resistor. Any receiver that wants to acknowledge the reception of the frame can drive the signal low. This condition on the ninth clock pulse is known as **ACK**. If no receiving device acknowledges the frame, SDA remains high, and the sender understands that the frame did not reach the intended destination:




Figure 7.7 – A single-byte I²C transaction on the bus, with the correct START and STOP conditions and the ACK flag set by the receiver

A transaction consists of two or more frames and is always initiated by a device operating in master mode. The first frame of each transaction is called the **address frame** and contains the address and the mode for the next operation. All the subsequent frames in the transaction are data frames, containing 1 byte each. The master decides how many frames compose the transaction and the direction of the data transfer by keeping the transaction active for the desired amount of frames before enforcing a **STOP condition**.

Slave devices have fixed 7-bit addresses where they can be contacted using the bus. A slave that notices a START condition on the bus must listen for the address frame and compare it with its address. If the address matches, the address frame must be acknowledged by pulling the SDA line low during the ninth clock pulse within the transmission of the frame.

Data is always transferred with the leading **Most Significant Bit (MSB)**, and the format for the address frame is the following:




Figure 7.8 – Format of the address frame containing a destination 7-bit address and the R/W flag

The preceding diagram shows the format used by the address frame. The R/W bit is set by the master to indicate the direction of the transaction. R/W reads as read, not write, meaning that a value of 0 indicates a write operation, and a value of 1 indicates a read operation. Depending on the value of this bit, the data bytes following the transactions are either flowing toward the slave (a write operation) or from the selected slave to the master (a read operation). In a read operation, the direction of the ACK bit is also inverted for the data frames following the selection of the slave, and the master is supposed to acknowledge each frame received within the transaction. The master can decide to abort the transmission at any time by not pulling down the ACK bit on the last frame, and enforcing a STOP condition afterward.

The transaction continues after the transfer of the address frame, and the data can be transferred using subsequent data frames, each containing 1 byte, that can be acknowledged by the receiver. If the value of the R/W bit in the address frame is set to 0, the master intends to initiate a write operation. Once the slave has acknowledged the address frame by recognizing itself as the destination, it is ready to receive data, and acknowledges data frames, until the master sends the STOP condition.

The I²C protocol specifies that if a START condition is repeated at the end of a transaction, instead of sending the STOP condition, a new transaction can be started right away without setting the bus to its idling state. A repeated START condition ensures that two or more transactions can be performed on the same bus without interruptions, for example, preventing another master from starting a communication between them.

A less popular format foresees 10-bit addresses for the slaves. 10-bit addresses are an extension of the standard, introduced at a later time, that provide compatibility with 7-bit addressable devices on the same bus. The address is selected using 2 consecutive frames, and the first 5 bits, **A6-A2**, in the first frame are set to 11110 to indicate the selection of a 10-bit address. As per the protocol specification, addresses starting with 0000 or 1111 are reserved and must not be used by slaves. In the 10-bit format, the most significant 2 bits are contained in **A1** and **A0** of the first frame, while the second frame contains the remaining 8 bits. The R/\bar{W} bit keeps its position in the first frame. This addressing mechanism is not very common, as only a few slave devices support it.

Clock stretching

We have observed that the master is the only one driving the SCL signal during I²C transactions. This is always true, except when the slave is not yet ready to transmit the requested data from the master. In this particular case, the slave may decide to delay the transaction by keeping the clock line pulled low, which results in the transaction being put on hold. The master recognizes its inability to oscillate the clock, as releasing the SCL signal to a floating state does not result in a change to a high logic level on the bus. The master will keep trying to release the SCL signal to its natural high position until the requested data is finally available on the slave, which eventually releases the hold on the line.

The transmission can now resume after being kept on hold for an indefinite amount of time, and the master is still expected to produce the nine clock pulses to conclude the transmission. Because no more frames are expected within this transaction, the master does not pull the ACK bit low in the end, and sends the STOP condition instead to correctly complete the transaction:




Figure 7.9 – I²C read transaction with the reply frame delayed by the slave using the clock-stretching technique

Even though not all devices support clock stretching, this mechanism is useful to complete transactions when the requested data is slightly late. Clock stretching is a very unique feature of I²C, making it a very versatile protocol to communicate with sensors and other input peripherals. Clock stretching is very important to communicate with slower devices that cannot provide the values to complete the transaction in time. It is advisable that this feature is correctly supported by a master device that is designed to communicate with generic I2C slaves. On the slave side, to enforce clock stretching, the device must provide a hardware configuration that allows us to keep the SCL line at a logical low value until it is ready again. This means that the SCL line must be bidirectional in this particular case, and the slave should be designed to access it to enforce a pull-down to keep the transaction alive while preparing the transfer of the next frame.

Multiple masters

I²C offers a deterministic mechanism to detect and react to the presence of multiple masters on the bus, which is, again, based on the electrical property of the SDA line.

Before initiating any communication, the master ensures that the bus is available by sensing the SDA and SCL lines. The way the START condition is designed can already rule out most of the conflicts. Concurrent start conditions can be interrupted whenever the SDA line is sensed low in the initial grace time between the two edges. This mechanism alone does not prevent two I²C masters from accessing the channel at the same time, because conflicts are still possible due to the propagation time of the signal across the wire.

Two master devices that initiate a transaction at the same time continuously compare the status of the line, after each bit has been transmitted. In the case of two masters perfectly synchronized for two different transmissions, the first bit with a different value on the two sources will only be noticed by the master transmitting a 1 value, because the expected value is not reflected by the actual line status. That master aborts the transaction immediately, and the transmitter can detect the error as a conflict on the network, which, in this context, means that the arbitration was lost in favor of another master. Meanwhile, the other master will not notice anything, and neither will the slaves, because the transaction will continue despite the silently contended bus line.

Programming the controller

Microcontrollers may provide one or more I²C controllers on board that can be bound to specific pins using alternate functions. On our reference board, to enable the I2C1 bus, we activate the clock gating and start the initialization procedure by accessing the control, data, and status register mapped in the peripheral memory region:

```
#define APB1_CLOCK_ER (*(volatile uint32_t *) (0x40023840))
#define APB1_CLOCK_RST (*(volatile uint32_t *) (0x40023820))
#define I2C1_APB1_CLOCK_ER_VAL (1 << 21)
```

The I2C1 controller on the STM32F407 is associated with pins PB6 and PB9 when they are configured with the AF 4 alternate function:

```
#define I2C1_PIN_AF 4
#define I2C1_SCL 6
#define I2C1_SDA 9
#define GPIO_MODE_AF (2)

static void i2c1_pins_setup(void)
{
    uint32_t reg;
    AHB1_CLOCK_ER |= GPIOB_AHB1_CLOCK_ER;
    /* Set mode = AF */
    reg = GPIOB_MODE & ~(0x03 << (I2C1_SCL * 2));
    reg &= ~(0x03 << (I2C1_SDA * 2));
    GPIOB_MODE = reg | (2 << (I2C1_SCL * 2)) |
        (2 << (I2C1_SDA * 2));
    /* Alternate function: */
    reg = GPIOB_AFL & ~(0xf << ((I2C1_SCL) * 4));
    GPIOB_AFL = reg | (I2C1_PIN_AF << ((I2C1_SCL - 8) * 4));
    reg = GPIOB_AFH & ~(0xf << ((I2C1_SDA - 8) * 4));
    GPIOB_AFH = reg | (I2C1_PIN_AF << ((I2C1_SDA - 8) * 4));
}
```

The initialization function accesses the configuration registers of the I²C controller, mapped in the peripheral region. After the pin configuration and the RCC startup sequence, the transceiver speed is calibrated by using the frequency of the APB1 bus clock, in MHz. When the clocks are calibrated, the transceiver is enabled by setting a bit in the CR1 register. The parameters used here configure the master bus clock to run at 400 kHz. While the default setting for the protocol foresees a clock of 100 kHz, the 400 kHz option was added later on, and is now supported by many devices:

```
#define I2C1 (0x40005400)
#define APB1_SPEED_IN_MHZ (42)
#define I2C1_CR1 (*(volatile uint32_t *) (I2C1))
#define I2C1_CR2 (*(volatile uint32_t *) (I2C1 + 0x04))
#define I2C1_OAR1 (*(volatile uint32_t *) (I2C1 + 0x08))
#define I2C1_OAR2 (*(volatile uint32_t *) (I2C1 + 0x0c))
#define I2C1_DR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (I2C1 + 0x10))
```

```

#define I2C1_SR1 (*(volatile uint32_t *) (I2C1 + 0x14))
#define I2C1_SR2 (*(volatile uint32_t *) (I2C1 + 0x18))
#define I2C1_CCR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (I2C1 + 0x1c))
#define I2C1_TRISE (*(volatile uint32_t *) (I2C1 + 0x20))
#define I2C_CR2_FREQ_MASK (0x3ff)
#define I2C_CCR_MASK (0xffff)
#define I2C_TRISE_MASK (0x3f)
#define I2C_CR1_ENABLE (1 << 0)

void i2c1_setup(void)
{
    uint32_t reg;
    i2c1_pins_setup();
    APB1_CLOCK_ER |= I2C1_APB1_CLOCK_ER_VAL;
    I2C1_CR1 &= ~I2C_CR1_ENABLE;
    i2c1_reset();
    reg = I2C1_CR2 & ~(I2C_CR2_FREQ_MASK);
    I2C1_CR2 = reg | APB1_SPEED_IN_MHZ;
    reg = I2C1_CCR & ~(I2C_CCR_MASK);
    I2C1_CCR = reg | (APB1_SPEED_IN_MHZ * 5);
    reg = I2C1_TRISE & ~(I2C_TRISE_MASK);
    I2C1_TRISE = reg | APB1_SPEED_IN_MHZ + 1;
    I2C1_CR1 |= I2C_CR1_ENABLE;
}

```

From this moment on, the controller is ready to be configured and used, either in master or slave mode. Data can be read and written using I2C1_DR, in the same way as SPI and UART. The main difference here is that, for a master I²C device, the START and STOP conditions must be manually triggered by setting the corresponding values in the I2C1_CR1 register. Functions such as the following are intended for this purpose:

```

static void i2c1_send_start(void)
{
    volatile uint32_t srl;
    I2C1_CR1 |= I2C_CR1_START;
    do {

```

```

    sr1 = I2C1_SR1;
} while ((sr1 & I2C_SR1_START) == 0);
}
static void i2c1_send_stop(void)
{
    I2C1_CR1 |= I2C_CR1_STOP;
}

```

At the end of each condition, the bus must be tested for possible errors or abnormal events. The combination of the flags in I2C1_CR1 and I2C1_CR2 must reflect the expected status for the transaction to continue, or it must be gracefully aborted in the case of timeouts or unrecoverable errors.

Due to the complexity caused by the high number of events possible during the setup of the transaction, it is necessary to implement a complete state machine that keeps track of the phases of the transmission to use the transceiver in master mode.

As a demonstration of basic interactions with the transceiver, we can write a sequential interaction with the bus, but a real-life scenario would require us to keep track of the state of each transaction and react to the many scenarios possible within the combination of the flags contained in I2C1_SR1 and I2C1_SR2. This sequence initiates a transaction toward an I²C slave with an address of 0x42, and if the slave responds, it sends 2 bytes with values of 0x00 and 0x01, respectively. The only purpose of this sequence is to show the interaction with the transceiver, and it does not recover from any of the possible errors. At the beginning of the transaction, we zero the flags related to the ACK or the STOP condition, and we enable the transceiver using the lowest bit in CR1:

```

void i2c1_test_sequence(void)
{
    volatile uint32_t sr1, sr2;
    const uint8_t address = 0x42;
    I2C1_CR1 &= ~(I2C_CR1_ENABLE | I2C_CR1_STOP |
                 I2C_CR1_ACK);
    I2C1_CR1 |= I2C_CR1_ENABLE;
}

```

To ensure that no other master is occupying the bus, the procedure hangs until the busy flag is cleared in the transceiver:

```

do {
    sr2 = I2C1_SR2;
} while ((sr2 & I2C_SR2_BUSY) != 0);

```


A START condition is sent, using the function defined earlier, which will also wait until the same START condition appears on the bus:

```
i2c1_send_start();
```

The destination address is set to the highest 7 bits of the byte we are about to transmit. The lowest bit is off as well, indicating a write operation. To proceed after a correct address selection that has been acknowledged by the receiving slave, two flags must be set in I2C1_SR2, indicating that the master mode has been selected and the bus is still taken:

```
I2C1_DR = (address << 1);
do {
    sr2 = I2C1_SR2;
} while ((sr2 & (I2C_SR2_BUSY | I2C_SR2_MASTER)) !=
        (I2C_SR2_BUSY | I2C_SR2_MASTER));
```

The data communication with the slave has now been initiated, and the 2 data bytes can be transmitted. The TX FIFO EMPTY event indicates when each byte has been transferred within a frame in the transaction:

```
I2C1_DR = (0x00);
do {
    sr1 = I2C1_SR1;
} while ((sr1 & I2C_SR1_TX_EMPTY) != 0);
I2C1_DR = (0x01);
do {
    sr1 = I2C1_SR1;
} while ((sr1 & I2C_SR1_TX_EMPTY) != 0);
```

Finally, the STOP condition is set, and the transaction is over:

```
i2c1_send_stop();
}
```

Interrupt handling

The event interface of the I²C controller on the reference target is complex enough to provide two separate interrupt handlers for each transceiver. The suggested implementation for a generic I²C master includes a proper interrupt setup and the definition of all the combinations between states and events. The I²C controller can be configured to associate interrupts with all the relevant events happening on the bus, allowing for the fine-tuning of specific corner cases, and a more-or-less complete implementation of the I²C protocol.

That brings us to the end of this chapter.

Summary

This chapter has given us the necessary information to start programming system support for the most popular local bus communication interfaces available on embedded targets. Accessing peripherals and other microcontrollers in the same geographical location is one of the typical requirements of embedded systems interacting with sensors, actuators, and other devices in proximity of the embedded system.

Several implementations providing a higher level of abstraction to the transceivers analyzed here already exist. The serial communication protocols covered in this chapter, namely UART, SPI, and I²C, are usually accessible through drivers that are part of the board support kit and do not need to be reimplemented from scratch. This chapter, however, purposely focused on studying the behavior of the components from the closest possible point of view, to better understand the interface provided by the hardware manufacturer, and possibly provide the tools to design new ways of accessing the interfaces, tailored or optimized, for a specific platform or scenario, while also understanding the choices behind some of the protocol design characteristics.

In the next chapter, we will describe the mechanisms used to reduce the power consumption of embedded systems by studying the low-power and ultra-low-power features present in modern embedded devices.

8

Power Management and Energy Saving

Energy efficiency has always been one of the leading factors in the microcontroller market. Since the early 2000s, signal-processing 16-bit RISC microcontrollers, such as the MSP430, have been designed for extremely low-power usage and are still leading the path of ultra-low-power optimization architectures in embedded systems.

In the last few years, more advanced 32-bit RISC microcontrollers, rich in features and capable of running real-time operating systems, have scaled down in size and power consumption, and set foot in the low-power and ultra-low-power domains. Battery-powered systems and devices relying on energy-harvesting techniques are becoming more and more common in many industries. Low-power wireless communication is now offered by a number of connected platforms, so an increasing number of IoT systems include low-power and ultra-low-power characteristics in their design.

Depending on the architecture, microcontrollers offer different strategies to reduce power consumption while running and implement low-power states that consume very little energy when activated.

Reducing the energy demand of an embedded system is often a tricky process. In fact, all the devices on the board may consume power if not deactivated properly. Generating high-frequency clocks is one of the most expensive operations, so the CPU and bus clocks should only be enabled when in use.

Researching the ideal strategy to save energy depends on the compromises that can be made between performance and energy saving. Microcontrollers designed for ultra-low-power applications are capable of slowing down the CPU frequency, and even reaching different variations of a hibernation state, where all the clocks are stopped and the external peripherals are turned off for maximum power savings.

With the appropriate energy profiling techniques, and by implementing ultra-low-power strategies, battery-powered devices can run for several years before needing to be replaced. Using alternative power sources, such as solar panels, heat-converting devices, or other forms of energy harvesting from the surrounding environment, a well-profiled embedded system may run indefinitely as long as the external conditions allow it.

Advanced microprocessors running at very high speeds are generally not designed to implement effective power consumption optimizations, which is what makes smaller, low-power microcontrollers such as the Cortex-M so popular in all those embedded systems where a small power footprint is one of the requirements.

In this chapter, we will highlight a few key practices when approaching the design of low-power and ultra-low-power embedded systems. Low-power extensions of the Cortex-M microcontroller are demonstrated as examples of real-life implementations of low-power optimization on real targets. The chapter is divided into three sections:

- System configuration
- Low-power operating modes
- Measuring power
- Designing low-power embedded applications

By the end of this chapter, you will have learned about the management of different low-power configurations for the microcontroller and peripherals.

Technical requirements

The code files for this chapter are available on GitHub at <https://github.com/PacktPublishing/Embedded-Systems-Architecture-Second-Edition/tree/main/Chapter8>.

System configuration

A system that includes power consumption constraints in its specifications must be designed to meet the requirements in all its aspects, including hardware, software, and mechanical design. The selection of components and peripherals must take into account their energy profiles. External peripherals are often the most power-demanding components, and thus their power source must be interrupted by the microcontroller when they are not being used.

This section will describe the best practices concerning peripheral configuration, system clock settings, and voltage control, and their impact on power consumption.

Hardware design

In low-power embedded systems, the hardware design must include the possibility to power peripherals on or off using a GPIO pin. This is better done using a line that is normally low so that it can be pulled down using passive components when the GPIO is not driven by the microcontroller. MOSFETs are often used to control the power supplied to external peripherals, using a GPIO signal to control the gate voltage.

Even when peripherals are turned off by interrupting their power source line, smaller currents may leak through other signals connected to them, such as a serial bus or other control signals. The hardware design must be able to detect and identify these leakages in early prototyping stages to minimize the energy lost this way.

Additionally, if the power-saving strategy includes the possibility to put the microprocessor into a deep-sleep operation mode, the logic of the input signals must be tailored to provide the correct wake-up events to resume normal operation. Signals that might not be driven while in sleep mode must maintain a known logic value enforced using passive components.

Clock management

Internal peripherals and interfaces that are not in use must also stay off. If the platform supports it, clock gating is generally the mechanism used to selectively control the clock source for each peripheral and interface on the system. Each clock line enabled in the system clock gating configuration increases the power usage. Furthermore, the higher the scaling factor applied to generate the CPU clock from a slow oscillator, the higher the energy required by the PLL. The PLL is one of the most power-demanding components of the system, and the power consumed by the CPU is also directly proportional to its clock frequency. Many CPUs are designed to run with a reduced clock speed, offering a range of possible trade-offs between performance and energy saving. Accordingly, the PLL can generally be reconfigured at runtime to adapt to different profiles. However, every change to the system clock requires a reconfiguration of all the clock dividers for all the timers and peripherals currently in use.

On the reference platform, we can reconfigure the CPU frequency at runtime to save a significant amount of power whenever the system does not require computing performance. To do this, the function in `system.c`, used to set the system clock in all the examples so far, has been modified to allow the selection of two different running frequencies. In performance mode, the system runs at its maximum frequency of 168 MHz. If the `powersave` flag argument is not zero, the clocks are configured to run at 48 MHz instead, for a more energy-efficient scenario:

```
void clock_pll_on(int powersave)
{
    uint32_t reg32, pllcn, pllm, pllq,
        pllp, pllrr, hpre, ppre1, ppre2,
        flash_waitstates;
    if (powersave) {
        cpu_freq = 48000000;
        pllm = 8;
        pllcn = 96;
        pllp = 2;
```

```

    pllq = 2;
    pllr = 0;
    hpre = RCC_PRESCALER_DIV_NONE;
    ppre1 = RCC_PRESCALER_DIV_4;
    ppre2 = RCC_PRESCALER_DIV_2;
    flash_waitstates = 5;
} else {
    cpu_freq = 168000000;
    pll_m = 8;
    pll_n = 336;
    pll_p = 2;
    pllq = 7;
    pll_r = 0;
    hpre = RCC_PRESCALER_DIV_NONE;
    ppre1 = RCC_PRESCALER_DIV_4;
    ppre2 = RCC_PRESCALER_DIV_2;
    flash_waitstates = 3;
}

```

The number of wait states for the flash operation has also been changed here, because, according to the documentation of the STM32F407, at 48 MHz, the flash only requires three wait states:

```
flash_set_waitstates(flash_waitstates);
```

The procedure for setting the system clock is the usual one. First, the HSI is enabled and then selected as the temporary clock source. Afterward, the 8 MHz external oscillator is enabled, and it is ready to feed the PLL:

```

RCC_CR |= RCC_CR_HSION;
DMB();
while ((RCC_CR & RCC_CR_HSIRDY) == 0) {};

reg32 = RCC_CFGR;
reg32 &= ~(1 << 1) | (1 << 0);
RCC_CFGR = (reg32 | RCC_CFGR_SW_HSI);
DMB();

RCC_CR |= RCC_CR_HSEON;

```

```
DMB();
while ((RCC_CR & RCC_CR_HSERDY) == 0)
    ;
```

The parameters for the clock divisors and multipliers for the chosen mode are set in the PLL configuration register, and the PLL is enabled:

```
reg32 = RCC_CFGR;
reg32 &= ~(0xF0);
RCC_CFGR = (reg32 | (hpre << 4));
DMB();
reg32 = RCC_CFGR;
reg32 &= ~(0x1C00);
RCC_CFGR = (reg32 | (ppre1 << 10));
DMB();
reg32 = RCC_CFGR;
reg32 &= ~(0x07 << 13);
RCC_CFGR = (reg32 | (ppre2 << 13));
DMB();

reg32 = RCC_PLLCFGR;
reg32 &= ~(PLL_FULL_MASK);
RCC_PLLCFGR = reg32 | RCC_PLLCFGR_PLLSRC | pll_m |
    (pll_n << 6) | (((pll_p >> 1) - 1) << 16) | (pll_q << 24);
}
```

Changing the CPU and system clocks means that all the peripherals that use the clocks must be reconfigured. If a timer is running, or any device using the clocks as reference is in use by the application, the pre-scaler register that is used for providing the timing reference must be adapted accordingly based on clock speed updates.

Running the system at a lower speed offers other benefits, such as the possibility to decrease the number of wait states required to access the flash memory and enable extra low-power features that are only available when the system is not running at full speed.

An embedded platform usually includes low-frequency clock generators, in the kHz range, which may be used as sources for time-keeping devices such as watchdogs and **real-time clocks (RTCs)**. External or internal oscillators can be active during low-power operating modes and used to implement wake-up strategies.

Voltage control

Microcontrollers have a relatively wide range of operating voltages. Supplying lower voltages, however, makes it impossible to run the CPU at full speed, and flash memory may require additional wait states due to the physical characteristics of the hardware. Nevertheless, lower-voltage-tolerant logic can improve the overall economy of the system in some cases.

Internal regulators can often be configured to produce a lower voltage for the core signals, to reach a compromise between the power consumption and performance when the CPU is not running at its maximum frequency.

An important aspect that is often neglected is the power consumed by the Schmitt triggers in the digital input logic. When GPIOs are configured as digital input, but not forced to a known logic state through external passive components, they might be floating around the average value, due to the electromagnetic fields in the environment. This causes the input signal to be triggered, resulting in a little energy being lost at every change in the logic state.

Low-power operating modes

Microcontrollers can execute in different power modes, switching from full performance to complete hibernation. A proper understanding of the microcontroller's low-power modes is fundamental to designing systems with improved energy profiles. Each architecture provides specific power configurations, where the CPU or other buses and peripherals are disabled, as well as appropriate mechanisms to be used by the system software to enter and exit low-power modes.

In an ARM-based microcontroller, the terminology used for the different low-power modes can be summarized as follows:

- **Normal operation mode:** Active components are selected through clock gating, and the clock is running at the desired frequency.
- **Sleep mode:** The CPU clock is temporarily suspended, but all the peripherals keep functioning as in normal mode. As long as the CPU is not executing, there is a noticeable, even if marginal, amount of power saved in this mode. Execution can be resumed after receiving an interrupt request. This mode is also referred to as *wait mode* by some chip manufacturers.
- **Stop mode:** The CPU clock and the bus clocks are disabled. All the peripherals powered by the microcontroller are off. The internal RAM and the CPU registers retain the stored values because the main voltage regulator stays on. The power consumption drops consistently, but it is still possible to wake up and resume the execution through an external interrupt or event. This mode is often also less appropriately called deep-sleep mode, although it is, in fact, one of two deep-sleep modes available.
- **Standby mode:** All the voltage regulators are off, and the content of the RAM and register is lost. A small amount of power, in the range of a few microwatts, may be required to keep the backup circuitry alive during the standby phase. Wake-up is then only possible under a few

specific conditions, such as an externally powered RTC, or a hardware-predefined wake-up event pin. When the system wakes up from standby, the normal boot procedure is followed, and the execution resumes from the reset service routine.

The ARMv7 microcode provides two instructions to enter low-power operating modes:

- **Wait for interrupt (WFI)**
- **Wait for event (WFE)**

These instructions can be invoked at any time while in normal running mode. WFI will put the system in a low-power mode until the next interrupt request is received, while WFE is slightly different. Only a few events in the system, including the external interrupts, can be configured to generate an event. Normal interrupt requests will not put the system back into normal running mode if it is in a sleep or stop mode that has been entered using WFE.

The low-power mode that is entered upon invocation depends on the settings stored in the **System Control Register (SCR)**, which on Cortex-M is located in the system configuration region, at address 0xE000ED10. The SCR only provides 3 meaningful 1-bit flag fields:

- SLEEPONEXIT (bit 1): When enabled, the system will go into low-power mode at the end of the execution of the next interrupt handler.
- SLEEPDEEP (bit 2): Determines which mode is entered upon the invocation of WFI or WFE, or when returning from an interrupt with SLEEPONEXIT active. If this bit is cleared, sleep mode is selected. When a low-power mode is entered with this bit active, the system will be put on stop or standby mode, depending on the configuration of the power management registers.
- SEVONPEND (bit 4): When this bit is active, any interrupt pending during a low-power mode will cause a wake-up event, regardless of whether the sleep mode or the stop mode was entered using a WFI or a WFE instruction.

Note that bit 0, bit 3, and bits 5-31 are reserved (must be kept at value 0).

Deep-sleep configuration

To select between stop and standby mode, and to set up certain parameters related to the deep-sleep modes, our reference platform provides a power controller, mapped in the internal peripherals region, at address 0x40007000. The controller consists of two registers:

- PWR_CR (control register) at an offset of 0
- PWR_SCR (status and control register) at an offset of 4

The relevant parameters that can be configured in these two registers are the following:

- **Regulator Voltage-Scaling Output Selection (VOS)**, set through PWR_CR bit 14. When active, saves extra power in normal running mode, by configuring the internal regulator to produce a slightly lower voltage for the CPU core logic. This feature is only available if the target is not running at maximum frequency.
- **Flash power down in deep sleep (FPDS)** mode, set through PWR_CR bit 9. If active while going into one of the deep-sleep modes, the flash will be turned off completely while the system is sleeping. This results in a moderate amount of power saved but also impacts the wake-up time.
- **Power down in deep sleep (PDDS)**, set through PWR_CR, bit 1. This bit determines which mode is entered when the CPU goes into a deep sleep. If cleared, stop mode is selected. If set, the system enters standby.
- **Low-power deep sleep (LPDS)**, set through PWR_CR bit 0. This bit only has an effect in stop mode. If enabled, it slightly reduces the energy used while in deep sleep by enabling the *under-drive* mode in the internal voltage regulator. The current is supplied to the core logic in a reduced leakage mode, which still allows you to preserve the content of memory and registers. This feature is only available if the system is not running at full speed.
- **Enable wake-up pin (EWUP)**, set through PWR_CSR bit 4. This flag determines whether the wake-up pin can be used as a normal GPIO, or whether it is reserved to detect a wake-up signal during standby. The pin associated with this function in the reference platform is PA0.

A **wake-up flag (WUF)** is automatically set by the hardware when exiting a sleep or a deep-sleep mode and can be read through PWR_CSR bit 0. Writing 1 into PWR_CR bit 2 **clears the wake-up flag** (CWUF).

On the STM32F407 microcontroller, we can access the registers related to the low-power modes and configuration using the following macros:

```
#define SCB_SCR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (0xE000ED10))
#define SCB_SCR_SEVONPEND (1 << 4)
#define SCB_SCR_SLEEPDEEP (1 << 2)
#define SCB_SCR_SLEEPONEXIT (1 << 1)

#define POW_BASE (0x40007000)
#define POW_CR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (POW_BASE + 0x00))
#define POW_SCR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (POW_BASE + 0x04))

#define POW_CR_VOS (1 << 14)
#define POW_CR_FPDS (1 << 9)
#define POW_CR_CWUF (1 << 2)
```

```
#define POW_CR_PDDS (1 << 1)
#define POW_CR_LPDS (1 << 0)
#define POW_SCR_WUF (1 << 0)
#define POW_SCR_EWUP (1 << 4)
```

For the activation of the low-power modes, and the generation of spontaneous events, we define macros containing single inline assembly instructions as follows:

```
#define WFI() asm volatile ("wfi")
#define WFE() asm volatile ("wfe")
```

If sleep mode is entered through WFI, the system suspends the execution until the next interrupt. Entering sleep mode with WFE instead ensures that only selected *events* can wake up the system again. Events of different types that occur on the system can be enabled to wake up the WFE.

When WFE is entered, all interrupts active in the NVIC will still count as events, thereby waking up the WFE call. Interrupts can be temporarily filtered out by disabling the corresponding IRQ line in the NVIC. If an interrupt is filtered this way, using NVIC, it remains in a pending state and it is handled as soon as the system goes back to normal running mode.

Stop mode

Sleep mode is entered by default every time that the WFI or WFE instructions are invoked, as long as SCB_SCR_SLEEPDEEP remains off. Other low-power modes can be enabled by enabling the SLEEPDEEP flag. To enter one of the available deep-sleep modes, the SCB_SCR and the POW registers must be configured before calling WFI or WFE. Depending on the configuration, the system enters one of the two deep-sleep modes, stop or standby.

In the following example, a continuous 1 Hz timer toggles the LED 10 times before switching to deep-sleep mode, using WFE. The main loop stays in sleep mode in between timer interrupts, using WFI:

```
void main(void) {
    int sleep = 0;
    pll_on(0);
    button_setup();
    led_setup();
    timer_init(CPU_FREQ, 1, 1000);
    while(1) {
        if (timer_elapsed) {
            WFE(); /* consume timer event */
            led_toggle();
        }
        WFI();
    }
}
```

```
        timer_elapsed = 0;
    }
    if (tim2_ticks > 10) {
        sleep = 1;
        tim2_ticks = 0;
    }
    if (sleep) {
        enter_lowpower_mode();
        WFE();
        sleep = 0;
        exit_lowpower_mode();
    } else
        WFI();
}
```

The interrupt service routine for the timer increases the `tim2_ticks` counter by 1 and sets the `timer_elapsed` flag, which will make the main loop toggle the LED and consume the event generated by the timer:

```
void isr_tim2(void) {
    nvic_irq_clear(NVIC_TIM2_IRQN);
    TIM2_SR &= ~TIM_SR_UIF;
    tim2_ticks++;
    timer_elapsed++;
}
```

The `enter_lowpower_mode` procedure is responsible for setting the values in the system control block and in the power control registers, depending on the desired low-power mode, and configuring all the optimizations accordingly.

The `enter_lowpower_mode` procedure performs the following actions:

1. It turns off the LED.
2. It sets the values in `SCB_SCR` and the power register to configure the low-power mode that will be entered upon WFE.
3. It selects the single extra power optimizations.

It is implemented as follows:

```
void enter_lowpower_mode(void)
{
    uint32_t scr = 0;
    led_off();
    scr = SCB_SCR;
    scr &= ~SCB_SCR_SEVONPEND;
    scr |= SCB_SCR_SLEEPDEEP;
    scr &= ~SCB_SCR_SLEEPONEXIT;
    SCB_SCR = scr;
    POW_CR |= POW_CR_CWUF | POW_CR_FPDS | POW_CR_LPDS;
}
```

In this case, stop mode is configured to reduce power consumption as much as possible, by activating the low-power voltage regulator settings (through `POW_CR_LPDS`) and by turning off the flash (through `POW_CR_FPDS`).

Low-power mode is now entered through a `WFE()` call. To be able to wake up the system, we configure an EXTI event, which is associated with the user pressing a button on the board. To do so, we configure EXTI0 to be sensitive to raised edges, as the PA0 pin changes its logical value from 0 to 1 upon being pressed.

As we are not particularly interested in the interrupt itself, we ensure that the flag to generate an interrupt request is turned off in EXTI. The event controller will ensure that an event is generated instead because the flag relative to the input pin is enforced in the `EXTI_EMR` register.

The initial configuration for the user button event looks like the following:

```
void button_setup(void)
{
    uint32_t reg;
    AHB1_CLOCK_ER |= GPIOA_AHB1_CLOCK_ER;
    APB2_CLOCK_ER |= SYSCFG_APB2_CLOCK_ER;
    GPIOA_MODE &= ~(0x03 << (BUTTON_PIN * 2));
    EXTI_CR0 &= ~EXTI_CR_EXTI0_MASK;
    EXTI_IMR &= ~0x7FFFFFFF;
    reg = EXTI_EMR & ~0x7FFFFFFF;
    EXTI_EMR = reg | (1 << BUTTON_PIN);
    reg = EXTI_RTISR & ~0x7FFFFFFF;
```

```
EXTI_RTISR = reg | (1 << BUTTON_PIN);  
EXTI_FTSR &= ~0x7FFFFFFF;  
}
```

No interrupts are configured for the button, as the event alone is sufficient to wake up the board during stop mode.

Upon entering stop mode, the PLL will be disabled, and the HSI will be automatically selected as the clock source when the system is back in normal running mode. To restore the clock configuration, there are a few steps to implement as soon as stop mode is exited:

1. SCB_SCR_SLEEPDEEP flag is cleared so that the next invocation of WFI or WFE does not trigger another switch to stop mode.
2. The POW_CR register is accessed to clear the wake-up flag set by the hardware at the end of the stop mode.
3. The PLL is configured again, as the clock is restored.
4. The LED is turned on.
5. The TIM2 interrupt is enabled again for the timer to restore its functionality in normal running mode:

```
void exit_lowpower_mode(void)  
{  
    SCB_SCR &= ~SCB_SCR_SLEEPDEEP;  
    POW_CR |= POW_CR_CWUF | POW_CR_CSBF;  
    clock_pll_on(0);  
    timer_init(cpu_freq, 1, 1000);  
    led_on();  
}
```

Deep-sleep mode reduces the power consumption consistently, and it is the ideal situation whenever the system must maintain the current running status but can be frozen for a longer period.

Standby mode

In standby mode, the system can go into ultra-low-power mode, consuming only a few microamperes, while waiting to be reinitialized by an external event. Entering standby mode requires you to set the SCB_SCR_PDDS flag prior to invoking WFI or WFE. While the system is on standby, all the voltage regulators are off, except for the low-speed oscillators, which are used to clock the independent watchdog timer and the real-time clock.

The procedure to enter standby mode is slightly different from the one used to enter stop mode. The `SCB_SCR_PDDS` flag is set to select standby mode as a deep-sleep variant. The flag `SCB_SCR_LPDS` is not activated in this case, because we know it has no effect in standby mode:

```
void enter_lowpower_mode(void)
{
    uint32_t scr = 0;
    led_off();
    scr = SCB_SCR;
    scr &= ~SCB_SCR_SEVONPEND;
    scr |= SCB_SCR_SLEEPDEEP;
    scr &= ~SCB_SCR_SLEEPONEXIT;
    SCB_SCR = scr;
    POW_CR |= POW_CR_CWUF | POW_CR_FPDS | POW_CR_PDDS;
    POW_SCR |= POW_CR_CSBF;
}
```

In this case, it is useless to set up the EXTI event for the button press, as the GPIO controllers will be disabled while the microcontroller is in standby mode. The easiest way to exit this state is configuring the real-time clock to generate a wake-up event after a fixed amount of time. In fact, during the standby phase, only a few peripherals will be kept alive, and they are all grouped in a special section of the clock configuration, namely the backup domain. The backup domain consists of the real-time clock and a small portion of the clock tree, containing the internal and external low-speed oscillators. The write access to the registers related to the backup domain is controlled by the flag disabling protection of the backup domain, or `POW_CR_DPB`, located in the `POW_CR` register at bit 8.

The RTC configuration registers, mapped in the peripherals area starting at address `0x40002870`, are protected from accidental writing due to electromagnetic interference, meaning that a special value sequence must be written to the write protection register before accessing the other registers. The RTC integrated into the reference platform is complex and has a lot of features, such as keeping track of date and time, and setting custom alarms and regular timestamp events. For this example, we want to use only the wake-up event, so most of the RTC registers are not documented here.

The restricted set of registers we access for RTC is as follows:

- The control register (`RTC_CR`) exposes the configuration of the various functionalities provided by the RTC. In the example, we use the values related to the wake-up trigger, enabling the interrupt with the wake-up timer interrupt enable flag, `RTC_CR_WUTIE`, and enabling the wake-up timer counter also using `RTC_CR_WUTE`.

- The initialization and status register (RTC_ISR) in this example is used to check the write status of the setup register for the wake-up timer through the special flag, RTC_ISR_WUTWF, during the timer setup.
- The wake-up timer register (RTC_WUTR) is used to set the interval before the next wake-up event.
- The write protection register (RTC_WPR) is used to transmit the unlock sequence before writing to other registers in the region.

The preprocessor macros that map these registers and the meaningful fields are as follows:

```
#define RTC_BASE (0x40002800)
#define RTC_CR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (RTC_BASE + 0x08))
#define RTC_ISR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (RTC_BASE + 0x0c))
#define RTC_WUTR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (RTC_BASE + 0x14))
#define RTC_WPR (*(volatile uint32_t *) (RTC_BASE + 0x24))

#define RTC_CR_WUP (0x03 << 21)
#define RTC_CR_WUTIE (1 << 14)
#define RTC_CR_WUTE (1 << 10)

#define RTC_ISR_WUTF (1 << 10)
#define RTC_ISR_WUTWF (1 << 2)
```

The procedure to initialize the RTC to generate a wake-up event includes the following steps:

1. Turn on the clock gating for the power configuration registers, if not already on, to enable the POW_CR_DPB flag, in order to initiate the setup of the RTC:

```
void rtc_init(void) {
    APB1_CLOCK_ER |= PWR_APB1_CLOCK_ER_VAL;
    POW_CR |= POW_CR_DPB;
```

2. Enable the RTC using bit 15 in the backup domain register configuration within the RCC:

```
RCC_BACKUP |= RCC_BACKUP_RTCEN;
```

3. Enable a backup clock source, selecting from the **Low-Speed Internal (LSI)** oscillator or a **Low-Speed External (LSE)** oscillator, if available.
4. In this example, we use the LSI oscillator because the LSE oscillator is not present on the reference platform. However, external oscillators are more accurate and are always preferable, when available, for reliable timekeeping. After the clock has been enabled, the procedure waits until it becomes ready by polling a bit in the status register:

```
RCC_CSR |= RCC_CSR_LSION;
while (!(RCC_CSR & RCC_CSR_LSIRDY))
    ;
```

5. Select the LSI as the source for the RTC:

```
RCC_BACKUP |= (RCC_BACKUP_RTCSEL_LSI <<
    RCC_BACKUP_RTCSEL_SHIFT);
```

6. Enable the interrupt and event generation for line 22 of EXTI, associating an event with the raised edge:

```
EXTI_IMR |= (1 << 22);
EXTI_EMR |= (1 << 22);
EXTI_RTSR |= (1 << 22);
```

7. Unlock the writing to the RTC registers by writing the unlock sequence to RTC_WPR:

```
RTC_WPR = 0xCA;
RTC_WPR = 0x53;
```

8. Disable the RTC so that it is permitted to write to the configuration registers. Wait until the write operation is possible, by polling RTC_ISR_WUTWF:

```
RTC_CR &= ~RTC_CR_WUTE;
DMB();
while (!(RTC_ISR & RTC_ISR_WUTWF))
    ;
```

9. Set the value for the interval before the next wake-up event. The LSI frequency is 32,768 Hz, and the default divider for the wake-up interval register is set to 16, so each unit in RTC_WUTR represents one 2048th of a second. To set an interval of 5 seconds, we use the following:

```
RTC_WUTR = (2048 * 5) - 1;
```

10. Enable the wake-up event:

```
RTC_CR |= RTC_CR_WUP;
```

11. Clear the wake-up flag that might have been set when returning from standby mode:

```
RTC_ISR &= ~RTC_ISR_WUTF;
```

12. To complete the sequence, we write an invalid byte to RTC_WPR. This way, the write protection on the RCC register is turned on again:

```
RTC_WPR = 0xb0;
}
```

13. To enable the RTC, right before entering standby mode, the following procedure ensures that the timer is active and counting and the event generation for the wake-up event is active:

```
void rtc_start(void)
{
    RTC_WPR = 0xCA;
    RTC_WPR = 0x53;
    RTC_CR |= RTC_CR_WUTIE | RTC_CR_WUTE;
    while (((RTC_ISR) & (RTC_ISR_WUTWF)))
        ;
    RTC_WPR = 0xb0;
}
```

If the procedure just shown is called before entering standby, the system will be up again when the wake-up event occurs, but it does not resume the execution from where it was suspended, as it happens in the other low-power modes. Instead, it starts over from the reset interrupt handler, at the beginning of the interrupt vector. For this reason, this example does not need an implementation for `exit_lowpower_mode`, and the WFE instruction that switches the system to standby will never return to the same context of execution. Eventually, the main function for the standby example looks like the following:

```
void main(void) {
    int sleep = 0;
    clock_pll_on(0);
    led_setup();
    rtc_init();
    timer_init(cpu_freq, 1, 1000);
    while(1) {
        if (timer_elapsed) {
            WFE(); /* Consume timer event */
            led_toggle();
            timer_elapsed = 0;
        }
        if (tim2_ticks > 10) {
```

```
    sleep = 1;
    tim2_ticks = 0;
}

if (sleep) {
    enter_lowpower_mode();
    rtc_start();
    WFE(); /* Never returns */
}
else
    WFI();
}
```

Wake-up intervals

An important aspect to consider when designing a low-power strategy is the wake-up time intervals, or, in other words, how long the system takes to resume the execution after switching into low-power mode. A system with real-time requirements may leave some room for compromises between power usage and reactivity, but it is important to understand the impact of the wake-up operations from the different low-power modes, in order to predict the latency of operations in the worst-case scenario. Wake-up times are very much conditioned by the hardware design of the microcontroller, and largely dependent on the architecture.

On our reference platform, while waking up from sleep mode takes a small number of CPU cycles, the situation changes for deep-sleep modes. Waking up from stop mode takes several microseconds. Further optimizations that have been activated while in stop mode, such as changing voltage regulators or turning off the flash memory, consistently impact the amount of time spent restoring the values to return to normal running. Resetting after standby mode produces even longer wake-up intervals, in the order of milliseconds, as the system should completely reboot after a wake-up event, and the start-up code execution time adds up to the fraction of milliseconds needed by the CPU to wake up.

When designing a low-power system, these wake-up times must be taken into account and properly measured, especially when the system has to deal with real-time constraints. The optimal low-power mode that fits the application timing and energy profile requirements must be chosen, taking into account the overhead produced by leaving low-power mode if the system wakes up often enough for these intervals to become non-negligible.

Once the system is designed to operate in the appropriate low-power modes, we need a reliable mechanism to measure the power used by the system while it is running. The next section suggests a common mechanism to keep track of the current values through the circuit under test to measure

the effects of the low-power operating modes of the microcontroller, and for the evaluation of all energy-saving optimizations introduced.

Measuring power

The current in use by the target can be measured at any time by connecting an ammeter in series with the device. This mechanism, however, does not show all the oscillations of the values during a time interval, which is why it is often useful to sample the values of the parasitic voltage at the ends of a shunt resistor using an oscilloscope.

A shunt resistor is placed in series with the target device, on either side of the power source. Its typical value is relatively small, in the range of a few ohms, to ensure that the parasite voltage stays low, but is still measurable by the oscilloscope:




Figure 8.1 – Measuring the current using an oscilloscope to sample the voltage applied to the shunt resistor

Due to the properties of a series circuit, the current running through the shunt is the same as the one used by the target system, so the voltage on the ends of the shunt resistor varies accordingly.

Development boards

In order to see the effects of the power optimizations, we must exclude the electronics that are not related to the system. Our reference board, for example, the STM32F407DISCOVERY, has an additional microcontroller that is used to provide a debug interface for the host, and it is powered using the same USB connector. However, development kits often offer a way to measure the current, excluding the unrelated hardware, allowing us to properly evaluate the low-power features of the microcontroller, excluding the development-related circuitry on board.

On our reference board, the JP1 jumper can be used to open the circuit between the power supply and the microcontroller circuitry. By replacing the jumper with an ammeter connected to the two pins, we can measure the current used by the actual system. In the same way, it is possible to apply a shunt resistor to monitor the current, using the oscilloscope to sample the voltage on the shunt.

A lab equipped with reliable energy metering is a good starting point for evaluating low-power implementations and assisting in the prototype and design phase of energy optimization.

Designing low-power embedded applications

In this section, a few design patterns are proposed to achieve a better energy profile on the target device, by evaluating the power demand of all the components and the states of the system we are about to design. Once we know how to measure the values in the target, and the details about the low-power mode in the selected architecture and microprocessor family, the application can be programmed, keeping other parameters in mind, such as the energy efficiency of the software we are writing.

Replacing busy loops with sleep mode

The reason busy loops are very popular among hobbyists is that they are so easy to implement. Suppose that the system needs to wait for a digital input to switch to a low-logic state, and this input is mapped to a certain GPIO. This can be easily done with the following one line of code:

```
while((GPIOX_IDR & (1 << INPUT_PINX)) != 0)
    ;
```

While this is perfectly working as expected, it will force the CPU into a loop of fetch-decode-execute, and to jump around the same few instructions until the condition becomes `false`. As we have seen, the power used by the microcontroller mostly depends on how fast the CPU is running. A lower frequency corresponds to a smaller amount of power used per instruction. Executing instructions in an infinite loop without switching to low-power mode sets the power demand from the CPU at its highest value for a measurable amount of time – in this case, the entire time needed for the logic input to change state.

Actively polling a value is the only way to go if interrupts are not enabled. The examples contained in this book tend to guide you toward a proper interrupt-handling approach. The proper way to handle the wait for the logic switch instead foresees the activation of an interrupt line related to the next operation. In the case of a GPIO line, we can use external interrupt triggers to wake up the main loop when the condition is met, and switch to a low-power mode, instead of looping, while waiting for the event.

In many other cases, the temptation to implement loops such as the previous one could be avoided by investigating another way to access the peripheral that is currently preventing the system from carrying out the next execution step. Modern serial and network controllers are equipped with interrupt signals, and when those are not available for the hardware we are accessing, there is always another way to sense an event through an external interrupt line. When a device can really only function in polling mode, as a last resort, the polling frequency can be reduced by associating the action with a timer interrupt, which would allow polling a few times per second, or even once in a while, using intervals that are more in line with the actual peripheral speed. Executing timed operations allows the CPU to sleep in between, and to switch to a low-power mode, reducing the average energy that the CPU would need to use while busy-looping.

The exception to this rule, seen many times in this chapter, is waiting for a ready flag after activating a system component. The following code activates the internal low-speed oscillator, and it is used in the standby mode example before entering low-speed mode. The CSR register is polled until the low-speed oscillator is actually running:

```
RCC_CSR |= RCC_CSR_LSION;
while (!(RCC_CSR & RCC_CSR_LSIRDY))
    ;
```

Operations such as this, performed on the integrated peripherals in the microcontroller silicon, have a well-known latency of a few CPU clocks, and thus do not impact the real-time constraints, as the maximum latency for similar internal actions is often mentioned in the microcontroller documentation. The situation changes whenever the polling occurs on a less predictable register, whose state and reaction times may depend on external factors, and long busy loops may occur in the system.

Deep sleep during longer inactivity periods

As we know, standby allows the system to be frozen with the minimum possible power consumption, in the ultra-low-power range. The use of standby is advised when the design has very strict ultra-low-power requirements and the following conditions are met:

- A viable wake-up strategy exists and is compatible with the current hardware design
- The system can restore the execution without relying on its previous state, as the content of the RAM and CPU registers is lost and the system restarts from the reset service routine at wake-up

Usually, longer periods of inactivity, where, for instance, the RTC can be used to program a wake-up alarm at a given time, are more fit for using standby mode. This applies to cases such as reading sensors and enabling actuators at programmed intervals during the day, keeping track of the time and a few status variables.

In most other cases, stop mode still saves enough power and provides a shorter wake-up interval. Another major advantage of stop mode is the increased flexibility of the wake-up strategy options. In

fact, any interrupt-based or configurable event can be used to wake up the system from its low-power deep-sleep mode, so it is more fit for states where there is still some asynchronous interactivity with the peripherals and interfaces surrounding the microcontroller.

Choosing the clock speed

Is all the computing power offered by the platform actually needed all the time?

The processing performance of microcontrollers nowadays is comparable to that of the personal computers of 20 years ago, which were already capable of fast operations and even processing real-time multimedia content. Embedded applications do not always require the CPU to run at full frequency. Especially when accessing peripherals, rather than crunching numbers, it does not matter how fast we clock the CPU and the bus. Both normal running mode and sleep mode require much less energy when the selected frequency is scaled down every single time the CPU performance is not actually the bottleneck of the execution pipe.

Many microcontrollers are designed to scale down the operating frequency for the CPU and the internal buses, which also generally allows the system to be fed with lower voltages. As we have seen, changing clocks can be done at runtime to compromise accordingly in terms of power and performance. However, this implies that all the devices using a clock as a reference must be reconfigured, so the change has a cost in terms of execution time and should not be abused. A convenient way to add frequency changes to the system design is to separate two or more CPU frequency scaling options into custom power states and switch to the required state by fading between performance and power usage.

Power state transitions

Consider a system connected to a sensor, producing and transmitting data through a network interface. The sensor is activated, then the system has to wait until it becomes ready, which is known to take several seconds. The sensor is then read multiple times in a row and then turned off. The data is processed, encrypted, and transmitted using a network device. The system remains idle for the next few hours before repeating the same operation. Initial rough modeling of the state machine is the following:




Figure 8.2 – State machine for a hypothetical sensor-reading system

The long idle interval foreseen in between two consecutive cycles suggests that it is perhaps a good idea to put the system on standby for most of the time and program an RTC alarm for the system to autonomously wake up in time for the next acquisition.

Other, less obvious optimizations are possible for the other states as well. While acquiring data from the sensor, the full computing power of the CPU is possibly never used, as the system is mostly busy communicating with the sensor, or waiting, possibly in sleep mode, until the next value is received. In this case, we can provide a power-saving running mode, which ensures that the system runs at a reduced frequency so, when alternating between running and sleep mode, both are affected by a smaller energy footprint. The only phases in which higher performance is required are when the data is processed, transformed, and sent over the network device. A faster system, in this case, would be optimized to run faster and elaborate data in a shorter time frame. A stop phase can be foreseen right after the sensor activation if the sensor is able to send an interrupt to wake up the system when it is ready to begin the acquisition of the data.

Once each phase has been associated with its optimized low-power mode and selected operating frequency, we can add notations to our design documentation, to remind us how the low-power optimization will be implemented, in the form of state transition, to achieve the best combination of performance, energy economy, and low latency. The following figure summarizes the transitions between the phases and the associated low-power modes:




Figure 8.3 – Power usage optimization for each running and idling state

Tuning an embedded system for its optimal energy profiles is a delicate process that heavily impacts other performance indicators, introducing delays and slowing down the speed of execution. In most cases, it consists of finding the best trade-off point between providing acceptable performance while keeping the power usage and the energy demand within the desired range.

Summary

Modern embedded systems open multiple possibilities for low-power and even ultra-low-power designs. This chapter analyzed the different energy profiles available for the reference microcontroller and how to design, integrate, and evaluate those procedures to control power usage in energy-aware embedded systems. Having understood several options available for the target, implementing low-power modes and further types of energy-saving techniques is the key to building durable and reliable battery-powered and energy-harvesting devices.

In the next chapter, we will switch focus to introducing connected devices and describing the impact of dealing with network protocols and interfaces in the embedded system architecture.

Distributed Systems and IoT Architecture

By accessing communication peripherals, such as network controllers and radio interfaces, microcontrollers are able to establish data communication with nearby devices and even with remote servers through the internet.

A set of embedded targets connected together and interacting with each other can be seen as a self-contained distributed system. Homogeneous machine-to-machine communication can be implemented using non-standard, and even proprietary, protocols.

Depending on the set of standard protocols it implements, an embedded system may be able to successfully communicate with heterogeneous, remote systems. Implementing standard protocols that are standardized or widely supported introduces the possibility to interact with gateways in the same geographic area, and with remote cloud servers across the internet.

The connectivity range of small, embedded devices may include remote coordination using **Information Technology (IT)** systems. The encounter between the two worlds has changed the modern interpretation of distributed systems: low-power, inexpensive devices can now be part of services with solid roots in IT, which, in turn, can extend their branches into localized and specialized sensors and actuators, creating what has been known as the **Internet of Things (IoT)**.

This technological step, considered revolutionary by many, is capable of changing the way we access technology, and human-to-machine interaction processes, forever. Unfortunately, the security aspects of IoT communication have too often been neglected, leading to unpleasant incidents, which may compromise the confidentiality and integrity of the data transmitted and permit attackers to take control of remote devices.

This chapter analyzes the telecommunication technologies and protocols that are possible to integrate into embedded targets, using them to better understand the design from the point of view of the whole embedded system, up to integration within IoT networks.

We will learn about the networking model, starting from the physical layer and the possible technologies for establishing wireless or wired links, up to tailored embedded applications that can establish secure communication with cloud services, using standard communication protocols.

In particular, we will look at the following:

- Network interfaces
- The Internet protocols
- TLS
- The application protocols

By the end of this chapter, you will have an in-depth understanding of today's microcontroller's IoT capabilities.

Technical requirements

In this chapter, we assume that you are familiar with general concepts of modern computer networking, although no previous experience with distributed applications is required. For a more complete background on network programming, which is relevant to the content of this chapter, we suggest, as further reading, *Hands On Network Programming with C* (L. Van Winkle – Packt Publishing 2019). There are no specific examples provided in the book's repository for this chapter. More complete examples of TCP and **Transport Layer Security (TLS)** client/server communication can be found in the source code distribution of the open source projects presented here.

Network interfaces

Embedded devices often integrate one or more communication interfaces. Many microcontrollers integrate the **Media Access Control (MAC)** portion of an Ethernet interface, so connecting a **Physical Layer Transceiver (PHY)** would enable LAN access. Some devices are coupled with radio transceivers, operating at fixed frequency ranges and implementing one or more protocols to communicate over wireless links. Frequently used frequencies for wireless communication are the 2.4 GHz band, in use by Bluetooth and 802.11 Wi-Fi, and some specific ISM ranges of frequency below 1 GHz, which depend on local regulations. Usable sub-GHz frequencies include the 868 MHz ISM band in the European Union and the 915 MHz ISM band in the US. Transceivers are usually designed to access the physical layer according to specific link protocols, regulating shared access to the physical media among two or more devices. While two interfaces accessing the same media can have different configurations, the MAC model implemented must follow the same specifications on all the endpoints in order to establish point-to-point communication. Part of the MAC layer may be implemented in the device itself, which, in turn, can use a parallel or a serial interface to transfer data to and from the microcontroller.

Hardware manufacturers may distribute the device drivers to access the link layer. When the full source code is made available, it is easier for a developer to customize the media access, integrate the device

communication features, and tailor the communication to any protocol stack supported by the media. However, many device drivers are only partially open source, sometimes limiting the possibilities for integration with open standards. Moreover, integrating third-party proprietary code into an embedded system impacts the project maintenance and often requires workarounds for known issues or to enable features not foreseen by the manufacturer, and definitely impacts the security model of the system.

The implementation of device drivers in embedded systems, for either wired or wireless network interfaces, includes integrating the relevant access control mechanism in the communication logic and dealing with specific channel features. Some characteristics of the link may affect the design of higher-level communication, thus impacting the architecture of the entire distributed system. Alongside a reliable interaction with the MAC mechanisms, aspects such as bit rate, latency, and maximum packet size must be addressed and evaluated in the design phase to evaluate the resources required based on the goals of the system.

The next section offers an overview of some popular network interfaces in the embedded world, typically used by connected devices to communicate with the other components of a broader distributed system. The subsequent section will suggest some criteria to navigate through the options for selecting the best technology for a specific purpose during the design of the communication infrastructures and protocols.

MAC

The most important components to establish successful communication links over any physical media are grouped in the MAC logic, the implementation of which is often a shared responsibility between the software and hardware. Different technologies have evolved to define standards to access the links that are used nowadays for machine-to-machine communication, while only a few can scale within the context of a geographically distributed IoT system without intermediate gateways performing protocol conversions.

Some of the standards are directly derived from the IT world and consist of adaptations of existing TCP/IP technologies capable of scaling down to fit within the limited resources available on embedded systems. Other standards have evolved entirely within the context of small, embedded devices, and interaction with the classic IT infrastructure is achieved through the modeling of TCP/IP protocols on top of low-power wireless technologies. In both cases, the research for convergence is dictated by the need for broader integration of small, inexpensive, self-powered devices into IoT services.

There is no such thing as a definitive one-size-fits-all solution to define network access for embedded systems. The differences in requirements across the embedded industry have encouraged the development of tailored MAC protocols and technologies, both standardized and proprietary, each of them tailored to respond to the need for specific features or a range of embedded systems.

In the following subsections, some of the most successful MAC technologies for machine-to-machine communication are described, taking into consideration the aspects related to the adoption of the technology and the modes of integration.

Ethernet

Even though it may sound a little impractical for contexts in which the size of the whole system is comparable to an RJ-45 connector, Ethernet is still the most reliable and fastest channel of communication available to integrate into embedded systems.

Many Cortex-M microcontrollers are equipped with one Ethernet MAC controller, which must be integrated with an external PHY. Other link-layer protocols implement the same mechanism for link-layer addressing, consisting of a 14-byte preamble attached to each packet transmitted, indicating the source and destination link addresses and the type of payload contained in the packet being transported. The MAC addresses are rewritten every time a packet is routed toward an Ethernet-like interface by the TCP/IP stack so that they match the next link that the packet must cross in its journey toward its final destination.

Device drivers can activate filters to discard all the traffic that does not involve the host, which would otherwise impact the amount of background data communication unnecessarily being processed by the TCP/IP stack.

Wi-Fi

Among all the possibilities in the wireless universe, 802.11 Wi-Fi is chosen for its high-speed, low-latency channel, and for the widest possible topological compatibility, including with personal computers and mobile devices. However, the power requirement of a Wi-Fi transceiver can sometimes be difficult to afford for low-power devices. The complexity of protocols and mechanisms to regulate media access requires a consistent amount of controlling software, which is often distributed in binary form, and thus impossible to debug and maintain without the support of the manufacturers.

Wi-Fi provides large bandwidth and reasonably low latency and may implement authentication and encryption at the data-link level.

While it is technically possible to realize a local mesh network configuring the Wi-Fi transceivers to operate in an ad hoc mode, embedded systems equipped with 802.11 technology are mostly used to connect to existing infrastructures to interact with other portable devices and access the internet.

Several embedded low-cost platforms are available on the market, equipped with a TCP/IP stack and a built-in RTOS, which can be used as a standalone platform or integrated into complete systems to access wireless LAN, either as a station or to provide an access point.

Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area Networks (LR-WPANs)

Sensor mesh networks make extensive use of wireless technology to establish communication in a local geographical area. The 802.15.4 standard regulates the access to 2.4 GHz and sub-GHz frequencies to provide limited-range local area networks with a typical maximum bit rate of 250 Kbps, which can be accessed using low-cost, low-power transceivers. The media access is not based on infrastructure and supports contention resolution and collision detection at the MAC level, using a beaconing system.

Each node can be addressed using 2 bytes, and the special address of 0xFFFF is reserved for broadcast traffic to reach all the nodes in visibility. The maximum payload size for 802.15.4 frames is fixed to 127 bytes, and thus it is not possible to encapsulate full-size IP packets routed from an Ethernet or a wireless LAN link. Network protocol implementations that are capable of communicating through 802.15.4 interfaces are either application-specific, do not support IP networking, or offer fragmentation and compression mechanisms to transmit and receive each packet across multiple wireless frames.

While not specifically designed for the IoT, and not directly compatible with classic IP infrastructures, there are multiple choices available to build networks on top of 802.15.4. In fact, while the standard specifies the MAC protocol for exchanging frames among nodes that are in visibility, multiple link-layer technologies, standard and non-standard, have been developed to define networks on top of 802.15.4.

LR-WPAN industrial link-layer extensions

Thanks to the flexibility of the transceivers, and the capability of transmitting and receiving 802.15.4 raw frames, it is relatively easy to implement networking protocols for LR-WPANs.

In the pre-IoT era, the process automation industry was the first to adopt the 802.15.4 technology and had been searching for a standard protocol stack to enable compatibility among devices from different manufacturers for a long time. The Zigbee protocol stack endeavored to become a de facto, industry-imposed standard for 802.15.4 networking, with noticeable success, considering the proprietary, closed-source, and royalties applicable to its commercial use. In a parallel effort, the **International Society of Automation (ISA)** has created a proposal for the open standard ISA100.11a, which aims to define the guidelines for building networks based on 802.15.4 links to be used in industrial automation processes. Another industrial automation protocol, originally developed by a consortium of enterprises and then approved by the **International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)** as a standard for industrial automation, is WirelessHART.

Technologies such as Zigbee, ISA100.1, and WirelessHART define the entire protocol stack above 802.15.4, including network definition and transport mechanisms, providing custom address mechanisms and communication models, and exporting an API that can be used to integrate applications. From the perspective of the design of the distributed system, enabling internet connectivity for devices in a custom network, not implementing the IP stack, requires one or more devices to act as a gateway, rerouting and transforming each packet for the custom LR-WPAN protocol stack. The transformation procedure, however, violates the end-to-end semantics of TCP/IP communication, impacting various aspects of the communication, including end-to-end security.

6LoWPAN

6LoWPAN, described in RFC 4944, is the IETF-standardized 802.15.4 link protocol that can transport IPv6 packets, and it is the established standard for IP-compatible LR-WPANs. 6LoWPAN makes it possible for embedded systems to access the internet using 802.15.4 interfaces, as long as the nodes implement TCP/IP networking, and the link layer provides mechanisms to transmit and receive full-size IP packets using short LR-WPAN frames. The content of the packet is fragmented and

transmitted into consecutive transport units, and the network and transport headers are optionally compressed to reduce the transmission overhead.

There is currently no IPv4 counterpart of the 6LoWPAN standard; however, IETF is evaluating proposals adopting a similar approach to enable legacy IPv4 connectivity for embedded nodes.

6LoWPAN is part of several network stack implementations, and it is part of a recent attempt to create an industrial alliance, the Thread group, whose goal is to promote a fully IPv6, low-power mesh network technology based on open-standard protocols designed for the IoT. Multiple free and open source TCP/IP stacks and embedded operating systems support 6LoWPAN and can access 802.15.4 transceivers to provide the necessary link infrastructure to build IP networks based on the functionalities and the protocol implemented.

Mesh networking can optionally be added to the link layer to provide a transparent bridge mechanism called mesh-under, where all the frames are repeated by the link layer to the remote corners of the mesh until their destination is reached.

Because 6LoWPAN provides the infrastructure for building the network topology, mesh networking can be approached differently, using application-level protocols to update the routing tables at the IP level. These mechanisms, known as route-over mesh networking, are based on standardized dynamic routing mechanisms, and may also be used to extend the mesh network across different physical links.

Bluetooth

Another machine-to-machine connectivity technology in constant evolution is Bluetooth. Its physical layer is based on 2.4 GHz communication to establish host/device communication or provide the infrastructure for PAN supporting multiple protocols, including TCP/IP communication. Thanks to its longtime success and its consequent wide adoption in the market of personal computers and portable devices, Bluetooth connectivity has started to gain popularity in the universe of embedded microcontrollers, mostly due to the recent evolution of the standard in the direction of lower power consumption.

Initially designed as a wireless replacement for serial communication for devices at a close range, the *classic* Bluetooth technology has evolved to support integrated dedicated channels, including TCP/IP-capable network interfaces and dedicated audio and video streaming links.

A low-power variant of the protocol stack, introduced with version 4 of the standard definition, has been designed to limit energy consumption for embedded sensor nodes and introduces a new set of services. A sensor device may export a **Generic Attribute Profile (GATT)** that can be accessed by a client (usually a host machine) to establish communication with a device. When the transceiver on the target is inactive, it consumes a small amount of power, with it still remaining possible to discover its attribute and initiate a GATT transfer from a client. Bluetooth is mostly used nowadays for short-range communication; to access sensor nodes from personal computers and portable devices; to exchange multimedia content with remote audio devices such as speakers, headsets, and hands-free

automotive voice interfaces; and in several healthcare applications, thanks to some profiles being specifically designed for this purpose.

Mobile networks

Connecting remote devices that have no fixed infrastructure available in their surroundings has been made possible using the same technology that portable devices use to access the internet over mobile networks, such as GSM/GPRS, 3G, and LTE. The increasing complexity, cost, and energy requirements characterizing the devices that access broadband mobile connectivity have increased the impact of integrating this sort of network communication into microcontroller-based embedded devices. Mobile networks support TCP/IP protocols natively and provide direct connectivity to the internet, or in some cases, to restricted networks provided by the access infrastructure.

Although still popular in some specific markets, such as automotive and railway, broadband network access profiles are usually overkill for transferring a small amount of information from remote sensor devices, while simpler modems to access older, narrow-bandwidth technologies are slowly disappearing from the market.

While mobile network technologies evolve, focusing on the requirements of the mobile phone market, embedded device architects are in search of new technologies that better match the needs of distributed IoT systems. New technologies better meet the embedded market goals and evolution toward low-power, cost-effective, long-distance communication.

Low-Power Wide Area Networks (LPWANs)

LWPANs are a family of emerging technologies that fill the market gap for cost-effective, low-power, long-distance, narrow-band communication. As for LR-WPANs, different industrial alliances have been formed in an attempt to conquer the market, and in some cases, establish a standard protocol stack for universal LPWAN networks. This process has led to healthy competition on features, costs, and power-saving features.

LPWAN technologies are usually based on sub-GHz physical channels, but use different radio settings, allowing for an increased range. Devices can communicate with each other over the air, and, in some cases, use an infrastructure to increase coverage, even across thousands of kilometers, when in visibility of a base station.

The most noticeable emerging technologies in this field include the following:

- **LoRa/LoRaWAN:** Based on patented wireless radio access mechanisms and a fully proprietary protocol stack, this technology provides long-distance communication with a high bit rate compared to similar technologies. While it offers several interesting features, such as local node-to-node communication in the absence of infrastructure, the closed-protocol approach makes this approach less appealing for the embedded market, and less likely to keep its place in the LPWAN competition eventually in favor of more open standards.

- **Sigfox:** This ultra-narrow-band radio technology requires an infrastructure to operate, and offers a particularly low bit rate on very long ranges. Regulated infrastructure access allows a limited number of bytes to be transferred from or to a node every day, and the payload of the messages is fixed at 12 bytes. While the physical layer implementation is proprietary, the protocol stack is distributed in source code form. Radio regulations in some countries are still an open point, though, and may impact the development of this technology worldwide, despite its considerable success in the European market.
- **Weightless:** Another technology based on ultra-narrow-band, Weightless is a fully open standard for LPWAN operating in the sub-GHz range. Similar to Sigfox in terms of range and performance, it provides an improved security model as an alternative to the classic pre-shared keys deploying mechanisms, allowing for over-the-air security key negotiation mechanisms.
- **DASH7:** The youngest of the technologies described here is based on a fully open design. The source code for the entire lightweight protocol stack is provided by the DASH7 alliance, which allows for easier integration of the technology into embedded systems. This protocol stack is designed to provide flexibility while designing distributed systems, due to the multiple choices in defining the network topology.

LPWAN protocols are not directly compatible with IP and require one of the nodes on the network to generate TCP/IP traffic based on the long-range communication data acquired from the nodes. The sporadic, low-bit rate characteristics of the network traffic make these technologies operate in their own field, and require nodes capable of rerouting data from the nodes when the architecture of the distributed systems foresees accessing remote nodes on the internet.

Selecting the appropriate network interfaces

Depending on the use case, each embedded system may benefit from the communication facilities offered by the technologies described in this section. Due to the high specialization of some embedded devices, a design tailored to specific use cases may even go beyond this classification and use technologies that are designed for one specific use case. Wireless communication is impossible in some cases, due to emission regulations in some environments, and when the media is not capable of transporting radio waves reliably, such as underwater or through the human body.

Submarines may communicate via specific transceivers, using sound waves to represent the data. Other widespread technologies are available for wired communication as well. Power line communication allows existing wires to be reused to refit older devices and brings local network connectivity, extending Ethernet or serial interfaces buses using high-frequency modulation that does not impact the original purpose of the wires used.

As it turns out, embedded devices have a broad range of possibilities when it comes to connectivity. The optimal choice always depends on the specific use case and the resources available on the system to implement protocols and standards required to reach the other endpoints of the communication. When selecting a communication technology, there might be several aspects to take into account:

- The range of communication
- The bit rate required for data transfer
- The total cost of ownership (transceiver price, integration effort, and service costs)
- Media-specific limitations, such as any latency introduced by the transceiver
- The impact of RF interference on the hardware design requirements
- The maximum transfer unit
- Power consumption and energy footprint
- Protocols or standards supported for compatibility with third-party systems
- Compliance with Internet protocols for integration in IoT systems
- Topology flexibility, dynamic routing, and mesh network feasibility
- The security model
- The resources required to implement drivers and protocols for a specific technology
- The use of open standards to avoid lock-in for long-lived projects

Each and every technology for connected devices offers a different take on how these aspects are addressed in its intrinsic design, also depending on whether the technology has been borrowed from a different context, such as Ethernet or GSM/LTE, or has been designed with low-power embedded systems in mind, as in LR-WPAN and LWPAN protocols.

Selecting the appropriate communication channels when designing distributed systems is an operation that requires strict collaboration between hardware and software design. Creating connected devices involves one more level of complexity, especially in the low-power domain.

The next section focuses on how the implementation of Internet protocols can be adapted to scale down to embedded devices to produce network endpoints that operate within standards and are rich in features. TCP/IP stack implementation can be extended and configured to meet the requirements of an IoT-distributed system. Cases in which non-IP protocols are translated by a border gateway to integrate non-standard communication in IoT systems (edge gateways) are not covered here, as they often involve larger dedicated systems with multiple network interfaces.

As we have observed, the embedded industry is specialized enough to operate at the edge of the standards, but a new research trend is bringing TCP/IP communication back to its original position as the established standard for network communication, due to the increasing influence of the existing

IT infrastructure in distributed systems, including small, low-power, cost-effective embedded systems. This has also recently extended in the market to standard security functionality, increasing the presence of secure end-to-end communication protocols such as TLS and DTLS on embedded systems.

The Internet protocols

Standardized at the beginning of the 1980s, the IP stack, mostly referred to nowadays as TCP/IP, is a family of network, transport, and application protocols providing standard communication over a wide range of technologies and interfaces. In the upcoming subsections, we will discuss the integration of these standard protocols into embedded systems, describe the interfaces that embedded applications use to communicate with remote endpoints, and learn how to interact with the different layers of the stack, from the network interfaces up to the socket abstraction to establish connections or connectionless sessions with a remote peer.

Standard protocols, custom implementations

Designing distributed communication using non-standard protocol stacks is, in almost all cases, not worth the effort required to reinvent state-of-the-art technology. TCP/IP standards have been the subject of extensive research for many decades, and have been the main building block for the internet as we know it today, integrating billions of heterogeneous devices. Equipping an embedded system with TCP/IP capabilities is no longer a pioneering task, as several open source implementations exist, and they can easily be integrated into small embedded systems, as long as they can access physical communication channels providing data transfer capabilities between two or more endpoints.

Sockets are the standard way to access transport-layer communication from network applications. The Berkeley socket model, later standardized by POSIX, includes a naming standard for functions and components and the behavior in a UNIX operating system. If the TCP/IP stack is integrated with the operating system, the scheduler can provide a mechanism to suspend the caller while waiting for a specific input, and the socket call API can be implemented to match POSIX specifications. In a bare-metal event-based application, however, synchronization with the sockets is done using callbacks, in order to follow the event-based model of the main loop. For this reason, writing applications that interact with network protocols is slightly different in terms of the APIs and paradigms. In a non-blocking network application within a single thread, no operation should keep the CPU busy while waiting for events, except the main loop function itself. Socket function calls make no exception, requiring a mechanism to initiate an operation, register a callback function to handle the end of it, and then immediately return to the main loop.

The TCP/IP stack

A modern TCP/IP stack is perhaps the most fundamental part of a distributed embedded system. The reliability of the communications depends on how accurately the standard protocols are implemented,

and the security of the services running on the device may be compromised by defects hidden in the TCP/IP stack implementation, its interface drivers, and the glue code to provide socket abstractions.

The most popular open source TCP/IP library for embedded devices is the **lightweight IP** stack, best known as **lwIP**. Integrated with many real-time OSes and even distributed in a bundle by hardware manufacturers, lwIP provides the IPv4 and IPv6 network, UDP and TCP socket communication, DNS and DHCP client, and a rich bundle of application-layer protocols that can be integrated into an embedded system using just a few tens of KBs of memory. Despite being tailored for small microcontrollers, the resources required by a fully featured stack, such as lwIP, are out of range for some smaller devices, including most sensor processing targets with ultra-low power characteristics.

Micro IP, mostly referred to as **uIP**, is a minimalistic TCP/IP implementation based on the unusual but brilliant intuition of processing one single buffer at a time. Not having to allocate multiple buffers in memory keeps the amount of RAM needed for TCP/IP communication as limited as possible, and reduces the complexity of the implementation of TCP and other protocols, and, as a result of this, the code size of the entire stack. uIP is not designed to scale up to a higher bit rate or for implementing advanced features, but it is sometimes the best compromise to connect nodes with very limited resources, mostly to LR-WPAN networks.

picoTCP is a free software TCP/IP stack with a more recent history. It shares similar resource footprints and features lists with lwIP, but has a different modular design and a stronger focus on IoT protocols, providing dynamic routing, IP filtering, and NAT capabilities. With native support for 6LoWPAN over 802.15.4 devices, picoTCP can be used to build mesh networks, using either the mesh-under capabilities in 6LoWPAN, or a more classic route-over approach, using dynamic routing protocols, such as OLSR and AODV, provided in the modules.

Other implementations exist for both open source and proprietary TCP/IP stacks, which can be integrated into both bare-metal applications and embedded operating systems, often providing similar APIs for integrating interface drivers and interacting with the system to provide socket communication to higher-level applications. An embedded TCP/IP stack is connected to network devices through a device driver, providing a function to send frames to the network, and capable of delivering the received packets using an entry point function, which the TCP/IP stack uses to take the packet in charge. The packets that are currently being handled by the TCP/IP stack may require asynchronous operations, so the application, or the OS, must ensure that the stack loop function is called periodically so that it can process the packets in the buffers. Finally, a socket interface is provided by the transport layer for the application to create and use the socket to communicate with remote endpoints.

Network device drivers

In order to integrate a driver for a network interface, the TCP/IP stack exposes an interface to its lowest layers, sending and receiving buffers containing frames or packets. If the device supports the link-layer Ethernet address, TCP/IP stacks must connect an additional component to deal with Ethernet frames, and activate the neighbor discovery protocols to find the MAC address of the receiving device before initiating any IP communication.

lwIP provides a `netif` structure, describing a network interface, which must be allocated by the driver code, but is then initialized automatically by the stack using the `netif_add` function:

```
struct *netif netif_add(struct netif *mynetif,
    struct ip_addr *ipaddr,
    struct ip_addr *netmask,
    struct ip_addr *gw, void *state,
    err_t (* init)(struct netif *netif),
    err_t (* input)(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif));
```

The `ipaddr`, `netmask`, and `gw` arguments can be used to set an initial IPv4 configuration for the link created through this interface. lwIP supports one IPv4 address and three IPv6 addresses per interface, but all of them can be reconfigured at a later stage by accessing the relative fields in the `netif` structure. The IP address can be configured either using a static IP address or a mechanism to automatically assign it, such as DHCP negotiation, or deriving it from link-local addresses.

The `state` variable is a user-defined pointer that can create an association between the net device and a private field that can be accessed using the `netif->state` pointer in the driver code.

The function pointer provided as the `init` argument is called during the initialization of the stack, with the same `netif` pointer, and it must be used by the driver to initialize the remaining fields for the `netif` device.

The function pointer provided through the `input` argument describes the internal action that the stack has to perform when it receives a packet from the network. If the device communicates using Ethernet frames, the `ethernet_input` function should be supplied to indicate that additional processing for the Ethernet frame would be required before parsing the frame content and that the network supports neighbor discovery protocols to associate IP addresses to MAC addresses before transmitting the data. If the driver is handling naked IP packets instead, the receiving function to associate is `ip_input`.

The device driver initialization is finalized in the `init` function, which must also assign a value to other important fields in the `netif` structure:

- `hw_addr`: Containing the MAC address for the Ethernet device, if supported.
- `mtu`: The maximum transfer unit size allowed by this interface.
- `name/num`: For device identification on the system.
- `output`: This function pointer is called by the stack to append a custom link header to the IP packet ready for transmission. For Ethernet devices, this should point to `etharp_output` to trigger neighbor discovery mechanisms.
- `link_output`: This function pointer is called by the stack when a buffer is ready to be transmitted.

After the link has been marked as up by calling `netif_up`, the device driver can call the input function upon the reception of new packets, and the stack itself will call the `output/link_output` functions to interact with the driver.

picoTCP exports a similar interface to implement device drivers, but it supports multiple addresses per interface, so the IP configuration is separate from the device drivers. Each device has a list of associated IPv4 and IPv6 links, each with its own IP configuration, to implement multi-homed services. A device driver structure in picoTCP must begin with a physical entry of the `pico_device` structure as its first field. This way, both structures point to the same address and the device can maintain its own private fields at the end of the `pico_device` structure. To initialize the device, the structure is allocated in the driver, and `pico_device_init` is called:

```
int pico_device_init(struct pico_device *dev, const char *name,
                    const uint8_t *mac);
```

The three arguments required are the pre-allocated device structure, a name used for identification within the system, and the Ethernet MAC address, if present. If the MAC is null, the stack bypasses the Ethernet protocol, and all the traffic handled by the driver is naked IP packets with no link-layer extensions. The driver must implement the `send` function that is used by the stack to deliver the frames or packets to be transmitted by the interface, and input is managed through the `pico_stack_recv` function:

```
int32_t pico_stack_recv(struct pico_device *dev, uint8_t
                        *buffer, uint32_t len);
```

The device is passed again as an argument so that the stack automatically recognizes whether the interface is receiving an Ethernet frame or a raw IP packet with no headers, and reacts accordingly. IP addresses can be configured using `pico_ipv4_link_add` and `pico_ipv6_link_add`, and the routing table is accessed through its API to add gateways and static routes to specific networks.

Running the TCP/IP stack

To integrate a network stack, the system must generally provide a few commodities, such as timekeeping and heap-memory management. All the system features required by the stack are associated at compile time using a system-specific configuration header, which associates functions and global values accordingly.

Depending on the characteristics of the physical channels and the throughput to achieve, a TCP/IP stack may become very demanding in terms of heap memory used, allocating space for new incoming buffers until the upper layers can process them. Assigning separate memory pools to TCP/IP stack operations might help in some designs to keep the memory usage of the stack under control by placing thresholds and hard limits without impacting the functionality of the other components on the system.

Most libraries implement their own internal timers using a monotonic counter, provided by the system and increased independently by another component in the system. The time tracking value can be increased using the `SysTick` interrupt, providing an acceptable accuracy at which the stack can organize timed operations for the protocols. For lwIP, it is sufficient to export a global variable called `lwip_sys_now`, which contains the time elapsed from booting, expressed in milliseconds. picoTCP needs to export a macro or an inline function called `PICO_TIME_MS` returning the same value. Both stacks expect that the main loop of the application provides recurring entry points, by calling a function in the core API, required to manage the internal states of the system protocols.

To check whether any of the pending timers have expired, the system calls `sys_check_timeouts` in lwIP, or `pico_stack_tick` in picoTCP, from the main event loop or a dedicated thread when running within an OS. The interval between consecutive calls may impact timer accuracy, and, in general, should not be longer than a few milliseconds to ensure that the network stack is responsive to timed events.

Network interfaces must also be polled for input from the network, either continuously or through an appropriate interrupt handling implemented in the system. When new data is available, the device drivers allocate new buffers and initiate the processing by calling the input functions of the data link or the network layer.

A typical bare-metal application using lwIP begins by performing all the initialization steps for the stack and the device driver. The structure for the network interface is allocated in the main function stack and initialized with a static IPv4 configuration. The following code assumes that the device driver exports a function called `driver_netdev_create`, which populates the interface-specific fields and callbacks:

```
void main(void)
{
    struct netif netif;
    struct ip_addr ipaddr, gateway, netmask;
    IP4_ADDR(&ipaddr, 192,168,0,2);
    IP4_ADDR(&gw, 192,168,0,1);
    IP4_ADDR(&netmask, 255,255,255,0);

    lwip_init();
    netif_add(&netif, &ipaddr, &netmask, &gw, NULL,
    driver_netdev_create, ethernet_input);
    netif_set_default(&netif);
```

The network interface is then activated in the TCP/IP stack:

```
netif_set_up(&netif);
```

Before entering the main loop, the application initializes the communication by creating and configuring the sockets, and associating the callbacks:

```
application_init_sockets();
```

The main loop relies on the driver to export a function called `driver_netdev_poll` in this case, which is the function where the driver calls `ethernet_input` whenever a new frame is received. Finally, `sys_check_timeouts` is called so that lwIP can keep track of the pending timers:

```
while (1) {
    /* poll netif, pass packet to lwIP */
    driver_netdev_poll(&netif);
    sys_check_timeouts();
    WFI();
}
}
```

A similar procedure is expected from bare-metal applications running picoTCP. The initialization of the device driver is independent of the stack, and the driver is expected to call `pico_device_init` on a `pico_device` struct contained in the custom `driver_device` type as the mandatory first member. The only function exported by the driver is `driver_netdev_create`, which also associates its specific network-polling function pointer, which will be called by `pico_stack_tick`. The stack expects a callback to `pico_stack_recv` whenever the poll function of the driver has new incoming packets to process:

```
void main(void)
{
    struct driver_device dev;
    struct ip4_addr, netmask, gw, zero, any;
    pico_string_to_ipv4("192.168.0.2", &ipaddr.addr);
    pico_string_to_ipv4("255.255.255.0", &netmask.addr);
    pico_string_to_ipv4("192.168.0.1", &gw.addr);
    any.addr = 0;

    pico_stack_init();
    driver_netdev_create(&dev);
}
```

The IPv4 address configuration is performed by accessing the API of the IPv4 module. Applications may associate one or more IP address configurations by calling `pico_ipv4_link_add` and

specifying the address and netmask. A route in the IP protocol is created automatically to reach all the neighbors in the subnet through the interface:

```
pico_ipv4_link_add(&dev, ipaddr, netmask);
```

To add a default route, the gateway is associated with the 0.0.0.0 address (indicating any host) with a metric of 1. The default gateway can be later overridden by defining more specific routes for other subnetworks:

```
pico_ipv4_route_add(any, any, gw, 1, NULL);
```

As in the previous example, the application can now initialize its sockets and associate callbacks that will be called by the stack when needed:

```
application_init_sockets();
```

This simple main loop calls `pico_stack_tick` repeatedly, which will poll all the associated network interfaces in a round-robin, and perform all the pending actions in all protocol modules:

```
while (1)
    pico_stack_tick();
    WFI();
}
```

All the TCP/IP actions are associated with socket callbacks, which are called whenever the application is expected to react to network and timeout events, and timeouts are set up automatically by the stack when required to manage the internal states of the single protocols. The interface that is provided to access the socket communication in the absence of an operating system, as previously mentioned, is based on custom callbacks, depending on the implementation of the specific stack. The next section shows how to use non-blocking socket APIs in two different TCP/IP stack implementations.

Socket communication

The interface provided by lwIP for bare-metal socket communication, also called the raw socket API, consists of custom calls, each specifying a callback whenever an event is expected from the stack. When a specific event occurs, lwIP will call the callback from the main loop function.

The description of a TCP socket in lwIP is contained in a TCP-specific protocol control block structure, `tcp_pcb`. To allocate a new control block for the listening TCP socket, the following function is used:

```
struct tcp_pcb *tcp_new(void);
```

To accept a TCP connection, a bare-metal lwIP TCP server would first call this:

```
err_t tcp_bind(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, ip_addr_t *ipaddr,
               u16_t port);

err_t tcp_listen(struct tcp_pcb *pcb);
```

These non-blocking functions bind the socket to a local address and put it into a listening state.

At this point, a POSIX application using blocking sockets would call the `accept` function, which would wait indefinitely for the next incoming connection on the socket. A lwIP bare-metal application instead calls the following:

```
void tcp_accept(struct tcp_pcb *pcb,
    err_t (* accept)(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *newpcb,
    err_t err)
);
```

This simply indicates that the server is ready to accept new connections, and wants to be called back to the address of the `accept` function that has been passed as a parameter when a new incoming connection is established.

Using the same mechanism, to receive the next data segment, the application calls the following:

[illegible]

This indicates to the TCP/IP stack that the application is ready to receive the next segment over the TCP connection, and the operation can be performed when a new buffer is available because the stack calls the actual `recv` function that has been specified as the argument when `tcp_recv` has been called.

Similarly, picoTCP associates one callback with each socket object. The callback is a common point to react to any socket-related events, such as a new incoming TCP connection, new data to be read on the socket buffer, or the end of the previous write operation.

The callback is specified when the socket is created:

```
struct pico_socket *pico_socket_open(uint16_t net,
    uint16_t proto,
void (*wakeup)(uint16_t ev,
    struct pico_socket *s));
```

The preceding function creates a new socket object for use in the specified network and transport protocol context, the `net` and `proto` arguments respectively, and reacts to all socket events by calling the `wakeup` function that is provided by the application. Using this mechanism, picoTCP successfully detects half-closed socket connections and other events that are not specifically related to the current operation in progress but may occur due to a state change in the socket communication model.

A TCP socket server can be configured on the newly created socket using these functions:

```
int pico_socket_bind(struct pico_socket *s,
    void *local_addr,
    uint16_t *port);

int pico_socket_listen(struct pico_socket *s, int backlog);
```

At this point, the application has to wait for the incoming connections without calling `accept`. An event is generated, which calls the `wakeup` function, whenever a new incoming connection is established, and the application can finally call `accept` to generate the new socket object, corresponding to the incoming connection:

```
struct pico_socket *pico_socket_accept(
    struct pico_socket *s,
    void *orig,
    uint16_t *local_port);
```

The first argument passed to the picoTCP `wakeup` callback is a bitmask indicating the event types that occurred on the socket. Events may be as follows:

- `EV_RD`: Indicating that there is data to read on the incoming data buffer.
- `EV_CONN`: Indicating that a new connection has been established, after calling `connect`, or while waiting in a listening state, before calling `accept`.
- `EV_CLOSE`: Triggered when the other side of the connection sends a FIN TCP segment, indicating that it has finished its transmission. The socket is in the `CLOSE_WAIT` state, meaning that the application may still send data before terminating the connection.
- `EV_FIN`: Indicating that the socket has been closed, and it is not usable anymore after returning from the callback.
- `EV_ERR`: An error occurred.

The callback interface provided by the TCP/IP stacks may be a little obscure to use at the beginning, but it is a very efficient way to achieve higher throughput when correctly implemented in the application.

Both the TCP/IP stacks we have analyzed are capable of providing more standardized APIs in combination with an operating system, by running the TCP/IP library main loop in a separate thread and providing access to the sockets using system calls.

Socket communication is only one of the APIs exposed by the TCP/IP stacks. Other protocols implemented by the stack provide their own function signatures; these are described in both libraries' manuals.

Connectionless protocols

TCP is a widely used transport protocol, wherever the connection-oriented paradigm makes sense for the application. Its connectionless counterpart, UDP, is mostly used to solve a different range of problems, but it can, in some cases, cover all the needs of a small, resource-limited embedded system. TCP implementations are, in fact, large and, on some platforms, they take up a considerable portion of the available flash space. This is due to the complex internal mechanisms of TCP, which result in a lot of code to include to manage retransmissions, timeouts, and acknowledgments; organize buffers; and keep track of multiple state machines for each socket.

UDP, on the other hand, is quite simple and applies few transformations to the data from the socket interface to the network and vice-versa. Typically, UDP implementations are much smaller in size and due to the lack of reliability requirements, do not need to keep track of the order and gaps in the data already transmitted or received, impacting the runtime RAM usage as well. When the network characteristics permit it, using UDP for low-traffic redundant data transmission is often a viable option.

Mesh networks and dynamic routing

As previously mentioned, a link-layer protocol may be able to implement mesh-under mechanisms, which hide the complexity of the topology for the upper layers. A different approach is applied when the link-layer protocol does not implement this feature, or whenever the mesh solution may be extended across different network interfaces, and thus must implement a standard protocol that is interface-agnostic. Each link connects two devices in direct visibility, which, in turn, coordinates to detect the optimal network path to reach a remote node, based on the detected topology. Intermediate nodes along the path are configured to route the traffic toward the destination, based on the information available on the current topology:




Figure 9.1 – Example of a mesh network topology (node A chooses node C to route packets towards I, after detecting the optimal four-hop route)

In some scenarios, the topology is not fixed but evolves when nodes in the path become unavailable or change their location, altering their direct visibility with adjacent nodes. Mesh networks with non-static topology are referred to as **Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs)**. Dynamic routing mechanisms designed for MANETs must be able to react to topology changes and update their routes accordingly, as the network is in continuous evolution.

Route-over mesh mechanisms are implemented within the TCP/IP stack because they must be able to reconfigure the IP routing table at runtime, and access socket communication. Mesh networks based on dynamic IP routing rely on different protocols, which can be divided into two categories:

- **Proactive dynamic-routing protocols:** Each network node sends a broadcast message to announce its presence on the network, and other nodes can detect a neighbor's presence by reading the messages, and communicating the neighbor list to the neighbors. The mesh network is ready to use at all times and requires a fixed reconfiguration time on topology changes.
- **Reactive dynamic-routing protocols:** Nodes can be idling when there is no data to exchange, and then the path is configured by querying every neighbor, asking for a route to the destination. The message is then repeated, increasing a counter to keep track of the hops, until it reaches the destination, at which point, using the reply, the network can define the path requested by the sender. These mechanisms imply that dynamic routes are formed on demand, so the first messages of the communication can suffer an additional delay; on the other hand, it requires less power and may react faster to topology changes.

The most widely used protocols in the former group are the following:

- **Optimized Link-State Routing (OLSR)**, standardized by IETF in RFC3626 and RFC7181
- **Better Approach to Mobile Ad Hoc Networking (B.A.T.M.A.N.)**
- Babel (IETF RFC6126)
- **Destination Sequence Distance Vector (DSDV)**

The reactive, on-demand routing protocols standardized by IETF are the following:

- **Ad-hoc, On-demand, Distance Vector (AODV)**, RFC3561
- Dynamic Source Routing (RFC4728)

The choice of a routing protocol depends, once again, on the requirements of the mesh network that needs to be built. Reactive, on-demand protocols are the best fit in networks with sporadic data and battery-powered nodes, where a longer reaction time from the routing protocol is acceptable. Always-on, embedded systems may benefit from proactive routing mechanisms instead, which ensure that the routing tables are always updated to the last known state of the network, and each node knows the best route toward each possible destination at all times, but, at the same time, requires regular updates to travel across the network in the form of broadcast packets, constantly refreshing the status of the network nodes and their neighbors.

picoTCP, which has been designed to provide advanced routing technologies for IoT devices, supports one mesh-under mechanism, in the 6LoWPAN link layer, and two route-over protocols, namely OLSR (reactive) and AODV (proactive), giving broader choices for integrating TCP/IP communication into mobile, ad hoc networks. To enable OLSR, for example, it is sufficient to compile the stack with support for OLSR, and the OLSR daemon service will automatically be enabled and run within the main TCP/IP stack loop. All the devices that must participate in the definition of the mesh network must be added by calling `pico_olsr_add`:

```
pico_olsr_add(struct pico_device *dev);
```

AODV networking can be enabled similarly, and the interfaces are added using the `pico_aodv_add` function:

```
pico_aodv_add(struct pico_devices *dev);
```

In both cases, the services will run transparently for the user and alter the routing table every time a new node is detected on the network in the case of OLSR, or every time that we request communication to a remote node and an on-demand route is created to reach it. Nodes that are not in direct visibility specify a first-hop gateway that guarantees that the destination node can be reached, using the routing metric as an indication of the number of hops so that when a new, shorter destination is found, the

route is replaced and the communication can continue, ideally with no disruptions caused by the route being replaced.

Routing protocols, such as OLSR, can consider other parameters rather than the number of hops when calculating the best path to a given destination in the mesh network. It is possible, for instance, to integrate information about the wireless link quality, such as the signal-to-noise ratio or the indication of the received signal strength, when calculating the best path. This allows us to select routes based on multiple parameters, and always select the best option available in terms of a wireless signal.

Route-over mesh network strategies do not foresee mechanisms to forward broadcast packets, which must be repeated by the link-layer protocol in order to reach all the nodes in the network. However, it is known that implementing such a mechanism can easily trigger a ping-pong effect where a single packet is bounced across two or more nodes, so broadcast-forwarding mechanisms implemented in the link layer must avoid retransmitting the same frame twice by keeping track of the last few frames forwarded this way.

For IoT systems in the real world, communication requires implementing security for data in transfer. This includes, but is not limited to, encryption to guarantee the confidentiality of the data transmitted.

Implementing standard security protocols guarantees interoperability between heterogeneous components in the network (for example, between the device and a remote server), in an end-to-end fashion and relying on software solutions that are perfectly compatible with the protocols used in the classic IT world. The next section approaches transport layer security and proposes.

TLS

Link-layer protocols often provide some basic security mechanisms to guarantee the authentication of the client connecting to a specific network and encrypt data by using symmetric keys such as AES. In most cases, authentication at the link layer is sufficient to guarantee a basic level of security. Nevertheless, pre-shared, well-known keys often used in LR-WPAN network stacks may be vulnerable to multiple kinds of attacks, and using a pre-shared key would allow an attacker to decipher any traffic that has been previously captured on the same link if the key was compromised. In other scenarios, encryption alone is not sufficient to guarantee that the other endpoint is what it claims to be, or that the data flow has not been altered during transmission.

A device that takes part in an IoT-distributed system is required to implement a higher grade of security, especially in embedded devices that do not protect the memory in any way and where any backdoor means that attackers can take control of the device, and retrieve all the sensitive information, such as private keys used for authentication and encryption in the communication with remote systems. TLS is a set of cryptography protocols aimed to provide secure communication over standard TCP/IP sockets. The responsibilities of this component are mostly focused on three key requirements for secure communication in distributed systems:

- The **confidentiality** of communication between the parts involved through the use of symmetric cryptography. TLS defines cryptographic techniques aimed to generate one-time symmetric keys, which lose their validity at the end of the session they were generated for.
- The **authentication** of the parts involved in the communication, using public-key cryptography to sign and verify a challenge payload. Due to the properties of asymmetric keys, only the part that owns the secret private key is able to sign a payload, while anyone can verify the authenticity of the signature by checking the signature with the public key counterpart of the key that signed the message.
- The **integrity** of the communication, using message digests, which verify that the message has not been modified along its path.

A few open source implementations of the required protocol suite to enable standard cryptography algorithms and strategies for secure socket communications are available for the embedded market.

Note

Closed-source, proprietary implementations for security components should be avoided in this context as much as possible because security issues are much harder to track down in a closed system, and the source of the implementation has to be blindly trusted in terms of vulnerability management.

One of the most complete and up-to-date implementations is provided by the free and open source software library, **wolfSSL**. The library offers the latest standard version of both TLS and DTLS and is designed for performance and reliability on small embedded systems, including support for hardware accelerators and random number generators for many embedded platforms designed for system security.

wolfSSL implements the cryptographic primitives in its core library (`wolfCrypt`) and groups them in cipher suites used by TLS sockets that can be easily integrated into both, bare-metal network applications and any embedded operating system that provides a transport socket communication API. These cryptography primitives are optimized for embedded devices, and use assembly code for the most performance-critical operations for the best performance.

The main advantage of a TLS/SSL library designed for microcontrollers is that it implements the same protocols as any PC or server on the internet, but with a fraction of the code size, and keeps the resources usage, such as memory usage during the most expensive cryptographic operations, under control at all times.

The adoption of a TLS library with support for bleeding-edge cryptography algorithms allows perfect integration with the security measures implemented in the classic IT infrastructure components of the IoT network. On the cloud side, services meant to be accessed by remote embedded systems should allow the selection of more efficient cipher suites based on elliptic curves, as the classic RSA-based public key encryption requires larger keys and complex calculations to reach the same level of security. New standards for public-key-based encryption, such as Curve25519, are included in the TLS 1.3

specifications to provide more efficient key handling for systems with fewer resources while keeping the same security level of older algorithms. Selecting the right set of cryptographic algorithms for TLS communication among heterogeneous systems must take into account the computation times of the operations performed on the target, such as encryption, session key generation, payload signing, and verification.

Securing socket communication

wolfSSL has built-in support for many embedded operating systems, to adapt to the specific memory configurations and socket interfaces provided by different paradigms, and can also be integrated into a bare-metal system with any compatible TCP/IP stack, or easily adapted thanks to a generic, callback-based **Input/Output (I/O)** interface.

In either case, bare-metal or OS, the application must be designed to access the **Secure Socket Layer (SSL)** to communicate with the remote system, while the library is responsible for providing the abstraction for the secure communication channel through the transport layer. To integrate TLS sessions on top of an existing bare-metal TCP/IP implementation, wolfSSL can be configured to work in non-blocking mode, polling the system for new packets received on the socket, which must be processed by the TLS layer. The application initiates a TCP connection as usual, either by connecting to a remote socket in the client mode or by accepting new connections from a local listening socket. After the connection is established, wolfSSL assigns a context to it when the application calls `wolfSSL_accept` or `wolfSSL_connect`, in server mode or in client mode, respectively, to initiate the TLS handshake with the remote system. Data communication is then available using the `wolfSSL_read` and `wolfSSL_write` functions, instead of the normal socket read/write functions exported by the TCP/IP stack so that the stream can be processed by the additional SSL built by the TLS library on top.

The following usage example refers to using wolfSSL to create a TLS socket on top of a TCP connection. The approach for creating a DTLS socket, the TLS equivalent for connectionless socket, on top of UDP is quite similar, and still uses the same connect/accept paradigm as TLS, despite UDP being usually utilized in a peer-to-peer fashion that does not expose a net distinction between the client and the server side as well as TCP does. More information about creating DTLS connectionless secure sockets can be found in the wolfSSL user manual (<https://www.wolfssl.com/documentation/manuals/wolfssl/index.html>).

In our simple usage example, the library is first initialized before accessing any API, using `wolfSSL_Init`. This is the only requirement to initialize and create new objects that are commonly called contexts. A single context implements one specific method (the TLS v. 1.2 server in this example) and will be associated with one or more existing sockets through a different abstraction called **SSL**, which, in the case of the wolfSSL implementation, is represented by a variable of type `WOLFSSL`. Multiple SSL objects generated from the same context share the same set of cryptography keys and I/O callback functions that wolfSSL can use to query the system for incoming data, or transmit the processed data through the socket connection:

```

wolfSSL_Init();
wolfSSL_CTX *ctx;
ctx = wolfSSL_CTX_new(wolfTLSv1_2_server_method());
wolfSSL_SetIORecv(ctx, wolfssl_recv_cb);
wolfSSL_SetIOSend(ctx, wolfssl_send_cb);

```

The two callbacks are implemented in the system to access socket communication in the TCP/IP stack, by using the system-specific TCP socket API. Suppose, for example, that a custom TCP implementation exports read and write functions as `tcp_socket_write` and `tcp_socket_read` in a bare-metal context, and these functions return 0 when no action is taken because the TCP/IP stack is busy or not ready to process the buffers. The `wolfssl_send_cb` callback can be implemented to return the size of the processed data in case of success, or the `WOLFSSL_CBIO_ERR_WANT_WRITE` special value, which indicate that the I/O operation could not be completed without blocking:

```

int wolfssl_send_cb(WOLFSSL* ssl, char *buf, int sz, void *sk_
ctx)
{
    tcp_ip_socket *sk = (tcp_ip_socket *)sk_ctx;
    int ret = tcp_socket_write(sk, buf, sz);
    if (ret > 0)
        return ret;
    else
        return WOLFSSL_CBIO_ERR_WANT_WRITE;
}

```

And the corresponding read callback will use the corresponding `WOLFSSL_CBIO_ERR_WANT_READ` special value to indicate that no data is available to process from the stack:

```

int wolfssl_recv_cb(WOLFSSL *ssl, char *buf, int sz, void *sk_
ctx)
{
    tcp_ip_socket *sk = (tcp_ip_socket *)sk_ctx;
    int ret = tcp_socket_read(sk, buf, sz);
    if (ret > 0)
        return ret;
    else
        return WOLFSSL_CBIO_ERR_WANT_READ;
}

```

For most commonly used operating systems and TCP/IP stack APIs, wolfSSL already provides default I/O callbacks, so implementing custom callback functions is not required as long as you activate the correct configuration options.

The `wolfSSL_CTX` object, associated with SSL objects for every connection, must be equipped with a set of certificates and keys prior to initiating any communication. In a more complex system, certificates and keys are stored in the filesystem and can be accessed when wolfSSL has been integrated to use file operations. In embedded systems where filesystems are often not supported, certificates and keys can be stored in memory instead, and loaded into the context using pointers to their locations in memory:

```
wolfSSL_CTX_use_certificate_buffer(ctx, certificate, len, SSL_
FILETYPE_ASN1);
wolfSSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_buffer(ctx, key, len, SSL_FILETYPE_
ASN1 );
```

The socket context that is passed to the callbacks is set after the underlying TCP connection is established. For a server, this can be done contextually to the `accept` function, while a client can associate the socket to the specific SSL context after the `connect` function has returned successfully. Accepting an SSL connection on the server side requires the application to call `wolfSSL_accept` so that the SSL handshake can be finalized before any actual data transfers. The SSL accept procedure should follow the socket `accept` call, after the pointer to the TCP/IP socket object is associated as the context in the SSL object, and will be used as the `sk_ctx` argument for the callbacks related to this socket:

```
tcp_ip_socket new_sk = accept(listen_sk, origin);
WOLFSSL ssl = wolfSSL_new(ctx);

if (new_sk) {
    wolfSSL_SetIOReadCtx(ssl, new_sk);
    wolfSSL_SetIOWriteCtx(ssl, new_sk);
}
```

`wolfSSL_accept` is called after setting the socket context, because the `accept` mechanism may already need to call the underlying stack to progress through its states:

```
int ret = wolfSSL_accept(ssl);
```

If the SSL handshake is successful, `wolfSSL_accept` returns the `WOLFSSL_SUCCESS` special value, so the secure socket is now ready for communication through the `wolfSSL_read` and `wolfSSL_write` functions. When running in a bare-metal application, `wolfSSL_read` and `wolfSSL_write` must be used in non-blocking mode, by setting this flag at runtime on the SSL session object:

```
wolfSSL_set_using_nonblock(ssl, 1);
```

Using non-blocking I/O for wolfSSL functions ensures that the event-driven main loop model previously described for transport sockets can be kept because calling library functions never stalls the system. API functions in wolfSSL are designed to immediately return specific values (such as `WANT_WRITE` and `WANT_READ`) to indicate that the operation is in progress, and the associated function (for example, `wolfSSL_accept` in this case) should be called again later when new data from the underlying TCP socket is available.

Once the communication between transport endpoints is secured, it is possible to exchange data using secure socket communications. What follows is an overview of some of the most common application protocols used by IoT systems.

Application protocols

In order to be able to communicate with remote devices and cloud servers in a distributed scenario, embedded systems must implement standard protocols that are compatible with the existing infrastructure. Two of the most common approaches taken when designing remote services are as follows:

- Web-based services
- Message protocols

The former is mainly the classic, client-server, **Representational State Transfer (REST)**-based communication that is popular in web services accessed through personal computers or portable devices. Web services require no adaptation in particular on the cloud side to support embedded systems, except for the choice of an embedded-friendly cipher set, as described in the *Securing socket communication* section. However, the request-reply communication model introduces some restrictions on the design of distributed applications. The HTTP protocol can be upgraded by common agreement on the two HTTP endpoints, and support WebSocket, which is a protocol that provides the abstraction of a symmetric, bidirectional channel on top of the HTTP services.

Message protocols are a different approach that better reflects the functions of a sensor- or actuator-embedded system, where information is exchanged by using short binary messages, which can be relayed by intermediate agents and gathered or distributed from server nodes. Message protocols are the preferred choice when the network includes smaller nodes because of the simpler presentation of the data, as opposed to web services, which are mostly based on human-readable strings and add a much larger overhead to the transport size and memory footprint of the targets having to handle the ASCII strings.

In both cases, TLS should be supported at the infrastructure- and device-level, for end-to-end encryption and reliable device identification. Plaintext authentication and pre-shared key encryption are obsolete techniques and thus should not be part of the security strategy of modern distributed systems.

Message protocols

Message-based communication protocols are not a novelty in computer networking software but have found a particularly good match with IoT-distributed systems, especially in scenarios where a one-to-many message-based model allows us to reach many devices at a time and establish bidirectional communication, or multiple devices from different locations can communicate with each other using an external server that acts as a communication broker. The lack of standardization in this area has led to several different models, each one with its own API and network protocol definition.

Some open standards in particular, however, have been designed to implement secure distributed messaging systems specifically tailored for a system with reduced resources and networks with limited bandwidth, by including specifications that are reasonably feasible to implement within a small code footprint. This is the case with the **Message-Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT)** protocol. Thanks to its publisher-subscriber model and the possibility to interconnect embedded devices at different physical locations over TCP/IP, MQTT has become widely used and is supported by several cloud architectures.

The protocol relies on TCP for establishing connections to a central broker, which dispatches messages from publishers to subscribers. Publishers push data for a certain topic, described by a URI, and subscribers can filter the topics they want to follow upon connection so that the broker selectively only forwards the messages matching the filters.

A few implementations for the client library exist for small, embedded devices too, although many of them lack support for security mechanisms. The protocol supports a plaintext password-authentication mechanism, which is not a valid security measure, and should never be used on top of clear TCP/IP communication because passwords can easily be intercepted along the path.

According to the standard, instead of the socket-based TCP communication through IANA-registered TCP port 1883, it is possible to establish an SSL session, which uses TCP port 8883 instead. A secure implementation that uses SSL sessions on top of TCP is provided by wolfSSL, in a separate GPL library called **wolfMQTT**. This library offers secure MQTT socket connections by default. It is capable of implementing both client and server authentication through certificates and public keys and provides symmetric-key encryption through the established session.

The REST architectural pattern

REST was a term introduced by Roy Fielding to describe the pattern used by web services to communicate with remote systems using a stateless protocol. In a REST-compliant system, resources are accessed in the form of HTTP requests targeting a specific URI, using the same protocol stack as web pages obtained through a request from a remote browser. In fact, REST requests are extended HTTP requests, representing all data as encoded strings, transported through TCP in a readable HTTP stream.

Adopting this pattern provides a number of architectural benefits on the server side, and allows us to build distributed systems with very high scalability. Although not very efficient and definitely not designed with embedded systems resources in mind, embedded systems can interact with remote web services exposed by a RESTful system by implementing a simple REST client.

Distributed systems – single points of failure

Designing distributed systems also means taking into account link defects, unreachable gateways, and other failures. Embedded devices should not stop working when disconnected from the internet, but rather offer fallback mechanisms based on local gateways. Consider, for example, a domestic IoT system for controlling all the heating and cooling units in a house, accessible from portable devices and coordinated remotely using any network access. Temperature sensors, heaters, and coolers are controlled using a mesh network of embedded devices while the central control is on remote cloud servers. The system can control the actuators remotely based on user settings and sensor readings. This gives us the possibility to access the service even from a remote location, allowing the user to tune the system to set the desired temperature in each room, based on the commands sent from user interfaces, which are processed and relayed by the cloud to reach their destination in the embedded devices. As long as all the components are connected to the internet, the IoT system works as expected.

Nevertheless, in the case of connection failure, users will not be able to control the system or activate any function. Terminating the application service on a local device within the local area network ensures the continuity of the services across failures of the link to the internet and any issues that would prevent the local network from accessing the remote cloud device. If this kind of mechanism is in place, a system disconnected from the internet would still provide a failover alternative to access sensors and actuators, assuming that all the actors at play are connected to a common LAN. Moreover, having a local system processing and relaying settings and commands reduces the latency of the actions requested because requests do not have to travel across the internet to be processed and forwarded back to the same network. Designing reliable IoT networks must include a careful assessment of the single points of failure among all the links and devices used to provide services, and this must include the backbone link used to reach services, message brokers, and remote devices that can cause malfunctions or other issues on the entire system.

Summary

This chapter has given us an overview of the design of machine-to-machine distributed systems and IoT services, including connected embedded devices, with a focus on security elements that are too often overlooked or underestimated in embedded development. The technology proposed allows full, professional-grade, secure, and fast TCP/IP connectivity on very small targets and uses state-of-the-art technology, such as the most recent version of the TLS cipher suites. Several approaches have been considered, both in terms of hardware and software technologies available for microcontroller-based targets, for a broader view of the technologies, protocols, and security algorithms available for building distributed embedded systems.

The next chapter will illustrate the multitasking possibilities of modern embedded microcontrollers by explaining how to write a small scheduler for Cortex-M microprocessors from scratch, and will summarize the key roles of a real-time operating system running on an embedded target.

Part 4 – Multithreading

This part introduces parallel multithreaded applications through the development of a scheduler and an explanation of context change in an ARM CPU. In the last chapter, the TEE approach is explained, with examples of a system secured with TrustZone-M.

This part has the following chapters:

- *Chapter 10, Parallel Tasks and Scheduling*
- *Chapter 11, Trusted Execution Environment*

Parallel Tasks and Scheduling

When the complexity of the system increases and the software has to manage multiple peripherals and events at the same time, it is more convenient to rely on an operating system to coordinate and synchronize all the different operations. Separating the application logic into different threads offers a few important architectural advantages. Each component performs the designed operation within its running unit, and it may release the CPU while it is suspended, or waiting for input or a timeout event.

In this chapter, the mechanisms used to implement a multithreading embedded operating system will be covered. This will be done through the development of a minimalistic operating system tailored to the reference platform, and written step by step from scratch, providing a working scheduler to run multiple tasks in parallel.

The scheduler's internals are mostly implemented within system service calls, and its design impacts the system's performance and other features, such as different priority levels and time constraints for real-time-dependent tasks. Some of the possible scheduling policies, for different contexts, will be explained and implemented in the example code.

Running multiple threads in parallel implies that resources can be shared, and there is the possibility of concurrent access to the same memory. Most microprocessors designed to run multithreading systems provide primitive functions, accessible through specific assembly instructions, to implement locking mechanisms such as semaphores. Our example operating system exposes mutex and semaphore primitives that can be used by the threads to control access to shared resources.

By introducing memory protection mechanisms, it is possible to provide a separation of the resources based on their addresses and let the kernels supervise all the operations involving the hardware through a system call interface. Most real-time embedded operating systems prefer a flat model with no segmentation to keep the kernel code as small as possible, and with a minimal API to optimize the resources available for the applications. The example kernel will show us how to create a system call API to centralize the control of the resources, using physical memory segmentation to protect the resources of the kernel, the system control block, the mapped peripherals, and the other tasks, to increase the level of safety of the system.

This chapter is split into the following sections:

- Task management
- Scheduler implementation
- Synchronization
- System resource separation

By the end of this chapter, you will have learned how to build a multithreaded embedded environment.

Technical requirements

You can find the code files for this chapter on GitHub at <https://github.com/PacktPublishing/Embedded-Systems-Architecture-Second-Edition/tree/main/Chapter10>.

Task management

An operating system provides the abstraction of parallel running processes and threads by alternating the applications to run in parallel. In fact, on systems with a single CPU, there can only be one running thread at a time. While the running thread executes, all the others are waiting in line until the next task switch.

In a cooperative model, switching the task is always a voluntary action requested by the thread implementation. The opposite approach, known as **preemption**, requires that the kernel periodically interrupts tasks at any point of their execution, to temporarily save the status and resume the next task in line.

Switching the running task consists of storing the values of the CPU registers in RAM, and loading from memory those of the next task that has been selected for running. This operation is better known as **context switching** and is the core of the scheduling system.

The task block

Tasks are represented in the system in the form of a task block structure. This object contains all the information needed for the scheduler to keep track of the state of the task at all times and is dependent on the design of the scheduler. Tasks might be defined at compile time and started after the kernel boots, or spawned and terminated while the system is running.

Each task block may contain a pointer to the start function, which defines the beginning of the code that is executed when the task is spawned, and a set of optional arguments. Memory is assigned for each task to use as its private stack region. This way, the execution context of each thread and process is separated from all the others, and the values of the registers can be stored in a task-specific memory area when the task is interrupted. The task-specific stack pointer is stored in the task block structure, and it is used to store the values of the CPU register upon context switches.

Running with separate stacks requires that some memory is reserved in advance, and associated with each task. In the simplest case, all tasks using a stack of the same size are created before the scheduler starts and cannot be terminated. This way, the memory that has been reserved to be associated with private stacks can be contiguous and associated with each new task. The memory region used for the stack areas can be defined in the linker script.

The reference platform has a separate core-coupled memory, mapped at 0x10000000. Among the many ways to arrange the memory sections, we have decided to map the start of the stack space, used to associate stack areas with the threads, at the beginning of the CCRAM. The remaining CCRAM space is used as a stack for the kernel, which leaves all the SRAM, excluding the `.data` and `.bss` sections, for heap allocation. The pointers are exported by the linker script with the following PROVIDE instructions:

```
PROVIDE(_end_stack = ORIGIN(CCRAM) + LENGTH(CCRAM)) ;
PROVIDE(stack_space = ORIGIN(CCRAM)) ;
PROVIDE(_start_heap = _end) ;
```

In the kernel source, `stack_space` is declared as external, because it is exported by the linker script. We also declare the amount of space reserved for the execution stack of each task (expressed in four-byte words):

```
extern uint32_t stack_space;
#define STACK_SIZE (256)
```

Every time a new task is created, the next kilobyte in the stack space is assigned as its execution stack, and the initial stack pointer is set at the highest address in the area since the execution stack grows backward:




Figure 10.1 – Memory configuration used to provide separate execution stacks to tasks

A simple task block structure can then be declared, as follows:

```
#define TASK_WAITING 0
#define TASK_READY 1
#define TASK_RUNNING 2

#define TASK_NAME_MAXLEN 16;

struct task_block {
    char name[TASK_NAME_MAXLEN];
    int id;
    int state;
    void (*start)(void *arg);
    void *arg;
    uint32_t *sp;
};
```

A global array is defined to contain all the task blocks of the system. We must use a global index to keep track of the tasks already created so that we can use the position in memory relative to the task identifier and the ID of the currently running task:

```
#define MAX_TASKS 8
static struct task_block TASKS[MAX_TASKS];
static int n_tasks = 1;
static int running_task_id = 0;
#define kernel TASKS[0]
```

With this model, the task block is pre-allocated in the data section, and the fields are initialized in place, keeping track of the index. The first element of the array is reserved for the task block of the kernel, which is the currently running process.

In our example, tasks are created by invoking the `task_create` function and providing a name, an entry point, and its argument. For a static configuration with a predefined number of tasks, this is done when the kernel is initialized, but more advanced schedulers may allow us to allocate new control blocks to spawn new processes at runtime, while the scheduler is running:

```
struct task_block *task_create(char *name, void (*start)(void
*arg), void *arg)
{
    struct task_block *t;
```

```
int i;
if (n_tasks >= MAX_TASKS)
    return NULL;
t = &TASKS[n_tasks];
t->id = n_tasks++;
for (i = 0; i < TASK_NAME_MAXLEN; i++) {
    t->name[i] = name[i];
    if (name[i] == 0)
        break;
}
t->state = TASK_READY;
t->start = start;
t->arg = arg;
t->sp = ((&stack_space) + n_tasks * STACK_SIZE);
task_stack_init(t);
return t;
}
```

To implement the `task_stack_init` function, which initializes the values in the stack for the process to start running, we need to understand how the context switch works, and how new tasks are started when the scheduler is running.

Context switch

The context switch procedure consists of getting the values of the CPU register during the execution and saving them at the bottom of the stack of the currently running task. Then, we must restore the values for the next task to resume its execution. This operation must happen in the interrupt context, and its internal mechanisms are CPU-specific. On the reference platform, any interrupt handler can replace the currently running task and restore another context, but this operation is more often done within interrupt service routines associated with system events. Cortex-M provides two CPU exceptions that are designed to provide the basic support for context switching because they can be arbitrarily triggered in any context:

- **PendSV:** This is the default way for a preemptive kernel to force an interrupt in the immediate future, after setting one bit in a specific register within the system control block, and it is usually associated with the context switch of the next task.
- **SVCall:** This is the main entry point for the user application to submit a formal request to access a resource that is managed by the kernel. This feature is designed to provide an API to access the kernel safely to request operations from a component or a driver. As the result of

the operation may be not immediately available, SVCall can also permit preempting the calling task to provide the abstraction of blocking system calls.

The routines used to store and restore the values of the CPU registers to/from memory during the context switch are partially implemented in hardware on the Cortex-M CPU. This means that, when the interrupt is entered, a copy of part of the register is automatically pushed into the stack. The copy of the registers in the stack is called the **stack frame**, and contains registers **R0** to **R3**, **R12**, **LR**, **PC**, and **xPSR**, in the order shown in the following figure:




Figure 10.2 – Registers are automatically copied to the stack when entering an interrupt handler

The stack pointer, however, does not include the other half of the CPU registers – that is, R4 to R11. For this reason, to complete the context switch successfully, a system handler that intends to replace the running process must store the extra stack frame containing the value for these registers, and restore the extra stack frame of the next task just before returning from the handler. ARM Thumb-2 assembly provides instructions on how to push the value of contiguous CPU registers to the stack and pop them back in place. The following two functions are used to push and pop the extra stack frame in the stack:

```
static void __attribute__((naked)) store_context(void)
{
    asm volatile("mrs r0, msp");
    asm volatile("stmdb r0!, {r4-r11}");
    asm volatile("msr msp, r0");
    asm volatile("bx lr");
}

static void __attribute__((naked)) restore_context(void)
{
    asm volatile("mrs r0, msp");
    asm volatile("ldmfd r0!, {r4-r11}");
    asm volatile("msr msp, r0");
}
```

```
asm volatile("bx lr");
}
```

The `((naked))` attribute is used to prevent GCC from putting prologue and epilogue sequences, consisting of a few assembly instructions each, into the compiled code. The prologue would change the values of some of the registers in the extra stack frame area, which would be restored in the epilogue, and this conflicts with the purpose of the functions accessing register values using assembly instructions. Due to the missing epilogue, the naked functions return by jumping back to the calling instruction, which is stored in the LR register.

As a result of the assembly push operation, this is how the stack of the process being preempted looks:




Figure 10.3 – The remaining register values are copied to the stack to complete the context switch

Creating tasks

When the system is running, all the tasks except the one running are in a *wait* state, which means that the full stack frame is saved at the bottom of the stack, and the stack pointer is stored in the control block to be used by the scheduler to resume each process.

A newly created task will wake up for the first time in the middle of the context switch. At that point, the task is expected to have preserved the previous state of its CPU registers, but obviously, a new task does not have such a thing. Upon stack creation, a forged stack frame is pushed to the end of the stack so that when the task resumes, the values stored are copied into the system registers, and the task can resume from its entry point.

The `task_create` function relies on a stack initialization function, `task_stack_init`, which pushes the initial values for the system registers to allow the task to be restored and moves the stored stack pointer to the beginning of the extra frame, which can be left uninitialized. To easily access the stored register in the stack frame, we must declare a `stack_frame` structure that uses one field per register, and an `extra_frame` structure, just for completeness:

```
struct stack_frame {
    uint32_t r0, r1, r2, r3, r12, lr, pc, xpsr;
```

```

};

struct extra_frame {
    uint32_t r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, r10, r11;
};

static void task_stack_init(struct task_block *t)
{
    struct stack_frame *tf;
    t->sp -= sizeof(struct stack_frame);
    tf = (struct stack_frame *) (t->sp);
    tf->r0 = (uint32_t) t->arg;
    tf->pc = (uint32_t) t->start;
    tf->lr = (uint32_t) task_terminated;
    tf->xpsr = (1 << 24);
    t->sp -= sizeof(struct extra_frame);
}

```

Once the context has been restored, the exception handler return procedure automatically restores the context from the stack frame we are forging. The registers for the starting task are initialized as follows:

- The **program counter (PC)** contains the address of the start function, where the system will jump to switch to this task for the first time.
- **R0-R3** may contain optional arguments to pass to the start function, according to the ABI of the CPU. In our case, we carry the value of the single argument given for the start function by the caller of `task_create`.
- The **execution program status register (xPSR)** must be programmed to have only the mandatory thumb flag set at bit 24.
- The **link register (LR)** contains the pointer to the procedure that is called when the start function returns. In our case, tasks are not allowed to return from the start function, so the `task_terminated` function is just an infinite loop, and it is considered a system error. In other cases, if tasks are allowed to terminate, a function can be set as a common exit point for the tasks, to perform the cleanup operations required upon returning from the start function.

Once the initial stack frame has been created, the task can participate in multitasking, and can be picked by the scheduler at any time to resume the execution, from the same state as all the other tasks not running:




Figure 10.4 – Stack pointers of three tasks during different execution states

Our simple kernel main function can now create processes and prepare the stack but is not yet actually able to run them until we implement the scheduler internals. Timekeeping is useful in this case, so SysTick is enabled at startup to keep track of time in the system. The task block of the kernel is initialized, and two new tasks are created:

```
void main(void) {
    clock_pll_on(0);
    systick_enable();
    led_setup();
    kernel.name[0] = 0;
}
```

```

kernel.id = 0;
kernel.state = TASK_RUNNING;
task_create("test0", task_test0, NULL);
task_create("test1", task_test1, NULL);
while(1) {
    schedule();
}
}

```

The two main tasks are created so that they point to different start functions, and both have `NULL` as argument. Both functions should never return and can be interrupted and resumed according to the implemented scheduler policy.

To proceed from this point, the scheduler's internals need to be implemented to start and alternate the execution of the parallel tasks we just defined.

Scheduler implementation

The architecture of the system depends on the way the scheduler is implemented. Tasks can be running in a cooperative model until they voluntarily decide to yield the CPU to the next task, or the OS can decide to trigger an interrupt to swap the running task behind the scenes, applying a specific policy to decide the interval in between task switches and the priority for the selection of the next task. In both cases, the context switch happens within one of the supervisor calls available, set to decide which tasks to schedule next, and to perform the context switch. In this section, the full context switch procedure through `PendSV` will be added to our example, and then a few of the possible scheduling policies will be analyzed and implemented.

Supervisor calls

The core component of the scheduler consists of the exception handler associated with the system interrupt events, such as `PendSV` and `SVC`. On Cortex-M, a `PendSV` exception can be triggered at any time by the software by setting the `PENDSET` flag, corresponding to bit 28 of the interrupt control and state register, located in the SCB at address `0xE000ED04`. A simple macro is defined to initiate the context switch by setting the flag:

```

#define SCB_ICSR (*(volatile uint32_t *)0xE000ED04)
#define schedule() SCB_ICSR |= (1 << 28)

```

The call to schedule from the kernel, and all the subsequent calls, will cause a context switch, which can now be implemented in the PendSV handler. To complete a context switch, the handler has to perform the following steps:

1. Store the current stack pointer from the SP register in the task block.
2. Push the extra stack frame to the stack by calling `store_context`.
3. Change the state of the current task to `TASK_READY`.
4. Select a new task to resume.
5. Change the state of the new task to `TASK_RUNNING`.
6. Retrieve the new stack pointer from the associated task block.
7. Pop the extra stack frame from the stack by calling `restore_context`.
8. Set a special return value for the interrupt handler to activate thread mode at the end of the PendSV service routine.

The `isr_pendsv` function must be naked because it accesses the CPU register directly through the `store` and `restore_context` functions:

```
void __attribute__((naked)) isr_pendsv(void)
{
    store_context();
    asm volatile("mrs %0, msp" : "=r" (
        TASKS[running_task_id].sp));
    TASKS[running_task_id].state = TASK_READY;
    running_task_id++;
    if (running_task_id >= n_tasks)
        running_task_id = 0;
    TASKS[running_task_id].state = TASK_RUNNING;
    asm volatile("msr msp, %0"::"r" (
        TASKS[running_task_id].sp));
    restore_context();
    asm volatile("mov lr, %0" ::"r" (0xFFFFFFFF9));
    asm volatile("bx lr");
}
```

The value that is loaded in the LR before returning is used to indicate that we are returning to thread mode at the end of this interrupt. Depending on the value of the last 3 bits, the service routine informs the CPU which stack pointer to use when returning from the interrupt. The `0xFFFFFFFF9` value used in this case corresponds to thread mode using the main stack pointer. Different values will be

needed later on when the example is expanded to support separate stack pointers between the kernel and the process.

With that, the complete context has been implemented inside the PendSV service routine, which for now is simply selecting the next task and wraps around to execute the kernel with an ID of 0 after the last task in the array. The service routine is triggered to run in handler mode every time the `schedule` macro is called.

Cooperative scheduler

Different policies can be defined to alternate the execution of the tasks in the system. In the simplest case, the main functions of each task voluntarily suspend its execution by invoking the `schedule` macro.

In this example implementation, two threads have been defined. Both will turn on an LED and hold the CPU in a busy loop for 1 second before turning off the LED and explicitly calling the `schedule()` function to trigger a context switch:

```
void task_test0(void *arg)
{
    uint32_t now = jiffies;
    blue_led_on();
    while(1) {
        if ((jiffies - now) > 1000) {
            blue_led_off();
            schedule();
            now = jiffies;
            blue_led_on();
        }
    }
}

void task_test1(void *arg)
{
    uint32_t now = jiffies;
    red_led_on();
    while(1) {
        if ((jiffies - now) > 1000) {
            red_led_off();
            schedule();
        }
    }
}
```

```
        now = jiffies;
        red_led_on();
    }
}
```

The little operating system is finally working, and the kernel is scheduling the two tasks in sequence. The task with an ID of 0 is also resumed at the beginning of each loop, but in this simple case, the kernel task is only calling the `schedule` in a loop, immediately resuming the task with an ID of 1. With this design, the reactivity of the system depends entirely on the implementation of the tasks, as each task can hold the CPU indefinitely, and prevent other tasks from running. The cooperative model is only used in very specific scenarios, where each task is directly responsible for regulating its CPU cycles and cooperating with the other threads, and may impact the responsiveness and the fairness of the entire system.

For the sake of simplicity, this implementation does not take into account the wrap-around of the `jiffies` variable. If incremented every millisecond, `jiffies` would overflow its maximum value after about 42 days. Real operating systems, unlike our simplistic example, must implement an appropriate mechanism to compare time variables, not shown here, that can detect the wrap-around while calculating time differences.

Concurrency and timeslices

A different approach consists of assigning short intervals of CPU time to each task and continuously swapping processes at very short intervals. A preemptive scheduler autonomously interrupts the running task to resume the next one without an explicit request from the task itself. It can also impose its policy regarding the selection of the next task to run and the duration of the interval where the CPU is assigned to each task, namely its timeslice.

From the task's point of view, the execution can now be continuous and completely independent from the scheduler, which acts behind the scenes to interrupt and resume each task continuously, giving the illusion that all the tasks are running at the same time. The threads can be redefined to blink the LEDs at two different intervals:

```
void task_test0(void *arg)
{
    uint32_t now = jiffies;
    blue_led_on();
    while(1) {
        if ((jiffies - now) > 500) {
            blue_led_toggle();
        }
    }
}
```



```

        now = jiffies;
    }
}

void task_test1(void *arg)
{
    uint32_t now = jiffies;
    red_led_on();
    while(1) {
        if ((jiffies - now) > 125) {
            red_led_toggle();
            now = jiffies;
        }
    }
}

```

To alternate tasks in a round-robin fashion, we can trigger the execution of PendSV from within the SysTick handler, which results in a task switch that occurs at regular intervals. The new SysTick handler triggers a context switch every TIMESLICE milliseconds:

```

#define TIMESLICE (20)
void isr_systick(void)
{
    if ((++jiffies % TIMESLICE) == 0)
        schedule();
}

```

In this new configuration, we now have a more complete model, allowing multiple tasks to run independently, and the scheduling to be supervised completely by the kernel.

Blocking tasks

The simple scheduler we have implemented so far provides only two states for the tasks: `TASK_READY` and `TASK_RUNNING`. A third state can be implemented to define a task that does not need to be resumed because it has been blocked and is waiting for an event or a timeout. A task can be waiting for a system event of some type, such as the following:

- Interrupt events from an **input/output (I/O)** device in use by the task
- Communication from another task, such as the TCP/IP stack

- Synchronization mechanisms, such as a mutex or a semaphore, to access a shared resource in the system that is currently unavailable
- Timeout events

To manage the different states, the scheduler may implement two or more lists to separate the tasks currently running, or ready to run, from those waiting for an event. The scheduler then selects the next task among those in the `TASK_READY` state, and ignores the ones in the list of blocked tasks:




Figure 10.5 – State machine describing the task's execution states

This second version of the scheduler keeps track of the currently running task using a global pointer, instead of the index of the array, and organizes the tasks into two lists:

- `tasklist_active`: This contains the task block for the running task and all the tasks in the `TASK_READY` state, waiting to be scheduled
- `tasklist_waiting`: This contains the task block of the tasks currently blocked

The easiest showcase to implement for this new mechanism is a `sleep_ms` function, which can be used by tasks to temporarily switch to a waiting state and set up a resume point in the future to be scheduled again. Providing this kind of facility allows our tasks to sleep in between LED toggle actions, instead of running a busy loop that repeatedly checks whether the timer expired. These new tasks are not only more efficient, because they do not waste CPU cycles in a busy loop, but are also more readable:

```
void task_test0(void *arg) {
    blue_led_on();
}
```

```
while(1) {
    sleep_ms(500);
    blue_led_toggle();
}

void task_test1(void *arg)
{
    red_led_on();
    while(1) {
        sleep_ms(125);
        red_led_toggle();
    }
}
```

To arrange the task blocks into lists, a pointer to the next element must be added to the structure so that the two lists are populated at runtime. To manage the `sleep_ms` function, a new field must be added to keep track of the system time when the task is supposed to be put in the active list to be resumed:

```
struct task_block {
    char name[TASK_NAME_MAXLEN];
    int id;
    int state;
    void (*start)(void *arg);
    void *arg;
    uint8_t *sp;
    uint32_t wakeup_time;
    struct task_block *next;
};
```

These lists can be managed with two simple functions to the insert/delete elements:

```
struct task_block *tasklist_active = NULL;
struct task_block *tasklist_waiting = NULL;

static void tasklist_add(struct task_block **list, struct task_block *el)
{

```

```

    el->next = *list;
    *list = el;
}

static int tasklist_del(struct task_block **list, struct task_
block *delme)
{
    struct task_block *t = *list;
    struct task_block *p = NULL;
    while (t) {
        if (t == delme) {
            if (p == NULL)
                *list = t->next;
            else
                p->next = t->next;
            return 0;
        }
        p = t;
        t = t->next;
    }
    return -1;
}

```

Two additional functions must be added to move the tasks from the active list to the waiting list and vice versa, which additionally change the state of the task itself:

```

static void task_waiting(struct task_block *t)
{
    if (tasklist_del(&tasklist_active, t) == 0) {
        tasklist_add(&tasklist_waiting, t);
        t->state = TASK_WAITING;
    }
}

static void task_ready(struct task_block *t)
{
    if (tasklist_del(&tasklist_waiting, t) == 0) {

```

```

    tasklist_add(&tasklist_active, t);
    t->state = TASK_READY;
}
}

```

The `sleep_ms` function sets the resume time and moves the task to the waiting state, then activates the scheduler so that the task is preempted:

```

void sleep_ms(int ms)
{
    if (ms < TASK_TIMESLICE)
        return;
    t_cur->wakeup_time = jiffies + ms;
    task_waiting(t_cur);
    schedule();
}

```

The new PendSV handler selects the next task to run from the active list, which is assumed to always contain at least one task as the kernel main task is never put in the waiting state. The new thread is selected through the `tasklist_next_ready` function, which also ensures that if the current task has been moved from the active list, or is the last in line, the head of the active list is selected for the next timeslice:

```

static inline struct task_block *tasklist_next_ready(struct
task_block *t)
{
    if ((t->next == NULL) || (t->next->state != TASK_READY))
        return tasklist_active;
    return t->next;
}

```

This small function is the core of the new scheduler based on the double list, and is invoked in the middle of each context switch to select the next active task in PendSV:

```

void __attribute__((naked)) isr_pendsv(void)
{
    store_context();
    asm volatile("mrs %0, msp" : "=r"(t_cur->sp));
    if (t_cur->state == TASK_RUNNING) {
        t_cur->state = TASK_READY;
    }
}

```

```

}
t_cur = tasklist_next_ready(t_cur);
t_cur->state = TASK_RUNNING;
asm volatile("msr msp, %0" ::"r"(t_cur->sp));
restore_context();
asm volatile("mov lr, %0" ::"r"(0xFFFFFFFF9));
asm volatile("bx lr");
}

```

Finally, to check the wake-up time of each sleeping task, the kernel visits the list of waiting tasks and moves the task blocks back to the active list whenever the wake-up time has elapsed. The kernel initialization now includes a few extra steps to ensure that the kernel task itself is put in the list of running tasks at boot:

```

void main(void) {
    clock_pll_on(0);
    led_setup();
    button_setup();
    systick_enable();
    kernel.name[0] = 0;
    kernel.id = 0;
    kernel.state = TASK_RUNNING;
    kernel.wakeup_time = 0;
    tasklist_add(&tasklist_active, &kernel);
    task_create("test0", task_test0, NULL);
    task_create("test1", task_test1, NULL);
    task_create("test2", task_test2, NULL);
    while(1) {
        struct task_block *t = tasklist_waiting;
        while (t) {
            if (t->wakeup_time && (t->wakeup_time < jiffies)) {
                t->wakeup_time = 0;
                task_ready(t);
            }
            t = t->next;
        }
    }
}

```

```

    WFI();
}
}

```

Waiting for resources

Blocking at a given time interval is only one of the possibilities for a task to be temporarily excluded from the active list. The kernel may implement other event and interrupt handlers to bring the tasks back into the scheduler loop so that the task may block, waiting for I/O events from a specific set of resources while in a `TASK_WAITING` state.

In our example code, a read function can be implemented to retrieve the status of the button from a task, which would block and only return once the button is pressed. Until then, the calling task remains on the waiting list and is never scheduled. A task that toggles the green LED every time the button is pressed relies on `button_read()` as its blocking point:

```

#define BUTTON_DEBOUNCE_TIME 120
void task_test2(void *arg)
{
    uint32_t toggle_time = 0;
    green_led_off();
    while(1) {
        if (button_read()) {
            if((jiffies - toggle_time) > BUTTON_DEBOUNCE_TIME)
            {
                green_led_toggle();
                toggle_time = jiffies;
            }
        }
    }
}

```

The `button_read` function keeps track of the calling task, so the `button_task` pointer is used to wake it up when the button is pressed. The task is moved to the waiting list and the read operation is initiated in the driver, and then the task is preempted:

```

struct task_block *button_task = NULL;
int button_read(void)
{
    if (button_task)

```

```

    return 0;
    button_task = t_cur;
    task_waiting(t_cur);
    button_start_read();
    schedule();
    return 1;
}

```

To notify the scheduler whenever the button is pressed, the driver uses a callback, specified by the kernel during initialization, and passes it as an argument to `button_setup`:

```

static void (*button_callback)(void) = NULL;

void button_setup(void (*callback)(void))
{
    AHB1_CLOCK_ER |= GPIOA_AHB1_CLOCK_ER;
    GPIOA_MODE &= ~ (0x03 << (BUTTON_PIN * 2));
    EXTI_CR0 &= ~EXTI_CR_EXTIO_MASK;
    button_callback = callback;
}

```

The kernel associates the `button_wakeup` function with the driver callback so that when an event occurs, if a task is awaiting the button press notification, it is moved back to the active tasks list and resumes as soon as the scheduler selects it to run:

```

void button_wakeup(void)
{
    if (button_task) {
        task_ready(button_task);
        button_task = NULL;
        schedule();
    }
}

```

In the button driver, to initiate the blocking operation, the interrupt is enabled and associated with the rising edge of a signal, which corresponds to the button press event:

```

void button_start_read(void)
{

```



```
EXTI_IMR |= (1 << BUTTON_PIN);  
EXTI_EMR |= (1 << BUTTON_PIN);  
EXTI_RTSR |= (1 << BUTTON_PIN);  
nvic_irq_enable(NVIC_EXTIO_IRQN);  
}
```

The callback is executed in the interrupt context when the event is detected. The interrupt is disabled until the next call to `button_start_read`:

```
void isr_exti0(void)  
{  
    nvic_irq_disable(NVIC_EXTIO_IRQN);  
    EXTI_PR |= (1 << BUTTON_PIN);  
    if (button_callback)  
        button_callback();  
}
```

Any device driver or system module that relies on interrupt handling to unlock the associated task may use a callback mechanism to interact with the scheduler. Using a similar blocking strategy, read and write operations can be implemented to keep the calling task on the waiting list until the desired event is detected and handled toward a callback in the scheduler code.

Other system components and libraries designed for bare-metal embedded applications may require an additional layer to integrate into the operating system with blocking calls. Embedded TCP/IP stack implementations, such as lwIP and picoTCP, provide a portable RTOS integration layer, including blocking socket calls, implemented by running the loop functions in a dedicated task, which manages the communication with the socket API used in the other tasks. Locking mechanisms, such as mutexes and semaphores, are expected to implement blocking calls, which would suspend the task when the resource requested is unavailable.

The scheduling policy we have implemented so far is very reactive and gives a perfect level of interaction among tasks, but it does not foresee priority levels, which is necessary when designing real-time systems.

Real-time scheduling

One of the key requirements for real-time operating systems is the ability to react to a selected number of events by executing the associated code within a short and predictable amount of time. To implement features with strict timing requirements, the operating system must focus on quick interrupt handling and dispatching, rather than other metrics, such as throughput or fairness. Each task might have specific requirements, such as *deadlines*, indicating the exact time when the execution must start or stop, or related to shared resources that might introduce dependencies to other tasks

in the system. A system that can execute tasks with a *deterministic* time requirement must be able to meet the deadlines within a measurable, fixed amount of time.

Approaching real-time scheduling is a complex matter. Authoritative literature exists on the topic, so the subject will not be extensively explained here. Research has indicated that several approaches based on *priorities* assigned to each task, combined with an appropriate strategy used to switch the tasks at runtime, provide a sufficient approximation to provide a generic solution to real-time requirements.

To support hard real-time tasks with deterministic deadlines, an operating system should consider implementing the following characteristics:

- A fast context switch procedure implemented in the scheduler
- Measurable intervals where the system runs with the interrupts disabled
- Short interrupt handlers
- Support for interrupt priorities
- Support for task priorities to minimize the latency of hard real-time tasks

From the point of view of task scheduling, the latency for real-time tasks is mostly related to the ability of the system to resume the task when an external event occurs.

To guarantee a deterministic delay for a selected group of tasks, RTOSs often implement fixed-priority levels, which are assigned to tasks upon creation, and determine the order in which the next task is selected at each execution of the supervisor call of the scheduler.

Time-critical operations should be implemented in tasks with a higher priority. Many scheduler policies have been researched to optimize the reaction time of real-time tasks while keeping the system responsive and allowing issues related to the possible starvation of the tasks with a lower priority. Finding an optimal scheduling policy for a specific scenario can be very hard; the details regarding deterministically calculating the latency and jitter of a real-time system are outside the scope of this book.

One of the proposed approaches is very popular among real-time operating systems. It provides immediate context switches for real-time tasks by selecting the task with the highest priority among those ready for execution, upon every invocation of the scheduler supervisor call. This scheduling policy, known as **static priority-driven preemptive scheduling**, is not optimal in all cases, as the latency of the tasks depends on the number of tasks at the same priority level, and foresees no mechanism to prevent potential starvation of tasks with a lower priority in the case of higher system loads. However, the mechanism is simple enough that it can be easily implemented to demonstrate the impact of priority mechanisms on the latency of real-time tasks.

Another possible approach would consist of reassigning priorities dynamically at runtime, based on the characteristics of the tasks. Real-time schedulers may benefit from a mechanism that ensures that the task with the closest deadline is selected first. This approach, known as **earliest-deadline-first** scheduling, or simply **EDF**, is more efficient in meeting real-time deadlines in a system under

a heavier load. The `SCHED_DEADLINE` scheduler, included in Linux starting from version 3.14, is an implementation of this mechanism, which is less popular in embedded operating systems despite being relatively simple to implement.

This example shows a simplistic implementation of a static priority-driven scheduler. We are using four separate lists to store the active tasks, one for each priority level supported on the system. A priority level is assigned to each task upon creation, and the kernel is kept at priority 0, with its main task running only when all the other tasks are sleeping, and whose unique purpose is to check the timers of the sleeping tasks. Tasks can be inserted into the active task list with the corresponding priority level when they become ready, and they are moved to the waiting list when they are blocked. To keep track of the static priority of the task, the priority field is added to the task block:

```
struct task_block {
    char name[TASK_NAME_MAXLEN];
    int id;
    int state;
    void (*start)(void *arg);
    void *arg;
    uint8_t *sp;
    uint32_t wakeup_time;
    uint8_t priority;
    struct task_block *next;
};
```

Two shortcut functions must be defined to quickly add and remove the task block from the list of tasks with the same priority:

```
static void tasklist_add_active(struct task_block *el)
{
    tasklist_add(&tasklist_active[el->priority], el);
}

static int tasklist_del_active(struct task_block *el)
{
    return tasklist_del(&tasklist_active[el->priority], el);
}
```

They can then be used in the new versions of the `task_waiting` and `task_ready` functions when the task is removed or inserted into the corresponding list of active tasks at the given priority:

```
static void task_waiting(struct task_block *t)
{
    if (tasklist_del_active(t) == 0) {
        tasklist_add(&tasklist_waiting, t);
        t->state = TASK_WAITING;
    }
}

static void task_ready(struct task_block *t)
{
    if (tasklist_del(&tasklist_waiting, t) == 0) {
        tasklist_add_active(t);
        t->state = TASK_READY;
    }
}
```

The three tasks are created on the system, but the one that would block upon the button press event is created with a higher priority level:

```
void main(void) {
    clock_pll_on(0);
    led_setup();
    button_setup(button_wakeup);
    systick_enable();
    kernel.name[0] = 0;
    kernel.id = 0;
    kernel.state = TASK_RUNNING;
    kernel.wakeup_time = 0;
    kernel.priority = 0;
    tasklist_add_active(&kernel);
    task_create("test0", task_test0, NULL, 1);
    task_create("test1", task_test1, NULL, 1);
    task_create("test2", task_test2, NULL, 3);

    while(1) {
```

```

    struct task_block *t = tasklist_waiting;
    while (t) {
        if (t->wakeup_time && (t->wakeup_time < jiffies)) {
            t->wakeup_time = 0;
            task_ready(t);
        }
        t = t->next;
    }
    WFI();
}
}

```

The function that selects the next task is reworked to find the task with the highest priority among those ready to run. To do so, the priority lists are visited, from highest to lowest. If the list with the highest priority is the same as one of the current tasks, the next task in the same level is selected, if possible, to guarantee a round-robin mechanism in the case of tasks competing for the CPU within the same priority level. In any other case, the first task in the list with the highest priority is selected:

```

static int idx;
static inline struct task_block *
tasklist_next_ready(struct task_block *t)
{
    for (idx = MAX_PRIO - 1; idx >= 0; idx--) {
        if ((idx == t->priority) && (t->next != NULL) &&
            (t->next->state == TASK_READY))
            return t->next;
        if (tasklist_active[idx])
            return tasklist_active[idx];
    }
    return t;
}

```

The major difference between this scheduler and the one with a single priority level in terms of reacting to the button press event in the task with an ID equal to 2 is the time interval between the button press event and the reaction from the task itself. Both schedulers implement preemption by immediately putting the task back into the ready state within the interrupt handler of the button event.

However, in the first case, the task comes back to the carousel of the tasks being scheduled to compete with the other tasks on the same priority level, which can cause a delay in the reaction of the task. We can estimate this to be $N * \text{TIMESLICE}$ in the worst-case scenario, where N is the number of processes ready to run at the moment when the interrupt occurs.

With the priority-driven scheduling approach, there is a degree of certainty that the real-time task is the first one to be scheduled after the interrupt occurs so that the time required from the interrupt to resuming the task is measurable, and in the order of a few microseconds, as the CPU executes a predictable amount of instructions to perform all the actions in between.

Real-time embedded OSs are fundamental to implementing life-critical systems, mostly in the transport and medical industries. On the other hand, they rely on simplified models to keep the basic system operations as lightweight as possible, and with minimum overhead for system call interfaces and system APIs. An opposite approach could consist of increasing the complexity of the kernel to introduce optimizations in terms of throughput, task interaction, memory safety improvements, and other performance indicators, which may be a better fit in embedded systems with loose or non-existent real-time requirements. Stricter priority-based scheduling policies improve latency and guarantee real-time responses in well-controlled scenarios but are less flexible to use in a general-purpose embedded system where other constraints are more compelling than task latency, where a time-based preemption-scheduling approach may provide better results.

Synchronization

In a multithreaded environment where memory, peripherals, and system accesses are shared, a system should provide synchronization mechanisms to allow the tasks to cooperate on the arbitration of the access to system-wide available resources.

Mutexes and semaphores are two of the most commonly used mechanisms of synchronization between parallel threads as they provide the minimal set to solve most concurrency problems. Functions that could block the calling tasks must be able to interact with the scheduler, to move the task to the waiting state whenever the resource is not available and until the lock is released or the semaphore is incremented.

Semaphores

A semaphore is the most common synchronization primitive, which provides a counter with exclusive access, and it is used by two or more threads to cooperate on the arbitration of the usage of a specific shared resource. The API provided to the tasks must guarantee that the object can be used to implement a counter with exclusive access, which, in general, requires some auxiliary features on the CPU. For this reason, the internal implementation of the synchronization strategies is dependent on the microcode implemented in the target processor.

On Cortex-M3/M4, the implementation of locking mechanisms relies on instructions provided by the CPU to perform exclusive operations. The instruction set of the reference platform provides the following two instructions:

- **Load Register Exclusive (LDREX)**: Loads a value from an address in memory into a CPU register.
- **Store Register Exclusive (STREX)**: Attempts to store the new value contained in the register in an address in memory corresponding to the last LDREX instruction. If the STREX succeeds, the CPU guarantees that writing the value in memory happened exclusively and that the value has not been modified since the last LDREX call. Between two concurrent LDREX/STREX sections, only one will result in a successful write to the register; the second STREX instruction will fail, returning zero.

The characteristics of these instructions guarantee exclusive access to a counter, which is then used to implement the primitive functions at the base of semaphores and mutexes.

The `sem_trywait` function attempts to decrement the value of the semaphore. The operation is always allowed unless the value of the semaphore is 0, which results in an immediate failure. The function returns 0 upon success, and -1 if the semaphore value is zero, and it is impossible to decrement the semaphore value at this time.

The sequence of the events in `sem_trywait` is as follows:

1. The value of the semaphore variable (an integer accessed with exclusive load and store instructions) is read from the memory pointed to by the function argument into the register, R1.
2. If the value of R1 is 0, the semaphore cannot be acquired, and the function returns -1.
3. The value of R1 is decremented by one.
4. The value of R1 is stored in the memory pointed to by the function argument, and the result of the STREX operation is put into R2.
5. If the operation succeeds, R2 contains 0, the semaphore is acquired and successfully decremented, and the function can return with a success status.
6. If the store operation fails (concurrent access is attempted), the procedure is immediately repeated for a second attempt.

Here is the assembly routine implementing all of the steps, returning 0 upon success and -1 when the decrement fails:

```
sem_trywait:
    LDREX r1, [r0]
    CMP r1, #0
    BEQ sem_trywait_fail
    SUBS r1, #1
```

```

    STREX r2, r1, [r0]
    CMP r2, #0
    BNE sem_trywait
    DMB
    MOVS r0, #0
    BX lr
sem_trywait_fail:
    DMB
    MOV r0, #-1
    BX lr

```

The following code is the corresponding function to increase the semaphore, which is similar to the wait routine, except that the counting semaphore is increased instead, and the operation is eventually going to succeed, even if multiple tasks are trying to access the semaphore at the same time. The function returns 0 on success, except if the value before the counter was zero, in which case it returns 1, to remind the caller to notify any listener in a wait state that the value has increased and the associated resource is now available:

```

.global sem_dopost
sem_dopost:
    LDREX r1, [r0]
    ADDS r1, #1
    STREX r2, r1, [r0]
    CMP r2, #0
    BNE sem_dopost
    CMP r0, #1
    DMB
    BGE sem_signal_up
    MOVS r0, #0
    BX lr
sem_signal_up:
    MOVS r0, #1
    BX lr

```

To integrate the blocking status of the `sem_wait` function into the scheduler, the semaphore interface exposed by the OS to the tasks wraps the non-blocking `sem_trywait` call into its blocking version, which blocks the task when the value of the semaphore is zero.

To implement a blocking version of the semaphore interface, the `semaphore` object may keep track of the tasks accessing the resources and waiting for a post event. In this case, the identifiers of the tasks are stored in an array named `listeners`:

```
#define MAX_LISTENERS 4
struct semaphore {
    uint32_t value;
    uint8_t listeners[MAX_LISTENERS];
};

typedef struct semaphore semaphore;
```

When a wait operation fails, the task is blocked and it will try again only after a successful post operation from another task. The task identifier is added to the array of listeners for this resource:

```
int sem_wait(semaphore *s)
{
    int i;
    if (s == NULL)
        return -1;
    if (sem_trywait(s) == 0)
        return 0;
    for (i = 0; i < MAX_LISTENERS; i++) {
        if (!s->listeners[i])
            s->listeners[i] = t_cur->id;
        if (s->listeners[i] == t_cur->id)
            break;
    }
    task_waiting(t_cur);
    schedule();
    return sem_wait(s);}
```

The assembly routine, `sem_dopost`, returns a positive value if the post operation has triggered an increment from zero to one, which means that the listeners, if present, must be resumed to try to acquire the resource that just became available.

Mutexes

Mutex is short for **mutual exclusion** and is closely related to the semaphore, to the point that it can be implemented using the same assembly routines. A mutex is nothing but a binary semaphore that is initialized with a value of 1 to allow the first lock operation.

Due to the property of the semaphore, which would fail any attempt to decrement its counter after its value has reached 0, our quick implementation of the mutex interface renames the semaphore primitives `sem_wait` and `sem_post` to `mutex_lock` and `mutex_unlock`, respectively.

Two tasks can try to decrement an unlocked mutex at the same time, but only one will succeed; the other will fail. In the blocking version of the mutex for the example scheduler, the wrappers for the mutex API built on top of the semaphore functions are as follows:

```
typedef semaphore mutex;
#define mutex_init(m) sem_init(m, 1)
#define mutex_trylock(m) sem_trywait(m)
#define mutex_lock(x) sem_wait(x)
#define mutex_unlock(x) sem_post(x)
```

For both semaphores and mutexes, the example operating system written so far offers a complete API for synchronization mechanisms integrated with the scheduler.

Priority inversion

A phenomenon that is often encountered when developing operating systems with preemptive, priority-based schedulers using integrated synchronization mechanisms is priority inversion. This condition affects the reactivity time of the real-time tasks that share resources with other tasks with a lower priority, and, in some cases, may cause the higher-priority tasks to starve for an unpredictable amount of time. This event occurs when the high-priority task is waiting for a resource to be freed by a lower-priority one, which in the meanwhile may be preempted by other unrelated tasks in the system.

In particular, the sequence of events that might trigger this phenomenon is as follows:

1. T1, T2, and T3 are three of the running tasks, with priority 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
2. T1 acquires a lock using a mutex on resource X.
3. T1 is preempted by T3, which has a higher priority.
4. T3 tries to access the shared resource, X, and blocks on the mutex.
5. T1 resumes the execution in the critical section.
6. T1 is preempted by T2, which has a higher priority.
7. An arbitrary number of tasks with priorities greater than 1 can interrupt the execution of T1 before it can release the lock and wake up T3.

One of the possible mechanisms that can be implemented to avoid this situation is called **priority inheritance**. This mechanism consists of temporarily increasing the priority of a task sharing a resource to the highest priority of all the tasks accessing the resource. This way, a task with a lower priority does not cause scheduling delays for the higher-priority ones, and the real-time requirements are still met.

System resource separation

The example operating system we have built throughout this chapter already has many interesting features, but it is still characterized by a flat model, with no memory segmentation or privilege separation. Minimalist systems do not provide any mechanisms to separate system resources and regulate access to the memory space. Instead, tasks in the system are allowed to perform any privileged operation, including reading and altering other tasks' memory, executing operations in the address space of the kernel, and directly accessing peripherals and CPU registers at runtime.

Different approaches are available on the target platform, aimed at increasing the level of safety on the system by introducing a limited number of modifications to the kernel to:

- Implement kernel/process privilege separation
- Integrate memory protection in the scheduler
- Provide a system call interface through the supervisor call to access resources

Let's discuss each in detail.

Privilege levels

The Cortex-M CPU is designed to run code with two different levels of privilege. Privilege separation is important whenever untrusted application code is running on the system, allowing the kernel to keep control of the execution at all times, and prevent system failures due to a misbehaving user thread. The default execution level at boot is privileged, to allow the kernel to boot. Applications can be configured to execute at the user level and use a different stack-pointer register during the context switch operations.

Changing privilege levels is possible only during an exception handler, and it is done using the special exception return value, which is stored in LR before it is returned from an exception handler that performed the context switch. The flag that controls the privilege level is the lowest bit of the CONTROL register, which can be changed during context switches before returning from the exception handler, to relegate application threads to run at the user privilege level.

Moreover, most Cortex-M CPUs provide two separate stack-pointer CPU registers:

- A **Master Stack Pointer (MSP)**
- A **Process Stack Pointer (PSP)**

Following the ARM recommendation, operating systems must use PSP to execute user threads, while MSP is used by interrupt handlers and the kernel. The stack selection depends on the special return value at the end of the exception handler. The scheduler we have implemented so far has this value hardcoded to `0xFFFFFFFF9`, which is used to return in thread mode after an interrupt and keeps executing the code at a privileged level. Returning the `0xFFFFFFFFD` value from the interrupt handler tells the CPU to select the PSP as a stack-pointer register when returning to thread mode.

To implement privilege separation properly, the PendSV handler used for switching tasks has to be modified to save and restore the context using the right stack pointer for the task being preempted and the stack selected. The `store_context` and `restore_context` functions we have used so far are renamed to `store_kernel_context` and `restore_kernel_context`, respectively, because the kernel is still using the master stack pointer. Two new functions are added to the store and restore thread contexts from the new context switch routine, which uses the PSP register instead, for storing and restoring the contexts of the threads:

```
static void __attribute__((naked)) store_user_context(void)
{
    asm volatile("mrs r0, psp");
    asm volatile("stmdb r0!, {r4-r11}");
    asm volatile("msr psp, r0");
    asm volatile("bx lr");
}

static void __attribute__((naked)) restore_user_context(void)
{
    asm volatile("mrs r0, psp");
    asm volatile("ldmfd r0!, {r4-r11}");
    asm volatile("msr psp, r0");
    asm volatile("bx lr");
}
```

In the safe version of the scheduler, the PendSV service routine selects the correct stack pointer for storing and restoring the context and calls the associated routines. Depending on the new context, the return value stored in LR is used to select the register used as a new stack pointer, and the privilege level is set in the CONTROL register to switch to the user or privileged level in the upcoming thread mode, using values of 1 or 0, respectively:

```
void __attribute__((naked)) isr_pendsv(void)
{
    if (t_cur->id == 0) {
```

```

    store_kernel_context();
    asm volatile("mrs %0, msp" : "=r"(t_cur->sp));
} else {
    store_user_context();
    asm volatile("mrs %0, psp" : "=r"(t_cur->sp));
}
if (t_cur->state == TASK_RUNNING) {
    t_cur->state = TASK_READY;
}
t_cur = tasklist_next_ready(t_cur);
t_cur->state = TASK_RUNNING;
if (t_cur->id == 0) {
    asm volatile("msr msp, %0" :: "r"(t_cur->sp));
    restore_kernel_context();
    asm volatile("mov lr, %0" :: "r"(0xFFFFFFFF9));
    asm volatile("msr CONTROL, %0" :: "r"(0x00));
} else {
    asm volatile("msr psp, %0" :: "r"(t_cur->sp));
    restore_user_context();
    asm volatile("mov lr, %0" :: "r"(0xFFFFFFFFD));
    asm volatile("msr CONTROL, %0" :: "r"(0x01));
}
asm volatile("bx lr");
}

```

A task running with the privilege mode bit set in the CONTROL register has restricted access to the resources of the system. In particular, threads cannot access registers in the SCB region, which means that some basic operations, such as enabling and disabling interrupts through the NVIC, are reserved for the exclusive use of the kernel. When used in combination with the MPU, privilege separation improves the safety of the system even further by imposing memory separation at the access level, which can detect and interrupt misbehaving application code.

Memory segmentation

Dynamic memory segmentation strategies can be integrated into the scheduler to ensure that the single tasks do not access memory regions associated with system-critical components and that the resources that require kernel supervision can be accessed from user space.

In *Chapter 5, Memory Management*, we saw how the MPU can be used to delimit contiguous segments of memory and disallow access to specific areas by any of the code running on the systems. The MPU controller provides a permission mask to change the attributes of the single-memory regions with more granularity. In particular, we can only allow access to some areas if the CPU is running at a privileged level, which is an efficient way of preventing user applications from accessing certain areas of the system without the supervision of the kernel. A safe operating system may decide to completely exclude the application tasks from accessing the peripheral region and the system registers by using kernel-only permission flags for these areas. The values associated with specific permissions in the MPU region attribute register can be defined as follows:

```
#define RASR_KERNEL_RW (1 << 24)
#define RASR_KERNEL_RO (5 << 24)
#define RASR_RDONLY (6 << 24)
#define RASR_NOACCESS (0 << 24)
#define RASR_USER_RW (3 << 24)
#define RASR_USER_RO (2 << 24)
```

The MPU configuration can be enforced at boot by the kernel. In this example, we have set the flash region to be globally readable, as region 0, using `RASR_RDONLY`, and the SRAM region to be globally accessible, as region 1, mapped at an address of `0x20000000`:

```
int mpu_enable(void)
{
    volatile uint32_t type;
    volatile uint32_t start;
    volatile uint32_t attr;
    type = MPU_TYPE;
    if (type == 0)
        return -1;
    MPU_CTRL = 0;
    start = 0;
    attr = RASR_ENABLED | MPUSIZE_256K | RASR_SCB |
          RASR_RDONLY;
    mpu_set_region(0, start, attr);

    start = 0x20000000;
    attr = RASR_ENABLED | MPUSIZE_128K | RASR_SCB | RASR_
USER_RW | RASR_NOEXEC;
    mpu_set_region(1, start, attr);
```

A stricter policy may even restrict the usage of the SRAM by the user tasks in non-privileged mode, but it would require a reorganization of the `.data` and `.bss` regions that are mapped when the task is started. In this example, we are simply demonstrating how to integrate the per-task memory protection policy into the scheduler to prevent access to system resources and protect the stack areas of the other tasks. The CCRAM is the area we want to protect as it contains the execution stack of the kernel, as well as those of the other tasks in the system. To do so, the CCRAM area must be marked to be of exclusive access of the kernel as region 2. Later, an exception must be created for the selected task during the context switch, to permit access to its own stack space:

```
start = 0x10000000;
attr = RASR_ENABLED | MPUSIZE_64K | RASR_SCB |
      RASR_KERNEL_RW | RASR_NOEXEC;
mpu_set_region(2, start, attr);
```

Peripheral regions and system registers are restricted areas in our system, so they too are marked for exclusive kernel access at runtime. In our safe OS design, tasks that want to access peripherals must use system calls to perform supervised privileged operations:

```
start = 0x40000000;
attr = RASR_ENABLED | MPUSIZE_1G | RASR_SB |
      RASR_KERNEL_RW | RASR_NOEXEC;
mpu_set_region(4, start, attr);
start = 0xE0000000;
attr = RASR_ENABLED | MPUSIZE_256M | RASR_SB |
      RASR_KERNEL_RW | RASR_NOEXEC;
mpu_set_region(5, start, attr);
SHCSR |= MEMFAULT_ENABLE;
MPU_CTRL = 1;
return 0;
}
```

During the context switch, just before returning from the `isr_pendsv` service routine, the scheduler can invoke the function that is exported by our custom MPU module to temporarily permit access to the stack area of the task selected to run next in non-privileged mode:

```
void mpu_task_stack_permit(void *start)
{
    uint32_t attr = RASR_ENABLED | MPUSIZE_1K |
                  RASR_SCB | RASR_USER_RW;
    MPU_CTRL = 0;
```

```

    DMB();
    mpu_set_region(3, (uint32_t)start, attr);
    MPU_CTRL = 1;
}

```

These further restrictions have limited the possibility for the currently implemented tasks to access any resources directly. To maintain the same functionalities as before, the example system must now export a new safe API for the tasks to request system operations.

System calls

The latest evolution of the example operating system we have implemented in this chapter no longer allows our tasks to control system resources, such as input and output peripherals, and does not even allow the tasks to block voluntarily as the `sleep_ms` function is not allowed to set the pending flag to initiate a context switch.

The operating system exports an API that is accessible by the tasks through a system call mechanism via the SVCcall exception, which is handled by the `isr_svc` service routine, and triggered at any time from tasks through the `svc` instruction.

In this simple example, we are using the `svc 0` assembly instruction to switch to handler mode by defining a shortcut macro, `SVC()`:

```
#define SVC() asm volatile ("svc 0")
```

We wrap this instruction within a C function so that we can pass arguments to it. The ABI for the platform provides the first four arguments of the call across the mode switch inside the R0-R3 registers. Our example API does not allow us to pass any arguments to the system calls, but uses the first argument in R0 to identify the request that has been passed from the application to the kernel:

```

static int syscall(int arg0)
{
    SVC();
}

```

This way, we implement the entire system call interface for this operating system, which consists of the following system calls with no arguments. Each system call has an associated identification number, passed as `arg0`. The list of system calls is the contract for the interface between the tasks and the kernel, and the only way for the tasks to use the protected resources in the system:

```

#define SYS_SCHEDULE 0
#define SYS_BUTTON_READ 1
#define SYS_BLUELED_ON 2

```



```

#define SYS_BLUELED_OFF 3
#define SYS_BLUELED_TOGGLE 4
#define SYS_REDLLED_ON 5
#define SYS_REDLLED_OFF 6
#define SYS_REDLLED_TOGGLE 7
#define SYS_GREENLED_ON 8
#define SYS_GREENLED_OFF 9
#define SYS_GREENLED_TOGGLE 10

```

Each of these system calls must be handled in `isr_svc`. Controlling peripherals and system block registers can be done by calling the driver functions in the handler context, even if this is done just for brevity here. In a proper design, operations that take more than a few instructions to complete should be deferred to be run by the kernel task the next time it is scheduled. The following code has been used just to show a possible implementation of `isr_svc` that reacts to user requests allowed by the system API, to control the LED and the button on the board, while also providing a mechanism that can be expanded to implement blocking system calls.

The `svc` service routine executes the requested command, passed as an argument to the handler itself. If the system call is blocking, such as the `SYS_SCHEDULE` system call, a new task is selected to complete a task switch within the handler.

The `svc` routine can now handle internal commands, as shown in the following example handler function:

```

void __attribute__((naked)) isr_svc(int arg)
{
    store_user_context();
    asm volatile("mrs %0, psp" : "=r"(t_cur->sp));
    if (t_cur->state == TASK_RUNNING) {
        t_cur->state = TASK_READY;
    }
    switch(arg) {
        case SYS_BUTTON_READ: /* cmd to read button value */
            button_start_read();
            break;
        case SYS_SCHEDULE: /* cmd to schedule the next task */
            t_cur = tasklist_next_ready(t_cur);
            t_cur->state = TASK_RUNNING;
            break;
        case SYS_BLUELED_ON: /* cmd to turn on blue LED */

```

```

        blue_led_on();
        break;
    /* case ... (more LED related cmds follow) */
}

```

The context is resumed at the end of the routine, in the same way as within PendSV. Though it is optional, a task switch might occur if the call must block:

```

    if (t_cur->id == 0) {
        asm volatile("msr msp, %0" ::"r"(t_cur->sp));
        restore_kernel_context();
        asm volatile("mov lr, %0" ::"r"(0xFFFFFFFF9));
        asm volatile("msr CONTROL, %0" ::"r"(0x00));
    } else {
        asm volatile("msr psp, %0" ::"r"(t_cur->sp));
        restore_user_context();
        mpu_task_stack_permit(((uint8_t *)(&stack_space))
                               +(t_cur->id << 10));
        asm volatile("mov
lr, %0" ::"r"(0xFFFFFFFFD));
        asm volatile("msr CONTROL, %0" ::"r"(0x01));
    }
    asm volatile("bx lr");}

```

While limited in its functionalities, the new system exports all the APIs needed for our application threads to run again, once all the prohibited privileged calls have been removed from the task code, and the newly created system calls are invoked instead:

```

void task_test0(void *arg)
{
    while(1) {
        syscall(SYS_BLUELED_ON);
        mutex_lock(&m);
        sleep_ms(500);
        syscall(SYS_BLUELED_OFF);
        mutex_unlock(&m);
        sleep_ms(1000);
    }
}

```

```
}

void task_test1(void *arg)
{
    syscall(SYS_REDLED_ON);
    while(1) {
        sleep_ms(50);
        mutex_lock(&m);
        syscall(SYS_REDLED_TOGGLE);
        mutex_unlock(&m);
    }
}

void task_test2(void *arg)
{
    uint32_t toggle_time = 0;
    syscall(SYS_GREENLED_OFF);
    while(1) {
        button_read();
        if ((jiffies - toggle_time) > 120) {
            syscall(SYS_GREENLED_TOGGLE);
            toggle_time = jiffies;
        }
    }
}
```

The code size of a safe operating system may grow quickly if it implements all the operations in kernel space and has to provide the implementation of all the system calls allowed. On the other hand, it provides physical memory separation among tasks, and it protects system resources and other memory areas from accidental errors in the application code.

Embedded operating systems

As illustrated in the previous sections of this chapter, building a scheduler tailored to a custom solution from scratch is not impossible and, if done properly, would provide the closest approximation of the desired architecture and focus on the specific characteristics offered by the target hardware. In a real-life scenario, however, it is advisable to consider one of the many embedded operating systems

options available and ready to be integrated into the architecture among those supporting the selected hardware platform, and providing the features that we have learned about in this chapter.

Many of the available kernel implementations for microcontrollers are open source and in a healthy development state, so they are deserving of their well-established role in the embedded market. A few of them are sufficiently popular and widely tested to provide a foundation for building reliable embedded multitasking applications.

OS selection

Selecting the operating system that best fits the purpose and the platform under development is a delicate task that impacts the overall architecture, may have consequences on the whole development model, and may introduce API lock-ins in the application code base. The criteria for selection vary according to the hardware characteristics, the integration with the other components, such as third-party libraries, the facilities offered to interact with peripherals and interfaces, and, most importantly, the range of use cases that the system is designed to cover.

With a few exceptions, operating systems include, alongside the scheduler and the memory management, a set of integrated libraries, modules, and tools. Depending on the purpose, an embedded OS may provide a suite that covers several areas, including the following:

- Platform-specific hardware abstraction layers
- Device drivers for common peripherals
- TCP/IP stack integration for connectivity
- Filesystems and file abstractions
- Integrated power management systems

Depending on the implementation of the thread model in the scheduler, some systems are expected to run with a fixed amount of predefined tasks, configured at compile time, while others opt for more complex processes and thread hierarchies that allow us to create new threads at runtime, and terminate them at any point in the execution. However, dynamic task creation and termination are rarely a requirement on embedded systems, and in most of these cases, an alternative design may help us work around it.

More complex systems introduce some overhead due to the additional logic in the system exceptions code and are less fit for critical real-time operations, which is the reason why most successful RTOSs nowadays maintain their simple architecture, providing the bare minimum to run multiple threads with a flat-memory mode that is easy to manage and does not require additional context switches to manage the privilege of the operations, keeping the latency low and measurable to comply with real-time requirements.

Due to the many options available and the continuous evolution following technological progress, providing an exhaustive list of operating systems for embedded devices is outside the scope of this book. Unlike the PC domain, where less than a handful of operating systems dominate the entire market, the several embedded OSs are all very different from each other in terms of their design, APIs, drivers, supported hardware, and build tools.

In this last section of this chapter, we will explore two of the most popular open-source operating systems for embedded devices, FreeRTOS and Riot OS, by comparing their design choices for parallel task execution, memory management, and accessory features available.

FreeRTOS

Possibly the most popular among the open-source operating systems for embedded devices, approaching 20 years of active development at the time of writing, FreeRTOS is extremely portable across many embedded platforms, with tens of available hardware ports and support for most, if not all, embedded CPU architectures.

Designed with a small code footprint and simple interfaces in mind, this system does not offer a complete driver's platform or advanced CPU-specific features, but rather focuses on two things: real-time scheduling of the threads and heap memory management. The simplicity of its design allows it to be ported to a large number of platforms and keeps the development focus on a restricted amount of well-tested and reliable operations.

On the other hand, third-party libraries and example code provided by hardware manufacturers often integrate FreeRTOS into their software kit, most of the time as the only alternative to the bare-metal approach for test applications and examples. Since third-party code is not directly included in FreeRTOS, this promotes competition among different solutions, as, for example, it is possible to integrate it with many TCP/IP stack implementations to provide networking support, even though none of them are part of the core system or tightly integrated with the kernel. Device drivers are not included in the kernel, but there are several demos of complete systems based on the integration of FreeRTOS with board support packages both distributed by the manufacturers or as part of a broader ecosystem, where FreeRTOS is included as a kernel.

The scheduler is preemptive, with fixed priority levels and priority inheritance through shared mutexes. Priority levels and stack space sizes for all threads are decided upon when the thread is created. A typical FreeRTOS application starts from its `main` function, which is in charge of initializing the threads and starting the scheduler. A new task can be spawned using the `xTaskCreate` function:

```
xTaskCreate(task_entry_fn, "TaskName", task_stack_size,  
           ( void * ) custom_params, priority, task_handle);
```

The first parameter is a pointer to the `main` function, which will be the entry point for the task. When the entry point of the task is invoked, the custom parameters, which are specified as the fourth parameter here, will be passed as the sole argument for the function, allowing us to share a user-

defined parameter with the thread upon task creation. The second argument of `xTaskCreate` is just the name of the task in a printable string, which is used for debugging purposes. The third and fifth parameters specify the stack size and the priority for this task, respectively. Finally, the last argument is an optional pointer to the internal struct of the task that will be populated when `xTaskCreate` returns, if a valid pointer was provided. This object, which is of the `TaskHandle_t` type, is required to access some of the task functionalities, such as task notifications or generic task utilities.

Once the application has created its tasks, the main function invokes the main scheduler by calling the following:

```
vTaskStartScheduler();
```

If everything goes well, this function never returns and the main function of the application becomes the actual kernel task, which is in charge of scheduling the tasks defined earlier and newer tasks that can be added later on.

One of the most interesting features offered by FreeRTOS is heap memory management, which is available in five flavors optimized for different designs:

- **Heap 1:** Allows only one-time, static allocation in the heap, with no possibility of freeing up the memory. This is useful if the applications can allocate all the space needed at the beginning, as the memory will never become available to the system again.
- **Heap 2:** Allows freeing memory, but does not reassemble the freed blocks. This mechanism is suitable for implementations with a limited number of heap allocations, especially if they keep the same size as previously freed objects. If used improperly, this model may result in a heavily fragmented stack with the risk of running out of heap in the long run, even if the total size of the allocated object does not increase, due to the lack of memory reorganization.
- **Heap 3:** This method is a wrapper for a `malloc/free` implementation provided by a third-party library that ensures that the wrapped memory operations become thread-safe when used within the FreeRTOS multithreading context. This model allows us to define a custom memory management method by defining the `malloc/free` function in a separate model, or by using the library implementation and attaching the `sbrk()` system call, as seen in *Chapter 5, Memory Management*.
- **Heap 4:** This is a more advanced memory manager with support for memory coalescence. Contiguous `free` blocks are merged and some housekeeping is done to optimize the use of the heap across heterogeneous allocations from different threads. This method limits the fragmentation of the heap and improves memory usage in the long run.
- **Heap 5:** This method uses the same mechanism as heap 4, but allows us to define multiple non-contiguous memory regions to be part of the same heap space. This method is a ready-to-use solution for physical fragmentation, provided that the regions are defined during initialization time and provided to the system through the available API.

Selecting a specific heap model consists of including one of the available source files defining the same functions with different implementations. These files are part of the FreeRTOS distribution under recognizable names (`heap_1.c`, `heap_2.c`, and so on). Only one is chosen and must be linked to the final application to manage memory.

The important functions that are exposed by the heap memory manager in FreeRTOS are `pvPortMalloc` and `pvPortFree`, both of which have similar signatures and effects as the `malloc` and `free` functions that we saw in *Chapter 5, Memory Management*.

Support for MPU and thread mode is available, and threads can be run in restricted mode, where the only memory that is accessible is the one assigned to the specific thread. When running threads in restricted mode, the system API is still available as the system functions are mapped in a specific area in memory. The main safety strategy consists of voluntarily placing tasks in restricted mode and defining memory access boundaries by allowing the task to only access its own stack and up to three configurable regions in the mapped memory.

Low-power management is limited to sleep mode, and no deep sleep mechanism is implemented by default. The system, however, allows us to redefine the scheduler callback functions to enter custom low-power modes, which may be used as starting points to implement tailored power-saving strategies.

Recent versions of FreeRTOS include specific distributions with third-party code as a starting point for building a secure connected platform for IoT systems. The same authors have created a TCP/IP stack that is designed for FreeRTOS, and it is distributed in a FreeRTOS Plus bundle package alongside the kernel and wolfSSL library to support secure socket communication.

RIOT OS

Mostly built on top of constrained microcontrollers, such as the Cortex-M0, low-power embedded systems are often little, battery-powered, or energy-harvesting devices, sporadically connecting to remote services using wireless technologies. These small, inexpensive systems are used in both IoT projects and install-and-forget scenarios, where they can operate for years on a single integrated power source with nearly no maintenance costs.

Bare-metal architectures are still very popular in these use cases. However, a few very lightweight operating systems have been designed to organize and synchronize tasks using as few resources as possible, while still keeping a specific focus on power saving and connectivity. The challenge when developing this kind of operating system is to find a way to fit complex networking protocols into a few kilobytes of memory. Future-proof systems designed for the IoT services offer native IPv6 networking, often through 6LoWPAN, and fully equipped yet minimalist TCP/IP stacks, designed to sacrifice throughput in favor of smaller memory footprints.

Due to their small code size, these systems may lack some advanced features by design. For example, they may not provide any memory safety strategies, or have a limited connectivity stack to save resources. It is not uncommon to have these kinds of systems run on a UDP-only network stack.

Riot OS has a fast-growing community of enthusiasts and system developers. The goal of the project is to provide a system designed for low power consumption, taking into account the requirements to integrate the device into larger distributed systems. The core system is very scalable, as single components can be excluded at compile time.

The approach used by Riot OS differs from the minimalist concept we saw in FreeRTOS, where the bare minimum amount of code is part of the core operating system, and everything else is integrated as external components. Riot OS offers a wide selection of libraries and device support code, including network stacks and wireless drivers communication, which makes this system particularly IoT-friendly. Components that are not part of the core functionality of the OS are divided into optional modules, with a custom, makefile-based build system designed to facilitate the inclusion of the modules in the application.

From an API point of view, the choice of the Riot community is an attempt to mimic the POSIX interface as much as possible. This improves the experience of embedded application development for programmers coming from different backgrounds and is used to write code using the APIs offered by the standard C language to access the resources on the system. The system, however, still runs on a flat model. Privilege separation is not implemented at the system level, and user space applications are still supposed to access system resources by referencing the system memory directly.

As an additional safety measure, the MPU can be used to detect stack overflows in the single threads by placing a small read-only area at the bottom of the stack, which triggers an exception if threads are attempting to write past the limit of their assigned stack space.

Riot implements a few communication stacks as modules, including a minimalist IP stack called **GNRC**. GNRC is an IPv6-only implementation tailored to the features of the underlying 802.15.4 network and provides a socket implementation to write lightweight IoT applications. The support for networking includes a lwIP compatibility layer. lwIP is included as a module to provide more complete TCP/IP implementations when required. WolfSSL is also available in a module, opening up possibilities for securing socket communication using the latest TLS version, as well as utilizing cryptography functionality to secure data at rest, for example.

One of the features offered by Riot is access to the configuration of low-power modes, which is integrated into the system through the power management module. This module provides an abstraction for managing platform-specific features, such as the stop and standby modes on Cortex-M platforms. Low-power modes can be activated at runtime from the application code to facilitate the integration of low-power strategies in the architecture. This is done using the real-time clock, the watchdog timer, or other external signals to return to normal running mode.

The scheduler in Riot OS is tickless and based mostly on cooperation. Tasks can suspend themselves explicitly by calling the `task_yield` function, or by calling any of the blocking functions to access kernel features (such as IPC and timers) and hardware peripherals. Riot OS does not enforce any concurrency based on timeslices; a task is forcibly interrupted uniquely in case a hardware interrupt

is received. Programming applications with this scheduler requires particular attention, because accidentally creating a busy loop in one task may lock up the entire system to starvation.

Tasks in Riot OS can be created through the `thread_create` function:

```
thread_create(task_stack_mem, task_stack_size, priority,  
             flags, task_entry_fn, (void*)custom_args, "TaskName");
```

While the syntax of `thread_create` may look similar to that of the equivalent function in FreeRTOS, we can spot a few differences in the approach to the two schedulers. In Riot OS, for example, the memory reserved for the stack space of the task being created must be allocated by the caller. The stack space cannot be automatically allocated upon task creation, which means more code in the caller but also more flexibility for customizing the location of each stack space in memory. As we mentioned previously, the scheduler is tickless, so there is no necessity to start it manually. Tasks can be created and stopped at any time during the execution.

Being designed for embedded targets with little RAM available, the use of dynamically allocated memory is discouraged in Riot OS. However, the system offers three different approaches for heap memory management:

- **One-time static allocation:** Similar to the FreeRTOS “heap 1” model, this allocator does not offer any facilities to free or reuse memory areas. Once allocated, the memory is reserved and never released. By default, the `malloc` function uses this implementation, and the `free` function has no effect.
- **Memory-array allocator:** A statically allocated buffer can be used as a memory pool for pseudo-dynamic allocation requests of a fixed, predefined size. This allocator may be useful in those scenarios where multiple buffers of the same size are handled by the application. This allocator has a custom API and does not modify the behavior of the default `malloc` function.
- **Two-level segregate fit (TLSF) allocator:** This allocator supports multiple memory pools based on an algorithm optimized for RTOS and provides dynamic memory support while dealing with real-time deadlines. The support for TLSF `malloc` is available as an optional module. When compiled in, the module replaces the `malloc` and `free` functions provided by the one-time allocator, which is then disabled.

Riot OS is an interesting choice as a starting point for IoT systems. It provides a wide range of device drivers and modules, built and integrated on top of a lightweight and energy-aware core system, including a microkernel with a pre-emptive scheduler.

Summary

In this chapter, we explored the typical components of an embedded operating system by implementing one from scratch, with the only purpose of studying the internals of the system, how the various mechanisms can be integrated into the scheduler, and how blocking calls, driver APIs, and synchronization mechanisms can be provided to tasks.

We then analyzed the components of two of the many very popular open-source, real-time operating systems for embedded microcontrollers, namely FreeRTOS and Riot OS, to highlight the differences in the design choices, implementation, and APIs provided for the applications to work with threads and memory management.

At this point, we can select the most appropriate OS for our architecture, and even write one ourselves when needed, by implementing our favorite scheduling, priority mechanisms, privilege separation between tasks and the kernel itself, and memory segmentation.

In the next chapter, we will take a closer look at **Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs)**, with a particular focus on the TrustZone-M features recently introduced by ARM in their latest family of microcontrollers, which adds a new orthogonal level of privilege separation.

Trusted Execution Environment

An important step in the technological evolution of microcontroller hardware architecture has been recently achieved with the introduction of a domain separation mechanism, which is already present in other architectures, where it is usually referred to as a **Trusted Execution Environment**, or **TEE**.

TEE is an abstraction that provides two or more separated execution domains, or “worlds”, with different capabilities and permissions to access devices, resources, and peripherals.

Isolating the execution environment of one or more software components and modules, also generally known as **sandboxing**, consists of limiting their view of the system, without impacting their performance and normal operation. This is a requirement for many use cases and domains in computer science, and not only for increasing the security of embedded systems.

Similar hardware-assisted isolation mechanisms in other domains are the building blocks of the cloud server infrastructure as we know it today, in the form of virtualization extensions and security isolation mechanisms that allow us to run multiple “guest” virtual machines or containers simultaneously on the same hardware.

The concepts and technologies analyzed in this chapter are as follows:

- Sandboxing
- TrustZone-M
- System resources separation
- Building and running the example

By the end of this chapter, you will have learned about TEE and how to configure and use TrustZone-M on Cortex-M microcontrollers to obtain two separate execution domains.

Technical requirements

In order to run the proposed example available in this book's repository, an STM32L552 microcontroller is required. The TrustZone-M technology is only supported by the newest family of ARM Cortex-M microcontrollers. The STM32L552 is a Cortex-M33, fully supporting TrustZone-M, which makes it a convenient and affordable choice for taking our first steps when learning about this technology.

The code files for this chapter are available at <https://github.com/PacktPublishing/Embedded-Systems-Architecture-Second-Edition/tree/main/Chapter11>.

Sandboxing

Sandboxing is a generic concept in computer security that refers to a set of hardware and software measures that limit the “view” of the system for one or more of its components, to restrict the area of the system affected by accidental malfunctions or purportedly forged malicious attacks and prevent them from spreading across the entire system. Sandboxing can have different forms and implementations, which may or may not leverage specific hardware functionalities to improve safety and effectiveness.

By the term TEE, we refer to those sandbox mechanisms that involve the CPU keeping track of the secure status of the running code at all times, without significantly impacting the performance of the running application. Due to these TEE mechanisms being intrinsically bonded to the CPU design, TEE behavior, management, and communication models in sandboxes differ across heterogeneous platforms and heavily depend on the architecture. Moreover, TEEs can be used for different purposes, often in combination with cryptography to preserve the integrity and authenticity of software through a hardware root of trust.

In 2005, Intel implemented the first virtualization instructions (Intel VT) for x86 processors to run isolated virtual machine code natively (as opposed to emulating the CPU in a dedicated process on the host machine), by providing the hardware-assisted virtualization of the core components (CPU, RAM, and peripherals). Intel CPUs limit the access of the guest virtual machines to the real hardware using an extension of the existing hierarchical protection domains, often simply called **rings**, already used for kernel/userspace separation.

Virtual machines are not the only use case of TEE on x86 processors. Intel **Software Guard Extensions (SGX)** is a set of security-related instructions present in many x86 CPUs, protecting specific memory regions, or enclaves, from unauthorized access. While these instructions have been recently removed from consumer Intel CPUs, they are still present in specific microprocessors in the cloud and enterprise hardware segment. SGX can be used for several purposes, such as providing a secure vault to hide secret keys to be used securely by the applications. Originally, however, they were introduced to fulfill the specific task of implementing **Digital Rights Management (DRM)** on PCs, which would have enforced copyright protection on media and proprietary software content by authorizing access to the protected content only to pre-authorized, signed software applications. In this setup, the adversaries that TEE protects the system against are the final users themselves.

Later on, AMD added vendor-specific architecture extensions to their CPUs, grouped into a technology called **Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)**. In addition to providing a sandbox for running virtual machines managed by a hypervisor, SEV uses hardware-assisted encryption to ensure the confidentiality of the content of single memory pages, and even CPU registers, during execution.

The Intel architectures, however, were not the first ones to introduce CPU-assisted, built-in, secure extensions. ARM started research on trusted computing in the early 2000s and finally announced support for a technology called TrustZone in 2003. Modern ARM microprocessors, such as those in the Cortex-A family, support a technology called TrustZone-A, which implements two separate Secure (S) and Non-Secure (NS) worlds, the latter having a restricted pre-configured view on the actual system, while the former is capable of accessing all the hardware resources directly.

To find the first microcontrollers implementing TEE, we have to look at the recently designed RISC-V architecture. Both microprocessors and microcontrollers within the RISC-V families offer complete sandboxes separate from each other, in both 32-bit and 64-bit architectures that implement “S” or “U” extensions. Each hardware-assisted container provides a subset of the resources available on the system and runs its own firmware.

Finally, the newest family of microcontrollers by ARM, the ARMv8-M family, includes the extensions and the microcode needed to implement isolation between secure and non-secure execution domains, based on the existing and well-oiled TrustZone technology design. This feature is called TrustZone-M, and it is the specific technology that we will be focusing on in more detail later in this chapter. ARMv8-M is a direct evolution of the ARMv7-M family of microcontrollers that have been used as a reference platform in all the previous chapters of this book.

The rest of this chapter will refer exclusively to TrustZone-M and how to configure and develop components in an embedded system, implementing TEE on the ARMv8-M family of microcontrollers. The term TrustZone from now on will refer specifically to the TrustZone-M technology.

TrustZone-M

ARMv7-M cores, such as the Cortex-M0+ and Cortex-M4 microcontrollers, have dominated the embedded market for decades and are still the most popular choice for many embedded system designs. Although there have been a number of changes and additions, the new Cortex-M23 and Cortex-M33 cores, as well as the newer M35P and M55, have inherited and expanded many of the successful features of the Cortex-M0, Cortex-M4, and Cortex-M7 microcontrollers.

In a typical TrustZone use case, multiple actors may be involved in the distinct phases of software development. The owner of a device may provide a base system, already equipped with all the software authorized to run in the secure world. This would still leave the possibility for a system integrator to customize the non-secure part but with a restricted view of the system, which depends on the configuration of the resources allowed by the secure domain. The system integrator in this case receives a system that is partially locked, with TrustZone enabled and flash memory protections in place to protect its integrity. The secure software provided supervises the execution of any custom software

in the non-secure domain, while preserving the resources mapped in the secure world and limiting access from the running application. System integrators without authorized access to the secure execution domain can still run privileged or non-privileged software in the non-secure world, thus including operating systems and device drivers that access the interfaces authorized, either directly, or with some assistance from the secure supervisor.

The example associated with this chapter can be compiled and run on the reference platform. This example is based on the bootloader example introduced in *Chapter 4, The Boot-Up Procedure*. This is due to the similarity of the structure of the TrustZone-based solution that we want to describe, because the software for the two execution domains is shipped into separate binaries. In the TrustZone case, the separation between bootloader code executing in the secure domain and staging an application running in the non-secure world will help us understand the elements and tools used to build, configure, and run the components on a real system.

The next subsection contains a description of the reference platform, and then we will briefly introduce the execution model behind the secure and non-secure domains, which will then bring us to a deeper analysis of the TrustZone-M units and controllers regulating resource separation on a system.

Reference platform

The microcontroller used for reference in the examples is the STM32L552, a Cortex-M33 CPU that can be found on development boards in the convenient Nucleo-144 format. The STM32L5 series of microcontrollers may be considered the closest evolution of the older STM32F4 series, targeting the same slice of the market by combining low-power modes with high performance. For this reason, a microcontroller in this series has been selected in this chapter as a reference platform for the examples provided. Most of the concepts and the components of the TrustZone-M technology that will be described are, however, applicable to all the microcontrollers in the ARMv8-M family available from ST Microelectronics and several other chip manufacturers.

On the STM32L552ZE, the CPU clock can be configured to run at 110 MHz. The microcontroller is equipped with 256 KB of SRAM, divided into two banks SRAM1 and SRAM2 mapped into separate regions. 512 KB of flash memory can be used as one contiguous space or configured as two separate banks. The ST microcontroller provides platform-specific libraries and tools that are not part of the provided examples, which as usual are based on a fresh implementation that begins with an understanding of the documentation. The only exception to this approach in the example we are going to introduce is the use of the STM32 programming command-line interface, `STM32_Programmer_CLI`, which can be used to display the current value of the programmable option bytes, just by connecting through the ST-Link debugger on board to the PC with a USB cable and running the following:

```
STM32_Programmer_CLI -c port=swd -ob displ
```

This tool will be useful to set the *option bytes* required to turn TrustZone on and off and set up other options for separating areas of flash memory. Values for option bytes are stored in non-volatile memory, and the values will be retained after the board has been powered off.

Important note

Modifying some of the option bytes accessible through a programmer tool may be irreversible and, in some cases, brick your device. Please refer to the reference manual and application notes of your microcontroller before changing any option.

One of the option bytes contains the TZEN flag, which should be disabled per the factory default. Only when TrustZone-M has been configured will we then enable it on the target to upload and run the example. The bootloader part in the secure world will be responsible for setting up the environment for the application, installed as a different binary, and executing it in the non-secure domain. We will then demonstrate the transitions between the two worlds by introducing new ARMv8 assembly instructions introduced for this purpose.

In the next subsection, we will introduce the extensions included in the ARMv8-M architecture for executing code and controlling execution domains. These extensions are generic and included in all the ARMv8-M microcontrollers that support TrustZone, and are the core component for the execution in separate domains.

Secure and non-secure execution domains

In *Chapter 10, Parallel Tasks and Scheduling*, we learned that resource separation among threads and between threads and the operating system is possible, with the help of memory segmentation. In the ARMv8-m family of microcontrollers, TrustZone-M is often referred to as a security extension because it does, in fact, add one additional level of privilege separation between software components that are running on the target. These security extensions do not replace the existing thread separation we implemented earlier in the safe version of the scheduler. Instead, they introduce an additional security mode on top of the existing separation.

Similar to how an OS running without these extensions enforces a separation between thread mode and privileged mode, and can set boundaries for accessing memory-mapped areas using a MPU, TrustZone-M adds **Secure (S)** and **Non-Secure (NS)** execution domains (or “worlds”) with CPU-controlled access to the single resources.

Within each of those worlds, it is still possible to implement privileged/thread separation by using the existing mechanism based on the CONTROL bit. Each security world can have its own privileged and non-privileged execution modes. An OS running in the NS world can still use the classic privilege separation that has been inherited from the previous ARMv7-M architecture. This creates a total of four available execution contexts that can be followed simultaneously by the CPU, summarized in this table as a combination of domain and privilege levels:

Secure world	Non-secure world
Secure privileged execution	Non-secure privileged execution
Secure thread execution	Non-secure thread execution

Table 11.1 – Available execution modes in secure/non-secure domains

As we pointed out in *Chapter 10, Parallel Tasks and Scheduling*, the Cortex-M4 provides two separate stack pointers (MSP and PSP) to keep track of the different contexts when executing threads or kernel code. In the Cortex-M33, there is a total of four different stack pointers, MSP_S, PSP_S, MSP_NS, and PSP_NS. Each stack pointer is aliased into the actual SP register during execution, depending on the current domain and context.

A very convenient feature has been added to the ARMv8-M architecture when MAIN extensions are present on the CPU, as in our reference platform. Each one of the four stack pointers has a corresponding **stack pointer limit (SPLIM)** register (called MSPLIM_S, PSPLIM_S, MSPLIM_NS, and PSPLIM_NS respectively). These registers indicate the lower limit for the stack pointer value in the four cases. This is in fact an effective countermeasure to the issues analyzed in the *Stack overflows* subsection in *Chapter 5, Memory Management*. The CPU will constantly check at runtime that the stack never grows past its lower limit in memory by generating an exception when this happens. This mechanism provides a better hardware-assisted way to protect memory from accidental stack overflows and collisions with other memory regions than the one proposed in the examples from *Chapter 5, Memory Management*, where we introduced a guard region between the two memory areas assigned to heap and stack.

We already analyzed how to switch between execution modes, and how setting or clearing the CONTROL bit while returning from system calls plays a role in the transactions between privilege and thread execution modes. The mechanisms for switching between secure and non-secure executions are implemented via specific assembly instructions, which we will explain later after introducing resource separation between secure and non-secure worlds.

To better understand what system resources the software running in the non-secure world may or may not access, the next section will go into detail about the different possibilities provided by the TrustZone-M controller modules to isolate and separate hardware resources.

System resources separation

When TrustZone-M is enabled, all areas mapped in memory, including RAM, peripherals, and even FLASH storage, receive a new security attribute. Besides the secure and non-secure domains, a security attribute may assume a third value, **Non-Secure Callable (NSC)**. This last attribute defines special regions of memory used to implement transactions from the non-secure world to the secure world through a specific mechanism, which will be explained in the last section, *Building and running the example*. An NSC area is used to offer secure APIs that act like system calls with new powers. The secure domain exposes service routines that can perform specific controlled actions while accessing secure resources from its non-secure counterpart.

Security attributes and memory regions

Cortex-M33 microcontrollers offer various levels of protection. The combination of the effects of those levels determines which of the memory-mapped areas associated with a resource on the system are available to both execution domains and which of them are only accessible from the secure world.

Enabling TrustZone-M will also duplicate the representation of some of the system resources. The flash memory usually mapped from the start of the address 0x08000000 has an alias in the region 0x0C000000, which is used to access the same storage from the secure world. Many system registers are “banked” and have secure and non-secure versions at separate memory locations. For example, the GPIOA controller is mapped to the address 0x42020000 when TrustZone is disabled. When TrustZone is enabled, the same address is used by software running in the non-secure domain if the GPIOA controller is accessible from the non-secure world. However, software running in the secure domain will use the same controller mapped from the start of the address 0x52020000. The same banking applies to many other registers in the peripheral region, which have secure and non-secure versions of the same registers mapped into two separate regions.

Before being processed by other TrustZone-aware components, each memory access is monitored and filtered by two units responsible for configuring the attributes. These are the **Security Attribution Unit (SAU)** and **Implementation-Defined Attribution Unit (IDAU)**. These units affect the accessibility of the entire memory mapping regardless of the type of resource associated with each region. While the SAU is configurable through a set of registers, the IDAU contains hardcoded mappings enforced by the chip manufacturer. The combination of the attributes of IDAU and SAU influences the accessibility of each memory-mapped region, the following in particular:

- Regions mapped as secure by IDAU are not influenced by SAU attributes and will always stay mapped as secure
- Regions mapped as NSC by IDAU can be secure or NSC, based on the SAU attribute
- Regions mapped as non-secure by IDAU will follow the SAU mapping

The combination of the attributes and the resulting mapping for each region is summarized in the following table:

IDAU attribute	SAU attribute	Resulting attribute
Secure	Secure, NSC, or Non-secure	Secure
NSC	Secure	Secure
Non-secure	Secure	Secure
NSC	NSC or Non-secure	NSC
Non-secure	NSC	NSC
Non-secure	Non-secure	Non-secure

Table 11.2 – A combination of IDAU and SAU attributes

By default, our IDAU in the STM32L552 reference platform enforces the secure/NSC mapping of a few key regions:

- The flash memory mapping in secure space, starting at the address 0x0C000000
- The second SRAM bank, SRAM2, mapped from the start of the address 0x30000000

- The memory between 0x50000000 and 0x5FFFFFFF, reserved for secure peripherals' control and configuration

The SAU sets all the regions as secure upon reset and is disabled by default. To execute non-secure code, we must define at least two non-secure regions within the intervals allowed by the IDAU configuration.

In our example, we initialize a few memory areas to allow access from the applications, before enabling SAU. SAU is controlled through four main 32-bit registers:

- **SAU_CTRL** (SAU control): Used to activate SAU. It contains a flag to “invert” the logic of the SAU filter, by setting all the memory regions as non-secure.
- **SAU_RNR** (SAU region number register): Contains the region number to select at the beginning of the configuration procedure for the memory regions. Further writes to SAU_RBAR and SAU_RLAR will refer to this numbered region.
- **SAU_RBAR** (SAU region base address register): Indicates the base address of the region that we want to configure.
- **SAU_RLAR** (SAU region limit address register): Contains the end address of the region to configure. The least significant 5 bits are reserved for flags. Bit 1, when on, indicates that the region is secure or non-secure callable. Bit 0 enables the region and indicates that its configuration is complete.

In the following example code, you can find the `sau_init_region` convenience function. Given a region identifier, base address, end address, and secure bit value, it will set all the register values accordingly:

```
static void sau_init_region(uint32_t region,
    uint32_t start_addr,
    uint32_t end_addr,
    int secure)
{
    uint32_t secure_flag = 0;
    if (secure)
        secure_flag = SAU_REG_SECURE;
    SAU_RNR = region & SAU_REGION_MASK;
    SAU_RBAR = start_addr & SAU_ADDR_MASK;
    SAU_RLAR = (end_addr & SAU_ADDR_MASK)
        | secure_flag | SAU_REG_ENABLE;
}
```

This function is called by the `secure_world_init` initialization function to map the four SAU regions that we want to configure for this example, which are, specifically, the following:

- **Region 0:** An non-secure callable section, where our secure API that is callable from the non-secure application will be stored. In this example, we expose a single function called `nsc_blue_led_toggle`, which will be the only way that the application can access an otherwise secure-only GPIO, wired to the blue LED on the Nucleo board.
- **Region 1:** An non-secure area in the flash, starting from the address `0x08040000`. This is where the code of our non-secure application will reside.
- **Region 2:** An non-secure part of the SRAM1 bank that can be used by the non-secure application for the stack and variables. This is a necessary step to ensure the application can access RAM addresses.
- **Region 3:** The non-secure peripheral control mapped at the address `0x40000000`, including the non-secure GPIO controllers. This area will be accessed by the non-secure application to set the system clock and control the green led in the example.

The code for the SAU initialization in the example is the following:

```
static void secure_world_init(void)
{
    /* Non-secure callable: NSC functions area */
    sau_init_region(0, 0x0C001000, 0x0C001FFF, 1);

    /* Non-secure: application flash area */
    sau_init_region(1, 0x08040000, 0x0804FFFF, 0);

    /* Non-secure RAM region in SRAM1 */
    sau_init_region(2, 0x20018000, 0x2002FFFF, 0);

    /* Non-secure: internal peripherals */
    sau_init_region(3, 0x40000000, 0x4FFFFFFF, 0);
}
```

The code in the tail of this function activates the SAU and enables a specific handler that detects secure faults:

```
/* Enable SAU */
SAU_CTRL = SAU_INIT_CTRL_ENABLE;

/* Enable securefault handler */
SCB_SHCSR |= SCB_SHCSR_SECUREFAULT_EN;
}
```

By default, enabling SAU would mark all regions as secure, so each region configuration trims an non-secure or non-secure callable “window” within the addressable memory space. Region 0 is the only region marked with the NSC flag in our example configuration, which means that NSC code (explained later) will be installed here by the secure application. Regions 1, 2, and 3 are the only memory areas that may be accessed when running in the non-secure domain with TrustZone-M enabled.

As previously mentioned, IDAU/SAU is just the first level of filters for the TrustZone-M protection mechanisms. Flash memory and RAM are protected by additional secure gates, which can be block-based or watermark-based. The STM32L552 microcontroller is equipped with a **Global TrustZone Controller (GTZC)**, which includes one watermark-based gate controller for the flash and one block-based to define secure/non-secure RAM blocks.

Flash memory and secure watermarks

On the target platform, flash memory can be configured to be mapped as a single, contiguous space, or split in half by activating a dual bank configuration. For the sake of our TrustZone-M example, we will keep the flash memory in a single bank.

In this configuration, when TrustZone is enabled, we can assign an non-secure area in the higher half of the contiguous flash memory space, starting at the address 0x08040000. When the flash is divided into two banks, each bank can configure its own independent secure watermark. The flash area in between the start/end addresses is marked as secure, and everything left outside of the marks is non-secure. The secure area in each bank is delimited by the value of the option bytes, SECWMx_PSTRT and SECWMx_PEND. If the delimiters overlap – that is, when the value of SECWMx_PEND is bigger than that of SECWMx_PSTRT – the entire area is marked as non-secure.

Their value can be modified using the programmer tool provided, as shown here:

```
STM32_Programmer_CLI -c port=swd -ob SECWM1_PSTRT=0
SECWM1_PEND=0x39
```

In single-bank mode, each flash sector is 4096 B. By setting these option bytes, we are marking the first 64 sectors (from 0x00 to 0x39) as secure, which leaves the other half of the flash, starting from the address 0x08040000, to be used by the non-secure application in our example. The programmer tool, launched with the `-ob displ` option, will show the following:

```
Secure Area 1:
SECWM1_PSTRT : 0x0   (0x8000000)
SECWM1_PEND  : 0x39  (0x8039000)
```

GTZC configuration and block-based SRAM protection

An additional gate to control access is present in the TrustZone controller on the reference platform. The block-based gate component of the GTZC allows us to configure the secure-only bit to portions of SRAM. SRAM on STM32L552 is divided into two main banks:

- SRAM1: 192 KB of RAM mapped at the address 0x08000000
- SRAM2: 64 KB of RAM mapped at the address 0x30000000 and set as NSC in IDAU

In our example, we are marking the higher half of SRAM1, starting at the address 0x2018000, as non-secure. To do so, the GTZC provides two sets of registers, one for each bank, to configure the block-based gate to each page in RAM. Each block represents 256B, and each 32-bit register, by holding one secure bit per block, can map 32 pages, also defined as an 8 KB superblock. 24 registers are required to map the 24 superblocks for a total of 192 KB in SRAM1, and only 8 are required to map the 64 KB area in SRAM2.

Like for the SAU initialization, once again the approach taken in the example relies on a convenient macro that, given a memory bank, the superblock number, and its register value, calculates the address for the right register that refers to the superblock and generates the right assignment statement:

```
#define SET_GTZC_MPCBBx_S_VCTR(bank,n,val) \
  (*(volatile uint32_t *) (GTZC_MPCBB##bank##_S_VCTR_BASE) \
    + n ) = val
```

This way we can easily configure block-based gates of contiguous regions within a loop. The secure-world application example uses the following function to configure the block-based gates for the two banks:

```
static void gtzc_init(void)
{
    int i;
    /* Configure lower half of SRAM1 as secure */
    for (i = 0; i < 12; i++) {
        SET_GTZC_MPCBBx_S_VCTR(1, i, 0xFFFFFFFF);
    }
    /* Configure upper half of SRAM1 as non-secure */
    for (i = 12; i < 24; i++) {
        SET_GTZC_MPCBBx_S_VCTR(1, i, 0x0);
    }

    /* Configure SRAM2 as secure */
    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
```

```

        SET_GTZC_MPCBBx_S_VCTR(2, i, 0xFFFFFFFF);
    }
}

```

We now have everything required to run the simplest non-secure application on the system; we have defined the non-secure areas in SAU, set the watermark for the separation of the flash memory, and finally, set the block-based gates to enable non-secure access to the higher half of SRAM1.

There is, however, another aspect that deserves attention, and that is the possibility of configuring secure access to peripherals.

Configuring secure access to peripherals

On the reference platforms, peripherals are divided into two categories:

- **Securable peripherals:** Peripherals are not directly connected to a local bus, but through a gate system controlled by the **TrustZone Secure Controller (TZSC)**
- **TrustZone-aware peripherals:** These are peripherals that integrate with TrustZone mechanisms – for example, by offering separate interfaces to access their resources, depending on the execution domain

For the first category of peripherals, the configuration of the secure access and privileged access within secure and non-secure domains can be configured through the TZSC registers within the GTZC. At system startup, all devices are set as secure by default, so to enable access to UART, I2C, timers, and other peripherals, it will be necessary to turn off the secure bit associated with the specific controller.

TrustZone-aware peripherals have banked registers for both secure domains. In the next example, we configure three GPIO controllers (GPIOA, GPIOB, and GPIOC), which are connected to the LEDs on the Nucleo-144 board, via pins C7 (the green LED), B7 (the blue LED), and A9 (the red LED). The GPIO controller registers, when TrustZone is enabled, are banked into two regions. You will notice in the example code the difference between the two LED driver interfaces in the secure and non-secure applications. In the secure version of `led.h`, we define the following address base for the GPIO controller registers:

```

#define GPIOA_BASE 0x52020000
#define GPIOB_BASE 0x52020400
#define GPIOC_BASE 0x52020800

```

The same controllers, in the non-secure world application, are mapped in the non-secure peripheral address space:

```

#define GPIOA_BASE 0x42020000
#define GPIOB_BASE 0x42020400
#define GPIOC_BASE 0x42020800

```

This ensures that the GPIO configuration is accessible only through the interface assigned to the non-secure space when running in the non-secure domain.

Additionally, each GPIO controller provides an interface to secure each single controlled pin. This is achieved through a write-only register controlling the secure and non-secure access with a flag corresponding to each pin. The register is called `GPIOx_SECCFG` and is located at an offset of `0x24` in each GPIO controller space. This is only accessible for writing when running in a secure domain.

In the example, we define functions to set/clear the secure bit for each GPIO pin connected to the three LEDs. For example, we can set the secure state of the red LED, before staging the non-secure application to disallow changing the LED state in the application by calling `red_led_secure(1)`, which is implemented as follows:

```
void red_led_secure(int onoff)
{
    if (onoff)
        GPIOA_SECCFG |= (1 << RED_LED);
    else
        GPIOA_SECCFG &= ~(1 << RED_LED);
}
```

Our secure-world example application in fact restricts access to the blue and red LED before staging while allowing access to the green LED:

```
red_led_secure(1);
green_led_secure(0);
blue_led_secure(1);
```

After the domain switch, the non-secure application will attempt to turn on all three LEDs, but only the green one will actually be turned on, and the other will stay off because access through the non-secure interface is gated by the SECCFG bit set in the secure world and has no effect on the GPIO.

Blinking the blue LED, however, will still be done using a special non-secure callable interface, explained in the *Inter-domain transitions* subsection in the next section.

After configuring all the securable and TrustZone-aware peripherals, we are finally ready to build and install the firmware images for the two domains and observe their effects on the system.

Building and running the example

Finally, we are putting all we have learned about TrustZone-M into practice, by activating the option flags needed to enable TrustZone-M and running the two software components associated with the execution domains.

Enabling TrustZone-M

By default, TrustZone-M is turned off on our microcontroller when it is in its factory state. Turning on TrustZone is a one-way operation, but it is typically not irreversible unless combined with other hardware-assisted protection mechanisms that make it impossible to disable it when the embedded system is deployed. Disabling TrustZone once enabled, however, requires a more complex procedure than just clearing one bit in a register.

Important note

Please refer to your microcontroller's reference manual and application notes, and ensure that you understand the procedure and the consequences of enabling or attempting to disable TrustZone-M on your device.

On the reference platform, to enable TrustZone, we set the associated flag in the option bytes via the following command:

```
STM32_Programmer_CLI -c port=swd mode=hotplug -ob TZEN=1
```

Once TrustZone has been enabled, we can build and install the secure firmware. The next subsection highlights some important aspects to consider when building the secure part of the system.

Secure application entry point

The regions defined in the secure-world linker script reflect the system resources as seen by the secure firmware. We allocate a RAM region covering the lower half of the SRAM1 bank:

```
RAM (rwx) : ORIGIN = 0x20000000, LENGTH = 0x00018000
```

Our `.text` and `.data` LMSes end up in the FLASH region, mapped to its secure-domain address:

```
FLASH (rx) : ORIGIN = 0x0C000000, LENGTH = 0x1000
```

For our simple example, 4 KB is enough to store the bootloader image. Additionally, we define a non-secure callable area, which will contain the implementation of our secure stubs. This is an area dedicated to accessing secure APIs from the non-secure world through pre-defined inter-domain special function calls:

```
FLASH_NSC(rx) : ORIGIN = 0x0C001000, LENGTH = 0x1000
```

The entry point of the secure application on the reference platform is hardcoded in the option bytes. Before installing our image, we must ensure that the option bytes for SECBOOTADD0 are configured to point to the address 0x0C000000, which is the beginning of the flash memory in the secure system view. If, for any reason, the value has been previously modified, it can be restored via the following command:

```
STM32_Programmer_CLI -c port=swd mode=hotplug -ob
SECBOOTADD0=0x180000
```

This is because the granularity of SECBOOTADD0 is 128 bytes, so setting a value of 0x180000 will result in a pointer to the address 0x0C000000.

This last value completes the setup of option bytes, so we are finally ready to build and install the secure application.

A list of the option bytes and their values, assigned in order to configure the target run of the example code, is provided in the repository of this book, in the `Chapter11/option-bytes.txt` file.

Compiling and linking secure-world applications

If you look in the Makefile for the secure-world application, you will notice two new flags have been introduced in the build process. gcc requires us to use the `-mcmse` flag to indicate that we are compiling secure code for a TrustZone system. By adding this flag, we are telling the compiler to generate **Secure Gateway (SG)** stubs for the functions that are marked as non-secure callable. When compiling sources marked as secure, gcc allows specific attributes to mark our secure API calls. In our example, we define a secure API call that will allow non-secure code to toggle the value of the GPIO pin connected to the blue LED. The non-secure callable function is defined in the secure application code; in the case of the example, it is contained in the `nsc_led.c` file:

```
void __attribute__((cmse_nonsecure_entry))
nsc_blue_led_toggle(void)
{
    if ((GPIOB_ODR & (1 << BLUE_LED)) == (1 << BLUE_LED))
        blue_led_off();
    else
        blue_led_on();
}
```

The `__attribute__((cmse_nonsecure_entry))` compiler attribute tells gcc to generate the SG stub for this function. The `FLASH_NSC` section that we defined in the linker script is used to store the SG stubs for the secure API that we configure. The SG stubs are automatically placed in a section called `.gnu.sgstubs`, which we place in the `FLASH_NSC` region in the example linker script:

```
.gnu.sgstubs :
{
```

```

. = ALIGN(4);
*(.gnu.sgstubs) /* Secure Gateway stubs */
. = ALIGN(4);
} >FLASH_NSC

```

The extra linker flags, `--cmse-implib` and `--out-implib=led_cmse.o`, have a different purpose that does not directly affect the secure domain. When linking the secure application, by adding these flags we are asking the linker to create a new object file, which will not be linked in the final secure application. This new object file instead will be linked in the non-secure world application and contains the veneers for the secure API. These veneers prepare the jump from non-secure to non-secure callable world. In other words, this new file, `led_cmse.o`, is the non-secure world counterpart implementation of the secure calls through a non-secure callable SG stub. The veneers are generated by the linker and contain the code needed to jump to the non-secure callable stub. To recap, to build the secure application, we need to introduce two specific set of flags:

- The `-mcmse` compile time flag, which tells gcc that we are generating secure code for TrustZone and enables SG stubs for non-secure entry points
- The `-cmse-implib` and `-out-implib=...` linker flags, which tell the linker to generate veneers in object file formats, which in turn will be linked to the non-secure domain to access the associated secure API calls

Once built using make, the secure firmware image can be uploaded to the device flash, using the following command:

```
STM32_Programmer_CLI -c port=swd -d bootloader.bin 0x0C000000
```

The microcontroller flash is now populated with the secure firmware, our enhanced bootloader that is ready to set up all the parameters in the TrustZone controller and stage the non-secure application. The obvious next step is to compile and install the non-secure world counterpart.

Compiling and linking non-secure applications

The linker script for our non-secure application defines the boundaries for the world as seen from the non-secure execution domain. Secure and NSC regions are not reachable from here. Our view on the flash memory is restricted to its upper half, and the accessible RAM is limited to the upper half of the SRAM1 bank. The `target.ld` linker script in the non-secure application defines these regions as follows:

```

FLASH (rx) : ORIGIN = 0x08040000, LENGTH = 256K
RAM (rwx) : ORIGIN = 0x20018000, LENGTH = 96K

```

From this point onward, the build process is similar to building normal applications with no support for TrustZone. Unlike its secure counterpart, non-secure applications do not require any special compiler or linker flags.

The noticeable exception consists of the extra object file generated by the secure application build process, which allows the non-secure application to briefly interact with the secure world. The contract between the secure and non-secure domains consists of the secure API defined by the secure world. In our example, we have only defined one single secure function, `nsc_blue_led_toggle`. The object file containing the veneers (called `cmse_led.o` in our example), automatically generated when compiling the code for the secure domain, is linked within the non-secure application, and it is in fact the code that satisfies the symbol dependency in the secure application for these special symbols. We will explore the details of this procedure in the next subsection, *Inter-domain transitions*.

Once the non-secure application has been built by running `make`, we upload the non-secure firmware image into the internal flash of the target, starting from the address `0x08040000`:

```
STM32_Programmer_CLI -c port=swd -d image.bin 0x08040000
```

We will now take a closer look at the transitions from secure to non-secure domains and vice versa, to understand how new ARMv8-M instructions are involved in the transition operations and how these should be used in such cases.

Inter-domain transitions

When our secure world example bootloader is ready to stage the non-secure world application, we can notice some differences in the assembly that prepares the CPU registers and executes the jump to the non-secure domain. First, the VTOR system register is banked when TrustZone is enabled. This means that there are two separate registers that hold the offset for the vector table, one for each execution domain – VTOR_S and VTOR_NS, for secure and non-secure domains, respectively. Before jumping into the entry point for non-secure world code, the VTOR_NS register should contain the offset of the interrupt vector for the non-secure world application. As we know, the IV sits at the beginning of the binary image, so the following assignment in the bootloader's `main` procedure ensures that eventually our non-secure domain code will be able to execute interrupt service routines:

```
/* Update IV */
VTOR_NS = ((uint32_t) app_IV);
```

After this system register is set, we acquire the two important pointers needed for staging, similar to how we would do for bootloaders without TrustZone-M capabilities, like the one proposed in *Chapter 4, The Boot-Up Procedure*. These pointers, stored in the first two 32-bit words of the non-secure application binary image, are the initial stack pointer and the actual entry point containing the address of the `isr_reset` handler respectively. We read these two addresses into local stack variables before staging:

```
app_end_stack =
    (*((uint32_t *) (NS_WORLD_ENTRY_ADDRESS)));
app_entry =
    (void *) (*((uint32_t *) (NS_WORLD_ENTRY_ADDRESS + 4)));
```

In our example, we size the stack area in advance for the non-secure application, calculating the lowest address allowed for the stack as follows:

```
app_stack_limit = app_end_stack - MAX_NS_STACK_SIZE;
```

We then assign this value to the MSPLIM_NS register. MSPLIM_NS is a special register, so as usual we must use the msr instruction:

```
asm volatile("msr msplim_ns, %0" :: "r" (app_stack_limit));
```

We then set the value for the new stack pointer, which will replace SP once the domain transition is complete:

```
asm volatile("msr msp_ns, %0" :: "r" (app_end_stack));
```

The actual jump to non-secure code is where things differ a lot from our previous bootloader introduced in *Chapter 4, The Boot-Up Procedure*. First, we must ensure that the address for the jump is adjusted to comply with the convention used in ARMv8 transitions. The value we read from the binary image into the `app_entry` local variable is in fact odd, which is the classic requirement when assigning a new value to the PC register when jumping within the same domain – for example, when using `mov pc, ...` instructions in ARMv7-M, such as the one in the example bootloader from *Chapter 4, The Boot-Up Procedure*. In ARMv8-M, the instruction that executes the jump and the domain transition into the non-secure world at the same time, is `blxns`. However, when invoking `blxns` or any other instruction that implies a jump to a non-secure address, we must ensure that the destination address for the jump has its least significant bit turned off. For this reason, we decrease the value of `app_entry` by one before executing `blxns`:

```
/* Jump to non-secure app_entry */
asm volatile("mov r12, %0" :: "r"
             ((uint32_t)app_entry - 1));
asm volatile("blxns    r12" );
```

This is the last instruction executed in the secure domain before finally staging our non-secure application. If we use the debugger to check the values of the registers while stepping through these last instructions, we can see the values of the CPU registers being updated, and then finally, the SP register will point to the new context in the non-secure domain.

From this point onward, any attempt to jump back into the secure domain is, of course, not allowed and will generate an exception. However, as we have previously mentioned, the purpose of the functions placed in the NSC region is to provide temporary and controlled execution of secure functions from the non-secure domain.

In our example, before transitioning to the non-secure execution domain, we impose some limitation on access to the GPIO lines associated with the three LEDs, by setting the corresponding bits in the `GPIOx_SECCFG` register, as explained in the *Configuring secure access to peripherals* subsection previously in this chapter.

When both images composing the example are uploaded to the target platform, we can power-cycle and observe the effects by looking at the three LEDs. After rebooting, we should see the red LED that will be turned on at startup and kept on while the secure code is running in the bootloader. After spinning for an arbitrary number of cycles, to give us enough time to inspect the LED status, the red LED will then be turned off and secured. The blue LED is secured too, through the `blue_led_secure(1)` call executed before staging. The green LED is not secured and can be accessed normally in the non-secure domain.

When the non-secure application starts, we can see the green LED constantly on and the blue LED rapidly blinking. The latter is only possible thanks to the fact that non-secure applications can access a function within the secure APIs.

We can have a look at the assembly generated for this function by running `arm-none-eabi-objdump -D` on the secure-world `elf` file. We immediately notice that the non-secure callable function stub generated is in fact a short procedure placed at the beginning of the non-callable section:

```
0c001000 <nsc_blue_led_toggle>:
c001000:  e97f e97f  sg
c001004:  f7ff bdd2  b.w c000bac
                <__acle_se_nsc_blue_led_toggle>
```

The most interesting part of the code running in the NSC area is the use of the special assembly instruction, `sg`, which is a new instruction introduced in ARMv8-M with the specific purpose of implementing secure calls from non-secure domains. This instruction prepares the branching to an secure call in the secure flash space, and it is only legal when it is executed from an non-secure callable area.

Also, note that the real implementation is in fact contained in the `__acle_se_nsc_blue_led_toggle` function, generated by the compiler and placed in the S region of the flash.

The assembly code generated by the veneer for `nsc_blue_led_toggle`, as seen by disassembling the non-secure application in the same way after including the generated object in the final image, should look like the following:

```
080408e8 <__nsc_blue_led_toggle_veneer>:
80408e8:  f85f f000  ldr.w  pc, [pc]      ; 80408ec \
                                <__nsc_blue_led_toggle_veneer+0x4>
80408ec:  0c001001
```

The conclusion of the procedure of calling an secure function from the non-secure domain is in the tail of the actual implementation of the secure function toggling the blue LED, `__acle_se_nsc_blue_led_toggle`:

```
c000bee:  4774      bxns  lr
```

This should already look familiar to us, as it is in fact the non-linked version of the `bxlns` instruction that we have seen before, performing a jump to the return address of the non-secure veneer stored in the link register, while also transitioning back to the non-secure domain. The following checklist is a recap of the steps involved when a secure function is called from the NS execution domain in this chapter's example:

1. non-secure world code calls the veneer for `nsc_blue_led_toggle`, which is implemented in the `cmse_leds.o` object that is generated when compiling the secure code and linked to the non-secure application.
2. The veneer knows the SG stub location in the NSC region. This region is accessible for execution from the secure world, while being placed in a specific region inside the secure firmware. The veneer then proceeds to jump to the SG stub.
3. The SG stub calls the `sg` instruction, initiating the transition to the secure world, and then jumps to the actual implementation, `__acle_se_nsc_blue_led_toggle`. This now executes in the secure domain, performing the requested action (in our example, this is toggling the value of the GPIO line connected to the blue LED).
4. When the procedure terminates, the secure function performs a transition back to the non-secure world by using the `bxns` instruction, while at the same time jumping back to the address of the original caller in the non-secure world.

Despite its simplicity, our example shows how to configure and use all the features needed to separate the two execution domains, as well as the mechanisms to be used to implement the interactions between the two worlds. The design of these interactions in the secure domain will determine the capabilities offered to non-secure applications. The boundaries and the interface for the transitions act like a contract between the two parts, which is enforced by the hardware itself, thanks to TrustZone-M.

Summary

ARMv8-M is the newest architecture defined by ARM for modern microcontrollers. It extends and completes the capabilities of its predecessor, ARMv7-M, by integrating several new features. The most important improvement for this novel architecture design is the possibility to implement a TEE by separating the execution domains and creating a sandboxed environment to execute non-secure applications.

In real-life scenarios, this gives flexibility to the deployment of applications from different providers, with distinct levels of trust regarding accessing features and resources on a system.

In this last chapter, we have analyzed the mechanisms available in the TrustZone-M technology. TrustZone-M can be activated on ARMv8-M systems for the purpose of integrating a powerful, hardware-assisted solution, aimed to protect system components from any access that has not been explicitly authorized by a system supervisor component running in the secure domain.

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
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